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AENEAS' EMOTIONS IN VERGIL'S *AENEID* AND THEIR LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECT SCENES

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by

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This dissertation consists of nine chapters in which I explore the literary and philosophical background of the emotional profile of Aeneas as it is presented in select scenes of Vergil's *Aeneid*. After an introduction I discuss in detail the sea storm of *Aeneid* 1, Aeneas' subsequent encounter with his mother, Aeneas' arrival in Carthage, and Aeneas' emotions while he contemplates the pictures at the temple of Juno in Carthage. The next two chapters are devoted to the Helen episode and the final scene of the *Aeneid*. A conclusion rounds out this dissertation.

Regarding Vergil's literary sources, more emphasis is given to the role Apollonius' works played in shaping Vergil's work than has been done before. Apollonius' work is one of the two focal lenses through which Homeric traditions are handed down to Vergil. The tradition of reading Homer's works and similar stories morally is the other lens. Here, as has been observed before, Vergil pays attention to opinions of all major philosophical schools. In a dialogue particularly with Aristotle, Vergil even develops his own *poetics* as far as Vergil's advice on how to read epic poetry is concerned.

Looked at from the ancients' perspective of emotions, Aeneas reacts as can be reasonably expected from somebody in a similar situation. Changes in the way Vergil

treats the material stemming from his literary predecessors reflect the philosophical thinking of his time in considerable detail. Vergil emerges as a Hellenistic *poeta doctus* both in regard to literary works as well as in regard to philosophical education who puts his knowledge into practice.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations for literary works follow *LSJ* (Greek authors) and *ThlL* (Latin authors).

Titles of journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année philologique*.

LP-V = Lobel/Page (1963), Voigt (1971).

LSJ = Liddell/Scott/Jones/McKenzie (1996).

SVF = v. Arnim (1903-1924).

ThlL = Thesaurus linguae Latinae editus iussu et auctoritate consilii ab academicis societatibusque diversarum nationum electi (Leipzig 1900-).

1 Introduction

This dissertation will focus on and combine two aspects of the interpretation of Vergil's *Aeneid* that have received major attention in recent years: Vergil's roots in the tradition of epic poetry and his interest in and use of contemporary philosophy.[1] My approach to Vergil's *Aeneid* will be similar to the methods Vergil's contemporaries were most likely to apply to their reading of epic works like the *Aeneid*. I would like to explain why the time is opportune to avail ourselves of the progress made in these two areas. I will proceed to demonstrate in more detail in chapter 2 why this approach will enable us more easily to escape several fallacies that stem from cross-cultural and cross-temporal differences between our reading habits and ancient reading habits.

First, for a long time the opinion prevailed that Vergil's work rests on Homer and his Latin predecessors. In particular, it has been a common belief that Homer's influence eclipsed Apollonius' impact on Vergil's *Aeneid*.[2] Lately there has been an increased awareness that Vergil's work reflects a far broader knowledge of the Greco-Roman literary tradition even beyond the epic genre.[3] Particularly the opinion that Apollonius' influence on Vergil was negligble has been significantly challenged

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[1] Cf. already the general discussion in Rieks (1989) 25-39.

[2] Cf. Farrell (1991) 4. Also cf. Gransden (1984) 4. Apollonius also does not play a significant role for Vergilian epic poetry in Kennedy (1997). This list could be continued. Knauer (1979) 56 n. 2 is more cautious and indicates that he is discontented with the state of the scholarship on Vergil's relationship with Apollonius' work. Scholarship, however, tended to misunderstand Knauer's book as an indication that there was nothing more than Homer to Vergil's reworking of epic poetry. Cf. Kofler (2003) 586. The claim that Apollonius's impact was eclipsed is of course only true in general. The point has been made by Evans (1969) 62f., for example, that, due to being influenced by Greek lyric poetry and drama, Apollonius and Vergil as Apollonius' successor focus more on "momentary emotion and instantaneous reaction" than Homer.

[3] It was particularly the increased quantity of scholarship on Apollonius' poetry which brought about this chang in view of many scholars. It is the merit of Glei (2001) and Nelis (2001b) to have brought this fact to the attention of a broader audience. Cf., e.g., Barchiesi (2002/3) 89 and 91. Also see below. Closely connected with this is the question of Vergil's "originality" or the accusation of Homeric (or Apollonian) plagiarism against Vergil. Both views are one-sided. Vergil's originality lies in the fact of his particular brand of innovative adaptation of generic tradition – including the transgression of generic boundaries – that in one form or the other has always been a part of the epic genre in antiquity since Homer. Cf. Kakridis (1992) and Berres (1993) 344f. and 368f.

in recent years[4], when Apollonius[5] and his influence on others were rediscovered as an important area of scholarship.[6] Therefore, we need to look at the entire epic tradition from Homer up to Vergil's own times, at least as far as this tradition is still extant today.

Secondly, there has been considerable recent scholarship dealing with the impact that Hellenistic philosophy had on Augustan literature.[7] The same is true of the philosophical horizon against which Vergil wrote his *Aeneid*. In recent years the emotions[8] and their treatment by philosophers in relation to the *Aeneid* have attracted much scholarly interest.[9] A widely discussed scholarly topic today is the extent to which Vergil deals with the phenomenon that we call "emotions" in antiquity.[10] Great progress has been made towards a better understanding between that aspect of philosophy and the *Aeneid* especially in recent decades, even if many details are

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[4] There have been many works trying to determine the impact Apollonius' verses had on Vergil in the context of epic poetry. Cf. La Ville de Mirmont (1894a) and (1894b), Conrardy (1904), Rütten (1912), Duckworth (1933), Bozzi (1936), Leitich (1940), Mehmel (1940), Hügi (1952), Cova (1963), Briggs (1981), Clausen (1987), Beye (1993), Hunter (1993) ch. 7, Harrison (1995), Williams (1997), Beye (1999), and ultimately Nelis (2001b). Cf. Glei (2001) 26, Nelis (2001a). Scholarship has begun a new evaluation of Apollonius' work for all of later Latin and Greek epic poetry. Cf. Nelis (2000) and Vian (2001). Nelis (2001b) seems to finally have established that Vergil used Apollonius' work to a greater extent than previously admitted. Cf., e.g., Panoussi (2002), Kofler (2003) 586 and 588, O'Hara (2004) 375f.

[5] Cf. e.g. Beye (1999/2000) 178f., Glei (2001) 1.

[6] Also cf. Nelis (2005), esp. 353.

[7] Cf., e.g., Armstrong/Fish/Johnston/Skinner (2004).

[8] Emotions in general have become a point of great interest for modern academia since the 1970ies. See Sihvola/Engberg-Pedersen (1998b) vii.

[9] Cf. the debate about Vergil's acquaintance with Philodemus. The arguments for the existence of such a close relation (synopsis by Armstrong (2004a) 1-3, also cf. Gigante/Capasso (1989), Dorandi (1992) 183f., Armstrong (1993) 192, Galinsky (1994) 194, and Erler (1994) 370ff.) leave no room for doubt. Too sceptical are Naumann (1975) and Quartarone (2005). Cf. in general also Erler (1992b) 174-177 on how Epicurean thought took root in Rome (176 n. 30 on Vergil). Also cf. Erler (1994) 363-380, Timpe (2000) esp. 52-56, Haltenhoff (2003), esp. 243f. on Philodemus. It is highly improbable that nobody else besides Vergil took notice of Philodemus' works in antiquity when Philodemus apparently was well-connected with the Roman high society. Cf. Gigante (2002) 79-90. On Philodemus' place in the history of Greek literature see Gigante (2001). It has been debated whether we can see traces of Philodemus' influence also in Cicero. Cf. Tsouna (2001a), Erler (2001), and also Griffin (2001) 90 and 95ff. On the arrival of Aristotle's works in Rome cf. Barnes (1997).

[10] To name just a few recent publications: Sihvola/Engberg-Pedersen (1998a), Sorabji (2000), Harris (2001), Konstan (2001), Braund/Most (2003), Konstan/Rutter (2003), Knuuttila (2004) with further bibliography on p. 5 n. 1, and Kaster (2005).

much debated and consensus will be unlikely.[11]

At any rate, Vergilian studies have not yet fully taken into account the development of philosophical studies in the first century BC. A comparative conspectus of various philosophical teachings in Vergil's times in regard to practical aspects of Aeneas' and other characters' behavior is still missing. This, however, is an area in which more discoveries can still be made, particularly in regard to ancient ethics.

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation intends to bring together these two approaches to the interpretation of Vergil's *Aeneid.* Both are synergistically connected.[12] As we can see from Philodemus' works, for example, the discussion of literary characters is at the center of ethical consideration and judgments of the time.[13] This development should not come as a surprise. Vergil wrote an epic poem in which he treated his literary sources in the light of contemporary philosophy.[14]

My dissertation, therefore, focuses on the importance of Hellenistic literary criticism[15] and philosophy for Vergil's innovative reworking of epic poetry in the *Aeneid.*[16] More specifically, I deal with the question how, given this background, Vergil used emotions to characterize the hero[17] of his epic, Aeneas.[18]

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[11] On the emotions in the *Aeneid* cf. Maar (1953) and esp. Rieks (1989). Aeneas' anger in the final scene of the *Aeneid* is perhaps the most debated item in this respect. Cf., e.g., Galinsky (1997) 89, Armstrong (1998), Gill (2003) 226 and chapter 8.

[12] Cf. the discussion about Cicero's custom of quoting poetry. He inserts far fewer quotations into his speeches than into his rhetorical and philosophical works. The conclusion that we have to draw from this is probably that Cicero had to respect the customs of the respective audience. Cf. Heil (2003) 42-49. It becomes clear that in general the realms of poetry and philosophy are connected in Rome at the time of the first century BC.

[13] On Philodemus' reasons for doing this cf. Erler (2003) 152.

[14] The extent of Philodemus' influence on Latin poetry has been of interest for scholars for quite some time now. See, e.g., already Tait (1941), esp. 48-63 on Philodemus' influence on Vergil.

[15] On the basics of Alexandrian and Roman Hellenism as well as recent discussions on this topic see Kerkhecker (2001) 47-63.

[16] An interesting, brief overview over our contemporary understanding of the genre of epic poetry is provided by Hainsworth (1991) 1-10.

[17] The question of what constitutes epic heroism in general and in how far specific characters like Achilles, Jason, or Aeneas embody different concepts of heroism in antiquity has yielded enormous amounts of literature. Cf. Glei (2001) 6-13 and 25.

While there have been many studies of Homer, Apollonius[19], and Vergil, the spectrum of comparisons has not included systematic comparisons of all three of them in conjunction.[20] My dissertation will present an attempt at the first systematic and simultaneous comparison of select aspects of all these three epic poets, whose works at the same time are the only ones of their kind that still exist today in complete form. Specific attention will be paid to the question how the successors reinterpret and reintegrate the material found in the work of the predecessors.

In many works of literature, the depiction of emotions plays an important role. The assessment of emotions of characters in ancient literature by classical philologists has, for the most part, been surprisingly judgmental.[21] From a methodological point of view their basic assumptions about emotions continue to be disconnected from the findings of modern sciences like neurology as well as from up-to-date results of modern scholarship on ancient emotions and how ancient contemporaries as well as Hellenistic philosophy looked at them.[22] One of my tasks is to bring into the discussion basic anthropological insights into cross-cultural and

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[18] Cf. Heinze (1928) 281. He claims that in comparison with Homer Vergil shifted the emphasis from external events to the description of what happened to the psyche of his characters.

[19] Scholars have tended to slight Apollonius' poem and therefore neglected to take his poetry into account when it came to the history of "good" epic poetry, his alleged problematic relationship with Callimachus being one of the reasons. In more recent times Apollonius has gained more appreciation in this regard. Cf. Hutchinson (1988) 142: "We are fortunate that it [sc. Apollonius' *Argonautica*] has survived complete." See in general, e.g., Rengakos (1994) 9f., but also e.g. Schwinge (1986b) 83-154, who interprets the *Argonautica* as a paralysis and demonstrated impossibility of the epic genre. This approach has been turned into an appreciation of how Apollonius wrote an epic poem by writing an anti-epic, i.e. Callimachean epic poem. See, e.g., DeForest (1994) 4. This view has already been changed into the opinion that Apollonius' poetry applies both imitative and anti-imitative methods within his work. Cf. Manakidou (1998) 241. Knauer (1964) 392 expressed the need for further studies of Vergil's use of other sources beyond his own work on Homer's influence on Vergil.

[20] This is reather curious, because we know that Apollonius wrote his new epic within the framework of his own exegesis of Homer (cf. Rengakos (1994) 180). Why would Vergil not compose his poem in a similar fashion?

[21] Cf. Pöschl (1983) 179: "*Wir haben … einen Wandel der Mentalität zu registrieren, wobei selbstverständlich auch die Impulsivität südlichen Temperaments, die sich weniger gewandelt hat, in Rechnung zu stellen ist*." A claim such as this seems to be highly problematic in the light of recent scholarship on national stereotypes in psychology. Cf. Robins (2005).

[22] Pöschl (1983) 179f., I find, asks for roughly the same methodological approach as the one I am choosing.

cross-temporal differences[23] of the perception of emotions and to relate current scholarship on the assessment of emotions in Greco-Roman philosophy to a work of ancient literature.

This twofold emphasis and methodology[24] will bring out the overlooked realism with which already Apollonius systematically took into account the feelings of his heroes. Apollonius interrogated how they dealt with these basic experiences of human life. Vergil later perfected what Apollonius had begun and furthermore shows that his point of view is shaped by a close implicit discussion of how emotions were handled by his literary predecessors and contemporary philosophical analysis.

Late Hellenistic philosophy was involved in a tradition of interpreting Homer morally.[25] The issue of how one was to deal with one's emotions to live a virtuous

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[23] See, e.g., the sensible remarks on this topic from the angle of morality in terms of the differences between antiquity and today in ch. 1 of Williams (1993). Also see Farron (1993) ch. 2, esp. 32f., and Cairns (2003) 11f.

[24] This methodology is very close to Galinsky (1988).

[25] The question is not so much what kind of morality can be found in the Homeric epics (On that see, e.g., Rowe (1983) for a brief survey.), but what can one learn from these poems in the light of certain other systems of moral teachings. Lausberg (1983) 227ff. emphasizes the need for paying due heed to this fact in modern interpretations of Vergil. The Roman custom to imitate and emulate virtuous men as good *exempla* (Cf. Treggiari (2003) 157ff. and 163) is important in this regard. The assumption that literature could not or even should not contribute anything didactical in the course of a human being's education has been emphasized in modern times. Cf. Arntzen (1984) 3. Nussbaum (1987b) 78 argues for a new understanding of ethical theory by literary theorists. This goes hand in hand with renewed interest in what philosophers nowadays call "applied ethics". On that term cf. Haldane (2003) 490-493. The principal difference between poetry and philosophy, however, was stressed time and again in Hellenistic times and long before. Cf. already Pohlenz (1911). See also Horace's *epist.* 1.2. Horace attributes more value to what we can learn from Homer than to the teachings of the Stoic Chrysippus and the Academic Crantor (*epist.* 1.2.3f.; cf. Lefèvre (1993) 39, Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 83f., and Armstrong (2004b) 276ff.). In itself *epist.* 1.2 is a "protreptic to philosophy" (Moles (2002) 147). Also cf. Horace's *epist.* 2.2.41f. Naturally, Homer's stories were not the only providers of moral examples in antiquity. Cf. Whitmarsh (2001) 92f. Cf. Quintilian who demands morally good content in the texts at the level of elementary eduction already (*inst.* 1.1.35f.; cf. Colson (1924) 22). Cf. Christes (2003) 55-58. Also cf. in general on how Vergil's contemporaries read Homer Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 1-18. The exploration of the reception of Homer in ancient times has been a topic of increased interest lately. See also Lamberton/Keaney (1992) and Pontani (2005) ch. I 1.5. On Philodemus' way of reading Homer see Asmis (1991b) esp. 27 and Gigante (1998) 63-66. At the same time it has to be noted, that a moral way is not the only mode of interpretation that was applied to the myths of old. See, e.g., on the use of Homeric and other heroes in Roman politics at the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of imperial times Champlin (2003). Also see Erler (1992a) 105. Vergil combined this approach with the concept of the good king that had a long tradition in the Mediterranean World. Cf. Cairns (1989) ch. 1. We already find an internal exhortation to adapt present behavior to previous role

life, especially if one occupied a high position in society[26], was central not only to moral instruction[27] but also to the interpretation of epic poetry at the time, as we have learned from newly discovered texts from Vergil's period. The emotions of the epic heroes, therefore, are projected as examples of complex moral behavior for the reader to sort out, and this is clearly one of the central concerns of Vergil's national epic.

Vergil also transcends the work of his predecessors in transposing his analysis of the epic texts onto the metaliterary level. When in the final scene of the *Aeneid* Turnus tells Aeneas that he has the choice to either spare Turnus or to kill him and thereby follow the bad example of Achilles, Turnus does exactly what Hellenistic scholars did. He interprets Homer morally. But Turnus, of course, uses the lessons he learned from Homer in a very deliberate way. He elides certain aspects of the story of Achilles' anger to make "history" fit his point about the political situation at hand. Thus, Vergil plays with the tendency of interpreters of epic poetry to create moral typologies out of what they have read. This is, then, a very rich topic that can be studied from genuinely new perspectives and will change our perception of Vergil's alleged "delivery" of pro- or anti-Augustan propaganda.[28]

I will look at passages in the *Aeneid* in which Aeneas exhibits a clear emotional response to a given situation and compare them with those in parallel texts, whether in Vergil's poem or in one of his predecessors. The assessment of the similarities and differences between a given passage in Vergil's *Aeneid* and its counterparts, including some relevant examples from other precursors such as Theocritus, in the context of Vergil's intellectual environment will shed new light on the way Vergil

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models in the songs of Demodocus. Cf. Schütz (1998) esp. 406f. Already here we find the use of epic poetry as a tool for moral education.

[26] On the relationship between Roman rulers and their philosophic advisers in general cf. Rawson (1989).

[27] This instruction relied on philosophy. Romans did expect that philosophy had a bearing on one's behavior. Cf. Griffin (1989) 18f. On interpreting the *Odyssey* and Hesiod's *Theogony* as *specula principum* for the instruction of future rulers see Martin (1984).

[28] For recent developments in regard to this topic see, e.g., Thomas (2001) esp. 218-221, 256-259 and 276f., Enenkel (2005) 167ff., and Wittchow (2005) for a new twist in regarding the final scene of the *Aeneid* as a kind of reenactment of Caesar's assassination.

portrays character.[29] Here results of the most current scholarship need to be applied to Vergilian studies. I am referring especially to the new publications of recently found papyri of the philosopher Philodemus who was one of Vergil's teachers. In particular his treatise *On the Good King According to Homer* is highly relevant to Vergil's treatment of the emotions of his characters. For example, Philodemus' discussion of a king's ability to curb his excessive anger[30] is clearly and contrastively reflected in Vergil's presentation of Aeneas and his opponent Turnus and in the story of Nisus' and Euryalus' death.[31] These scenes include allusions exactly to those Homeric scenes that Philodemus is discussing as paradigms.[32] A further basis for comparison is the earlier reworking of the same Homeric scenes by Apollonius. Vergil lets us see that he knew these Apollonian passages and read them as integral part of the ethical interpretation of epic poetry in his times.

This represents an advance, I hope, in the interpretation of the *Aeneid* in several ways. On a textual level, I can bolster the case for some intertextual readings of the *Aeneid* which have not yet been widely accepted.[33] I will also be able to argue for new connections between scenes that have not been considered together previously.

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[29] On Vergilian portrayal of character cf., e.g., Griffin (1985), Mackie (1988). The results will further confirm that Aeneas undergoes little change in his character or personality as far as *Charakterentwicklung* is concernd. This and the *Bildungsroman* after all, are modern concepts videlicet genres. Cf. Liebing (1953), Wlosok (1973) 134, Fuhrer (1989) 68f., Horsfall (1995) 118-122.

[30] It is not unusual for an epic hero to be portrayed in a situation in which he feels angry. See Manakidou (1998) esp. 259f. who on pages 254f., however, points out that the gods in Apollonius are less often angry than in Homer. On the other hand, Dräger (2001) – see esp. page 3 – wants to identify the anger of Zeus as the central theme of the *Argonautica*. (Also see *Aen*. 1.11: *tantaene animis caelestibus irae*.) It would be too lengthy at this point to get into a detailed discussion of this and related topics. The unity of Apollonius' *Argonautica* is widely debated. Let it suffice for the moment to point to the works of Hurst (1967), Pietsch (1999b), and Byre (2002).

[31] On the influence of the Homeric *scholia* on the *Doloneia* in regard to the Nisus-Euryalus episode see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 23-65, esp. 64f.

[32] They become "window references". On this term see Thomas (1986) 188f. and Nelis (2001b) 5 with n. 25.

[33] This is the case with Vergil's Helen episode, e.g., whose authenticity has been doubted. For details see below ch. 7.

The intertextual significance of the Vergilian scenes, which I mentioned above, and others have generally been overlooked because the connections are more than merely textual: what ties them together is their emotional content, which in turn shows Vergil's utilization of contemporary moral philosophy with its emphasis on therapeutic analysis and handling of emotions.[34] The usual approach that has been taken in this regard was to compare the *Aeneid* as a whole with other epic poetry as a whole. In the vast majority of cases, this comparison, however, stopped at a comparison of Vergil's work with Homer. Therefore we have to pay due attention to whole chains of motifs, scenes and stories that have been told and retold by many authors. The changes and alteration that elements of the works of these authors underwent are of great interest for us, because we have to ask the question what value Vergil himself attributed to the previous changes of stories, scenes, characters etc. that were made by Vergil's predecessors to the literary tradition while this tradition itself was formed. New, surprising, and – as I hope – useful insights are still lurking behind many aspects of Vergil's *Aeneid*.

[34] This ancient view today regains ground in debates on education since emotions and one's habitual emotional responses are again considered to be, within certain limits, amenable to outside influences, such as from parents, teachers, or therapists as well as from other sources. The controversies surrounding this issue, however, are considerable. See, e.g., Kristjánsson (2002) 170-204. Also cf. Harris (2001) 390 on how the ancients evaluated the relation between "autonomomy of the individual" and "the irresistible force sometimes exercised by the passions". Cf. also Punam (2005) 474 who compares Juno (*accensa Aen.* 1.29), Turnus, maddened by Allecto in *Aen.* 7, and Aeneas in the final scene: "[Aeneas] … is still passive as well as active, a victim, not of physical force but of inner emotions that for this moment at least direct hi s destiny."

2 The Meaning of Emotions

2.1 Modern Day Views on Emotions

Before attempting to analyze the emotions and their significance within the epic tradition and Vergil in particular, we should ask ourselves what emotions are. At first sight this topic appears to be obvious and elusive at the same time.[35] The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary[36] defines the word like this: "Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state." But the same dictionary gives the following addition as a special meaning of the word in psychology[37]:

> A mental 'feeling' or 'affection' (*e.g.* of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope or fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness. Also *abstr.* 'feeling' as distinguished from the other classes of mental phenomena. (Italics by the authors of the dictionary)

Roughly twenty years later another dictionary defines the term this way[38]:

> **1.** An intense mental state that arises subjectively rather than through conscious effort and is often accompanied by physiological changes; a strong feeling: *the emotions of joy, sorrow, reverence, hate, and love*. **2.** A state of mental agitation or disturbance: *spoke unsteadily in a voice that betrayed his emotions*. See Synonyms at **feeling. 3.** The part of the consciousness that involves feeling: sensibility: "*The very essence of literature is the war between emotions and intellect*" (Isaac Bashevis Singer). (Bold print and italics by the authors of the dictionary)

I would like to restrict the subject of this dissertation to meaning 1[39] and 2. But even so, we have to admit that practically everybody talks about emotions and feelings and seems to be absolutely and self-consciously aware of the meaning of these terms in

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[35] Cf. Oatley (2004) 3f.
[36] Volume I, A-O (Oxford 1971, 3rd printing in the United States 1973) 124, 4.
[37] 124, 4b
[38] The American Heritage Dictionary of the American Language (3rd ed. Boston, New York 1992) 603.
[39] Or 4b in the Oxford English Dictionary (1933; reprinted 1971).

everyday life.[40] But this topic deserves a closer look which will reveal the differences in the views that we nevertheless all seem to share somehow.

To many non-specialists it seems to be the case that emotions are a typically psychological phenomenon[41] that also has neurological or physiological implications within our entire body and especially our brain.[42] Related questions are how many emotions can be identified as clearly separate and distinct from each other and whether something like a hierarchy exists among them.[43] But as it turns out, even today's specialists are neither quite sure about what exactly we mean when we use the term "emotions"[44] nor certain that we will not make new discoveries in the future and therefore will not have to change our current views.[45]

One universal in western societies as well as in Asia, for example, is that emotions are commonly contrasted with reason; it is implied that the latter is generally preferable to the former. To be influenced as little as possible by one's emotions when one is making decisions is consequently seen as ideal.[46] The moral exhortation to look beyond one's immediate self-interest is often implied.[47] But current research also suggests that if emotions and cognition are *de facto* inseparably intertwined, the question merely is how one should allow emotions to influence one's

[40] To define the term seems to be very difficult. Even entries in dictionaries such as the ones quoted above usually do not fail to draw criticism as the example of the definition of the term "passion" in the 1989 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary as quoted and examined by Gill (1996) 1 shows. Needless to say, the aforementioned definitions of "emotion" do not cover everything that will be said about them in due course in this chapter as well.
[41] Cf. Sarbin (1986) 84.
[42] Cf. e.g. Cacioppo/Larsen/Smith/Berntson (2004), Berridge (2004), Damasio (2004). On the anatomy of the brain areas that are responsible for the perception or creation of emotions cf. Bähr/Frotscher/Küker (2003) esp. 312f.
[43] Cf. Harré (1986) for an introduction on the several aspects of this question.
[44] Cf. Shweder (2004) 81.
[45] Cf. Damasio (2004) 50.
[46] Cf. Sarbin (1986) 85, Solomon (1995) 253.
[47] For a discussion of this aspect cf. Frank (2004).

decisions.[48] Scientists are consequently asking the question whether something like emotional intelligence exists.[49]

This brings us to the next question. Is an emotion something that is at least in part related to belief and judgment or is it something that has nothing to do with any kind of intention?[50] Are we completely victims of our emotions or can we at least to a certain extent steer our emotions?[51] Can we be intentionally angry, frightened, happy, and so forth? This debate between philosophers is in our days challenged by neurologists, neurophysiologists, and neuropsychologists. They assert that, among other psychological processes, emotions or at least our very basic and instinctive feelings depend on the physiology of and are based on vastly automatic stimulus-reaction patterns. In the view of these scientists, these patterns can be related to neurodynamic processes working inside a particular human being.[52] But if we cannot do anything about our emotions, what are the implications for morally good behavior, since in our culture moral judgments about motivations are at least in part based on what kind of emotions accompany or precede a certain action?[53] How are we going to interpret our feelings and emotions if there is no free will at all?[54] And even if we make allowance for something like free will and moral reasoning, the question remains how we are to judge the capability of adolescents to make sound moral decisions after brain research has discovered that the human brain continues to

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[48] Cf. Blackburn (2002) 95 and Mellers (2004) 296f.
[49] Cf. Salovey/Kokkonen/Lopes/Mayer (2004).
[50] On this rift between followers of Spinoza (emotion as "intentional attitude") and Hume (emotion as "nonintentional state") in regard to the perception of emotion cf. Zemach (2001) 197. Zemach argues for a Humean way of looking at emotions (cf. *loc. cit.* 197 and 207.
[51] The latter part of the question is answered in the affirmative by Solomon (2004) 28f.
[52] Cf. Panksepp (2004) 188f. and Winston, Dolan (2004) 216. See also Cairns (2003) 14ff.
[53] Cf. e.g. Gill (1996) 1 and Stocker (2002) 65f..
[54] For a discussion of emotions under the premise that at least from the perspective of neurobiology free will is a deception of our consciousness cf. Roth (2003) 154-181. Also cf. Singer (2003) 24-34 for a discussion of free will from the viewpoint of new results in brain research. Closely related to the question of the neurological and physiological basis for emotions is the question in how far our DNA or environmental conditions influence our behavior in general. Cf. Greenspan/Kandel/Jessell (1995) esp. 556f. and 576.

develop into the mid-twenties of the lifespan of a human being.[55] In the context of Vergil's *Aeneid* and given Iulus', Pallas', Lausus', and Turnus' age, this naturally has interesting consequences for our modern day[56] interpretation of their character.[57]

We may even be far from a complete understanding of the implications of these rather new scientific findings.[58] Furthermore, we should note that emotion must not be automatically equated with motivation. Even biology distinguishes the reason why somebody does something from the processing of neural information as such.[59] At any rate, what remains unchanged is that one's emotional responses to certain situation serve others a great deal to assess one's character.[60]

It is also a question when exactly an emotion is occurring within a human being, i.e., whether a mental perception is followed by a bodily expression which is then causing the emotion or whether a mental perception is followed by a mental affection which can be called "emotion" and is then followed by a bodily

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[55] On October 17, 2004 *The New York Times Magazine* featured an article by Raeburn on the viability of the death penalty for adolescents between 16 and 18 years of age in the USA in the light of these new findings and on the occasion that the Supreme Court of the USA had recently taken up a case (*Roper v. Simmons*) from Missouri. Especially the brain's ability to make judgments about emotions develops relatively late and remains particularly prone to failure under stress for a long time even into what today is generally considered adulthood, when, needless to say, everybody should be able to cope with one's emotions to the fullest extent possible. Cf. Raeburn (2004). The US Supreme Court decided in 2005 that, on the basis of the US constitution and especially its eigth amendment, it should not be allowed to sentence 16 to 18 year olds to death in the USA. Closely related to the question whether the death penalty should be applicable to adolescents who have killed a fellow human being is its appropriateness for mentally retarded or disabled murderers. The US Supreme Court has also ruled on this issue in *Atkins v. Virginia* in 2002. Both cases are subject to ongoing debate in the US as of this writing. But the discussion of these matters, of course, goes beyond the limits of the US judicial system. The repercussions of these new findings of brain researchers naturally extend beyond these side-aspects of the death penalty into the deeper question of the culpability of a person for all kinds of actions in general, whether they qualify as criminal conduct or not. The question is what we are: a sum of the measurable processes within our developing and maybe degenerating nerve cells or more than that. The answer to these questions has a direct bearing on philologists' opinion, e.g., on Turnus' death and Aeneas' behavior in this case.

[56] Of course, the cultural and information horizon of Vergil's audience did not include these modern findings yet, even if the notion that some emotions that are beyond our control precede actions is in a way similar to the Stoic idea of uncontrollable pre-emotions. See below chapter 2.2.3.

[57] In general on the regulation of emotions consult, e.g., Philippot/Feldman (2004).

[58] Cf. Solomon (1995) 259. For an overview of results of neurological scientific research on the relationship between emotions and the brain cf. Kandel/Kupfermann (1995) 595-612.

[59] Cf. Kupfermann/Schwartz (1995), 613.

[60] Cf. Goldie (2002) 100, Ebert (2003) 44f.

expression.[61] One difficulty is that in our perception some emotions are expressed by bodily gestures, while others are not.[62] Even so, the feelings that are expressed with gestures or words are more obvious than emotions that are felt inside, but not shown to the outside.[63] And yet, even emotions that are accompanied by outward gestures or utterances with one's voice are very hard to assess because of the various and varying degrees and mixtures of emotional status that occur.[64] In other words, we are lacking a totally reliable taxonomy according to which we could with absolute certainty "translate" the nature and the meaning of emotions and their degree in which they are felt by the person we encounter. On the other hand, today we probably would agree that sometimes we use words or phrases that express emotions, but do not necessarily correspond to the emotional status we are currently in when we use these expressions.[65] What aggravates the problem for us is the difficulty in talking about emotions on a strictly objective basis.[66]

We should also not overlook that different societies apparently have different ideas about emotions, their appropriateness[67], and their expression.[68] Hildred Geertz[69] suggested that there is a universal set of emotions that are basically experienced by all human beings[70], but that different socializations with their individual emphases, elaborations, and selections lead to different concepts, definitions, distinctions, and

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[61] Cf. James (1884) 189f. The latter view is as such related to what Zemach calls the view of Spinozists who consider an emotion to be a conclusion about something and thus cause the one who feel the emotion to act in a certain way. Cf. Zemach (2001) 197.
[62] Cf. James (1884) 189.
[63] On the difficulty to explain the various expressions of emotions cf. Goldie (2000).
[64] Cf. James (1884) 192.
[65] An example would be "I am afraid I will have to go home." Cf. Bedford (1986), 16. Ricottilli (2000) is a useful study of gestures in the *Aeneid*. Also cf. Lobe (1999). Ricottilli starts with a chapter on the difficulties of defining *gesto* even today.
[66] Cf. James (1884) 194.
[67] Cf. Armon-Jones (1986a) 67f.
[68] Cf. Cairns (2003) 12ff.
[69] Cf. Geertz (1959) 225. Her viewpoint proved to be very influential. Cf. e.g. Myers (1979), Middleton (1989) 187.
[70] The assumption that there are some basic emotions that are shared by all human beings was held throughout the history of at least western philosophy. The new physiological insights mentioned above could make us inclined to conclude that indeed all human beings are as such pretty much the same with the one obvious exception of physiological differences. Cf. Solomon (1995) 258f.

expression of emotions that also depend on one's status in society.[71] Therefore the question of whether a certain emotion is considered to be acceptable and to be displayed in a certain situation by a member of a given culture depends on many factors like gender, age, or status.[72] Also, the question of how and in what contexts one talks about emotions can be answered differently depending on the civilization one is living in.[73] These factors largely influence what "character" is "produced" by a given society.[74] A society's view on morality then comes into play.[75] But we also have to keep in mind, as I said earlier, that there may be emotions that we do not know or experience in our culture.[76]

The fact that we are aware of our emotions and that we continue to talk about them in both everyday life and academia actually produces a very interesting aspect. Our perception of emotion changes both individually and collectively over time.[77] Also, sometimes under certain circumstances deviant patterns of emotional behavior can become the trigger for social change and the more or less sudden acceptance of certain emotional states that were hitherto unacceptable in a given society. This is the case, for example, if a charismatic and popular public figure redefines certain types of behavior within certain boundaries.[78]

Although we sometimes find it difficult to recognize and deal with our emotions and those of people surrounding us, it becomes even more difficult if we meet people from other cultural backgrounds.[79] Often we are at a loss to decide how a

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[71] Cf. also Myers (1979) 343. For a broader discussion and further literature also on views differing from that held by Geertz cf. Solomon (1995) 262-272.
[72] Cf. Middleton's (1989, 189f.) example of anger in the Ilongot culture.
[73] Cf. Lutz (1986), 267f.
[74] Cf. Geertz (1959), 236, Gaffin (1995), 149ff. Pöschl (1983) 179f. points our attention to possible changes in the emotional lives of societies between southern European antiquity and modern day classical philologists.
[75] Cf. Heelas (1986), 260.
[76] Cf. Morsbach/Tyler (1986).
[77] Cf. Solomon (1995) 281. Cf. also Averill (1986), esp. 115 on the acquisition and relinquishment of emotions during adulthood. On the study of emotional development during childhood cf. Dunn (2004).
[78] Cf. Thoits (2004).
[79] Cf. Just (1991), 288-292. He gives an example of how he himself misjudged a scene in which anger was displayed in a village of the DouDonggo. On the other hand, research results seem to suggest a

particular expression of a certain emotion should be interpreted. But maybe we are already mistaken in our assumption that something we heard, saw, or even felt was indeed an indication that somebody intended to share his or her emotion with us. Or we misinterpret the absence of an utterance in a given situation as the absence of emotions. There are obviously differences between individual cultures and civilizations as to what they would classify as an emotion and what they would subsume under other categories.[80] In other words, both we and the "other" whom we encounter have to train ourselves about what each other connects with certain facial expressions for example, or what we think appropriate in certain situations.[81] We also have to be aware that the views on what emotions are have been changing greatly in the course of the last few centuries in western civilization.[82] At any given time a group of contemporary individuals will have different views on what emotions are depending on their education and their assessment of their very own experiences. This individual view will thereby largely depend on the stories one heard and also read about when others describe emotions and their equivalents. Thus even inside a given society the meaning of "emotion" changes although the term itself might remain unaltered.[83]

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genetic basis for the fact that emotional intonation normally is recognized by listeners even if they are unfamiliar with the language in which the emotions are expressed. Cf. Blonder (1999) 279.

[80] On implications of this thesis cf. Armon-Jones (1986). Brain research yields results that indeed allow for mistakes in interpreting other peoples' emotions, especially if these emotions are more complex. Cf. Laughlin/Throop (1999) 349.

[81] Cf. Solomon (1995) 256. A very interesting, but also very complicated side-aspect of this is the question how a given culture deals with emotions that are caused by psychological illnesses. Even the diagnosis and treatment of a certain such illness can depend on the framework of what is considered to be a "normal" emotional behavior in that particular society. Cf. Jenkins (1991), esp. 414-417.

[82] Cf. Harré (1986), 2ff. In this context, however, Chomsky's approach to grammar is of importance (Cf. Petitto (2005) for a brief overview.) even if his view is not unchallenged. But neuroanatomy is still at the very beginning of its inquiry into the phenomenon of language. Cf. Kandel (1995), 638f. and 648.

[83] Cf. Solomon (1995) 257.

These differences in both space and time also influence the language of a particular civilization.[84] And at this point the matter is no less complex. Just as in non-verbal communication certain gestures[85] do not mean the same[86], words and the semantic structures in which they are embedded may be significantly different even from the words of a different language into which these words are translated.[87] In respect to the latest findings in brain research and the question of free will, which we briefly mentioned above, it is most interesting that, within the very constrained limits that scientists have undertaken studies of the cross-cultural differences in regard to the neural mechanism of emotion organization inside the human brain, it appears to be the case that the very structure of acquired languages is indeed having an impact on the neural organization of emotions.[88] On the other hand, in order to be able to talk objectively about emotions across time and cultures it seems to be necessary to develop some kind of technical language that can be applied universally to the different variations of the phenomenon of "emotion".[89]

To summarize this brief overview of the various accounts of modern and scholarly views on the emotions, differences in how we approach what is rather vaguely described by the terms "émotion", "Gefühl", "emozione", "emoción"[90], or

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[84] Cf. Geertz (1959), especially 226f., 232-235. Cf. also Goddard (1996), 426f. especially on the so-called "natural semantic metalanguage" and on further literature.

[85] On the difficulties to gain scientifically valid results in the exploration of the meaning of facial expressions across cultures see Blonder (1999) 280-283.

[86] One infamous example is the difference between Texans' perception of the typical grouping of the fingers of the right hand during the school song of our university in Austin and that of the rest of civilization, as the irritation in many countries over this movement of the hand of President Bush on the occasion of his second inauguration on 01/20/2005 bore witness. He just wanted to greet our Longhorn Band marching in his inaugural parade and, like H. Clark and H. Pitts 50 years ago, probably did not know "what that hand sign means in Sicily" (Dean A. Nowotny on 11/11/1955). Cf. http://www.texasexes.org/about/heritage/index.asp?p=540 (11/11/2005, 2:27 pm CST)

[87] Cf. Solomon (1995) 256. He refers to the custom of French and American existentialist philosophers usually not to translate the German word *Angst*. They just write it *angst*. Cf. also with explicit respect to Roman antiquity Kaster (2005) 6-9.

[88] Scientists have not yet found any differences in this regard within the Euro-American cultures. Cf. Blonder (1999) 289. But science is just starting to explore this field.

[89] Cf. Shewder (2004) 94.

[90] "*Estado de ánimo caracterizado por una conmoción orgánica consiguiente a impresiones de los sentidos, ideas o recuerdos, la cual produce fenómenos viscerales que percibe el sujeto emocionado, y*

"emotion" should not be undervalued. Quite the contrary, it is of greatest importance for our own self-assessment and in regard to our view of the world.[91] We are too easily inclined to suppose that in other times and cultures there exists something like the system of emotions, as we know it. At the very least we are forced to talk about them in our language using our vocabulary and our preconceptions about this phenomenon. This, however, should not fool us. Great differences may be covered up by the belief that we can translate certain terms with our own words. The concept behind what is translated may be very different.

At this point it is clear that "emotions" are something that can be looked at from many distinct angles. A holistic approach to the emotions needs to take into account that biological and cultural conditions influence each other while at the same time themselves subject to constant change. This applies to both individuals over the course of their lives within any given society and to their societies over the course of history in general.[92] It should also be stressed that our progress in understanding meta-emotional knowledge is of great importance for exactly this ever-changing process. Emotions, then, have a synchronic and a diachronic aspect. At any given point in time the bandwidth of ontogenetic variations within the phylogenetic *status quo* is going to be considerable. If we, therefore, analyze emotions that were felt or described at a different time in a different place we need to be aware that within this apparent framework we cannot operate without acknowledging that the results of our discussion risks being inaccurate or anachronistic.[93] With some variation, the rules of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle apply to the aforementioned factors.

Also, we cannot neglect the fact that we will have to deal with emotions expressed in literature. A work of literature is a product of an emanation of a

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con frecuencia se traduce en gestos, actitudes u otras formas de expresión." Real Academia Española: Diccionario de la lengua Española (19th ed. Madrid 1970) 514.

[91] Cf. Solomon (1995) 257 and 273-277.

[92] Cf. Hinton (1999) 318 ff.

[93] It is nevertheless astonishing that apparently every kind of what we call "fictional" literature today does not disregard the existence of "emotions", either within the story told in it or in regard to the audience or both. Cf. Oatley (2004) 9.

particular language that has taken fixed shape. The caveat that should control our work in this regard is that we have to avoid falling prey to committing anachronistic interpretations of a work, such as Vergil's, in regard to the scientific, literary and cultural issues involved. It is of maximal importance to define the first horizon of the audience Vergil anticipated for his work.[94] This has many theoretical implications. The following are especially of interest for us:

First of all, we need to ask the general question what a narrative does to the readers' emotional life.[95] William James put it this way:

> In listening to poetry, drama, or heroic narrative, we are often surprised at the cutaneous shiver which like a sudden wave flows over us, and at the heart-swelling and the lachrymal effusion that unexpectedly catch us at intervals.[96]

In fact, it has been the subject of an intensive and long scholarly debate[97] what it exactly is that causes the reader of literature to feel sympathy with, pity towards, or anger about a deed or an entire character that appears within a story. At least as adults of today's world we know what the fictitiousness of literature means, or at least think we do. We cannot change the narrative, we cannot make haste to help the distressed hero, and at the same time the events told in a novel, play, or poem do not immediately concern us as events. At best we are participating in the plot by virtue of our imagination. On the other hand, this does not mean that the intensity of the emotions felt while reading fictional literature is necessarily weaker than those felt in regard to events that happen in reality.[98] Also it is important to note that, depending

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[94] The question what Vergil could or did anticipate is to a degree of course unanswerable. Nevertheless it needs to be asked and an answer has to be given as far as that answer is possible.

[95] For a discussion of philosophical views of emotional implications of reading see also Olsen (1978) chapter 2.

[96] James (1884) 196. The relationship between psyche and text is also subject to considerations from the viewpoint of literary theory. Cf. Bloom (1976) 1.

[97] In order to just name a few, I would suggest that one should compare the sequence of the following articles: Radford (1975), Neill (1993), Radford (1995), and Neill (1995). Within these articles one can find further literature.

[98] Cf. Neill (1993) 5f.

on what a particular piece of literature means to the recipient, the felt emotions can vary from reader to reader.[99]

Furthermore, our reaction to a piece of literature can be a highly complex conglomerate of several emotions. For example, we can be pleased by the art and the craftsmanship[100] of a particular work of literature and at the same time horrified by what is told within it.[101] This is true especially in the case of the attempt to understand a work of literature that is written in a different language, comes from a different social background, and is centuries, if not millennia, old.[102] The interest that people again and again show in reading the *Aeneid* clearly demonstrates that Vergil's work transcends individual cultures. This general observation is also true in regard to Vergil's portrayal of emotions. One should only think of episodes that are of particular interest in this regard, such as the Dido episode, Aeneas' reunion with his father in the underworld, and others. But because of the possibility that Vergil's world and its features do not completely coincide with our world, we have to undertake a cross-cultural examination of emotions for which there is only a basis that consists of various texts.[103] And yet, Vergil, too, described the emotions felt by the characters of his *Aeneid* with an eye on what other authors did with whom he neither shared the same culture nor lived in the same age.

Why is it necessary to write this introductory survey? The need to assess depictions of emotions in ancient authors within such a framework should, after all,

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[99] Cf. Roberts (2003) 349.

[100] Connected with this is the question what role the canonization of certain pieces of literature plays. Do readers become inured to the emotional appeals that a literary work sends out if they know similar works which might even be alluded to within the new work that they are reading at the moment? Does the opposite happen? Or does it not change anything? Cf. Bloom (2003) 28 and his considerations about the anxiety felt by poets in respect to their predecessors (2003, 77).

[101] Cf. Neill (1993) 6 and 10f. and Neill (1995) 77f. Also cf. Matravers (1998) 211f.: different tastes etc. make it impossible to exactly predict the feelings that one person will have about a work of art when encountering it.

[102] A very interesting case study on an emotion that is not regarded as an emotion any more today is Harré/Finlay-Jones (1986).

[103] The interplay between a society and their emotions remains a given at any time in history. Cf. Kaster (2005) 4.

be self-explanatory. Alas, much existing scholarship and interpretation has operated outside of such basic assumptions. Too often researchers have overlooked the importance of an approach that is sensitive to the differences between their views and Vergil's, Apollonius', and Homer's standpoint on what emotions are and what they mean. Admittedly it may be the case that we will to a vast extent be unable to reconstruct the individual shape of each of these authors' conscious or unconscious dealing with his emotions or that of others. In turn, however, this lack of awareness of different approaches to ancient literature has led to voluminous scholarly debates that are often simplistic and characterized by facile dichotomies. At worst, they have turned personal and impeded progress in our understanding of the individual works of ancient literature and their meaning for one another and ultimately for us.

In order to escape this trap, a brief and rather rough overview of the teachings of the four main schools of ancient philosophy will follow.[104] It will be obvious from the start that some of the ancient philosophers did not systematically define the phenomenon of "emotion" – at least as far as we can see from their still extant texts. But we will see that emotions played a key role in their further philosophical thoughts. Of particular importance is the field of wise and ethically good behavior. The intensity with which the individual schools and philosophers thought about this topic differs over the centuries. Interestingly enough, some actually thought about the impact that what we today call literature had on them and their fellow human beings since Plato and Aristotle.[105]

Aeneas' anger, for example, in the last scene of the *Aeneid* may serve as an introductory starting point to illuminate some of the problems I talked about in this

[104] On the problematic question whether there was any independent Cynicism present in Rome see Griffin (1996), esp. 204.
[105] Cf. Too (1998), esp. 1-12 for an overview on literary criticism, its development in antiquity, and the difficulties in examining a subject that in its present form has only in modern times come to the attention of scholars.

chapter.[106] For modern readers, at least in what is commonly called the Western World - whatever their particular national origin might be[107] and whatever educational or professional background they come from - apparently the first and foremost question that arises is this: Is the killing of Turnus morally justified? The answer more often than not already implied in this question today[108] is "no".[109] Who would think it morally correct if someone harms, even kills another defenseless person[110], even if he is an enemy combatant, in an act that goes beyond immediate self-defense?[111] From today's perspective, Aeneas should master his anger over suffered mischief and injustice, treat Turnus as a prisoner of war according to international standards or hand the villain over to an independent court on war crimes, allow for a proper trial, and let an independent entity enforce the decision of the court.[112]

One should, however, note at least in passing that even today we would probably find it hard to find an "independent" court to settle this "international" diplomatic crisis between several "sovereign" nations. Given the controversies about

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[106] Secondary literature on this topic abounds. See most recently Wittchow (2005) with an overview over recent scholarship on pages 45-49. Also cf. chapter 8.

[107] I have to confess that I do not know anybody who has read the *Aeneid* without having been exposed to some influence of the Western World before. Therefore I cannot account for any differences that might exist between the reception of the *Aeneid* in "Western" and other civilizations. On the, within the context of this chapter, interesting, but in the end unsuccessful attempt to link certain views of the *Aeneid* to the (Western) nationality of scholars of classical philology see Schmidt (2001a) 146 and Galinsky (2003a) 163-167. But also cf. Stahl (1981) 157, Suerbaum (1981) 82, Potz (1991) 249 with n. 8 and many others.

[108] On the fundamental difference between today and antiquity in regard to moral psychology and ethics see Brennan (2003) 257-260. In antiquity the demands of ethically ideal behavior were not necessarily limited by an individual's psychological abilities. Cf., however, Aristotle's remarks about what goes beyond humanly possible suffering of an individual in *EN* 1115b9f. What was recognized as ethically ideal behavior determined what a human psyche should look like or how it needed to be educated.

[109] On implications surrounding our reading of the final scene of the *Aeneid* also cf. Smith (1997) 16ff.

[110] This aspect is stressed by Farron (1981) *passim.*

[111] For today's view of that matter see art. 23c of the Hague Regulations: "It is especially forbidden … to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion." This combatant, however, must remain peaceful henceforth and may not attempt to escape imprisonment. Cf. Rogers (2004) 48f.

[112] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 193.

waging "just wars"[113], how would we today judge an immigrant nation that has lost its home and demands to stay within the borders of another country, even take over the political lead over that area?[114] I think it becomes clear that a judgment about the situation described in the *Aeneid* is not possible if we apply standards that were arrived at after mankind went from the first "international" trial in AD 1474 against one Peter von Hagenbach, who was found guilty of having committed war atrocities during the occupation of Breisach[115], to the institution of the International Criminal Court.[116] Even today it seems very problematic, if not outright impossible, to arrive at

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[113] See in general Evans (2005) and especially, e.g., the controversy of the legitimacy and proper procedure of invoking chapter VII of the UN charter in regard to the second Iraq War. Cf. Gray (2004) 279ff.

[114] Admittedly this is a very one-sided account of Aeneas' and the Trojans' arrival in Latium. More factors are involved like Latinus' wishes versus Amata's intentions, Juno's fears versus Jupiter's plan for a new people etc. Cf. also Nethercut (1968) and Fratantuono (2005) 36 on the *Aeneid* as a tale of various invasions.

[115] The problem of a fair trial of enemy combatants is, for example, already palpable in Thucydides 3.52 when Plataean prisoners are tried by Spartans not according customary Greek law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, but along the guiding question what these enemy combatants have done to advance Sparta's welfare. Since it is the nature of enemy combatants to fight against their enemies, the Plataeans only had "nothing" as a possible answer and were executed. Cf. Ober (2005) 404. Also cf., e.g., Lucan's *BC* 10.471f.: *Sed neque ius mundi valuit nec foedera sancta / gentibus*, …

[116] Noteworthy are also Monnier's theoretical considerations and ideas about how to punish transgressions of the 1864 Geneva convention. They were never institutionalized. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 led to the provisions of the Versailles treaty for a trial of the German Emperor Wilhelm II for his individual guilt in regard to WW I. But this trial never materialized, because the Netherlands insisted upon their sovereignty as a state and did not extradite a refugee. The sanctity of state sovereignty, treasured since the Peace of Westphalia, won. The international community was quicker to institute procedures to decide quarrels between themselves in the League of Nations Covenant (art. 13.4) and the UN charter (art. 94; International Court of Justice). Individuals, and coincidentally the various modern concepts of citizenship – remained the subjects of their respective states, which consider giving up their jurisdiction over these individuals to international organizations as an improper intrusion into domestic affairs. Yet the problem of jurisdiction over the states who are not members of the pertinent organizations remains among other difficulties of compliance with the rulings of the International Court of Justice. Cf. in general Schulte (2004). The sanctity of sovereignty and statehood was the issue again in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which, among other things, looked for a punishment of the Armenian genocide, and its replacement by the amnesty of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Cf. Schabas (2004) 1-25. After WW II the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials followed. Yet it took several decades until this idea was picked up again. Then, admittedly, the development was rather rapid and paved the way for the implementation of international tribunals in many countries, most recently, e.g., Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. Cf. Romano/Nollkaemper/Kleffner (2004) Ultimately the International Criminal Court was created. On the history of international criminal law see also Trifterer (1999) 18-23 and Ferencz (2001). It is important to note all this, because we may not forget that this development was and is not without opposition or

a consensus between this planet's many nations, who have various cultural backgrounds and legal traditions, regarding what "just" international law should look like, what "due process" means, what constitutes a "fair trial", what areas of jurisdiction international law should cover, and finally whose task it would be to settle disputes, to enforce the settlement[117], and last but not least to pay for the availability of the necessary resources.[118] This ongoing evolution of international law is widely regarded as being a reflection of the rise of globalization and the decline of the sovereignty of the individual countries.[119] Hence it is obvious that questions like whether Turnus should be handed over to a tribunal of non-Rutulians, non-Latins, and non-Trojans totally rests on modern-day, but not (yet) universally accepted concepts of general justice and tricky technicalities of definition of criminal terminology and of jurisdiction. From here it becomes clear that Turnus' case triggers high surges of emotions even today, since it reminds us of so many cases that we think are comparable at first sight.[120] Yet it seems to be widely agreed that someone should not stand trial for a crime that was not viewed to be a crime or procedural mistake at the time the deed was committed. So the question remains whether Aeneas did something he should not have done in the eyes of his contemporaries or in the eyes of Vergil's contemporaries.

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potential for improvement. See, e.g., on the shaky legal grounds of the Nuremberg Trials Ahlbrecht (2001), on the French failure to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslawia Safferling (2001) 366, or on the American, Chinese, and Russian opposition against the International Criminal Court Scheffer (2000), Broomhall (2003) 163-183, Beigbeder (2005) 190-204. Talking about international trials of individuals carries a lot of baggage with it to say the least, especially since we are to use the term "*vielfacher Kriegsverbrecher*", "notorious war criminal" (Wlosok (1973) 149) for Turnus. Rather we have to contextualize the question of Aeneas' guilt with contemporary concerns of Roman society after the civil war and with literary concerns of genre. See Vielberg (1994) 414f.

[117] Cf on these questions Safferling (2001) 21-53. On the extent of changes some of the signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court had to implement in their national legal systems see International Society (2003).

[118] Cf. Ingadottir/Romano (2003), Schabas (2004) 185ff.

[119] Cf. Brownlie/Lowe (2003).

[120] Due to the international publicity of these cases, much is at stake. Take, for example, Aeolus in his conversation with Juno (*Aen.* 1.65-80). The phrase "I just follow orders." would provoke hard feelings and sad memories to say the least.

Further questions immediately follow and tend to be answered depending on the answer to the question just mentioned. Such questions might be: What does Aeneas' behavior in Turnus' case say about Aeneas' moral qualities in general? Why does the *Aeneid* end this way?[121] What is Vergil trying to say here?[122] From what we know, ancient reactions to the end of the *Aeneid* were quite different from ours.[123] Servius, for one, explains Turnus' death as *ultio foederis rupti*.[124] He does not explicitly indicate whether he regards that vengeance[125] justified or not. Judging from the fact that Servius introduces this thought as an explanation, I think that Servius assumed his explanation would justify Aeneas' behavior.

At this point I do not want to anticipate the results of my discussion of the final scene of the *Aeneid* and what it perhaps meant in Vergil's times. But Vergil's delineation of emotions in the *Aeneid* clearly transcends his own time. The basis of our reaction to the *Aeneid* needs without a doubt to be examined in comparison to what we know about the cultural horizon of Vergil's first readers.

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[121] Further implications are looked for when the question of comparison between epic poems are made, e.g. between the end of Vergil's *Aeneid* and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Cf. Smith (1997) 6.

[122] I wonder if scholarship ever looked at this scene without making some sort of suggestion in order to explain what cannot be but regarded as a deliberate move – both stylistically and in terms of content – by Vergil. Very often the answer to the question of Vergil's potential motives for writing the end of the *Aeneid* the way he did gets connected with Vergil's relation to Augustus. On the other hand, did Vergil's death play a role in where his poem ended?

[123] See for an overview Galinsky (1994) 191 and (2003) 145f. (also for further literature on this topic).

[124] *Ad loc*. 12.949.

[125] Vengeance tends to have a negative connotation today. We will talk about ancient views of *ultio* later.

2.2 Emotions in Antiquity

We should bear in mind that we access the world of the emotions in the different times of the authors from the perspective of written language only. As researchers lately have come to appreciate, every language has its own grid within which the phenomena that are subsumed under the term 'emotions' and related words, phrases, and expressions are articulated and lexically located.[126] The difficulties already begin with the translation of 'emotion' into Greek and Latin. ά ρζ[127] and *affectus* cannot completely be squared with one another and with the English term 'emotions'.[128] I will explain why in due course.

As I have pointed out, different ages, different centuries, different languages, and different cultures will ultimately provide a different background to the views of individuals on the phenomenon of emotions. Homer probably understood what we call emotions within a social framework very different from our own. The reconstruction of this horizon is impeded especially by the fact that several layers of composition and editorial work have made it impossible to arrive at a conclusion regarding the date of his poems that could not be challenged in some way.[129] What we

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[126] Cf. Wierzbicka (1999) 24, 39. Cf. de Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*. Chomsky and other adherents of the transformational-generative grammar and its derivatives have often claimed that any realized sentence would only be the surface of deeper structures of meaning. For a brief introduction into this issue and related question like the impact of the difference between languages on the various models of a *Valenzgrammatik vel sim.* see, e.g., Wolf (1982) or Lasnik (2005). On the applicability of the generative transformation grammer to Latin and Greek see, e.g., Happ/Dönnges (1977).

[127] It seems almost customary to start a scholarly work on ancient concepts of emotions with a short paragraph or footnote that problematizes this word. See Knuuttila/Sihvola (1998) 1 for further literature. Kosman (1982) 104f. interprets this term from its litteral meaning of "suffering", i.e., he claims that emotions are really passive experiences. Others have followed in his footsteps. See Nussbaum (1994) 13. For example, it is not so much the case that I am angry. Rather I am angered by something or somebody. The question then is how my own actions relate to this feeling or vice versa. "The art of proper living, we should say, includes the art of feeling well as the correlative discipline to the art of acting well" (Kosman (1982) 105).

[128] On problems that we encounter while translating the Greek term see Knuuttila, Sihvola (1998) 1, Harris (2001) 4 n. 3, Tieleman (2003) 15f., and Knuuttila (2004) 3f.

[129] Because of these difficulties there indeed is and will continue to be a difference between "professional" philologists and "amateur" readers. Cf. Stempel (1983) 90, Galinsky (1987) 161. This

said about the possible impact of time on the change of social conventions on emotions is applicable already within the different parts of the Homeric poems. And yet, it is a long way to the next fully extant epic poet, Apollonius of Rhodes, even though he still wrote in Greek. From what we know, Greek culture had changed its face quite considerably from Homer's times to the Hellenistic period.

Vergil, in turn, lived and wrote roughly two centuries later in a society that had adapted some elements from Greek culture, yet was very proud to be different. Rome had reached the end of the Republic and was gradually transforming into the principate. However, since not only the three epic poets mentioned above incorporated emotions in their works or even wrote about emotions, we can gain insights into what antiquity thought about feelings that are quite similar to what we think are emotions. When we set out to discuss how Vergil used the works of Homer, Apollonius, and others to create those passages in which he attributes certain feelings to the characters in his epic poem, we have to keep in mind that Vergil already bridges the gaps between several centuries and two rather different civilizations. The questions whether he was aware of this fact and what he knew about earlier centuries cannot be answered fully. In creating an epic poem for his times he probably adapted a more or less contemporary view that also was used while people were reading the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, the *Argonautica*, and other epic poems, i.e. the predecessors of Vergil's *Aeneid*. Namely epic poems were used for in the broadest sense educational

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does not necessarily mean that the "professional" reading is "better" than an "amateur" understanding of a text. The question to which the preceding sentence would be the answer would already be a "wrong" question. In fact, the poet might never have aimed at distributing his text to "professionals". Cf. Stempel (1983) 106f. The framework within which both readings happen is simply different and guided by different goals. Cf. Bloom's question whether poets read texts like critics read them (1973, 19). He claims that every poet by necessity has to "misread" his precursors in order to create something new. Cf. especially the extensive discussion in Bloom (1975) 95-126. Ironically, in order to apply Bloom's more general considerations on knowing history (1982, 8), the poet as an active part of literary history who shapes this history cannot be aware of the consequences his doing will have for that history. Today literary history discovers its own limitation as doing research about history from a point that has its own historical prejudices and own modes of thinking about history. Cf. Kerkhecker (2001) 40ff. Besides, "professional" philology sometimes gets caught up in its very own fashions and trends. Cf. Iser (1966) 7, Galinsky (1992b) 166.

purposes and as an *exemplum* for the instruction of how to live one's life.[130] Philodemus' work *On the Good Kind According to Homer* is a prime example of that approach to Homer's epic poems. Nevertheless, this leaves us with the opportunity to recognize how Vergil read the works of his predecessors and perhaps to get a glimpse of what his intentions were when he composed his *Aeneid*. And even if in the end we will have to concede that our insights will remain fragmented, we can safely assume that Vergil did his share in shaping the way that Rome looked at emotions in the early years of Augustus' time.

Before turning to such speculation, let us consider first what the four principal philosophic schools of the time taught in regard to emotions.[131] For apparently Plato was the first to introduce the philosophical study of emotions which topic was then picked up by all philosophical schools to come.[132] This will serve as the foundation from which we will start a comparative analysis of the emotions of epic heroes from the viewpoint of Vergil's *Aeneid*.

[130] For an account, based on gender-studies, of the use of epic poetry in eduction see Keith (2000) 8-35.
[131] There is very little material on how the sceptics looked at emotions. Cf. Bett (1998) for an overview. Cf. Kuuttila/Sihvola (1998) for a useful introduction to Platonic and Aristotelian thinking about emotions. On the role of philosophy in Roman society in general cf., e.g., Griffin (1989).
[132] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 5ff. I would like to stress the difference between a philosophical analysis of emotions and the discussions of emotions within literary works that in part predate Plato.

2.2.1 Plato and the Academy[133]

Plato's thoughts on emotions, at least as far as we can see, were never explicitly systematized.[134] We can, however, observe a development in Plato's thinking about the emotions.

In the *Phaedo* (65e, 66b-c, 66e-67a), which counts among Plato's earlier works, Plato assumes that all emotions are to be located outside of reason and inside the body. The philosopher, therefore, had to detach himself from emotions as much as possible if not completely, because of their irrational nature.[135]

Later, in his *Republic* and other so-called middle dialogues, Plato deals with the emotions as movements of the soul. Plato thought of the human soul, as well as of the ideal structure of the political classes in a state[136], as a tripartite structure consisting of ς ό ορξ λωξ λν ό (the reasoning part), ς ό χπρηψέζ (the spirited part), and ς ό σλχπκς λν ό (the appetitive part). The reason why Plato arrives at this model of the soul in his *Republic* and other middle dialogues is that Plato acknowledges that somebody can indeed act in a certain way, yet be angry about what it is that he or she is doing.[137] Plato thinks that opposite desires, such as to do something and to avoid it at the same time, can only occur if they belong to different parts of the soul. Therefore, Plato develops an argument for the existence of more than one part of the soul.

Of these three parts, reason, the immortal and absolutely rational part of the soul, was required to rule over the two other parts (*Ti*. 41d-42d). Within this conceptual framework, reason was to obtain close assistance from the spirited part of the soul so that especially the lowest part of the soul (ς ό σλχπκς λν ό) could be

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[133] In this outline I closely follow Knuuttila, Sihvola (1998) 1-4.
[134] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 12. Cf., however, Büttner's summary of what we know (2000, 96-100). Nevertheless, the emotional response of the audience – both within and outside of the text – plays an important role for the teachings conveyed by them. Cf. Blank (1993).
[135] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 7.
[136] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 10.
[137] Story of Leontius: *R*. 439b-441c. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 8.

kept under control. If someone fails to give reason the supreme power over the other two parts of the soul, be it through lack of education or through disease, he or she will suffer from νυαῦα. This state is to be avoided according to Plato. If, however, the opposite is achieved and reason indeed is allowed to govern supremely, the spirited part of the soul and, within even stricter limits, its appetitive part will only be admitted to act if the reasoning part thinks that something is worthy of an emotional response (*R*. 4.443c-444a, 9.589a-590d).[138]

The appetitive part looks for immediate pleasure and sees to it that pain is avoided (*R*. 584c-585a). In Plato's view, one should only follow the appetites of the appetitive part of the soul as far as health requires it.[139] The spirited part of the soul where admiration, honor, and pride are located is seen as a helpful servant to reason (*R*. 441a-442c). But if the spirited part is allowed to go unchecked, it becomes the source of too much aggressiveness and strives for empty fame that grows out of proportion (*R*. 553d, 586c-d). The reasoning part of the soul, however, is driven by the love of the good (*R*. 608d-611a, *Ti*. 42c, 69c-d).

It has been argued that Plato in the *Republic* showed his awareness of the limitations of this theory of the tripartite soul (*R*. 443d). When Plato discusses joy, pity, distress, and sorrow as evoked through poetry in *R*. 10.603e-606d, Plato only distinguishes between two parts of the soul: reasoning and non-reasoning. However, specific emotions are attributed to specific parts of the soul. Shame, for example, belongs to the spirited part of the soul (*Lg*. 2.646e-647b). Other emotions are somewhat ambiguous. Love (*R*. 6.485af., 490b, 499c, 501d), e.g., can guide towards true wisdom or, in the form of an obsession, figure as stemming from the appetitive part of the soul (*R*. 9.573b-575a).[140]

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[138] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 10f. This cognitive element of emotions in Plato's thought will remain present in all the major philosophical schools. Cf. Nussbaum (1987a) 140.
[139] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 11.
[140] Cf. Knuuttila/Sihvola (1998) 3, Knuttila (2004) 12.

Scholars have assumed that Plato changed his views of the emotions somewhat after he wrote the *Republic* and that these changes ultimately influenced Aristotle's views on the emotions.[141] The simile of the chariot in Plato's *Phaedrus* (246a-256e) attributes a more positive role to emotions and love in particular, since charioteer and the two horses need to work together. It is not an eclipse of the appetitive part – and its emotions – that is looked for. Rather, dealing with it and taking care of it is the goal.[142] Although the more unruly horse has to be subjected to constant control, it is necessary to make good decisions (*Phdr*. 246a-256d). In the *Timaeus* (69c-d) Plato reverses this rather positive view again towards what he said in the *Republic*: The emotions belong to the mortal, and not the immortal, part of the soul, but similar to the chariot imagery in the *Phaedrus*, the *Timaeus* (89e-90a) assumes that all parts of the soul must and can fulfill their very own function if they are placed under the supervision of the reasoning part of the soul.[143]

Emotions seem to be personal and subjective feelings that require an awareness of them (*Phil*. 33d-24a, 43aff., 47d). Yet, Plato calls these feelings false advisers, because the actions recommended by these feelings to the individual who experiences them do not have anything to do with reasoning (*Lg*. 1.644cff.).[144] In different passages of his dialogues, Plato identifies the following emotions: ἡγρ ἤ- ἀυωρζ- οὔσκ- ι ὅερζ- οσἴζ- α γ ζ- α ω ὔ κ- ι λοΐα- πωρζ- ὀυξἤ- σὅ ρζ- υῆ ρζ- ῆορζ- ι ὅ ρζ- οηρζ- χπὅζ- and υθ ζ/[145]

In sum, it appears from Plato's works that Plato, especially after the *Republic*[146], did not think that there was a way to get rid entirely of one's emotions. Involuntarily, the part of the soul that Plato thought the seat of the emotions brings

[141] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 13-18 who is somewhat more reserved in regard to the extent of this change and proceeds with more caution in regard to the actual evidence of Plato's thoughts on emotions in his dialogues.
[142] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 13.
[143] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 16.
[144] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 18f.
[145] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 15ff.: *Ti*. 69d, *Lg*. 1.647a-d, 649bf., 2.653aff., 3.699cf., 10.897a, *La*. 191d, *Smp*. 207e, *R*. 429cf., 430af., *Tht*. 156b.
[146] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 24.

forth spontaneous emotional responses. These responses are intrinsically untrustworthy, and can and have to be educated and controlled.[147] For example, Plato says in the *Laws* (2.653bf., most relevant are πλωη υΐή πλωη and ωχ έυξηλ υΐή ωχ έυξηλ) "that young people should learn to love and to hate correctly, so that when their ability to reason and reflect is developed there will be no disturbing conflicts between emotional inclinations and what reason suggests."[148] As moderated and controllable entities emotions are even useful to constitute cohesion within the state (*Lg*. 1.646e-649e; 5.731b-d).[149]

[147] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 17f.
[148] Knuuttila (2004) 24.
[149] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 25.

2.2.2 Aristotle and the Peripatos[150]

Turning to Aristotle, we are on much more secure ground as far as his teachings on emotions are concerned than was the case with Plato.[151] Aristotle apparently had a very clear-cut idea about what emotions (σά κ) are. This term encompasses in his view desire, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, zeal, pity, and in sum everything of that sort which is followed by pleasure and displeasure (*EN* 1105b21ff.)[152]: οέξθ γἔ σά κ πἔ σλχπἄα ὃυξἤ ι ὅερ υάωρζι ὅ ρ αυἄ ιλοἴα πωρζσὅ ρ ῆορ οπρ - οθ ζ ρώ σηαλ ήγρ ἤ οὗσκ; //.

Later in the same work (*EN* 1108a30-b6), Aristotle adds α γ ζ- α ω ὗ κ- έπωζ, and σλ αλυηανΐα/[153] Also in Aristotle's work (*Top*. 113a35-b3, 126a8ff.), we can find traces of Plato's three parts of the soul to which Aristotle then attributes certain emotions. But in the *Rhetorica* we find the first detailed philosophical analysis of many emotions in Greek.[154]

Aristotle defines the term σά κ in the context of his discussion of what virtue is and what constitutes the morally good man.[155] Aristotle thought that in order to achieve moral goodness one has to deal with one's emotions in an appropriate way. Emotions as such are neither intrinsically bad nor intrinsically good as far as we can say from what Aristotle wrote. Therefore he does not ask for a suppression or eradication of every little stirring of emotion. After all, emotions are at first beyond

[150] I closely follow Hauskeller (1997) 96 here. Also cf. Gill (1996) 2.
[151] There is, however, "no general, analytical account of the emotions anywhere in any of the [sc. Aristotle's] ethical writings." Cooper (1999a) 406. On Aristotle's view of the emotions cf. in general Fortenbaugh (2002).
[152] The compositional aspect of the nature of emotions stems from Plato and is incorporated in Aristotle's new view of emotions. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 24 who alters previous views held by Forthenbaugh (1975) 49 and Nussbaum (1986) 307ff. who assumed that Aristotle merely further developed Platonic views.
[153] Scholars suspect that most of these emotions are included because of discussions in the Academy. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 17 with n. 24. In fact, the overlap between Plato's list of emotions given at the end of the previous chapter and this list are obvious.
[154] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 26f. and 40 for further details.
[155] *EN* book II beginning of chapter v.

our control (*EN* 1106a2).[156] Aristotle wants his morally good human being to give in to his emotions if it is appropriate to do so (ὦζ γη), but to do the opposite when it is not appropriate to follow one's emotions (ὦζ ρ γη).[157] A morally good man has to acquire a certain basic position and habit (μλζ)[158] which allows him to follow certain emotions in certain situations when it is appropriate to do so and to do the opposite if necessary.[159] To recognize what is appropriate and what is inappropriate in a given situation requires the human being who is in a particular situation to have a certain degree of insight into the nature of this situation. The decision (συραΐυηωλζ)[160] taken along the lines of one's μλζ about what one will do and what one will not do constitutes morally good - or bad - behavior.[161]

Aristotle does not want to extirpate emotions from human life. In fact, not to feel anything (σά ηλα) in certain situations is wrong, as we saw. An example for this is Aristotle's statement in *EN* 1126a3-8 that a person who does not feel anger will not defend himself and ultimately look slavish. Fearlessness in certain situations is called madness (*EN* 1115b24-8). Insensibility, after all, is not human in Aristotle's eyes.[162] Along these lines νυαῴα is also redefined in Aristotle as well. "Acting in accordance with occurent emotions is typical of *akrasia*, but not all acts based on emotions are acratic."[163] Aristotle was therefore very much interested in the question how one can teach or learn to deal with one's emotions in order to attain a good life.[164] Emotions, if dealt with correctly, in Aristotle's view, perform an important

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[156] Cf. Kosman (1982) 106.
[157] *EN* 1104b25.
[158] Childhood and youth of a human being are very important for Aristotle in this regard. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 26.
[159] *EN* 1105b19ff.
[160] *EN* 1106a3. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 28.
[161] *EN* book II chapter v 6. Also cf. Kosman (1980) 103: "… he [sc. Aristotle], like Plato, thinks of the question of moral philosophy as not simply how I am to conduct myself in my life, but how I am to become the kind of person readily disposed so to conduct myself, the kind of person for whom proper conduct emanates characteristically from a fixed disposition."
[162] Knuuttila (2004) 45f.
[163] Knuuttila (2004) 28.
[164] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 25 with further literature, esp. in notes 39 and 40.

function as providing information for subsequent decisions of a human being and as additional stimulus towards morally good deeds.[165]

[165] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 28f.

2.2.3 The Stoics[166]

Just as the Stoic idea of a corporeal and fully rational soul is something new in comparison to what we found in Plato and Aristotle, the ultimate goal of the Stoics for any human being in regard to emotions (σά κ) is in a sense comparable to early Platonic thoughts about emotions, but on the other hand quite new as well.[167] The Stoics strived to get rid of and to be free from them (σά ηλα).[168] A σά ρζ is indicative of a wrong judgment of a human being regarding what he deems to be important for his future.[169] This misguided judgment[170] is based on ignorance about the true nature of the human being and thereby on ignorance about what is truly morally good and bad. It is an irrational movement of the soul that happens against its nature (ορξ ρζ ναί σαυ ά ι ύωλ νί κω ζ φχ ῆζ) and that oversteps its boundaries (σοηρ ά ρχω α ῃυπή).[171] This definition, however, clearly depends on what is regarded as "overstepping the boundaries". Over time in the course of the development of the Stoic school it will become clear that the Stoic sage "will have all the normal inclinations and aversions, but no excessive ones."[172]

The Stoics distinguished basically four kinds of σά κ: fear (ι ός ρζ), pleasure (ήγρ ή), desire (σλ χπί α), and pain (οὖσκ).[173] Fear equals the irrational expectation

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[166] I closely follow Hauskeller (1997) 241-244. Cf. for details Steinmetz (1994), 545-548. Cf. also Gill (1996) 2f. and Armstrong (forthcoming a). Also see Annas (1992) 103-120. On the differences in Zeno's and Chrysippus' dealing with the phenomenon of emotions see Steinmetz (1994) 616ff. and Sorabji (2002). On Poseidonius' dubious remarks about Kleanthes' teachings on the emotions see Steinmetz (1994) 576.

[167] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 24, 47, 70f.

[168] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 69 for the divergent opinions of scholars on the meaning of this term.

[169] Cf. in general Vogt (2004) 71-75. See specifically for Chrysippus Nussbaum (1987a) 137. Another question is why emotions can subside over time. See, e.g., Vogt (2004) 88-91.

[170] Cf. Knuuttila, Sihvola (1998) 4, Halbig (2004) 33-41, Knuuttila (2004) 59. In connection with this Stoics discussed the fact that emotions can subside in time. Cf. Halbig (2004) 41-45, 53f.

[171] D.L. 7.110. Cf. *SVF* III 459. On this basis, Pohlenz assumed that the Stoics assumed the existence of two separate powers within the soul: irrational urge and order-giving reason. But I agree with Hauskeller (1997) 242 that this assumption is not necessary. The individual is overstepping the universal rules. Also cf. Nussbaum (1987a) 145, Halbig (2004) 45-49.

[172] Striker (1991) 274, cf. also *ibid*. 276f.

[173] Cf., e.g., Halbig (2004) 49.

of future evil (συροωγρνΐα νανρ).[174] Pleasure is the result of feeling happy about the presence of something that seems to be good. Desire is the irrational craving (ορξ ρζ υημλζ) for something that is not within one's reach at the moment whose possession nevertheless is expected to be advantageous. The Stoics subsumes hatred and anger under the heading of desire. For they thought that hatred expressed one's yearning that somebody else would fare badly. Anger represented the desire for revenge for being unduly wronged by somebody. Pain is felt because something at hand is thought to be harmful. For example, the Stoics regarded pity, envy, and jealousy as subcategories of pain.[175]

Emotions therefore are bad as such. For the Stoics it was inconceivable that emotions could be appropriate in certain situations. Nor were they of the opinion that one should just see to it to control the emotions constantly. The Stoic ideal was, as we said above, to be rid of them.[176]

Although the extirpation of emotions remains the general goal[177], in later times[178] the Stoic philosophers developed views that were a little more nuanced.[179] Diogenes of Seleukia compiled a system of positive emotions (η σά ηλλ)[180] like joy (αυά), precaution (η οάε ηλα), and wishing (ε ρΰοκωζ). He thought them to be the results of morally correct judgments.[181]

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[174] Cf. already Plato's *La.* 198b, *Prt.* 358d, and *Lg.* 644cf. Cf. Sorabji (2002) 225 with n. 11.
[175] D.L. 7.111-114. Cf. Vogt (2004) 75f.
[176] Cf. Cic. Tusc. disp. 3.76 ff. This view was countered by other philosophers already in antiquity. Kritolaos rejected the idea that emotions were all bad. Karneades criticized the Sotic differentiation between true and false imaginations by saying that this differentiation was impossible. See Steinmetz (1994) 627.
[177] So, e.g., for Cicero (*Tusc.* 3.13ff.), Seneca (*epist.* 116.1), and Lactantius (*SVF* III 444, 447). See Nussbaum (1987a) 162, 173ff. and Halbig (2004) 60.
[178] For a detailed account of the old Stoa in regard to its theory of emotions see also Brennan (1998). For the development from Chrysippus to Seneca see Sorabji (1998).
[179] On the Stoic teachings in regard to affects cf. also Forschner (1995) ch. VIII.
[180] Nussbaum (1987a) 172 calls them "affective responses" in opposition to "passions". Also cf. Vogt (2004) 76-80 and Rorty (2004) 166-169.
[181] Cf. *SVF* III 431-442 and Steinmetz (1994) 633. On Antipater of Tarsus' continuation of Diogenes' teachings on η σά ηλα see Steinmetz (1994) 640.

Panaitius was of the opinion that one has to control one's feelings correctly instead of rooting them out.[182] Combining this view with his predecessors' view on η σά ηλα[183] Panaitius could formulate the view that η χπΐα would be the desirable state of the soul.[184]

In Posidonius'[185] view one has to educate the irrational powers of the soul in such a way that they are most likely to obey the rational power of οὔξ ρζ.[186] Again, σά ηλα is not the goal any more.[187] Posidonius finally spells out that there is a possible psychosomatic impact of emotions.[188] Posidonius also held the view that emotions are impulses[189] and usually require reason to assent to them. In assuming that a feeling precedes emotion, Posidonius paved the way for the later Stoic teachings of pre-emotions (συρσά ηλα, *propassio*).[190] Thus, Stoics feel, e.g., pain, but do not have emotions.[191]

Seneca in *de ira* (*dial*. 4) 2.2 also makes it clear that every human being reacts involuntarily to certain inescapable conditions.[192] Humans cannot avoid sudden pallor of the face in certain situations, for example. Then Seneca explains in *dial*. 4.2.4 that there are indeed affects which cannot be avoided like yawning.[193]

As Cicero tells us, he was particularly interested in the therapy of emotions. Grounded in the teaching that emotions are false and misguided judgments, the will

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[182] Cf. Erler (1992b) 174.
[183] See Knuuttila (2004) 68f. for further details and the various viewpoints of scholarship on this term.
[184] Cf. Panaitius frg. 45. 112 (α αΐς λρζ γἔ (ι κώ ἡγρ ἤ) ς λ ἄ πἔ νας ἄ ι ὕωλ ὗσάυ ηλ - ς λ ἄ γἔ σαυἄ ι ὕωλ //. 115 (van Straaten, cf. frg. 80. 85. 86 Alesse), Steinmetz (1994) 659.
[185] On Posidonius, his view regarding emotions, and his criticism of Chrysippus see also Cooper (1999b). Posidonius expressed admiration for Plato's positions on emotions. Cf. frg. 150a Kidd. In adopting Plato's tripartite psychology, Posidonius disagrees with the Stoic Chrysippus who classifies emotions as function of reason. Cf. Cooper (1999b) 449. Posidonius regarded the right view of σά κ as the key to ethics in general. Cf. Kidd (1971) 202.
[186] Also cf. Pohlenz (1922) 192.
[187] Cf. Steinmetz (1994) 691f.
[188] Cf. Steinmetz (1994) 691.
[189] "The core of Stoic moral psychology" has its roots in Plato's *Republic*. Brennan (2003) 265f.
[190] Cf. Halbig (2004) 58ff., Vogt (2004) 80f., and Knuuttila (2004) 63ff.
[191] Cf. Halbig (2004) 64f. and Knuuttila (2004) 66 with n. 157.
[192] Cf. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 165 and Malchow (1986) 31-41.
[193] Cf. Malchow (1986) esp. 57 and Reydams-Schils (2005) 137f.

of a human being to control their inclination to emotions needs to be strengthened (*Tusc*. 4.65).[194] Cicero is not alone with his therapeutic approach.[195] Cognitive therapy and behavioral therapy work hand in hand.[196]

Within this context, we also have to note that the Stoics apparently were very interested in the relationship between poetry and the passions. At least we know several works written by Stoic thinkers on this subject.[197] Like Plato and in awareness of Plato's views, Stoics in general thought poetry to be extremely useful especially for educational purposes during childhood.[198]

[194] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 74f. and 79f.
[195] Cf. Schofied (2003) 253 f., esp. 253: "Stoic ethics was meant above all to be lived, not just systematized and elaborated to meet criticism and challenge." Cf. v. Albrecht (1986) 7, Sorabji (1997) 209, and Irwin (1998) 220f.
[196] Cf. Halbig (2004) 61ff.
[197] For a list see Nussbaum (1993) 99.
[198] Cf. Nussbaum (1993) 100 and 123-130. On the allegorical reading the Stoics applied to Homer see, e.g., Long (1992).

2.2.4 The Epicureans[199]

Knuuttila and others scholars have observed that Epicurean views on emotions were somewhat neglected in the past. They assume that this is due to the circumstance that our sources do not supply us with much evidence about this topic.[200] Nevertheless I think we can describe the Epicurean opinions about emotions as follows.[201]

In general, Epicurus held a view that distinguished four basic categories of σάκ: ήγρ ῆ, ι ὄε ρζ, σλ χπῐ́α, and οὔσκ, just like the Stoics or ultimately Plato.[202] The latter three "emotions" pose dangers for the first one which actually needs to be attained. In so far, Epicurus' "system" differs from those of his predecessors.

It is possible, in Epicurus view, to take care of fear[203] and desire[204] with reason, because one can, for example, explain many things one is afraid of due simply to one's ignorance. Epicurus' treatment of pain is a little bit more complicated, because pain can never be argued away, especially if felt physically. Epicurus apparently tried to explain the nature of encountered pain, devise a system of categories for the various kinds of pain, and thereby reduce the importance of pain in relation to one's ήγρ ῆ/β[205]

Within this general outline of four basic σάκ and their subdivisions, the Epicureans seemed to have distinguished between 'empty' (νη ὄζ)[206] and 'natural'

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[199] In this chapter I follow closely Annas (1989). I try to abstract a more general view of emotions from what in Annas' article is largely based on Philodemus' view of anger. Also cf. Gill (1996) 3

[200] Cf. Knuttila (2004) 86. He provides further literature on this topic in his n. 208. In addition, to arrive at a consistent portrayal of Epicurean emotions based on Lucretius' work is particularly difficult since there are many literary questions involved that have to be disentangled from what only then could be identified as his theory of emotions.

[201] Also cf. Procopé (1998).

[202] Cf. Hossenfelder (1991) 77.

[203] Cf. Hossenfelder (1991) 78-83.

[204] Cf. Hossenfelder (1991) 83-93.

[205] Cf. Hossenfelder (1991) 93-98.

[206] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 82.

(ι χωλνὄζ) emotions.[207] Empty emotions are rooted in a thoroughly knavish disposition (γλά ηωλζ σαποσὄ κυρζ) and bring many evils with them. Emotions are experienced in the soul because of false beliefs.[208] This false belief either entails that one is mistaken about a particular emotion in regard to its usefulness as such or in calculating its consequences in relation to the occasion in which the emotion is occurring. Since emotions may bring evils with them, one has to rid oneself of them by contemplating the magnitude and number of their evil consequences. If an emotion is unavoidable, in other words necessary, and does not entail any further evils beyond the unavoidable,[209] then an emotion can be called 'natural'.[210] Then an emotion will not be of detriment to the Epicurean goal of ςαυαμἵα[322]. Therefore, in the eyes of an Epicurean, it is necessary to remain in control of one's emotions[212] so that they do not grow beyond their natural space into something misguided and 'empty'.

On the other hand, as Epicurus said, the wise man is more likely to feel certain emotions like distress and pity which do not pose too much trouble for one's soul, than to feel anger, hatred, envy, or contempt, which Epicurus apparently did not regard as pleasant feelings (*D.L.* 10.117f.; *Sent.* 1, *Ep. Hrd.* 77).[213] In order to reach this state in which "wrong" emotions are not felt anymore, the Epicureans recommended therapeutic techniques for both children and adults alike,[214] which

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[207] For details cf. Sanders (2002) 15-54.
[208] Επχγργμἵα in Philodemus' terms, νη ργμἵα as Epicurus' *Sent.* have it.
[209] As such an emotion like anger needs to be a brief experience. See Armstrong (2004b) 281 with n. 21 and (forthcoming).
[210] This kind of emotion will and may indeed be felt by even the wise man. Cf. Armstrong (forthcoming a) who refutes Annas (1992) 196-199 and (1993) 199 who claims that according to Philodemus the wise Epicurean does not really feel anger.
[211] On the history and meaning of this term see, e.g., Striker (1990).
[212] This is quite similar to Platonic thinking. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 87.
[213] Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 83.
[214] On Epicurean education see Asmis (2001). On Epicurean therapeutical strategies see Tsouna (2001b).

focused on the unpleasant and evil consequences of emotions rather than on their intrinsic immorality.[215]

[215] Philodemus' *de ira* is particularly important in this regard. Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 86.

2.2.5 Conclusion

This is, of course, only a summary overview of the opinions that the individual philosophical schools up to the time of Vergil held on emotions. Over time, the boundaries between the philosophical schools vanished to some degree.[216] Academics became influenced by Stoic or Peripatetic ideas and vice versa. Ο η υ λ ρ σ ά η λ α, for example, moderation in regard to one's emotional life, became a new ideal in Platonism in response to the Stoic σ ά η λ α.[217]

Certain questions that are asked today seem not to have been asked in antiquity. Apart from Plato's assumption that the philosopher kings are few in number and the people to be governed many, mass or group psychology seems not to have been an issue.[218] Insights into the neurological anatomy of emotional processes were, of course, unattainable to ancient medicine and biology. As far as we can see from the existing evidence, the philosophical schools of antiquity did not ask whether there were cross-cultural or cross-temporal[219] differences between civilizations and what consequences this would yield. What becomes immediately obvious, however, is that all of these schools deal with emotions in connection with the question of an ethically sound behavior. Seen in this light it becomes clear that the emotions, which were experienced by the heroes of literary works, and the way these heroes dealt with their emotions, are quite important for the characterization of these literary personae.

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[216] For a detailed analysis of the development of philosophical teaching in the first century BC in the beginning Roman empire see Hadot (2002) ch. 8. Also cf. Strohm (1981) 53 and 68 on Cicero's dealing with Greek philosophy. Further cf. in general Erler (1992b) 173f. and Sedley (2003) especially on Philodemus. Knuuttila (2004) 87f. discusses the beginning of Middle Platonism in the 1st century BC as one example. A different opinion is held by Gill (2003) 217.

[217] Cf. Dillon (1990) 510-518.

[218] For modern views cf., e.g., parts II and III of Tiedens/Leach (2004).

[219] The increasing interest in this aspect is reflected in the great number of recent scholarly contributions towards histories of emotion. Cf. the list in Dixon (2003) 13. But already cf. the linguistical problems cited *ibid*. on page 20 when it comes to comparing literature from different languages.

2.3 Methodological Remarks on Allusions, Intertextuality, and Literary Genre

Just as we have to distinguish between our contemporary views on emotions and Vergil's understanding of them, we need to clarify another issue that will be of great importance in the course of this dissertation. What principles are to be followed in considering Vergil's treatment of other authors' texts?[220] Since this dissertation will rely almost entirely on the interpretation of similarities and differences between certain passages in Vergil's *Aeneid* and other works, we must look at Vergil's understanding of what he did with the works of his precursors and how we today interpret that procedure.[221]

Unfortunately, as in so many other areas, not much of the ancient works on literary theory has survived. As far as allusion is concerned, theorists, already in classical times, described the way an author dealt with the works of previous authors in the terms of πίμκωζ and ήοθ ωζ- *imitatio* and *aemulatio*.[222] The difference between both terms is sometimes hard to assess. Generally speaking, ήοθ ωζ or *aemulatio* entails an author's intention and attempt to surpass the work of his

[220] These predecessors of Vergil naturally had their own ways of dealing with their predecessors. The question is in how far Vergil took that fact into account and if we can recognize how he did it. The problem is aggravated in regard to the Homeric poems by the oral nature of their texts. Cf. Pucci (1987) 28f.

[221] The study of allusions to be found in Vergil's works has been subject of scholarship over the last two millennia. For a survey of methods and results see Farrell (1991) 3-25 or Wills (1996) 15-32. On literary quotations in Vergil cf. Gall (1999) ch. I. Intertextuality was one of the big topics in Classics in the 1980s, in the 1990s, and apparently still is. See e.g. Hinds (1998), Edmunds (2001), v. Tress (2004). For a very practical approach to intertextuality in Vergilian studies, in this case in regard to the *Georgics*, cf., e.g., Gale (2000) ch. 1, esp. 4ff. However, the term in itself has become somewhat fuzzy and unclear. Cf. Schmid/Stempel (1983) 5 and Broich/Pfister (1985) IX. Also cf. Genette's (1982, 7-14) terminology and categories of "transtextual" relations between texts. For a critical survey of the term's history see Pfister (1985) 1-24 and Hubbard (1998) 7-18. Therefore, much depends on how "intertextuality" is defined or subdivided. Cf. Pfister (1985) 25-30 and Broich (1985) 31-35. But in order to apply the term and ask for its functions, we need to establish what this term means and what interpretive results it will be able to yield. Cf. Schulte-Middelich (1985) 198f.

[222] Cf. on these terms in general Koller (1954), Reiff (1959), Zintzen (1987), and Döpp (2001) 9-11 with further literature. Also cf. Whitmarsh (2001) 47-87 and Halliwell (2002). Cf. for the importance of these two terms for the everyday life of the Roman family in regard to its ancestors Treggiari (2003) 155ff. and 163.

predecessor.[223] But since both terms only refer to the author's broadest purpose to imitate the works of earlier writers, it is immediately clear that in the eyes of modern scholars these interpretive instruments can yield rather coarse and therefore insufficient results only. Although it seems clear from Vergil's *Eclogues* that Vergil consciously wrote and created new poetry[224], we do not know any theoretical works that would explicitly inform us about in how far Vergil followed contemporary literary theory. This fact, however, might just be due to an unfortunate lack of textual evidence. It cannot be taken as proof for the assumption that Vergil would not have been interested in that kind of discussion.

In recent times, it appears to have become customary to describe the way allusions work in terms that are similar to the theory of metaphors, with additional focus on the dynamic and, at least to a certain degree, elusive nature of allusion.[225] The text that alludes to an earlier one is called "tenor".[226] The text that is alluded to is the "vehicle". The term "ground" describes the overlap between the two texts. A "gap", "ungrammaticality", "trigger", or "tension" that exists between the two texts forces the reader to reflect on the similarities and differences between the two texts.[227] This reflection then brings the reader to a fuller, easier or more complicated, at any rate new understanding of what he has just read.[228] Unlike in the case of a metaphor, where the *tertium comparationis* is most of the time fairly easy to grasp and does not leave much room for differing interpretations, an allusion is more complicated in nature. This is due to the fact that both tenor and vehicle are usually passages whose interpretation cannot be separated from their very own contexts.[229] Therefore, how

[223] Cf. v. Tress (2004) 7f. This chapter is as a whole greatly indebted to section 3 of her chapter 1.
[224] Cf. Buchheit (2004) 432-435.
[225] Cf. v. Tress (2004) 9f.
[226] Also cf. Garner (1990) 178f., 183
[227] Cf. Conte (1986) 23f.
[228] Cf. v. Tress (2004) 10.
[229] Cf. v. Tress (2004) 11. Also cf. Freistat (1986) 3f. who stresses the importance of "contextuality" of the position of single poems within collections of such poems and "contextural poetics". This is *mutatis mutandis* also true for single scenes of an epic poem. On the potential practical difficulties for

one perceives the meaning of the vehicle has a direct impact on the perception of the tenor through the unique assessment of the gap that by necessity will become visible in this process of comparing the tenor with the vehicle. This gap, one has to note, may not necessarily consist of something strange. In fact, the familiarity of a Homeric or Ennian phrase may have been translated into Vergil's own text within a no less familiar context.

An example is *Aen.* 1.92b = 12.951b: *solvuntur frigore membra*.[230] The new, more informed reading does not so much come from the intertextual allusions. What is a rather common and thus in terms of its semantic importance more or less insignificant formula in Homer[231], becomes very significant within the context of the *Aeneid*, but only if one accepts that the few occurrences of this new Vergilian phrase mark an intentional move by the author.[232]

Without the assumption of authorial intention, every allusion becomes a meaningless coincidence between two texts[233], because in that case no further

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ancient readers to recognize complicated structural patterns stemming from the nature of the shape of their "books" see Anderson (1986) 45.

[230] On the programmatic aspect of this bracket between the beginning and the end of the *Aeneid* see Galinsky (1974) 198.

[231] On intertextual repetition see Hinds (1998) 99-122. On the intratextual aspect of the allusion see Newman/Newman (2005) 64f.

[232] I am aware of the methodological problems that some theorists have with this claim. See below. Schabert's 1983 article, however, asks us to pay attention not only to questions of intertextuality, but also to the phenomenon of interauctoriality. But, in order to use Smirnov's (1983, 288) terminology, what first looks like an *indizierendes Zitat*, becomes a *konstruierendes Zitat* very quickly. Also cf. Plett (1985) 81-88 on the various possibilities to use and interpret literary quotations. Epic poetry as a genre normally does not use direct quotes. Cf. Barchiesi (2001a) 129. Cf. Bloom's *dictum* about what he calls "strong" poets: "Weaker talents idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves" (1973, 5). Closely related to the question how Vergil uses the changed Homeric formula is in how far Vergil considered himself a translator in regard to this verse. He probably was more interested to fit the result of his "translation" into the context of his new poem than to render a literal translation oriented on Homer's Greek. On general questions regarding literary translations see v. Koppenfels (1985), esp. 143-146 on the difference between original and result of a translation.

[233] Of course, we always run the risk of misinterpreting a possibly unintentional textual parallel as an intentional allusion. See Thomas (1986) 174. Cf. also Lyne (1994) 187 on the problem of intertextuality vs. intentionality. See also Culler (2002), e.g., 163, 198f., and 239 on Kristeva. Broich (1985) 27 and 31, however, calls a text intertextual only if the author of a text is not only aware of the fact that he uses other texts, but also expects the recipient to acknowledge the relation between these texts as intended by the author and important for the meaning of the text. Cf. Suerbaum's (1985, 77)

inferences as to the overarching architectural principles of the *Aeneid* and further conclusions as to, e.g., why the *Aeneid* was written the way it was written could be made.[234] Were there no author intention we would have to assume that all allusions that we detect in the text[235] would be merely coincidental. Of course, we cannot be absolutely sure whether all allusions that we detect were intended.[236] Nor can we say that all allusions that Vergil incorporated in his work have been detected, since so much ancient literature has not survived. Much less can we confidently proclaim that we will succeed in interpreting all allusions the way Vergil wanted them interpreted.[237] All one can strive for is an approximation on the basis of our

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example of Eco's *The Name of the Rose*: Eco's literary allusions are for the most part so remote and complicated that in regard to Eco's "average" reader most of Eco's intertextual work is in vain ("*für die Katz*"). Bloom (1973) 44f. discusses the fact that one author lets himself be influenced by another as "simultaneously intentional and involuntary". Cf. Bloom's discussion of the validity of a poet's autonomous ego (1973, 91) and his claim that all poetry essentially consists of "rewriting" what has been written before (1976, 3). Also cf. Conte (1994) 135-138 on allusion and author intention. On the other hand, a purely reader-oriented interpretation would also need to find other parameters than the author to escape the accusation of uncontrolled subjectivism and "affective fallacy". Cf. Iser (1976) 44, 48f. Also cf. Pfister (1985) 23f. who in turn quotes Riffaterre.

[234] Author intention has been "re-admitted" into the theoretical discourse about how to interpret texts in recent discussions. See Hinds (1998) 47-51, 144. Cf. Thomas (1999) 1.

[235] Iser (1974) 33ff. talks about the intention included in the text. He therefore distinguishes between three entities: text, author, and reader. The same distinction is made by Conte (1994) xix. This distinction can be traced back to Plato's *Phaedrus*. Socrates thinks it necessary that the author of a text is able to come to the aid of his text if that text is one way or the other misunderstood by its reader. Cf. Eco's (1990, 50 and 1995, 22) distinction between the *intentio operis*, *intentio auctoris*, and *intentio lectoris*.

[236] After all, it is absolutely irrefutable that a text only comes to life during the time it is read and thought about. Cf. Iser (1976) 39. But this does not mean that the author is to be or even can be eliminated from our considerations.

[237] In addition, it would be possible that what we recognize runs in fact counter to what the author had intended. In this context, naturally one does not only have to ask whether a reader is up to the task to recognize allusions and other intertextual relations between two or more given texts, but also to inquire whether a poet always lives up to his duties in regard to intertextuality. It could be the case that a poet just does not make it clear that a certain word, sentence, or passage rests upon a certain previous text. Or, which makes it even more complicated, the source referred to is not clearly identified so that a reader can mistake another source for the "real" source. Also, a poet could not be aware of the similarity between a feature of his text and a feature of another author's text. To make out these kinds of "mistakes" is probably next to impossible in case we do not have absolutely convincing evidence for each instance. Cf. for a general discussion and interesting modern examples Schulte-Middelich (1985) 208-213. Lastly, a mistake in interpreting a text can be made if the code that is used by the text has come to denote something else at the time when it is read. Cf. Eco's (1992b, 68) example of the word "gay".

experiences as a reader and our sketchy knowledge about Vergil, his personality as an author, and his time.[238]

That does not mean that we should not have our own thoughts about Vergil's work that go beyond Vergil's intended impact. Leaving aside the question whether we will ever be able to distinguish clearly between what he intended in this regard and what he did not, one must also note that in producing a literary[239] text, Vergil was running the risk of writing something whose meaning was not as clearly circumscribable as would have been the case with, let us say, a historical text.[240] Aristotle already was aware of these fundamental conditions of the various genres of texts.[241] Choosing to write a historically oriented interpretation of Vergil's *Aeneid* does not invalidate other approaches. But I hope to have made it clear why and to what end I made this choice.

After all, a poem needs to and usually does make sense in and by itself.[242] Naturally this presents us with the problem of to whom it needs to make sense. The first reader of any particular work is its own author. He knows best to what effect he wanted to incorporate any given allusion. But in order to turn a literary work into a literary classic that is of interest to readers at any given time after its creation, the topics dealt with and the way the story is told need to have a supratemporal aspect to them.[243] The author cannot be sure whether his future readers will have read his predecessors and the new work exactly the way he has done it.

From what has been said above it becomes immediately clear that there are multiple ways to construct and understand or misunderstand allusions. Here, once more, our lack of knowledge about Vergil's own library and the works he knew and

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[238] Cf. Galinsky (1993/4) 301f., 308. Besides, this is also true if one does not want to include the author's intention in one's interpretation. Cf. Iser (1976) 42.
[239] On the difficulties today's theorists have in defining "literature" see Eagleton (1983) 1-16.
[240] See Olsen (1987) 42 and 53 on the meaning of certain genres of texts and the necessity of interpretation. A literary text cannot be the pure illustration of its determined meaning. Cf. Iser (1974) 7.
[241] On the development of ancient awareness of genres see Ford (2002) 250f.
[242] Cf. Plett's (1985, 91f.) considerations about the literary quote in this regard.
[243] In a broader sense this is of course true of any literary work. Cf. Iser (1976) 28.

maybe even liked or disliked becomes vital. There might also be a gap between our and Vergil's understanding of the allusions that he constructed even if we do not fail to recognize them. Having all these difficulties in mind, scholars nevertheless have felt the need to categorize their findings and to establish typologies of allusions in ancient texts. They did so in order to assess the variety of allusions based on an account of realized allusions as far as they have been recognized.[244]

First of all, the extent of an allusion can vary.[245] A poet sometimes may use a particular word from one of his predecessors. This may be true of a phrase, a sentence, a few lines, and an entire scene, even the entire subject of a literary work.[246] Also, the position of a word or phrase within the hexametric pattern of an epic verse may be part of an allusive context. This is equally valid for the placement of a given feature within the structural framework of a given passage or scene. Needless to say, allusions can also occur where a poet does not use the same words as his predecessor.[247]

In dealing with Vergil's *Georgics* Thomas identified six different types of allusions[248], ranging from the casual, more general reference to the multiple, even self-referential reference.[249] Schmid[250] has articulated a more flexible and variable system[251], combining a more factual approach that looks for corresponding elements between two texts like protagonists and settings with a more text-based outlook,

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[244] Reader response is without a doubt the most reliable of the possible angles to look at literature.
[245] This fact in itself brings with it a lot of interpretive problems that cannot be discussed here in full. See W. Schmid (1983) 141-147.
[246] Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica* obviously recall Apollonius through the very title of the work.
[247] Since Virgil writes in Latin and some of his predecessors in Greek, this applies for translated words as well.
[248] Already Pfeiffer (1955) 72 called for a complete typology of Hellenistic art of allusion.
[249] Cf. Thomas (1986) 175. Cf. Hinds (1998) 19, 21-25 on Thomas' typology.
[250] Cf. Schmid (1983) 148.
[251] Smirnov's (1983, 273) fundamental criticism of any fixed scheme of categorizing rules and regulations concerning relations between texts as being necessary but insufficient is valid. Sytematizations of this achronistic kind can only be approximations to the phenomena to be found in texts. The interesting question is how close these various systems can be to the texts they aspire to describe. Ironically, it seems, the more a system allows for flexibility the closer it gets to achieving its aim.

defined by metrical or stylistical features of the text and constantly having an eye on narrative processes.

The next question, of course, is concerning the function of the allusion in question.[252] Is it just competitive[253] or corrective *oppositio in imitando*?[254] Does a particular allusion or a particular way to allude to certain authors represent a statement about the poet himself and his writing?[255] Does a poet want to show off his mastery of past works of past poets, however playfully? What, if anything, does the poet want to add or what, in our view, does he end up adding to his own work by incorporating a certain allusion?[256] In reflecting on the function of allusions, Conte, for example, proposed a system of two basic types of allusions: integrative and reflective. The first type of allusion integrates the text that is alluded to into the new text, thereby producing one single new meaning. The second type of allusion focuses more on the comparison of alluding and alluded text.[257]

While I find the terminology, which has been developed over time, useful to describe allusions, I would like to refrain from setting up a system that does not allow for some flexibility between the categories into which every theory wants to fit its

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[252] A nice overview over some terminology for the various aspects of function of allusion is provided by v. Tress (2004) 17 n. 57 and 60. Also cf. Schmid (1983) 148-152.

[253] Much has been written about the competitive aspect of allusions. Cf., e.g., v. Tress (2004) 11. The question is what we understand when we say "competitive". Not every allusion has to have the character of a poet's attempt to surpass his predecessor to whose work the allusion is directed. A certain way to allude to the work of one or the other predecessor simply may entail that a poet wants to situate his own work within the frame of another. In so far I agree with Conte (1986) 26 and v. Tress (2004) 15f. But every allusion by unavoidable necessity encompasses the fact that something that existed and served a purpose before is put into a new context and may in and by itself even be altered in order to fit, enrich, or make up the new context. This essentially dynamic and innovative aspect of the even most traditional of all elements of any given predecessor's work just cannot be avoided unless an author tells his predecessor's work from the beginning to the end in the same words. The question is the degree of this innovative, allusive work. Cf. Conte (1994) 139-143 on Vergil's way of dealing with Homer's epic poetry.

[254] Cf. Giangrande (1967) 85.

[255] Conte's "reflective" allusion fullfils this purpose (1986) 66.

[256] Cf. v. Tress (2004) 16f.

[257] Cf. Conte (1986) 66f. See Hinds (1998) 1-16 on "reflexive annotation".

objects.[258] For in response to Conte's distinction between integrative and reflective allusions, I would say that it is not only reflective allusion that calls attention to the creative process of the author's literary production. Every allusion, in effect, ultimately does that.[259] In my opinion, it is again the degree to which a specific allusion invites the reader to reflect upon an author's craftsmanship[260] that differs from one allusion to the other.

Due to what has been said so far in this chapter, I cannot follow admonitions of those theorists who assume that the relation between recipient and text only constitutes the literariness of a text.[261] We need to distinguish between Vergil's writing of the *Aeneid*, his (ancient way of) reading of other texts that he used as his model texts, and our understanding of conventions of the production of literature.[262] The question what meaning literature has for us might have received a different

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[258] For a somewhat polemical view on the limits of any literary theory and the danger innate in the attempt to rely on literary theory alone when interpreting literature see Olsen (1987) 211: "Given its metaphysical premise, literary theory is necessarily reductive and positivistic. … 'Literature' is a value concept, … If, with deconstruction, literary theory has entered a crisis from which it does not recover, this may be no bad thing. Problems that arise in connection with literary value can be fully discussed in literary aesthetics. Literary theory is thus not only impossible but also unnecessary and, because it has to deny that value is central in an explanation of literature, undesirable."

[259] Cf. Hinds (1998) 10.

[260] A related point is the question what the meaning of a literary *topos* is and when an allusion becomes topical. Cf. Hinds (1998) 34-47.

[261] For this rejected view cf., e.g., Riffaterre (1983) 24f. and Martindale (1993) 100. Cf. Eco's (1990, 44ff., or briefer: 1995, 16) criticism of an approach to literature that focuses on the addressee response only. After all, why would one care so much to know the name of the author of a text? For a history of and considerations about this phenomenon see Genette (1997) 37-54. A literary text can be characterized as standing between history and fiction. This fundamental condition of literary texts makes that these literary texts are subject to an endless number of cognitive discourses that can go beyond these texts but also are about them. Cf. Iser (1991) 15f. This is not to say that I would like to follow the recent academic trend of being an anti-theorist. Just as literary theory can become a means in itself, the opposite is also true. I would like to propose to follow a more balanced position which does not deny the merits of one or the other point of view. "*Ganz allgemein bedingen sich ja der Fortschritt in der historischen und systematischen Forschung gegenseitig; …*" Ratzinger (1992) VI. Cf. Pasternack (1975) 171-174 who, after having given an overview over the history of various literary theories and their applications as well as limitations, pleads for a scientifically accountable pluralism of theories.

[262] After all, academic literary theory itself is an invention of the 20th century. Cf. Todorov (1981) xxvi. Cf. Pasternack (1975) who starts his inquiry of the history of literary theory with materialism, its notion of "theory", and its self-image as something in opposition to everything traditional (p. 15). Even the term "literature" is quite recent (19th century). Cf. Todorov (1990) 1.

answer in Vergil's time or might not have been asked at all. In other words, the question is whether our understanding of intertextual relations between texts matched Vergil's understanding of them. Furthermore, would Vergil have used the same techniques today's authors have at their disposal or that today's literary critics have in their arsenal of patterns of interpretation?[263] A reading of Vergil's or anybody else's text that centers on the reader's response only might fall for the trap it tries to avoid. In and by itself, a theory which assumes that any given text is interpretable through some kind of spur-of-the-moment response of its readers only is deficient if it does not care to educate itself in addition and is not ready always to learn more about the historic circumstances of this text.[264] Such a deficient theory is setting up the stage for the "reading act" in a very specific way and excludes other ways of reading these texts.[265]

Apart from the fact that psychological research seems to prove that every reader in a first reaction to a given text tries to relate to and understand its author[266], other scholarship also has made the case that understanding a text means more than just a reader responding to a text. In following Bühler's *Organon-Modell*[267] we have to take into account that a particular text produces and makes sense on several levels. And a text is the medium through which the author wanted to transport a message to his reader. To decipher this poetic sign[268] needs not only the readers' response, but also the reader's knowledge about the poetic sign and its meaning.[269] In order to attain this knowledge, a reader must understand his role as part of the communicative process – with all its flaws and shortcomings – that in the case of a literary text was

[263] Cf. Broich (1985) 46f.
[264] On the impossibility to read a text innocently "without presuppositions" see Eagleton (1983) 89.
[265] Cf. Plett (1985) 95 who postulates a *litteratus doctus* as the counterpart of the *poeta doctus*.
[266] Cf. Schabert (1983) 680f. with further literature.
[267] Cf. Bühler (1965) 24-33, esp. fig. 3.
[268] Cf. Todorov (1990) chapter 4, where he considers various aspects and conditions of the actual process of reading a text. Also see Olsen (1987) 54f. on semiotic approaches to texts.
[269] Cf. Plett (1985) 95. Cf. also Habermas (1984) 307-311 and 329ff., esp. 330f. on interpretation of communicative acts.

initiated by the author.[270] In order to reconstruct as much of that as possible we naturally and by necessity have to use, quite contrary to what Riffaterre suggests, "external standards or yardsticks" such as at least an approximate knowledge of the intentions and knowledge of its author.[271] Only this will enable today's reader to assess the "unique" message of a text, whose existence as such cannot be denied. Only a comparison of interpretive communities, of historical circumstances, intellectual backgrounds, and so forth can distinguish and illuminate our understanding of the text in a way that brings it closer to historical accuracy which naturally cannot be fully achieved since we do not have all the resources that would be necessary for such a task.

To put it differently, I am not interested in simply describing my first (or second or third) reading[272] of the *Aeneid*. The kind of dissertation likely to be the result of that approach would better be categorized as something like reading a logbook or diary[273], but not as a dissertation, since in its own "uniqueness" it probably would fail to convince others in regard to its use, if they do not just happen to want to know what "my" experiences during reading were.

Of course, I have to say that I had my own thoughts about certain passages of the *Aeneid* when I first read them. But then already I compared them to previous reading experiences that I had with works of other authors. And during the second reading of the *Aeneid* I interpreted earlier passages in the light of my knowledge of later passages of the *Aeneid*. At a certain point the explanation of the text has to rely on information that only can be gathered from outside the reader. But in contrast to

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[270] Cf. Todorov (1984) 62, who describes "every representation of language" as part of a communicative process. For Todorov, intertextuality is in turn part of this process. Cf. also Schulte-Middelich (1985) 207f. This is not to say that our interpretation of a text is not already influenced by other readings (cf. Martindale (1993) xiii). But we do not have to give up trying as hard as possible to separate, indentify, and distinguish between the various layers of how we are interpreting a text.

[271] Cf. Freistat's (1986, 9) considerations about the interrelations of organization and structure of collections of poems on the one hand and their author's intention on the other.

[272] By necessity the second reading of a text takes into account what it knows from the first reading of the text. It corrects and transforms the results of the first reading. Cf. Iser (1974) 15f. Cf. Edmunds (1992) for an application of Iser's ideas to a Latin text.

[273] Needless to say, in themselves these are no despicable genres.

Riffaterre I would deny that this procedure as such necessarily includes generalizations that try to strip the piece of literature before us from its uniqueness and literariness. Reading habits, taboos, and other impediments against which as Riffaterre claims any text is read can be changed over the course of different readings. An explanation of any given text that wants to clarify why this texts speaks to us in a certain way does not intend to "tame a work" or to "defuse it by reducing it to habits, to the reigning ideology, to familiar mythology, to something reassuring."[274]

Judging from my own reading experiences I would claim that a text can still arouse my disgust, anger, joy, agreement and so forth and ultimately remain inaccessible, a result with which I still feel uncomfortable, even after I try to explain and interpret the text. It is exactly the question what the author intended with a certain text that prevents the reader from adapting an unfamiliar text to what he wants to read. This kind of approach, namely to reckon with the possibility that an author exists whose views - even, e.g., his views about intended audiences[275] - have shaped

[274] Riffaterre (1983) 2f.

[275] Cf. Iser (1976) 50ff., 62f. and Galinsky (1993/4) 307ff. It is, needless to say, a very interesting question, whether a given reader will indeed assume the place that was intended for him by the author of the text. Cf. Iser (1976) 65. But if there is any such thing as the reader for whom a text was intended by the author (cf. Iser's (1976, 247) example of the novel of the 18th century) we cannot leave this fact out of sight for our interpretation. An author who would produce texts with the intention that nobody else would ever read them, would not be producing literature the way we know it. Cf. e.g. the fictive plot of Gus Van Sant's 2000 movie "Finding Forrester" in which Sean Connery plays such a writer who just writes for himself. And as far as we know it, Vergil may have intended to have his work destroyed after his death because of its deficiencies. On the other hand we have to note *Aen.* 9.446-449. Here Vergil in the voice of the author of these verses addresses Nisus and Euryalus expressing his confidence that his *Aeneid* will be read as long as Rome will be standing. Cf. Glei (1991) 34. For a general discussion on the many questions and problems involved here cf. Dingel (1997) 178ff. And Jupiter had given Rome an *imperium sine fine* in *Aen.* 1.279a, as we recall. And according to what we know about Vergil, he read parts of his *Aeneid* even to Augustus' family. (Hainsworth (1991) 109f. interprets this as part of a general change in the customs of literary publication at the time.) Therefore, we at least have a group of readers with which Vergil had to and indeed did reckon. Instead of practically negating the existence of an author, we better should ask ourselves not whether, but how Vergil, Apollonius, Homer, and others imagined their texts to interact with their readers. What are the consequences if our way of interacting with, e.g., the *Aeneid* differs from what its author anticipated it to be? Cf. as an example Hubbard's (1996, 15f.) list of possible reader responses to Vergil's allusion (*Aen.* 6.460) to Catullus' lock of Berenice (66.39). Cf. also Norden (1927) *ad loc.* Also cf. Olsen (1978) 82: "As an action the literary work is aimed at producing an aesthetic response, so that response is what the author necessarily intends to achieve in a reader." Also see Olsen (1978) 118.

the text in question at a certain point in time, leads to certain evaluations if not judgments.[276] It assesses anew the importance or the opposite of importance that this text can have for the actual reader.

Such an explanation of a text, which tries to come to grips with the arbitrariness of the signs included in a text and the sign that the text itself represents, makes these evaluations more accessible, even perhaps plausible, to other readers of a text. An explanation of these arbitrary signs does not take their arbitrariness away unless one simplifies these signs to one-dimensional entities that they usually are not. At the same time this method eliminates to the greatest possible extent the arbitrariness of the interpretation[277] of these signs by introducing further checks and balances. By multiplying the possible checkpoints for the meaning of a text beyond the readers' response to a given text, we assess the meaning of this text from as many viewpoints as possible. This is a necessary precaution especially as far as ancient literature is concerned where one way to look at a text can only produce limited results. It is in this context important to recognize whether a reader response could be in tune with the author's intention or positioned within or outside of its context in, for example, society. Taken radically, the maxim that only readers' responses to a text are valid responses has a kind of *chacun à son goût* principle as its consequence.[278] But it leaves the possibility open to settle the *explication du texte* for less than would be within reach.

However, I would like to insert here that the reader's comparison of what he reads with what he himself knows as his reality is nevertheless important. Firstly, this importance stems from the fact that probably no one can read something without

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[276] It cannot be denied that an author writes his texts in a certain way to sometimes lead and direct his readers' attention. Cf. Iser (1974) 19-23. Awareness about the phenomenon that an author of a text intentionally or accidentally encrypted his message within a text, sometimes left it ambiguous, and required the reader to interpret it can be found in antiquity. Cf. Fuhrmann (1966) 50f. and esp. 67f. on Longinus 7.2f.

[277] On this general problem see, e.g., Schwanitz (1983) esp. 27 and 49, Grivel (1983) 61ff., Galinsky (1992a) 4-13.

[278] On the difficulties to validate any given interpretation of a text see Olsen (1978) chapter 5.

immediately starting this kind of comparative activity. Secondly, only if a certain text has meaning for the reader's present, will the reader actually read it and recommend it to others. If there is such a supratemporal meaning in a text, the text becomes a classic.[279] For this very reason, when evaluating a text we need to be aware of the differences between the context of our time, which in part may have been shaped by the work of literature we are discussing, and the context within which the work was produced. Then we can assess the features of the work that have spoken to past generations of readers and that affect us. Needless to say, these features do not necessarily have to be the same.

To illuminate this conclusion, let me turn to another claim of Riffaterre. He says that poetry as opposed to prose seems to convey a specific message in itself.[280] Riffaterre has defined poetry's function as "an experience of alienation."[281] I personally know people who would refute this claim at once even today. But to read the *Aeneid* under this premise would be principally wrong from the standpoint of this dissertation, since a text that was cast into hexametric bound language carried with it a specific connotation and was within its genre not perceived as something extraordinary. In fact, hexametric form and heroic content formed a necessary alliance.[282] If the reader were to approach the *Aeneid* with today's attitudes towards poetry only, he would not do justice to the text and its author and, what is even worse, would misunderstand the *Aeneid* in this important aspect.[283] This, of course, implies

[279] Cf. Eagleton (1983) 12.
[280] Cf. Riffaterre (1983) 26.
[281] (1983) 42.
[282] See below.
[283] Cf. Riffaterre (1983) 100. Riffaterre, however, does not explain how he heals the rift between the "context" of a text in the time when it was written and the author who produced the text in this context and as such was necessarily part of this context. He continues (pages 105f.) to say that a reconstruction of the response of the first readers of a text is all that counts. In the case of Vergil's or Homer's works such reconstruction is next to impossible unless we let other texts that are clearly influenced by the works of these authors speak. But in doing that we might find ourselves in a vicious circle. Did the recipient author intend to include an allusion in his work? Are we sure that we describe their new "codes" correctly, because we have to rely on works that were written within a sometimes not insignificant temporal distance. Besides, we would need to distinguish between an intertextuality that concerns the production of a text and its reception. Cf. Stierle (1983) 9-12.

that in order to do just that we have to try to change our own reading habits fundamentally right from the start.[284]

Yet this kills a second bird at the same time. In choosing this particular form of epic poetry, Vergil automatically could expect what kind of literature his *Aeneid* would be perceived to be.[285] We cannot but recognize that Vergil in all likelihood had a very specific intention when he wrote his *Aeneid*, particularly when seen in combination with the *Eclogues*. Thus, in opposition to recent scholarship on author intention[286], I am afraid my dissertation will try to assess this intention[287] as far as that is attainable.

Thus we arrive at what intertextuality[288] will be for our purposes: a descriptive means to illuminate systematically the levels on which a certain text communicates with other texts.[289] It is assumed that at least some of these items and features of a text that are identified as communicating with earlier texts[290] were also intended to be read as such; in the individual instance as well as in their conspectus, all form a substantial

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[284] I do not mean to say that such an approach would not yield interesting results nor should such reading be despised if no other reading is possible or if this is the effect that is looked for by the reader in question.

[285] On the other hand, his own work shaped this very same genre to a great extent as far as later writers and readers of epic poetry are concerned. Cf. on the impact of new works on existing genres Stierle (1983) 7ff.

[286] Edmunds (2001) xif., 19-38.

[287] This is not to say that the "meaning" of Vergil's *Aeneid* is or should be restricted to Vergil's intentions about what he thought his work should mean. The direction of my argument does not want to imply any such "intentionalist" (Olsen 1987, 55) notion.

[288] For synonyms of this term (dialogicism, bivocalism, polylogism) and its meaning or meanings see Grivel (1983) 53-62. Cf. also Bloom (1982) 46: "…, but what is called "intertextuality" these days is an ancient critical and poetic phenomenon, more traditionally subsumed under the broad categories of echo, allusion and influence." Cf. Galinsky (1993/4) 301.

[289] Cf. the definition by Stierle (1983) 21.

[290] While a reader can read, for example, Ovid first and then Homer it nevertheless remains a historical fact that Homer never could have known Ovid's works. Therefore Homer's text cannot allude to Ovid. Only the opposite can be the case. Cf. Smirnov's (1983, 273) demand of a diachronic approach to the systematization of relations between texts. This commonplace observation should serve as a reminder that once again without an author's intention there can only be accidental congruences, but no meaningful allusions between texts. Similarly, without the existence of an author intention there would not be a self-reflexive way of an author who self-consciously calls attention to his own allusive practices. Busch's remarks (1983, 199) about the importance of being aware of the fact that an author might have had an intention when he set out to write a text are transferable to ancient authors.

part of what the author wants to tell his readers with the text.[291] This tool has its limitations in the realm of ancient texts. One has to point to the caveat that, as is the case with all literature from antiquity, much is lost. Among the lost pieces may be some to which Vergil's *Aeneid* or any of the other texts that I will be talking about alluded. Since these texts are lost, the allusions are lost as well.[292] Nevertheless I will undertake a close comparison of passages of text that will encompass a detailed analysis of their small and big textual components and their functions.[293]

Within this context, we need to say a few words about the literary genre[294] Vergil chose for his *Aeneid* and return to this issue which we touched upon several times already. We saw that Aristotle shows that ancient literary criticism was well aware of the fact that a group of texts that shared a similar set of features and characteristics form a genre within literature. The question therefore is what it meant that Vergil chose to write an epic poem.

One conclusion that we can draw from contemporary views of the conditions of literary genres is that allusions within the genre probably do not need markers to the same degree as allusions to texts which are outside the chosen genre.[295] The canonization of texts plays an important role. It facilitates the recognition of intertextual references on the reader's side.[296] We therefore can assume that allusions to epic poems require to be marked to a lesser degree than allusions to texts that stand

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[291] Given these modifications,
[292] Cf. Edmunds (2001) xviif.
[293] This is in keeping with Riffaterre (1983) 98.
[294] There are, at least today, also some connotations that are connected with simply qualifying something as a "literary work". See Olsen (1978) 16.
[295] Cf. Suerbaum (1985) 58f. Also see Todorov (1981) 62 who talks about literary genres as "keys (in the musical sense) for the interpretation of works; …" [brackets by Todorov].
[296] For example, just the preface of the *Aeneid* will have evoked certain reader responses already in antiquity and continue to do so. To assume that its author did or could not anticipate that effect would be contrary to all probability. Cf. Eco (1992a) 65 on associations connected with the typical starting phrase of a fairy tale. However, to somebody who is not acquainted with the customs of epic literature an epic proem remains meaningless. Cf. Todorov (1981) 63. He uses the *Odyssey* as an example.

outside the epic genre. We can observe that the same is true for Hellenistic authors who already play with generic expectations.[297]

However, and this is where we must again resort to a caveat: the loss of the canonized texts, be it physically or from the memory of the reader, poses a problem. And that such a loss has occurred is certain, since for example on the Latin side, we only have scant remains of epic poetry in Vergil's own language before Virgil's time, but we can clearly see that earlier Roman poets like Ennius, Naevius, and Livius Andronicus, for example, must have had great influence upon Vergil's work.[298]

What is Vergil's concept of the genre[299] he chose for his *Aeneid*? In Vergil, the older, Homeric, and mythological epic poetry and the younger, Hellenistic, historical epic poetry of long hexametric poems merge even if Vergil clings more to the historical and encomiastic poetic story of just one hero.[300] *Arma virumque* (*Aen*. 1.1) are Vergil's subject just as Aristotle defined σὄοπρζ and ἥυ as the subject of Homer's poetry.[301] Vergil writes in the tradition of writers such as Homer, Apollonius, Livius Andronicus, Naevius, and Ennius[302], but also develops the genre further.[303] Therefore we can expect Vergil's poetry to rely on the poetic conventions established by these authors.

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[297] Cf., e.g., Zanker (1998) 229ff.
[298] Cf. Wigodsky (1972).
[299] On modern difficulties to define the term "genre" or to answer the question "What is genre?" see Todorov (1984) 82f. and also Fowler (1982).
[300] Cf. Koster (1970) 130, 133. Cf. also Galinsky (1981) 995.
[301] Also cf. Horsfall (1995) 101f. with further literature. Therefore, Theodorakopoulos' (1998, 187) interpretation of this Vergilian phrase as playing out an alleged dichotomy between novelistic *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* as a poem of warfare (Also cf. Hirdt (1975) 114ff. and Froesch (1991) *passim* with further considerations, Nightenhelser (1995) 192 and Higgins (1994/5) 41) does not quite sufficiently grasp the multidimensional weight of the beginning of the *Aeneid*. For an attempt to locate the beginning of the *Aeneid* within the anthropological framework of Augustan times see Alston (1998). On the programmatics and the realities of epic poetry in Vergil's Rome and beyond see Hinds (2000) 223-236.
[302] On the role of Ennius for the development of Latin literature, especially Roman epic poetry see, e.g., Hose (2000) 51f. with n. 107 on page 57 on the Hellenistic historical epic poetry in relation to Ennius. Also see Kerkhecker (2001).
[303] On differences in the reception of epic poetry already between the centuries of antiquity cf. Latacz (1991) esp. 92-101.

On the other hand, innovation within an established genre comes from a change of the intertextual background.[304] The crossing of the genres has to receive much attention in this context.[305] In the case of a reference to a text outside of a literary genre, various genre-specific aspects of meaning come into play in addition to the factors of referencing single texts. In their extraordinariness they may even overshadow the textual reference.[306] And in the course of this study we will come across many instances where Vergil's *Aeneid* firmly rests upon his concept of a renewed[307] epic poetry that merges mythological epic and historical epic, but also adds[308] references to tragedy and other genres of literature at the same time.

[304] Cf. Suerbaum (1985) 77.
[305] Cf. the general remarks by Todorov (1984) 84. See Lenz (1985) 158f. for further literature. Closely related is the crossing of the limits of the medium through which a text is transported. Cf. Zander (1985) *passim*. We cannot be sure, however, whether Vergil's references to dramas are geared to or triggered by the texts or the dramas only or in addition by certain stage productions of these dramas. *Ekphraseis* confront us with similar questions. I will discuss the specifics of each such scene in the following chapters. Also cf. in general on the theory *der Kreuzung der Gattungen* the pertinent and name-giving chapter in Kroll (1924) and Barchiesi (2001b).
[306] Cf. Lenz (1985) 163.
[307] On the paradoxical danger that a genre can become an impediment for its own survival if it ceases to be innovative see Bakhtin (1981) 3f.
[308] Cf. Todorov (1990) 14: "The fact that a work "disobeys" its genre does not mean that the genre does not exist." I would like to add that this kind of disobedience does not imply that the work in question does not belong to the genre whose rules it normally obeys. Cf. Barchiesi's (2001, 129) remarks: "… [epic poetry] is a well-identified and internally coherent literary genre." Cf. Thomas (1996), esp. 244, who, in regard to the way pastoral poetry establishes itself as a genre in Hellenistic times, observes "sufficient parallelism" between the poems of the genre.

3 Sea Storm and Landing on the Shore of Africa

3.1 How to Enter a Poem and to Suffer Shipwreck Epically

In this scene of the first book of Vergil's *Aeneid*, Aeneas and his companions are described as being *laeti* (*Aen*. 1.35) when they set sail from Sicily.[309] The sea storm follows a description of Juno's anger[310] about the Trojans in general and her fear that Trojan descendants will come to destroy her beloved Carthage at some point in the future. The joyfulness[311] of the Trojans therefore stands in marked contrast to Juno's anger[312] and the turmoil it will create for the Trojans soon[313] after their departure from Sicily.[314] As a rhetorical strategem, this contrast between Juno's anger and Trojan happiness is repeated in *Aen*. 7.286-289: *saeva Iovis coniunx – laetus Aeneas classisque*.[315] This deity is what Aeneas is up against without really knowing it.

It has been stressed that this is the first appearance of Aeneas[316] himself in the poem. As such, it has been compared to other epic poems. The *Iliad* has Achilles' first entry in *Il*. 1.58 when he begins to challenge[317] Agamemnon over the plague that is ravaging the Greek camp.[318] This scene is subsequently the point where Achilles'

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[309] This time an emotion is already present in human beings. When emotions start, they normally come to human beings from the outside. Cf. Bolkestein (1968) 12-18. Even *Aen*. 2.96 (*verbis odia aspera movi*) in the end means that Odysseus showed signs of hatred towards the speaker. Cf. Connington/Nettleship (1884) 99.

[310] On the general question of Iliadic influences on this scene see Lausberg (1983) 204-227.

[311] Austin (1999), 40: "… the Trojans delight was the last straw for Juno, and their happiness is charged with irony."

[312] Cf. Buchheit (1963) 59 n. 220. He claims that this is indeed more than just a "*Stimmungskontrast*". Note also Juno's feeling of pain: *dolens* (*Aen.* 1.9) and *saevi dolores* (*Aen.* 1.25)

[313] Cf. Anderson (1930) 3.

[314] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 13, Rieks (1989) 201

[315] Cf. Highet (1972) 10. Cf. also Horsfall (2000) 203ff., esp. *ad Aen*. 7.288. The joy of the Trojans also stands in a certain contrast to the fact that Anchises died in Sicily just prior to the departure of the Trojans. See *Aen*. 3.708-711. Of course Anchises' death also paves the way for the second visit to Sicily in *Aeneid* 5. Cf. Williams (1962) 211 and also Binder/Binder (2001) 153.

[316] As part of a group at first.

[317] Cf. Kirk (1985) 59: "It is worth noticing that Akhilleus' opening remarks to Agamemnon are perfectly unprovocative." Also cf. Latacz (2000) 50.

[318] Cf. Galinsky (1992b) 77.

anger starts about which Homer has promised to write his epic poem (*Il.* 1.1).[319] While this situation is not similar to Aeneas' sea storm, Achilles' slightly delayed personal introduction into the poem and its immediate connection with the proem can be found in the *Aeneid*. The plague as a phenomenon of nature is not used in its immediacy and symbolism for setting mood and tone for the subsequent events, unlike the sea storm in the *Aeneid*.[320]

Even more belated, Odysseus enters the *Odyssey* only in book 5. The reader finds Odysseus crying in 5.82ff., looking to the horizon, and seeking home. Finally, Hermes has come to deliver Zeus' message to Calypso that Odysseus needs to be let go. The wish to achieve great anticipation, contrast, and suspense seems to be the reason for Homer's narratological procedure.[321] But the immediate connection between the present state of affairs on Calypso's island with the proem of the *Odyssey* is less obvious.

Jason's first appearance in the *Argonautica* is notable in this regard. It happens shortly after the proem. Jason looses one of his sandals while crossing the river Anauros in the winter[322] (*A.R.* 1.8-17).[323] This fact will lead to Jason's voyage with the Argonauts. This "anecdote" is narrated almost in passing without making it symbolic, as Vergil fashions the first appearance of his hero.[324] The first expanded scene in which Jason plays a major role shows him as comforting his parents (*A.R.* 1.265f.)[325] while taking care of the preparations for the journey (*A.R.* 1.266bf.). Jason

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[319] On *Il.* 1.1 and the interpretive issues involved see Kirk (1985) 51ff., Muellner (1996), esp. 1-4, Latacz (2000) 12f., and Most (2003) 50f. For a lexical survey of anger and its context as well as expression in Homer see Cairns (2003) 21-48. Kim (2000), esp. 182 points out that Achilles' anger and Achilles' pity in the end of the poem are connected and give narrative unity to the *Iliad*.

[320] Cf. Pöschl (1977) 13 and 23.

[321] Cf. Mackie (1988) 16.

[322] This means that the river is swollen. Cf. Mooney (1912) 68. Cf. Achilles' complaint in the Scamander when he pictures himself drowning like a swineherd who underestimated the waters of a river during winter time (*Il.* 21.282). This is very unheroic.

[323] On details of this "prehistory" and parallel traditions see Green (1997) 202.

[324] Cf. Pöschl (1977) 13.

[325] Aison's grief in *A.R.* 1.261-264 has been compared to Priam's in *Il.* 24.160-168. See Clauss (1993) 40f. and Green (1997) 205.

is pious, dutiful and acts as if he would always act like a hero on the upcoming journey, but as he will not be acting most of the time thereafter.[326] It is especially noteworthy that in this scene Jason's mother expresses her wish to already have died so that she would not live to see the days of her old age without a son who could take care of her (*A.R.* 1.278-291). This motif is important also in the other epic poems, but in a different shape. Jason cannot act against Pelias' will and, under the pretense to get the Golden Fleece, is sent on a mission intended for killing Jason. Aeneas, however, is undertaking his journey to save his father, his entire house, and in fact Troy. In his *pietas* Aeneas, although in Carthage he comes very close to failure, ultimately always succeeds in fulfilling his duties as leader of the Trojans, especially after his father's death. Aeneas is Jason's opposite right at the start of the epic poem. But also in respect to other "first entries" of epic heroes, it can be said that "as always, Virgil has combined and disguised his sources – by transforming them."[327]

Besides being a counterpoint to other "first appearances", the Vergilian scene of the sea storm is, however, more directly founded on Homeric and Apollonian models.[328] As it becomes clear from *Aeneid* 3.707, the Trojans leave the Sicilian city Drepanum[329] before the storm of book 1 hits them. The Argonauts leave Phaeacian Drepane in *A.R.* 4.1223.[330] The result of the storm is that the Argonauts are driven to Libya and beached on the sand of the Syrtes just as three Trojan ships are (*Aen.* 1.110-112 and *A.R.* 4.1232-1236). The parallels reach even the point of inversion. Triton's divine help (*Aen.* 1.144 f.) leads to the landing of the three stranded ships in Libya, in the *Argonautica* to Argo's departure from Libya (*A.R.* 4.1609 f.).

But what can we say about the Argonauts' feelings during their departure from Drepane? Their feelings are not explicitly expressed in the text. But when they

[326] Cf. de Grummond (1977) 229f.
[327] Cf. de Grummond (1977) 231.
[328] For details and the following discussion see Nelis (2001b), 121-123.
[329] Herodotus (4.179) has Delphi as the point of departure for Jason's involuntary traveling to Lybia. See Dräger (2002) 548.
[330] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 58f.

travel the skies are calm (*A.R.* 4.1224). A wind is blowing at *A.R.* 4.1223f. which enables them to make progress quickly (*A.R.* 4.1224f.) on their itinerary[331] (*A.R.* 4.1228-1231) with wide spread sails (*A.R.* 4.1229f.). Just as the author, however, told us in *A.R.* 4.1225ff., the fate of the Argonauts did not allow them to return home yet, but forced them to toil in Libya. Five verses later, a storm breaks loose that brings the Argonauts indeed to Libya exactly at the moment when the Land of Pelops, i.e. the Peloponnesos, came in sight. The Argonauts would only have had to sail around the peninsula and their final destination would have been at hand. The Argonauts must have been glad about their quick progress. Their sadness about the detour that was forced upon them is great.[332] The contrast is made palpable only in the *Aeneid* where the place of the sailors' joy is soon taken by the expression of fear of the Trojans (*Aen.* 1.87) and Aeneas himself (*Aen.* 1.92).[333]

Interestingly enough, we do not hear anything about the Argonauts' feelings during the storm that went on for nine days and nights.[334] But the tone of Aeneas' speech during the storm, wishing that he would have had the chance to die a brave death before the eyes of his ancestors like so many other Trojan heroes, can be found in the conversations of the Argonauts on the Libyan sea shore.[335] It would have been better to die for a great cause (*A.R.* 4.1255), they say to one another.

This feature is also part of Odysseus' lamenting in the storm that is caused by Poseidon who at the moment of his return from Aethiopia finds Odysseus sailing home (*Od.* 5.282 ff.). The verbal parallels between Aeneas and Odysseus' lamenting at *Aen.* 1.94b-101 and *Od.* 5.299-312, esp. 306-312 are striking.[336] But we need to

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[331] Apollonius' account is quite detailed. Cf. Green (1997), 339.
[332] *A.R.* 4.1245 and the following scenes on the Libyan sea shore.
[333] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 13. The shift in the focus from the general Trojan joy to Aeneas' individual speech and emotion is noted by de Grummond (1977) 224.
[334] A rather conventional duration as it seems from *Od.* 10.28. Cf. Green (1997) 340. Already their departure from Drepane happened after a customary time span. Cf. Livrea (1973) 345 *ad A.R.* 4.1223.
[335] Yet, the Vergilian phrase *ante ora patrum* apparently remains unparalleled in epic poetry. Cf. Galinsky (1992b) 77. This will soon become important.
[336] Cf. Knauer (1979), 150 n. 1.

take a closer look at the reaction to the storm.[337] In the *Aeneid* as well as in the *Odyssey* these storms are weather catastrophes for the main hero. They are not the first catastrophes the heroes have ever encountered, but they are the first in the narrative sequence of the epics written about Aeneas and Odysseus. This makes these storms important right from the start. The parallels go deeper, however.

Extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra (*Aen.* 1.92). Besides the fact that this line, modeled on a Homeric formulaic verse[338], has its one and only repetition in Vergil in *Aen.* 12.951[339] very significantly when it is applied to Turnus[340], it also harkens back to Livius Andronicus 30 (Blänsdorf).[341] The Livian *cor frixit prae pavore* is brought into a different shape. *Frigus* has no direct counterpart in Homer.[342] The "loosening of limbs" is as Homeric as the idea that somebody is "chilled" (ψυχρή , *Il.* 15.436; *Od.* 23.216) by fear[343], yet Livius apparently[344] already brought the chill factor into play. We have to note that it seems that *pavor* denotes a stronger kind of fear than *frigus*. *Frigus* has the coldness that makes one freeze at the core of

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[337] "… the changes Vergil makes are significant, as always." Galinsky (1996) 123.

[338] See Knauer (1979), 321. Homer plays with the slackening of limbs. Love is the driving force behind the suitors' weak limbs in *Od.* 18.212, fear of death in *Od.* 22.68. Cf. Russo (1992) 64 and Fernández-Galiano (1992) 233.

[339] Cf. Wacht (1996) 482 f.

[340] His life goes down to Hades in the same way as Camilla's does: *vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras*. This line only appears twice in the *Aeneid*, too. Cf. *Aen.* 11.831 and *Aen.* 12.952. See Knauer (1979), 320 and Wacht (1996), 615.

[341] Cf. Knauer (1979), 60 n. 1 and 321 n. 2. For further parallels between these scenes from *Aeneid* and *Odyssey* also cf. Williams (1963) 270. Cf., however, Blänsdorf's (1995) *apparatus criticus* for Homeric parallels. Hence, Blänsdorf calls this a *fragmentum incertae sedis*.

[342] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 13f. n. 2 and 3. She discusses the various possible meanings that scholarship has found for *frigus*. Aeneas just anticipates the kind of chill of death Turnus then will experience. I agree with Wlosok that *frigus* cannot simply denote the coldness of the storm. Were that so, the word would not fit the end of the *Aeneid*. Regarding Vergil's art to mirror two scenes in fashion similar to the one applied here, cf. v. Albrecht (1965). On pages 61f. v. Albrecht deals with the final scene of the *Aeneid*; this parallel between the first appearance of Aeneas and the last appearance of Turnus supports v. Albrecht's argument even further. If the same word meant different things in both passages in which it occurs in such a parallel usage, Vergil would have missed the opportunity to compare expressly Aeneas and Turnus and in the end liken them to each other.

[343] Cf. Wigodsky (1972) 16f. with n. 68. Also cf. *Aen.* 12.905.

[344] Servius is our witness for the fact that Vergil indeed wanted to "translate" *Od.* 5.297. Servius critizes Vergil for this translation. For a discussion of Servius' superficial attack on Vergil see Gossage (1963) 131f.

its meaning.[345] It has been interpreted as denoting not real fear but "*Entsetzen*", horror.[346] In the context of the sea storm in the *Aeneid*, this coldness has a meaning as well.[347] Given the weather condition described in *Aen*. 1.84-91 a sudden drop in temperature can be expected. So *frigus* has a double meaning.[348] Aeneas can be prevented from moving by both freezing and fear. *Pavor*, on the other hand, leads to panic.[349] Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations* defines *pavor* as *metus mentem loco movens* and he quotes Ennius' *Alcmeon* as the source for his opinion (*Tusc*. 4.19).[350]

If it really is the case that Livius' fr. 30 is the translation for *Od*. 5.297, then we can observe how Vergil presents us with a hero who is more restrained in his fear than Odysseus is in the *Odyssey* or at least in Livius' version of it. *Aen*. 1.92, however, refers us explicitly to *Odyssey* 5.297 f.[351], whereas it is very curious that the Homeric formula cannot be found in Apollonius.[352]

The slackening of limbs, however, is quickly past Aeneas.[353] Already in the next verse (*Aen*. 1.93) he is able to raise his arms.[354] So to speak, his utter despair in

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[345] Rubenbauer (1912-1926) 1334.13ff.
[346] Cf. Rieks (1983) 147 n. 16 who quotes Wlosok (1967) 13ff.
[347] Cf. Harrison (1992) 111.
[348] We should briefly note Seneca's *de ira* 2.2.1 (*dial*. 4.2.1) here. He uses the fact that somebody can be horrified if sprinkled at with cold water as an example for his claim that human beings in certain circumstances cannot help but react in a certain way: "*omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, ut horror frigida adspersis, …*"
[349] Cf. Hickson (1991) *passim*, on *Aen*. 1.92 esp. 841.42. Besides, in Vergil *pavor* appears in the nominative only. Cf. Warwick (1975) 636.
[350] Cf. Graver (2002) 146. Ennius' words in Cicero's quotation are these: *Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat*.
[351] Cf. Knauer (1979) 320 ff.
[352] Cf. Papathomopoulos (1996), 85. But it is curious that Jason keeps his knees supple in *A.R*. 3.1350 in the middle of his trials and Medea cannot move their knees in *A.R*. 3.964 when she meets with Jason in secret. Fear or love seems to make knees immobile in Apollonius. Cf. Hunter (1989a) 203 f. and Green (1997) 278 on *A.R*. 3.964.
[353] For a longerlasting cramp of limbs due to fear see Dira's influence and Turnus' reaction to the sight of the Dira in *Aen*. 12.905-921.
[354] Whether Aeneas raising his arms and praying for nine lines is realistic in the face of a very sudden storm, can be at least doubted. If the storm is already picking up, Aeneas would instantly go overboard and drown. The gesture and its overall meaning in Aeneas' mind is the important aspect of this passage.

the face of the inescapable forces of nature[355] lasts for one verse only. Odysseus does not employ any gestures, but in his despair just wishes that he had died at Troy, because he is expecting to die a shameful death now (*Od*. 5.308-312)[356]. Two innovative aspects of Vergil's emulation of Homer lie in the fact that this is the instance where the reader of his epic poem encounters Aeneas personally for the first time and in the fact that Aeneas expresses a certain envy[357] of others who are in a position he himself would like to be in. Here we have to note the parallel of Apollonius' *A.R*. 4.1251-1258, too, where the Argonauts tell themselves that they wish to have died in a more important cause. However, the soul searching of the Argonauts is illuminating. They wish they had dared to act against their own fear, which they describe as ρ οὔπη ρζ, "destructive". They ask themselves why they had complied with Zeus' order and not returned through the clashing rocks. The Argonauts therefore see themselves as having had an opportunity to choose the path for the Argo. At the same time they indicate that they did not really have a choice because of the will of Zeus, which is thereby openly questioned in its rationale (*A.R*. 4.1254f.).[358] Even Odysseus had mistakenly interpreted the storm that was about to

[355] The storm is approaching more quickly than the one in the beginning of book 5 of the *Aeneid*. The Trojans will be able to circumvent that one.

[356] This scene is harking back at *Od*. 1.237-244. Cf. West (1988) 104 for further parallels of *Od*. 1.237-240. Telemachus expresses his wish that Odysseus would have died among his companions at Troy. For then would there be a tomb and Odysseus would have won glory for himself and for his son. Now only mourning is possible for Telemachus. And further troubles are ahead. Odysseus is apparently not thinking of his family in book 5 of the *Odyssey*. Odysseus is only thinking about his funeral, but only from the perspective of his own glory (Cf. νοέρζ in *Od*. 5.311. It is the cherished goal of Homeric heroes.). This reinforces the meaning and importance of Aeneas being aware of his duties resulting form *pietas* in the *Aeneid* later on. On the other hand, the lack of his care for his companions in this scene is therefore significant as well. It is interesting to note that the Aeneas' and Odysseus' perspectives on the battlefield are, of course, exchanged. Odysseus is listing some events from the Greek perspective, whereas Aeneas is focusing on the Trojan side. Even at this point, however, Odysseus is concentrating on events that go on around him, whereas Aeneas evokes his encounter with Diomedes (*Aen*. 1.96 ff.), but also mentions some of his comrades and their fate explicitly and others in general terms (*Aen*. 1.99 ff.). Odysseus uses the fallen Greeks only to blame Agamemnon and Menelaus for their deaths. And Achilles' dead body serves as the starting point for mentioning Odysseus' own heroic efforts (*Od*. 5.306-310).

[357] Cf. Sullivan (1961) 398. Gossage (1963) 134 argues that Aeneas is absolutely not envious. I will, however, argue that Aeneas' envy does not go as far as, e.g., Odysseus.

[358] Cf. Fränkel (1968) 590 who says that this passage betrays the Argonauts' bitterness.

break loose as caused by Zeus (*Od.* 5.303f.). Odysseus, however, sees the storm as the fulfillment of an oracle (*Od.* 5.300ff.). He seems to ask himself why he had undertaken his journey anyway. In regard to this detail, Apollonius' scene is thus an inversion of this Odyssean passage.

We find a subtler, but nevertheless parallel version of the Apollonian criticism of the gods in Aeneas' words. Aeneas is disappointed that he himself was unable to achieve his death on the battlefield in his fight against Diomedes[359] (*non potuisse … animam … effundere … Aen.* 1.98). His mother Aphrodite had rescued Aeneas from certain death in this fight (*Il.* 5.312)[360] – even if Apollo had to get the job done after Diomedes had wounded Aphrodite.[361]

It is indeed striking that Aeneas chooses his fight with Diomedes as starting point here.[362] For in *Il.* 20 Aeneas fights also with Achilles and is only saved by Poseidon. In *Il.* 20.302-308 Poseidon[363] foretells Aeneas' fate and the situation on the field between Aeneas and Achilles is the model for the final duel between Turnus and Aeneas. It seems as if the duel of *Il.* 20 is saved for later, because the story of the duel between Diomedes and Aeneas implicitly[364] entails Aeneas' mother and gives Vergil the opportunity to sow the seeds of what will be the issue at the center of Aeneas' encounter with his mother later on.[365] Jupiter addresses Mercury and orders him to remind Aeneas that Venus has not rescued him twice so that he can stay in Carthage. The fight with Diomedes (*Il.* 5) and Venus' interference in the Helen episode (*Aen.* 2) are put alongside each other and incorporated into Jupiter's and the fates' grand plan

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[359] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 18ff. This praise of Diomedes connects various passages from *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Cf. Highet (1972) 190f.

[360] Cf. Austin (1971) 56. In this Homeric scene, Aphrodite's maternal motives are stressed. Cf. Kirk (1990) 93. The Iliadic scene in which Aeneas is carried off by his mother has received much attention from ancient artists. See Galinsky (1969a) plates 102, 104, and 105. The fight against Diomedes in *Iliad* 5 has influenced several scenes of the *Aeneid*. Cf. Nehrkorn (1971) *passim*, esp. 568.

[361] Cf. Harrison (1981) 222f. Harrison also stresses the connection between the rescue of Aeneas in the *Iliad* and the Helen episode (*Aen.* 2.604ff.).

[362] Already cf. Servius *ad loc*.

[363] On the political position of Poseidon in the Trojan War see Edwards (1991) 325.

[364] Cf. de Grummond (1967) 40.

[365] See also *Aen.* 4.227ff.

for Rome.[366] Poseidon even warned Aeneas that only Achilles would be able to kill Aeneas (*Il.* 20.339).[367] Thus *Aen.* 1.97f., where Aeneas deplores that it was not possible to be killed by Diomedes, assumes an additional dimension of meaning. Diomedes, in turn, makes his first entry into the *Aeneid* in this scene. Although he never enters the narrative stage himself[368], Diomedes is a Greek parallel to Aeneas' wanderings and exile.[369] Diomedes will play an important role as a Greek survivor of the Trojan War, as an exile to Italy[370], and as a catalyst for the new balance of power in the Mediterranean found in Rome later on.[371]

At the same time the fact that deities intervene with clouds and similar deceptive devices plays an important intertextual role in the entire epic. In fact, Turnus shows that one needs to know Homer and Vergil in order to judge correctly the situation at hand in *Aen.* 12.52f., where he is happy to say that this time Venus will not help her son.[372] Turnus not only confuses or contaminates the rescue scenes in which Aeneas is saved by Venus' gown, Apollo's cloud, and Poseidon's deception of Achilles' eyes in *Iliad* 5.315, 345 and 20.321. He shows certain gaps in his knowledge of Homer, so to speak. Poseidon had explicitly saved Aeneas for the future glory (*Il.* 20.300-308) of Troy.[373] How could Turnus assume that Aeneas would die now? As a matter of fact, Odysseus and Aeneas had been helped in their pursuits by Athena and Venus, using clouds. These clouds never worked to the rescued person's disadvantage. Turnus, however, had not understood the hint he received

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[366] Cf. Williams (1972a) 352 and Wlosok (1967) 18 n. 15.
[367] This is important, because this passage also marks the last entry of Aeneas in the *Iliad*. See Edwards (1991) 328. Poseidon's warning is successfully heeded and working.
[368] Cf. de Grummond (1967) 40 and 43.
[369] Cf. Krickel/Wiltshire (1981/2) 73.
[370] Cf. *Aen.* 8.9 and Williams (1972b) 230.
[371] Cf. de Grummond (1967) 42 and Papaioannou (2000) 194, 215f.
[372] Cf. Beye (1999) 283.
[373] Turnus, however, joins Juno (*Aen.* 10.81ff.) in having a somewhat scant memory about the details of Venus' rescue of her son in *Il.* 5.315 and the metamorphosis of Aeneas' ships in *Aen.* 9.116f. Also cf. Williams (1972b) 326f. Venus, however, seems to remember correctly what she had done to rescue her son in *Iliad* 5. In a passage that is full of reminders of Aeneas' previous trials, in *Aen.* 10.50 Venus asks for permission to rescue Ascanius by *tegere* and *subducere*.

from Juno when she sent him onto a ship to follow a fleeing (*fugiens Aen.* 10.656) phantom Aeneas in the passage starting at *Aen.* 10.633.[374] Juno hidden in a cloud forms this phantom to rescue Turnus, using the very trick with a phantom image she falsely claimed Venus had used in *Iliad* 5 (*Aen.* 10.82).[375] But as Jupiter told Juno, her undertaking was in vain (*Aen.* 10.625bff.).[376] Turnus, on the other hand, regards these cloudy devices as signs of the feminine (*feminea Aen.* 12.53) behavior of cowards (*fugax Aen.* 12.52). We see how several aspects of what will happen in later books of the *Aeneid* have their origin early on in the *Aeneid*. Important in our context, however, is that Aeneas' rescue apparently could give his enemies reason to accuse him of cowardice.

Aeneas' outburst is, among other things, an accusation of his mother[377], who did not allow him to die in battle, whereas even Zeus lost his son Sarpedon at Troy (*Aen.* 1.100).[378] Aeneas' comparison between Sarpedon's and his own case is emphasized in its importance by the words with which Hera prevents Zeus from rescuing his mortal son. Other gods would want to do the same (*Il.* 16.440-449), she says.[379] Instead of rescuing Sarpedon, Zeus should honor his son with a burial at home (*Il.* 16.450-457). This is exactly how Aeneas wishes his mother had treated him.[380]

It is curious that Vergil as the narrator tells the reader the Trojans' location at the very moment when Juno is talking to herself before she sets out to go to Aeolus (*Aen.* 1.34 ff.). Apollonius talks about what the Argonauts see in the moment the

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[374] On the influence of the Homeric *scholia* on this and comparable scenes see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 259-266.
[375] To attribute all help for the Trojans to Venus seems to be a common practice of Juno. Cf. Harrison (1991) 80. On the other hand, Aphrodites' technique that she uses in Aeneas' rescue in *Iliad* 5 is unique in epic terms. See Kirk (1990) 93f.
[376] Harrison (1991) 224 interprets Jupiter's words as admission that Jupiter at least thinks it likely that Juno would try to make the opposite happen.
[377] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 18 n. 15.
[378] Cf. Jupiter's poignant reminiscence of this even in *Aen.* 10.467-472, recalling Aeneas' speech (*Troiae sub moenibus altis* in *Aen.* 10.469). I owe this reference to K. Galinsky.
[379] The argument is in its form typical. See Janko (1992) 376.
[380] But when Hera spoke, Venus already had rescued her son.

storm is breaking loose. In a similar context, Homer says from where Poseidon spots Odysseus.[381] The traditional epic motif is clear in its variations. At the same time, similitude can be found in the differences.[382] But these differences and similarities also show that Vergil alludes more closely to Homer than to Apollonius. This general tendency, apparent from Vergil's handling of the parts of the story, also pertains to the emotions of the heroes.

Just like the Trojans, Odysseus is said to be joyful when he sets out to leave Calypso's island (ξκ ὄωχ ρζ- *Od.* 5.269a). Knauer noted the close parallel between the verses *Od.* 5.269 and *Aen.* 1.35a: *vela dabant laeti*.[383] By contrast, Apollonius is not explicitly noting a feeling of joy on the side of the Argonauts. But the description of the serene sky (ὖσ ηὔγλρζ, *A.R.* 4.1224) and the winds fit for traveling smoothly along with their progress towards their home is just as apt for evoking the picture that we get from the comparable scenes in the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid*: the feeling of joy over the opportune wind (ξκ ὄωχ ρζ γ' ρῦυώ, *Od.* 5.269a)[385].

Just as everybody feels great happiness at the time of their respective departure, so the pendulum in all three scenes swings to the other side. The ensuing events throw people into despair. In Odysseus' case it is a shipwreck. A similar catastrophe befalls some ships of Aeneas' fleet. Finally, the Argonauts get trapped in too shallow waters. These results of a sea storm turn joy into its opposite.

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[381] This passage is alluded to by Vergil in *Aen.* 7.286-292. Cf. Knauer (1979), 150 f.
[382] In order to give just one more example, Odysseus is sailing or, rather, rowing alone, of course, in contrast to the Argonauts who are sailing along in one ship, and in contrast to the Trojans who are staffing more than one ship. Only the Trojans and Odysseus are rowing, however. The Argonauts are said to be relying on the wind. Oars are not mentioned. This kind of differences can be easily explained by the different situations that are being described.
[383] Knauer (1979) 149 n. 2
[384] Cf. Fränkel (1968) 588.
[385] Cf. Ameis/Henze/Cauer (1920) 165 *ad loc.*

An interesting parallel scene to Aeneas' reaction to the sea storm is *A.R.* 4.1701b-1705.[386] In a darkness that makes the Argonauts wonder whether they are still on the sea or already in Hades, Jason is seen in a pose very similar to Aeneas in *Aen.* 1.93.[387] The content, however, of Aeneas' speech to the gods in general is very different from Jason's prayer to Apollo in particular. Aeneas manages to utter a cry of despair directed to somebody mortal who is in addition alive. This cry is delivered in the form of a prayer, but in fact is not a prayer.[388] Jason asks to be rescued and promises many gifts. In fact, the Argonauts obtain a chance to fulfill their promises and seize this opportunity in *A.R.* 4.1714-1719a. This prayer scene is built as if it means to show that Jason had learned a lesson from the sea storm he and the Argonauts experienced a little earlier before in book 4.

Finally, we have to direct our attention to the 21st book of the *Iliad.* Achilles is in danger of drowning in the river Skamander (*Il.* 21.272-283).[389] He says a short prayer[390] that also mentions the fact that it would be shameful[391] to now die in the waters, a wish which also finds fulfillment. Of course, this scene is quite different from the ones we just examined more closely, due to the reason why Achilles finds himself in danger. There is no storm involved here. But as a spontaneous outburst of

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[386] Cf. Fränkel (1968) 516f. and Green (1997) 356f. on the mood of the Argonauts.
[387] *Aen.* 1.93 corresponds directly with *A.R.* 4.1702a. See Nelis (2001b) 455.
[388] Already Servius observes that Aeneas raises his arms, the Roman gesture of prayer, but does not pray. Cf. Wlosok (1967) 14 and *loc. cit.* n. 4, de Grummond (1977) 225, Stahl (1981) 162. Cf. my remarks on the realism of the Vergilian scene above.
[389] It is interesting to note that Aeneas mentions the fact that the river Simois dragged away the corpses and weapons of many heroes (*Aen.* 1.100bf.). He mentions Achilles, the grandson of Aeacus in *Aen.* 1.99 as the killer of Hector. The Skamander had to fulfill the same task as the Simois, but Aeneas does not mention him. A list of two rivers would have increased the cruelty of his account of what happened at Troy. It is as if Vergil leaves is open to the reader to supply the scene in which Skamander fails to bring an end to the Greek hopes to defeat the city. As such, this scene is a good example of Iser's "gap".
[390] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 15.
[391] In this aspect Achilles' complaint to Zeus is different from other complaints that Zeus receives from other heroes in Homer. Cf. Richardson (1993) 75. Therefore, this is as close as it gets to Odysseus' speech in *Od.* 5 during the sea storm (*Od.* 5.312 = *Il.* 21.281) and Aeneas' complaint during the sea storm of *Aeneid* 1. Cf. Richardson (1993) 76.

emotion Aeneas' cry of despair is closer to Achilles' words[392] than to Odysseus' somewhat longer speech which is directed more to himself than Aeneas' attempt to pray.[393] Like Achilles, Aeneas[394] longs for a more glorious death than the one he sees before him. He also longs for home. Aeneas suffers.[395] In addition, we find the critique of Achilles' mother to go beyond Aeneas' words. In an address to Zeus Achilles accuses his mother of telling him lies (*Il.* 21.276)[396] which have brought him into this miserable situation in the river. Furthermore, as I think, Wlosok[397] is not mistaken when she recognizes the burgeoning of doubt in Aeneas about the gods' seriousness when they sent him on his way and guided him through repeated oracles. This kind of doubt indeed is part of Achilles' formally more correct prayer in *Il.* 21. I would just add that this doubt within Aeneas will continue to grow, as we shall see.

When the Argonauts, forced by the powers of nature, had reached Africa, despair (πκ α ἴα *A.R.* 4.1259)[398] was prevalent. In a speech at the seashore the steersman Ancaius, while tears were running down his cheeks, indicated that he did not know the ways and means to return home any more (*A.R.* 4.1259-1277a).[399] Since all who knew something about ships agreed with him, all Argonauts consequently lost hope. This loss is expressed in the bodily symptoms the Argonauts experienced. Their heartbeat stops and they turn pale (*A.R.* 4.1277bff.). After Apollonius then described the mood among the Argonauts in quite some detail (*A.R.* 4.1280-1304), the same thing happens, as was the case earlier when joy and happiness were just the

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[392] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 19.
[393] Cf. Heinze (1928) 430.
[394] For a detailed account of the similarities and differences see Wlosok (1967) 16f.
[395] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 17f.
[396] Cf. Aeneas' words starting at *Aen.* 1.407. Aeneas accuses his mother of deceiving him with *falsae imagines* and of not speaking to him in *verae voces*. Cf. my discussion in the next chapter.
[397] Also cf. Williams (1972a) 168.
[398] Something Jason is normally "credited" with. It is, of course, a pun on Odysseus' attribute σρούπκς χζ or σροχπῆ α ρζ (cf. Jackson (1992) 156) although it has to be said that Homeric heroes may be overcome by the same form of resignation, despair, and inability to act (cf., e.g., *Od.* 9.295 and Hunter (1988) 438f.). Apollonius introduces Medea as the cunning female counterpart. Cf. Holmberg (1998) 135f. and 156f.
[399] The desperate situation is highlighted by the fact that Ancaius is the speaker who raised low spirits in *A.R.* 2.851-858. There seems to be no hope even for him anymore. Cf. Green (1997) 340.

signs of an imminent turn of fate. Now that despair is so complete that even after a sleepless night the Argonauts do not rise in the morning, help is on the way. Libyan guardian heroines[400] appear to Jason at noon.[401] Finally the focus of Apollonius' story is back on the main hero of the poem. We hear that these deities, before they give their divine counsel, take away from Jason's head the cloak that he had used for veiling it (*A.R.* 4.1314).[402] This taking away the veil indicates that Jason did not do anything different from what the other crewmembers had done. They too had veiled their heads (*A.R.* 4.1294) in order to expect their death lying in the sand without food during the whole night and morning (*A.R.* 4.1295f.). The despair of the Argonauts is therefore fully shared by Jason. Jason furthermore does nothing to justify his position as a leader of the Argonauts. He needs an external third party to come and show him the way out of the predicament his people are currently in.[403]

Aeneas' behavior is totally different, even if Vergil draws out the parallels between these scenes as far as they can be taken. Just as in Apollonius, the focus of Vergil's narrative is set on all Trojans (*Aen.* 1.157-173). But Vergil pointedly makes it clear that Aeneas is collecting the remains of his fleet and directing them to the shore (*Aen.* 1.170f.).[404] Achates carries out the first reported individual act on the shore. Unlike Ancaius, however, Achates does not make a long speech that would be even more detrimental to the morale of his people. He sees to it that the Trojans obtain food. The same concern is on Aeneas' mind, who, after making sure that he cannot see any more fellow Trojans on the sea, goes hunting for his people. And after

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[400] Regarding their identity consult Green (1997) 342.

[401] See Green (1997) 342 on daydreams and similar events (Of course, Jason seems to have been awake in this scene.) happening at noon in epic stories.

[402] Cf. on the models for this dream scene Vian/Delage (2002c) 191f. This scene can be seen as the model for the appearance of the *penates* in *Aen.* 3.147-153. On further literary models see Binder/Binder (1997) 144. Also see *A.R.* 1080b-1089. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 459 and 507.

[403] The scene in which the *penates* come to visit Aeneas on Crete is similar to this Apollonian passage. Aeneas too does not quite know what to make of the counsel of the *penates* just as Jason does not understand the counsel of the Libyan heroines and needs to call on his comrades for deliberation (*A.R.* 4.1333-1336). Cf. Vian/Delage (2002c) 191f. and Arend (1933) 61ff.

[404] "Where others throw tantrums and emote, he maintains self-control. Where others look out for themselves, he looks out for others." Galinsky (1992b) 85.

the Trojans eat and drink, Aeneas addresses his people with a very uplifting speech while he himself tries to hide his own anxieties about what the future will bring (*Aen.* 1.198-209). Jason lacks any such leadership abilities. He just gives in to the common mood that has taken over the Argonauts, who simply throw themselves on the sands of Libya (*A.R.* 4.1292) that prevent the Argo from sailing away. Compare this with the Trojans' behavior when they land in Africa. The Trojans consider this sand as part of the safe haven that they just reached (*Aen.* 1.171f.).[405]

Odysseus in the end escapes from the sea storm that is stirred by the anger of Poseidon, in stark contrast to the role of Neptune in the *Aeneid*.[406] Vergil also alludes to it in a way that is very similar to his allusion to Apollonius. There are no complete parallels. In fact, Odysseus comes to a shore where there are explicitly no such natural ports as Aeneas and his men find near Carthage[407] (*Od.* 5.404). Of course, he does not have to care for his crew any more. But even in his despair, he manages to think about what is necessary to keep alive on the new shore (*Od.* 5.464-487), unlike Apollonius' Jason. On the other hand, Aeneas' internal concerns are at least in part justified in the eyes of the reader of the *Aeneid*, who probably knew the ninth book of the *Odyssey*. The haven that Aeneas and the Trojans have now reached bears similarities with the port that Odysseus and his men reached just before they encountered Polyphemus.[408]

Of course, it should not be overlooked that the sea storm in book 1 of the *Aeneid* is fulfilling its role for the *Aeneid* itself as well. For example, the Trojans and Aeneas do not at all look like the *populus late rex belloque superbus* that is feared by

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[405] In passing, it might be worth noting that there is a cave on the Carthaginian shore inhabited by Nymphs (*Aen.* 1.168). But these nymphs never actively participate in the story unlike the guardian heroines in Apollonius.

[406] Neptune's role in the *Aeneid* is not the same as the one of Athene in the *Odyssey* either. Starting at *Od.* 5.382 Athene just moderates the storm, but sees to it that the storm brings Odysseus to the Phaeacians. Neptune in the *Aeneid* does not have any particular destination in mind for the Trojans after the storm. And he lets the storm end completely.

[407] The antithesis Rome – Carthage is of course not only part of the bigger political but also part of the bigger literary picture that the *Aeneid* is embedded in. Vergil follows Naevius here. Cf. Buchheit (1963) 54f.

[408] For details cf. Clay (1988) 197f. Also see the role of other ports in the *Odyssey*.

Juno and destined to become reality because of the *Parcae* in verses 21ff.[409] Unlike Odysseus Aeneas is not able to explain the storm as the fulfillment of divine prophecies. His attempt to pray is answered not by divine help, as was the case with Achilles. Quite to the contrary, as if to spite Aeneas' wishes that underlie his words, the dreaded storm hits the Trojans with full force just after Aeneas' words.[410] At the same time Vergil demonstrates how a real leader of the people has to be in the inverted[411] simile of Neptune and the *pietate gravis et meritis vir* in 151. After the storm the Trojans are called *Aeneadae*, emphasizing both the Trojans' dependence upon Aeneas and the duty the *pius*[412] Aeneas has to face. However, the Trojans now feel a "great longing (*amor*) for land" (*Aen.* 1.171). They all gain the wished for (*optata*) sand of the shore (1.172). This is where Aeneas leads them (*Aen.* 1.170). He is not led as Odysseus is by Athene or simply a victim of the forces of nature like the Argonauts.

This scene, however, harks back to another passage in Apollonius. *Aen.* 1.152b and *A.R.* 1.513 ff.[413] connect a broader context. In Apollonius Jason and the song of Orpheus[414] prevent a struggle between Idmon and Idas from becoming more

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[409] This passage is related with the verses in the beginning of the *Argonautica* that deal with why Jason will have to embark on a journey (See Nelis (2001b) 272 f. and 454. Of course this also recalls the beginning of the *Odyssey*, esp. vers 17 of the first book. To some extent, the Vergilian Juno finds its counterpart in the Homeric Calypso and Poseidon at the same time. Yet desire (Calypso) and rage (Neptune) are quite distinct from Juno's fear. On the human side Odysseus wants to return home and to his wife (*Od.* 1.13; cf. West (1988) 73) a feeling that he apparently did not always have (ρ νές λ γα η ὕπ κ, *Od.* 5.153). Cf. Knauer (1979), 213 n. 1. Knauer compares *Od.* 1.13-15 to *Aen.* 1.12-22. In his opinion, the two passages serve to explain book 5 of the *Odyssey* and book 4 of the *Aeneid* respectively.

[410] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 20.

[411] The simile is "inverted", because it uses a scene from everyday life to describe what is happening in nature. Normally a simile is taken from nature to explain something that is happening in the story. On the statesman simile in general cf., e.g., Pöschl (1977) 19-23 and Galinsky (1996) 20-24.

[412] On the historical background of terms *pietas* and *pius* as descriptions of Aeneas cf. Galinsky (1983) 40 and Galinsky (1993/4) 306f. Cyrus in Xenophon's *Cyropedia* also is a role model in terms of η ωέε ηλα. The will of the gods is recognized as a guide by Cyrus and his court. According to Xenophon, Persia enters the road to its own destruction with the decay of η ωέε ηλα and the violation of oaths. Cf. Gruber (1986) 30.

[413] On the image of the attentive ears see Ardizzoni (1967) 160. It can also be found in Herodotus (4.129.3), Callimachus (*Del.* 231), and Sophocles (*OT* 1385).

[414] On the question of content and context of this song see Pietsch (1999a) esp. 538f.

serious than it already is.[415] Both manage to calm down the angry emotions of their companions. Here, Aeneas alone tries to lift up his downcast people. However, *Aen.* 1.153 (*ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet*), which refers to Neptune through the lens of the statesman simile[416], is in part repeated in *Aen.* 1.197 (…, *et dictis maerentia pectora mulcet*) now. Aeneas is gradually overcoming his own fears and concerns and becomes the statesman of the preceding simile. But he has to work hard so that he can appear to be calm on the outside, while inside he is massively concerned and feeling ache in his heart (*Aen.* 1.208f.) And in fact, Aeneas neither succeeds in calming himself nor in soothing the sorrows of his companions. The food helps the Trojans, whose being tired and worn out is repeatedly expressed (*Aen.* 1.157, 168 in an *enallage*, 178), to recover.[417] But the fate of their companions is again on their mind after they have finished eating (*Aen.* 1.216-219). Besides, Aeneas' own mood is characterized by great concerns, deep suffering, and pretended hope that meant to cover up the first two at least in front of his people (*Aen.* 1.208f.).[418] Aeneas' exemplary qualities as a sympathetic and similarly responsible leader of his people particularly stand out when one compares his first and second speech in the *Aeneid*.[419] Towards his men Aeneas is able to keep the emotions in check that in the face of horrible disaster for a moment reigned free. At the same time, Aeneas' first emotional speech sheds a more favorable light onto his second speech.

Wlosok has pointed the attention of scholars to Odysseus' speech just before he and his companions reach Scylla in book 12 of the *Odyssey*. She emphasized that Aeneas, just like Odysseus, first addresses his companions in suffering. Secondly, Aeneas recalls past dangers, including the Scylla adventure itself. In my opinion, this

[415] On this traditionally epic scene cf. also Manakidou (1998) 252f. and Pietsch (1999b) 138-141. On Apollonius' Idas see Fränkel (1960).
[416] On which see, e.g., Binder/Binder (1994) 145.
[417] *Aen.* 1.210-223.
[418] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 22f. based on Pöschl.
[419] For a similar take on this cf. Wlosok (1967) 23ff.

mentioning of *Scyllaea rabies* in *Aen.* 1.200 is a clear intertextual hint. Virgil wants his readers to read Aeneas' speech against the background of Odysseus' speech and subsequent adventure.[420] As to the goal of the respective speeches, Wlosok says that Aeneas wants to preach endurance, patience, and trust in the gods, whereas Odysseus wants his men to have faith in his abilities and to obey his orders.[421] The difference can be explained by the different placement of the speeches. Yet within this framework we need to observe, too, that Odysseus, in his report of this speech to his comrades, admits that he did not disclose to them what exactly it was that lay ahead. He expressly says that, because encountering Scylla could not be avoided (συκνς ρζ ἴκ *Od.* 12.223), he acted so that his companions would not be incapacitated on account of their fear (γπΐωα ς ηζ *Od.*12.223ff.). Vergil focuses on what Aeneas tried[422] to do: *et dictis maerentia pectora mulcet* (*Aen.* 1.197b).[423] Right after the speech, just as Homer, Vergil tells his reader what Aeneas did not disclose to his companions: his own fear (*Aen.* 1.208f.). Aeneas, in contrast to Odysseus, is described as having personal feelings that he overcomes for the greater good of his men. Odysseus presents himself[424] as the one who is in control of everything and brave to the extent that he forgets Circe's advice not to fight against Scylla (*Od.* 12.226f.).

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[420] In Vergil, the sequence of events is reverted. This applies not just to the broader context with the reversal of the order of the encounters with Polyphemus and Scylla. Aeneas' speech comes after the storm. Odysseus addresses his men when the indication of future danger is obvious. In the *Aeneid* Aenas' prayer has taken over the place of Odysseus' speech. And in using the same phrase (*talia voce refert*) in *Aen.* 1.94 (after Aeneas' speech) and *Aen.* 1.208 (before Aeneas' prayer, cf. also *Aen.* 1.102: *talia iactanti*: "wild words" according to Anderson (1930) 3.), Vergil indicates the close connection between both items. The dangerous storm in Vergil entails many of the details of the disturbed sea of the Homeric Scylla passage (Cf. *Od.* 18.237-243 with *Aen.* 1.102-123.). *Od.* 12.258f. describes how Scylla eats six crew members before Odysseus' eyes. *Aen.* 1.111 and 114f. are less specific as to who exactly sees the loss of Orontes' ship, but stress the fact that this loss is actually seen while it is happening.

[421] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 21f.

[422] Cf. the conative aspect of the Latin present. See Hofmann/Szantyr (1965) 316, but also Kühner/Stegmann/Thierfelder (1955) 120f.

[423] For a detailed discussion on Vergil's reworking of *Il.* 2.299, *Il.* 2.331, *Od.* 10.172-177, *Od.* 10.190-193, and *Od.* 12.206-213 see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 87-95.

[424] Note the difference in the narrative focalization.

We now have to return to the observation that in terms of the sequence of events Aeneas' incomplete prayer of *Aen.* 1.94-101 took the place of Odysseus' speech, discussed above. In comparison to Odysseus' behavior Aeneas' leadership qualities may be said to lag behind those of Odysseus at that point. On the other hand, Aeneas, since he had several ships under his command at that point, could not approach every one of the members of his crew as Odysseus claims to have done (*Od.* 12.206f.).[425] And whereas Odysseus reports that not he himself, but his companions were so frightened by the prospect of what was on the horizon that they let the oars fall out of their hands (*Od.* 12.201-105), Vergil narrows the focus from the Trojans in *Aen.* 1.87ff. to their leader in *Aen.* 1.92. Aeneas is not different from the other members of his crew at the moment disaster is breaking loose.[426] Thus, Vergil attributes parts of the behavior of both Odysseus and Jason to Aeneas and yet creates a new epic hero out of a very delicate intertextual balance. Aeneas cannot retain his self-control at first, but he finds it later on. This minutely detailed description of the enormous internal emotional tension in Aeneas' character[427] in the face of the danger of being completely destroyed after all that the Trojans had gone through and after the final destination, Italy, is so close[428], is put front and center during the sea storm.

In addition, it is Achates who ignites a fire first. He is the one who gets things going, not Aeneas. Aeneas is looking out for the rest of his fleet while Achates is taking care of the rescued Trojans. In the process he finds three stags and their herds. Aeneas sets out to hunt while Achates again, who is called *fidus* in this scene, helps him. Aeneas tries to hunt down as many deer as there are ships (*Aen.* 1.192f.) He does

[425] Just to note this in passing, in both texts the *Erzählzeit* indicates that the *erzählte Zeit* of both passages is quite similarly short. That means that both Aeneas and Odysseus have the same time to react.

[426] His speech to his companions on the shore of Carthage does not mention fear as one of his own feelings but attributes that kind of emotion to his crew only (*Aen.* 1.202bf.).

[427] I agree with Wlosok (1967) 23ff. that the center of this passage is not Aeneas' alleged lack of faith in the gods per se, but the broader context of emotions in which Aeneas lives.

[428] Aeneas' consolation speech shows that Aeneas is aware of what was and still is at stake at that point. He just phrases it in a less dramatic way.

not end his hunting (*nec prius absistit*) until he has reached this number. Thus Aeneas is intending to obtain enough meat for his people.

Aeneas then returns to his ships and divides the booty and the wine. In doing so, he fulfills his responsibilities as a leader and complements the feeding of his people with a consolatory speech whose introductory line *Aen.* 1.197b (*et dictis maerentia pectora mulcet*)[429], as we already saw, recalls *Aen.* 1.153[430] and assimilates Aeneas to Neptune. Just as Neptune puts an end to the sea storm and Juno's onslaught on the Trojans on a cosmic level, Aeneas is trying to do the same on the psychological level. Pointedly Aeneas is called *heros* at this point (*Aen.* 1.196). But what he obviously achieves in the souls of his companions[431] he fails to accomplish for himself. And while Aeneas is portrayed being pressed down by his concerns and fears, his companions start eating. And when the Trojans have eaten and they are not hungry any more[432], they are described as torn between hope and fear (*spemque metumque inter dubii*, *Aen.* 1.218), uncertain whether their other comrades have survived the sea storm. Vergil depicts Aeneas as the one who is especially mournful. Aeneas' sorrow is heightened by calling the lost ones *fortes* and their fate cruel (*Aen.*

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[429] On this scene cf. Cairns (1989) 31f.

[430] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 22 n.35.

[431] *Mulcet* is indicative in 1.197. Cf. Wlosok (1967) 22. Cf. the parallel (πηλὸν ἴρηξ σέβῃ) in *Od.* 10.173. Cf. Knauer (1979) 374.

[432] Cf. the formulaic (cf. West (1988) 95) *Od.* 1.150 where the suitors put away their hunger and thirst. The things next in the feast are songs and dancing. They are called the ἀοιδὴ θ' ἱμερόεσσα καὶ ὀρχηστύς. There is no doubt that Vergil wants to contrast his scene roughly at the beginning of the *Aeneid* and the suitor scene at the beginning of the *Odyssey*. See Knauer (1979) 374 and 482. He points out attention to the formulaic character of the verse. But I think the contrasting effect is what Vergil was looking for here, especially if we take into account Telemachus' speech that follows the description of the feast by the author. Telemachus points Athena to the possibility that Odysseus might have suffered shipwreck and his bones could rot on a shore in the rain or "rolled" (νηχομένου κῦμα, *Od.* 1.162.) by the waves in the sea (An interesting parallel to that is *Aen.* 1.101. But I am not quite sure what to make of it. It is not listed by Knauer (1979) 372.). Aeneas has just escaped a sea storm and some of his comrades are indeed missing. However, Telemachus does not have hope any more of Odysseus' returning. But he is imagining what would happen if that was possible. The result is a mixed picture between hope, despair, true joy, false happiness, and sorrow. After all Athene is expressing her view that the suitors feast arrogantly and with outrage. Any reasonable man would feel anger while seeing the shameful acts of the suitors (*Od.* 1.224-229). Verse *Od.* 1.150 will be picked up at *Aen.* 8.184 again. Further parallels: *Il.* 1.460, *Od.* 4.68, etc.

1.221f.). Still, it is not the kind of total despair that prevents the Argonauts from doing anything at all.

This scene in which Aeneas is giving a speech to console his companions is an inversion of the Apollonian passage where the Argonauts have discovered that they have unintentionally left behind Hylas, Polyphemus, and most importantly Herakles.[433] As a result, they start quarrelling with one another.[434] The contrast, however, is not only that the Trojans have disembarked from their ships and the Argonauts have done the opposite. Jason, struck by πκ α ἴαλ, simply sits there in the ship and does not say a word while he is eating out his χπὄζ due to this heavy blow. While Apollonius does not say anything about Jason trying to not let his emotions appear on his face, the *curae ingentes* can be found in the Apollonian ε αυπἦα ς κ (*A.R.* 1.1288) as well as in the πκ α ἴκ ωλ ς χ ηἦζ (*A.R.* 1.1286). The metaphor *premit altum corde dolorem* is an adaptation of ηλὄ η /// ο χπὄ γθ .[435] This adaptation in my opinion clearly is indicating the difference between the two characters: Aeneas is trying to overcome his sorrow[436] whereas Jason does not.

Aeneas' speech is a reversal of the speech Jason gives to his crew after they went through the Symplegades (*A.R.* 2.622-637).[437] In this speech which is also an intertextual, comic, response to Homer's trial of the army in *Iliad* 1 Jason claims to have all the leadership qualities that were missing in Libya.[438] He says he needs to consider the responsibility to bring back home the Argonauts since they are under his command and adds that he fears for the success of the overall mission of their voyage

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[433] On differences between Apollonius' and Theocritus' account see Green (1997) 230: Heracles is the deserter in Theocritus' *Idyll* 13.68ff. Also cf. Fränkel (1968) 149 on Aristotle's version that Heracles was not allowed to go sail with the Argonauts because of his towering excellence (*Pol.* 1284a22-25.).

[434] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 455. On the Apollonian scene especially in regard to Jason's excessive fear see also Pietsch (1999b) 144ff.

[435] A Homeric image. Cf. Ardizzoni (1967) 271.

[436] *Dolor* and *curae* in *Aen.* 1.208f. do not necessarily indicate "despair". In so far I would like to contradict Gossage (1963) 134.

[437] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 455.

[438] On this speech see in general Fränkel (1968) 214-221, Hunter (1988) 445ff. and and Green (1997) 242.

(*A.R.* 2.633b-637). Particularly *A.R.* 2.631ff. is illuminating in its closeness to *Aen.* 1.305. Jason is concerned about the Argonauts and spends sleepless nights thinking about the issues involved in their situation.[439] But although Aeneas does the same on the shore of Carthage, at the end of his thinking there are results (*constituit Aen.* 1.309). The initiative is on the side of Aeneas. As far as the Argonauts are concerned, Tiphys in addressing Jason got it right. The gods are on the side of the Argonauts. Therefore, Jason can give up his fear and trust that his mission will be accomplished (*A.R.* 2.611-618). Besides, in the dramatic moment when the Argo had sailed through the Symplegades, it was Tiphys who commanded the Argonauts to row at the decisive moment (*A.R.* 2.573f.) and executed a decisive maneuver in *A.R.* 2.584f. Jason is tucked away among the crowd of the other Argonauts. Honorably, he admits that he feels excessive fear in the face of his mission (*A.R.* 2.627), but claims to have no fear about himself (*A.R.* 2.634f.). After the Argonauts have encouraged their leader (*A.R.* 2.638ff.), he nevertheless concedes his fear. He promises that he will not allow fear to overcome him in the future any more (ς λ*A.R.* 2.641-647). Of course, he will forget his promise.

This entire scene is in itself a remake with variations of Odysseus' story about feeding and addressing his comrades on the shore of the island of Circe. The fact that Odysseus narrates it himself sets it apart from its successor scenes in Apollonius and Vergil. Nevertheless, Odysseus' account includes a port (*Od.* 10.141) similar to that in Vergil's book 1. Odysseus goes hunting in the morning (*Od.* 10.144f.). The Ithacans eat and drink (*Od.* 10.174-184). But Odysseus also makes a speech that starts out in a very similar fashion to Ancaius'. He paints a dire picture of the current situation (*Od.* 10.192f.). Unlike Ancaius, however, Odysseus uses the ensuing despair among his men to direct them towards an option that his men may otherwise have

[439] Note the difference between *Aen.* 1.305 *plurima* and *A.R.* 2.633 ς ἄ ναωχ α. Jason is more assuming. Besides, Jason himself has a problem with taking on responsibility for the actions of the Argonauts. Cf. *A.R.* 3.171-175 where Jason makes sure that all Argonauts share the responsibility for a possible failure of their mission. Cf. Fränkel (1968) 337.

rejected after their recent experiences on other islands (*Od.* 10.198-202). Odysseus proposes to explore the island.[440] Aeneas is like Odysseus in his ability to lead and think for his men. On the other hand, he has trustworthy companions and does not need to trick them into what needs to be done.[441]

Vergil compares Aeneas right from the start of his new epic poem with traditional epic heroes like Achilles and Odysseus. At the same time Vergil distinguishes his new hero from them.[442] He also clearly does the same in regard to Apollonius' heroes and, if we extrapolate from that, probably with other heroes of other epic poems.

To summarize this survey of the literary predecessors and parallel texts of the Vergilian sea storm in book 1 and its immediate aftermath: the new Vergilian hero emerges as somebody who feels anxiety or fear in the face of disaster just as any other human being[443], yet does not let his sorrow and anxiety lastingly impair his ability to think on his feet and plan ahead for what is coming afterwards. Consequently, Aeneas is called *pius* here in *Aen.* 1.305, a verse that simultaneously portrays him as concerned. After all, in *A.R.* 1.460f.[444] Jason offers a good example of how a leader should not let himself be known to be depressed about the future.[445] Jason does not care to disguise his concerns while he is pondering the state of affairs before the departure of the Argo. Idas[446] observes Jason's depression and reprimands

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[440] For a comparison of the function of the Circe episode and the Dido episode see Knauer (1979) 217f.
[441] Odysseus' distrust is, of course, justified given his experiences with how his companions dealt with the gift of Aeolus in the beginning of book 10 of the *Odyssey*. We have to also take into account the end of book 1 of the *Aeneid* in connection with the beginning of book 2 of the *Odyssey*. As soon as the sun has risen, Telemachus gets up, dresses, and summons an assembly (*Od.* 2.1-7). The night before he did not sleep. He is shown to us as pondering the journey that Athena has suggested to him (*Od.* 1.443 f.). In fact, already when he went to bed he was presented as thinking about many (σροοά) things (*Od.* 1.427). Telemachus is at that point on a very decisive stage in regard to his growing up in general as well as in regard to his own survival in particular.
[442] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 15.
[443] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 13.
[444] *A.R.* 1.461 in itself is a variation of a Homeric formula. Cf. Ardizzoni (1967) 153f.
[445] This is the first occasion of his typical πκ α ῖα. See Green (1997) 207f.
[446] In mythology, Idas was notoriously looking for quarrels, it seems. Cf. Green (1997) 208. Cf. also Manakidou (1998) 252ff.

him for being a coward while he has such brave and strong followers like himself (*A.R.* 1.462-471). Idas' boast leads to a struggle with Idmon that then needs to be taken care of by Jason and the other Argonauts, Orpheus in particular. Aeneas, however, manages not to instill in his comrades behavior that would be detrimental to the entire crew and its mission and thereby avoids creating additional problems. Similarly, Hector manages to overcome his grief about the loss of his charioteer in *Il.* 8.124ff. without giving up grieving. The circumstances require Hector to find a new driver of his chariot.[447] Hector does not let his grief prevent him from doing what is necessary.

[447] The rhythm of the verses of this passage reveal the tensity of the situation according to Kirk (1990) 308.

3.2 The Sea Storm off Crete: How to Weather a Storm Without Being Afraid

A counterpoint to the sea storm in *Aeneid* 1 is set by the sea storm in *Aeneid* 3 which bruises the Trojans after they departed from another island. This time it is Crete they are leaving, not Sicily. Vergil, or rather Aeneas presents the Trojans as they are sailing through the waves when after their departure they do not see the coast any more (*nec iam amplius ullae | apparent terrae Aen.* 3.192f.) but only sea and the sky (*caelum undique et undique pontus Aen.* 3.193). This scene is marked by an absence of direct expressions of feelings on the side of the Trojans. The whole description of the situation the Trojans find themselves in, however, is full of threatening details.

Aeneas describes the rather quick approach of severe weather from his perspective. A rain system has gathered directly above his head (*Aen.* 3.194) and brought darkness, storm, and heavy seas (*Aen.* 3.195). The fleet is dispersed and cannot hold its course while the storm continues. The lightning even intensifies (*ingeminant abruptis nubibus ignes Aen.* 3.199). Even Palinurus is unable to navigate any more (*Aen.* 3.202). The storm lasts three days and nights during which they can see neither the sun nor the stars in a way that it would suffice for navigation. Finally, days later, the Trojans see the Strophades (*Aen.* 3.205f.). The Trojans take down the sails and make great haste to reach the island by rowing (*Aen.* 3.207f.).[448] The focus of Aeneas' narrative shifts to himself. He tells his audience that he was the first who stepped onto the island's coast. But the agent of the sentence is the Strophades

[448] Verse *Aen.* 3.208 is repeated in *Aen.* 4.583. It also has a slight similarity to *Aen.* 3.290 and furthermore has an Ennian touch. Cf. Williams (1972a) 285. Especially important is the fact that this line is repeated in book 4 of the *Aeneid* during what Aeneas himself calls a *fuga* (*Aen.* 4.575): the hurried departure from Carthage and Dido. In *Aeneid* 3 one disaster is over for the Trojans and the next lies ahead. In book 4 the Trojans try to escape a very different, yet at the same time similar situation. Aeneas' relationship with Dido is threatening the divine mission of the Trojans. Dido's death is looming on the horizon. On the other hand, the Trojans will set sail and almost be caught by a storm again at the beginning of book 5.

themselves. Aeneas says that it was they who welcomed him first, after having been saved from the waves (*Aen.* 3.209f.).

This sea storm rages at Cape Malea as we will hear from Mnestheus in *Aen.* 5.191bff.[449]

> *nunc illas promite vires*
> *nunc animos, quibus in Gaetulis Syrtibus usi*
> *Ionioque mari Maleaeque sequacibus undis.*
> Now show your well-known strength and spirit which you used in the Gaetulian Syrtes and in the Ionian Sea and in the pursuing waves at Cape Malea.

Mnestheus uses the example of this particulat sea storm at Cape Malea and the bravery that the Trojans showed there and in the storm which hit them before they reached Carthage to fire the spirits of his crew during the ship race (*Aen.* 5.189).[450] Mnestheus leaves no doubt about what he thinks the Trojan answer to both storms looked like. But Mnestheus' geographically detailed encouragement brings us to other storms that were detrimental for other epic seafarers.

Odysseus and his companions have just left the coast of the Cicones. Their mood apparently is torn between their grief for their comrades who died in the battle against the Cicones (να ἤπη ρλ ἦς ρυ ο ///ι ἴορχζ ὄοέωα ς ηζ ς αἴυρχζ *Od.* 9.62f.) and the joy of having escaped the danger of death themselves (ωπη ρλ ν α ά ς ρλρ *Od.* 9.63a). This mixture of feelings is in marked contrast to the mood of the Trojans who leave a few members of their group behind, presumably alive (*Aen.*

[449] It fits the picture of the Trojans who have lost all means of orientation that Aeneas does not give his audience any geographical details during the storm. The storm begins shortly after the Trojans leave Crete and ends shortly before they reach the Strophades. In between the two places space is eclipsed by the violent storm.

[450] Both the Syrtes and Cape Malea were considered very dangerous for seafarers in antiquity. Cf. Propertius 3.19.7f. Also cf. the passages in the *Odyssey* in which this place is mentioned. See Knauer (1979) 185 and 185 n. 2. On the dangers of Cape Malea cf. also Heubeck (1989) 17. It is interesting to note that Mnestheus follows the order in which the two storms are narrated in the *Aeneid*. However, he reverses the order in which the Trojans experienced them in reality. Cf. Williams (1972a) 412.

3.190). But their mood is rather joyful when they depart from Crete (*paremus ovantes Aen.* 3.189).[451]

Odysseus and the members of his crew subsequently are the target of a storm. But whereas the initiator of that storm is not mentioned in Vergil, the *Odyssey* names Zeus as the source of the storm (*Od.* 9.67). And there are further discrepancies between this storm at Cape Malea in book 9 of the *Odyssey* and the storm in book 3 of the *Aeneid*. Homer emphasizes the darkness of the storm and the wind that is detrimental for the ships (*Od.* 9.67-71). Odysseus tells this story from the perspective of the Greeks as a group at first. But he will later on switch to the first person singular in his report. The Greeks manage to row to the coast before the storm can destroy their ships entirely. Homer expresses the feelings of the Greeks as well. They quickly take the sails down and eagerly row towards the shore, because they fear their death (γπΐωα ςπζ οη υρ *Od.* 9.72). Their attempt to sail past Cape Malea is stalled for two days. During this period they are, as Odysseus reports, "eating their courage" on account of their tiredness and sorrows (ηπρ ναπάςώ ςη ναΐί οξηωλ χπό γρ ςπζ *Od.* 9.75) On the third day finally they set sail again. After Odysseus has reported that the Greeks were sailing along, the focus of Odysseus' narrative is suddenly set on himself. With the help of an apodosis that has no protasis and is cast in a past contrary-to-fact statement Odysseus makes clear that he would have reached his homeland unscathed (*Od.* 9.79) if what happened next had not happened. When he was trying to sail around Cape Malea a huge wave and a northerly wind drove him off course to the land of the Lotus-Eaters. After Odysseus narrates how he himself was thrown off course, he includes his fellow Greeks again from *Od.* 9.82 onwards when he tells how they were tossed around by the storm for nine days and finally were able to make landfall (*Od.* 9.79-84).

Knauer has pointed out that Vergil has continued to mirror Odysseus' travels from Troy in Aeneas' journey and at the same time to contrast them with one another.

[451] Cf. this to the joyful mood in which the Trojans left Sicily in *Aen.* 1.35. Here in *Aeneid* 3 again joy will give way to misery.

Odysseus' first deed after he left Troy is to destroy another city, Ismaros, inhabited by the Cicones (*Od.* 9.39f.). Aeneas wanted to found a new city. On Crete he indeed founded Ainos. Odysseus fails to sail around Cape Malea. Aeneas and the Trojans ultimately succeed in this parallel undertaking even if they were hit by severe weather.[452] But an even more interesting point for the sake of our argument is to note that Odysseus, unlike Aeneas, expresses that he and his men were frightened by the storm. Aeneas paints a very dire picture of the circumstances of their voyage between Crete and the Strophades. But he does not have to interrupt the attempt to sail around the cape even if one also has to say that it may have been impossible for the Trojans to make landfall before the storm was upon them, since it happened so suddenly.

The sea storm in book 3 of the *Aeneid* is also to be compared with yet another storm that occurs in book 12 of the *Odyssey*. In regard to these two storms in *Odyssey* 9 and 12 Knauer notes: "*Geographische und strukturelle Entsprechungen beweisen die Übereinstimmung mit dem λ, wörtliche und motivische die mit dem π.*"[453] Knauer's words summarize his observation that in book 12 of the *Odyssey* the storm follows after Odysseus' companions have slaughtered the cattle of Helios. This storm then fulfills the prophecies of Teiresias and Circe. In book 3 of the *Aeneid* the storm comes before the slaughter of the cattle and the prophecy of Celaeno. In addition, *Aen.* 3.192-195

> *postquam altum tenuere rates nec iam amplius ullae*
> *apparent terrae, caelum undique et undique pontus,*
> *tum mihi caeruleus supra caput adstitit imber*
> *noctem hiememque ferens et inhorruit unda tenebris.*

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[452] Cf. Knauer (1979) 184ff. This sea storm will lead Odysseus to a place where after the Greeks set their foot on firm soil again they eat and drink first. Then Odysseus sends two of his men on a reconnaissance mission to gather information about the place. These two men do not return because they ate Lotus fruits which caused them to forget about their mission and their intention to travel back to Ithaca. Odysseus puts an end to their desire to stay in the community of the Lotus-Eaters and drags them back to the ships while they are crying. Odysseus commands to man the ships again and leave so that the ships will be saved and the task of the return to Ithaca not forgotten (*Od.* 9.85-104). This episode of course reminds one of the Carthage episode in the *Aeneid*. After landing near Carthage, the Trojans eat and drink. Then two men, Aeneas himself and Achates, are sent to explore the area. In the end, Aeneas himself almost forgets about his mission to sail to his new home in Latium.

[453] Knauer (1979) 187.

> After we reached the high sea and no land was in sight any more, there was only sky everywhere and sea everywhere. Then above my head there stood a dark rain-cloud, bringing night and storm, and the water quivered because of the darkness.

is an almost literal translation of *Od.* 12.403-406

> οο᾽ ςηγή ς ή ñωρ οηΐσρπη - ρ γέ ς λζ οοκ
> ι αΐ πρ ξαλάθ - οο᾽ ρ υα όζ ήγέ άοαωωα-
> γή ς ός η νχα έκ ηι έοκ ωρκωη Μυρ ΐθ
> κόζ όσημ ξοαι χυñζ- ή οχωηγέ σό ς ρζ ΰσ᾽ α ς ñζ/
> After we left the island and no other land was in sight, but the sky and the sea, then Zeus put a dark cloud over our hallow ship, but the sea went dark beneath it.

as Knauer has also noted.[454] Odysseus refrains from telling his audience anything about his own emotions during that storm and the loss of his comrades (*Od.* 12.403-425). Only when he comes closer to the subsequent adventure at the mouth of Charybdis, his emotions reappear on the stage of Odysseus' narrative (Πός ρζ /// ι έυθ π οξηα χπ *Od.* 12.427). But the overall picture that is painted by Homer during this storm is, just as in *Aeneid* 3, very dark, threatening, and dangerous. What is even more, Odysseus looses the rest of his companions as well as finally his ship. He is barely able to get a hold of some beams of wood that help him

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[454] Cf. Knauer (1979) 186f. Also cf. Knauer (1979) 519 for a list of his sources for this parallel. Yet we have to be very cautious. The inversion of the motifs is not as clearly cut as Knauer has assumed. In *Od.* 12.313ff.

> υωη σλ αñ ηπρ ηι ηρκξημέ ς α ήΰζ
> οαΐοασλ ηωσηώ□+ώ γέ ηι έηωωλνάοχφη
> ξ α α ηπρ ναί σό ς ρ ; ὸυώυηλγ᾽ ρ υα ό η ΰμ/

we find an almost literal repetition of *Od.* 9.67ff. (also see Heubeck (1989) 17 and 135f.)

> κχώγ᾽ σ υώ ηπρ Δρυέκ ηι ηρκξημέ ς α ήΰζ
> οαΐοασλ ηωσηώ□+ώ γέ ηι έηωωλνάοχφη
> ξ α α ηπρ ναί σό ς ρ ; ὸυώυηλγ᾽ ρ υα ό η ΰμ/

There is even one more parallel between these two passages of the *Odyssey*. The rise of Eos on the third day ends the storm in *Odyssey* 9.76. The rise of Eos in *Od.* 12.316, however, does not bring the storm to an end. In fact, this storm will bring winds that prevent the Greeks from continuing their voyage for a month (*Od.* 12.325f.). The voyage had been voluntarily interrupted. After their adventure with Scylla, the crew had demanded that they would make landfall at Helios' shore in spite of Odysseus' request to sail on, because he remembered Teiresias' and Circes' warnings regarding the cattle of the sun god (*Od.* 12.272f.). The Greeks are finally driven by hunger and persuaded by Eurylochus to slaughter the cattle of Helios (*Od.* 12.339-352). Thus in *Od.* 9.67ff. the Greeks are not in their ships any more. They are already on the shore.

to stay afloat instead to drown like his fellow Ithacans. Aeneas' fleet survives the storm without any losses.[455] On the other hand, the situation never got as desperate as Odysseus'. However, that Vergil did not include an account of the emotions that probably stirred the minds of the Trojans is more appropriate than in Homer's case, since Vergil's sea storm is less devastating.

Odysseus tells this version of a sea storm once more in book 14 of the *Odyssey*. *Od.* 14.301-304 is a verbal repetition of *Od.* 12.403-406. The same holds true for *Od.* 14.305-309 which equals *Od.* 12.415-419. Odysseus just leaves out some details of how the ship is affected by the storm and the part in which the ship's captain is killed and his body thrown overboard (*Od.* 12.407-414). This passage is put in the context of Odysseus' false story that serves to tell Eumaios where Odysseus came from, because at that point the time has not yet come for Odysseus to reveal his true identity. The storm that so closely resembles the storm episode that he tells to the Phaeacians in *Od.* 12 is now supposed to have happened after Odysseus passed Crete en route to Libya where the crew of the ship allegedly intended to sell Odysseus into slavery (*Od.* 14.296f.). His ship is wrecked, the crew lost, and Odysseus alone is washed ashore in the kingdom of the Thesprotians on the tenth day (*Od.* 14.314f.). This time period is in tune with *Od.* 12.447f. where Odysseus says that on the tenth day after his adventure at the mouth of Charybdis he came to Ogygia and Calypso.[456] But in this version, Odysseus lets Eumaius get a glimpse of his feelings during the sea storm. In *Od.* 14.310ff. it becomes clear that Odysseus feels the pain of the storm.[457] He attributes his opportunity to escape the misery created through the storm by clinging on to the ship's mast to Zeus' own intention (σθ ζ ς λσ ῆπα ι ὔξ ρλπλ*Od.* 14.312). This passage in turn corresponds to *Od.* 12.445f. even if Homer uses

[455] Palinurus will die at the end of book 5 of the *Aeneid* whereas in *Od.* 12.411b-414 the death of Odysseus' captain is narrated as the first loss in human lives that is incurred due to the storm.

[456] Also note the use of a form of νρπἴ θ in *Od.* 12.450 and *Od.* 14.316 for the expression of the friendly welcome Odysseus claims to have received at both places.

[457] ς ρ ςἴ σημ οξηα χπ - *Od.* 14.310b. closely resembles ι έυθ π οξηα χπ - *Od.* 12.427b.

different words at this point. Homer has Odysseus say that Zeus did not let him drift back to Scylla. Otherwise he would not have escaped death, Odysseus admits.

What Homer achieved in *Od.* 14 is clear. He lets the storm directly result in Odysseus' landing on a safe shore without another detour. Thus the second version of the storm is structurally closer to Vergil's account of the storm in *Aeneid* 3. In addition we have to note that both storms in *Od.* 14 and *Aen.* 3 occur after the coast of Crete is out of sight. And in terms of emotions, the difference is clear. Aeneas' storm might not be as devastating as Odysseus', but fear is not felt by the Trojans.

Whereas both accounts of a sea storm in *Od.* 12 and 14 end disastrously for Odysseus in that he is shipwrecked and alone, Vergil lets the Trojans master the storm, but at first they have to struggle through it. By virtue of Vergil's quasi-direct translation of *Od.* 12.403-406 as well as *Od.* 14.301-304[458] in *Aen.* 3.192-195 at the beginning of the sea storm, he creates a certain level of expectation in his reader. Will Aeneas fail just as Odysseus did? Of course, Aeneas' audience in Carthage knows that at least a substantial part of Aeneas' fleet is still with him. Due to its direct quotation from the *Odyssey*, the storm becomes very dangerous. Thus Aeneas' story appeals to the audience not by directly telling how frightened the Trojans were, but by alluding to the turmoil Odysseus had to go through. The appearance of Palinurus in *Aen.* 3.202, who, unlike Odysseus' captain does not have to die, but is just unable to provide proper navigation, makes those who know *Od.* 12 feel uneasy for the Trojans and their leader.

Yet at the same time, the audience of Aeneas' story will be also well aware that the behavior of the seafaring Trojans after the sea storm is over is quite like the Greeks' eagerness to reach the shore in *Od.* 9.72f. when they intend to avoid the full extent of a storm. The self-centeredness of Aeneas' report in *Aen.* 3.209f., which emphasized that it was he who was saved from the waves and welcomed by the Strophades first, reminds the recipient of Odysseus, who likewise focuses on himself

[458] Cf. Hoekstra (1989) 213.

in *Od*. 9.79. The difference, however, is a threefold one: Odysseus has to use a contrary-to-fact statement about his rescue and can talk about his return to his fatherland, whereas Aeneas cannot do so. Thirdly Odysseus makes his statement after the Greeks have resumed their journey and are sailing into yet another system of bad weather and will be thrown off course. But the result of the clearly intended comparison between Aeneas and Odysseus is that the reader will ask himself what kind of adventure it will be that will follow. The contamination of the various storms confronts the audience with an additional, albeit related question: When will Aeneas' story end? The storm in *Od*. 12 is closely followed by the end of Odysseus' account of his wanderings up to this point. He just has to master his "visit" to Charybdis before he is allowed to reach Ogygia and incidentally the end of his narrative. In *Od*. 14 Odysseus, at least according to his own story, has to live through the storm and one more adventure until he comes to Eumaius. Suspense as to what will happen to Aeneas is produced. The reader may ask how many more ordeals there are in stock for Aeneas.

Williams has noted that the *Aeneid*'s following episode of the Harpies serves the purpose of bringing about an "element of mystery and fantasy" to the national and quasi-historical atmosphere".[459] The same is of course true for Odysseus' encounter of the Lotus-Eaters in *Od*. 9. As Reinhardt[460] observed, Odysseus leaves the geography of reality behind in the sea storm of book 9. In so far, Vergil follows Homer. But besides the fact that there is a Harpies episode in Apollonius, but not in Homer, the build-up to the Harpies episodes in book 2 of Apollonius' *Argonautica* and book 3 of Vergil's *Aeneid* deserves a closer comparative look as well.

The start of the Argonauts' voyage to the land of Phineus, who is suffering from the Harpies' destructive predations, is set in the early morning hours (*A.R*. 2.164-168). Even if the wording is rather different, the time is nevertheless very

[459] Williams (1972a) 286.
[460] Reinhardt (1961) 56. He is quoted by Knauer (1979) 185

similar to *Od.* 9.76ff. and *Od.* 12.316f.[461] But since the passage in *Od.* 12 introduces the prolonged stay at Helios' shore and the Greeks use the morning hours to drag their ships to places where they are better protected from the unceasing winds (*Od.* 12.317)[462], we have to focus on *Od.* 9.76ff. Just as Odysseus and his companions have just come out of a battle with an enemy people, the Argonauts have fought against the Bebrycians. But the Argonauts have undoubtedly won the battle in contrast to the Greeks. The Argonauts' departure from Bebrycia therefore does not happen with mixed feelings, unlike in the Greeks' case (*Od.* 12.62f.). In fact, Apollonius does not tell us anything about the emotions of the Argonauts that accompany their departure after they held victory celebrations the night before (*A.R.* 2.154-163).

But there are two parallels between the Homeric and the Apollonian passages to which we need to pay attention. Both passages use a form of ὔθω (*Od.* 9.78, *A.R.* 2.168) to express "setting the course".[463] The more intriguing point, however, is what Apollonius has made of Odysseus' contrary-to-fact statement in *Od.* 9.79: ναῖε νῆας ἥειν ὀπίσσω /// Winds and a wave and the current prevented Odysseus from returning home as we already saw. In *A.R.* 2.171f. Apollonius himself talks about the grave threat that awaited the Argonauts in form of a big wave (*A.R.* 2.169ff.) at the waters of the Bosporus that Apollonius already described as whirling (*A.R.* 2.168).[464] The passage (*A.R.* 2.171f.) itself read like this: ἐγένηι αἴκε ὀμῳὰ λανάων ῥηξ- /// The potential optative[465] is used to

[461] For other Homeric parallels see Cuypers (1997) 179.

[462] However, *Od.* 12.316 (*per se* formulaic; see Heubeck (1989) 136) begins with the same word as *A.R.* 2.164: ἦπερ.

[463] For further Homeric parallels see Cuypers (1997) 182.

[464] The exact nature, form, and shape of that wave are debated in scholarship. Cf. Glei/Natzel-Glei (1996a) 161, Cuypers (1997) 182f., and Dräger (2002) 459.

[465] Whether ἴσαι κε indicates a past possibility is debated among scholars. See Dräger's 2002 translation, p. 115, for the opinion that this optative aorist is used to talk about a past possibility. Glei and Natzel-Glei in their 1996 translation, p. 85, render it as a present possibility. They thus concur with Fränkel (1968) 166. The usage of the aorist optative with κε as denoting a past possibility is rare. Cf. Smyth/Messing (1956) 408. In Homeric language the aorist optative with the enclitic κε is used in reference to the past. Cf. Cunliffe (1963) 220. He quotes *Il.* 3.220 as an example of κε used together with ἴσαι κε in this sense. Personally, I, too, would prefer a statement here that talks about the Argonauts' present and maybe even gives a more general perspective that looks towards all possible

express something very similar to what Odysseus talks about. Yet, it approaches the topic from the opposite perspective. Odysseus talks about the missed opportunity to return home unharmed. Apollonius identifies the situation as potentially harmful for seafarers unless they have a good captain. And the Argonauts do have a good captain. Therefore, so to speak, Apollonius talks about the missed opportunity to suffer shipwreck. Apollonius continues that this threat can be avoided if one has an able ship's captain. And indeed Tiphys sees to it that the Argonauts will reach their destination safely (*A.R.* 2.173b-177). But Apollonius' use of *imitatio* through *varatio* continues and with it Vergil's application of the same technique.

The appearance of the ship's captain is a connecting feature in *Od.* 12.412 where the steersman dies, in *A.R.* 2.175, a verse in which Tiphys succeeds, and in *Aen.* 3.202. Palinurus does not die like his counterpart in the *Odyssey*, but lives on like his counterpart in the *Argonautica*; he, however, loses orientation for the Trojans, who are not thrown out of their ships (*Od.* 12.417b: σέωρ γ' ν κῦζ ςα υρλ, *Od.* 14.307b σέωρ γ' ν κῦζ σα ςηζ)[466], but thrown off course like Odysseus in *Od.* 9.81: σέθ ωη- σαυέσοαξμη /Compare this verse to *Aen.* 3.200: *excutimur cursu et caecis erramus in undis*. Finally, Aeneas is saved from the waves (*servatum*, *Aen.* 209) on account of the eager labor of his shipmates (*Aen.* 3.207bf.: *haud mora, nautae / adnixi torquent spumas et caerula verrunt*.) just as the Argonauts are saved by Tiphys in spite of their own fear that they would not reach their destination (*A.R.* 2.176a: ωκ ηζ πἔ - ςἄυ σηι ρεκπέ ρλ). Odysseus was denied to be saved in 9.79 of the Odyssey: ωκ ἤζ.

Last, but not least, the Homeric ν πα is something that both of Homer's successors we are talking about use in their passages. They do so in pronouncedly different ways. In *Od.* 9.80f. the wave is just one of three things that force the

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seafarers who pass this place. Cf. Green's 1997 translation of the passage. This would be in tune with Fränkel's (1968, 166) assumption that in this passage (*A.R.* 2.169-174) Apollonius describes a natural phenomenon typical for the Bosporus. See also Cuypers (1997) 183.

[466] Cf. Hoekstra (1989) 214.

Ithacans to sail to the land of the Lotus-Eaters. In *A.R.* 2.169 a ν πα of extraordinary size causes the fear of the Argonauts.[467] The wave is like a mountain (ἠολε άς ώ αοϊξ νλρ ρῦυη, *A.R.* 2.169)[468] and is reared up in their path (πι έυης α λ συρσάυρλη 2.170a), looking like an attacker (σα□ρ ς λ ρλνὄζ *A.R.* 2.170b), and is rising above the clouds (α ἔ ὕσἔυ ηι έθ ἠηυπέ ρ *A.R.* 2.171a). It creates the threat, because it furiously hangs over the very middle of the ship like a cloud (σή πάοα πηωωὄ λ κὄζ ο οάε υρ σλνυέπας α λ να άσηυ έι ρζ/ *A.R.* 2.172bf.). We have discussed Knauer's comparison of *Od.* 12.403-406 and *Aen.* 3.192-195 already. But the gathering cloud above the ship is present in *Od.* 12.405f., in *A.R.* 2.172f., where the danger is more exactly above the middle of the ship, and in *Aen.* 3.194 as well, although it has to be admitted that Aeneas locates the cloud above his head and thus the cloud is only indirectly said to be above the ship. The whirling waters can be found in *A.R.* 2.168 and *Aen.* 3.197 even if the whirl of the water in the *Aeneid* is caused by the storm and very intense (*vastus*), whereas in Apollonius the Bosporus seems to be whirling constantly by nature. The threat of the wave is expressed in *A.R.* 2.169f. and 172f. In *Aen.* 3.195, however, the sea is afraid of the coming storm first and of the cloud that hangs over Aeneas' head (*inhorruit unda*). But then the waves continue to rise to ever-higher altitudes in *Aen.* 196f. (*magnaque surgunt / aequora*). And just as Tiphys is the savior of the Argonauts at the end of the description of the adverse situation (*A.R.* 2.175) and just before the conclusion of

[467] The description given by Apollonius is not quite clear. See Glei/Natzel-Glei (1996) 161. For the various textual versions of this passage cf. Vian/Delage (2002a) n. 2 on pages 184 and 186. Dräger (2002) 459 quotes Giangrande (1973) 16 who says that this passage describes a waterspout. Fänkel (1968) 166 tells us that he has not found out whether conditions as described by Apollonius indeed occur at the Bosporus. Green (1997) 236 cites Severin (1985) who encountered a very strong current in the Bosporus flowing in north-south direction. The way to meet this challenge is to zigzag back and forth through the channel.

[468] The picture itself is probably taken from the story of how Enipeus slept with Tyro in *Od.* 11.241-244. This episode or its material was very influential in antiquity. See Heubeck (1989) 92 on details. The whirling water, in this case a river (σρς απρ /// γλ ἤη ς ρζ *Od.* 11.242), is there and the wave like a mountain (ν πα σηλως ά κ- ρῦυη ὠρ 11.243) is hiding the scene. Also see Vergil's *georg.* 4.361: *curvata in montis faciem circumstetit unda.* Cf. Mooney (1912) 164. On other uses of this metaphor of high montains see Cuypers (1997) 184f.

their adventure is given (*A.R.* 2.176b), Palinurus appears on the stage (*Aen.* 3.201f.) after the storm is described and before its duration is indicated (*Aen.* 3.203f.). The difference is, as we said above, that Palinurus is unable to help.[469]

There is even one more passage in Apollonius we have to look at. Just after their encounter with Talos on Crete, when the Argonauts are sailing on, a starless night frightens them (ὕμ ι ὅε ηλ4.1695a). Apollonius informs us that this kind of night is commonly known as "bringer of doom" or "shrouding night" (ς ἤ σημ ς η νας ρχοάγα νλνοῆωρχωλ *A.R.* 4.1695b).[470] Indeed this destruction bringing night does not allow the seafarer to see the stars or the moon. This darkness seems to come either from the heavens or from the depth of the sea. In the end, the Argonauts were unsure whether they were still sailing the sea of the upper world or in Hades (*A.R.* 4.1696-1700a). They finally have to entrust their voyage to the sea because they do not know any more where the sea would lead them (*A.R.* 4.1700bf.). Then Jason lifts his hands to the sky, in tears cries out for help to Apollo, and promises him great gifts in return (*A.R.* 4.1701b-1705). Apollo heeds the prayer and by a burning arrow shot from his bow lets the Argonauts see one of the islands of the Sporades, where they anchor and stop (*A.R.* 4.1706-1713a). Immediately thereafter the sun rises and the Argonauts build a sanctuary for Apollo.[471] We already discussed the implications of this scene for the sea storm in *Aeneid* 1 in the previous subchapter.

Green[472] points out that here in *A.R.* 4 the darkness is not due to a storm. In addition, he says, the area of the Cretan sea that is given as the location for what is happening is notoriously dangerous for seafaring people, because the eclipse of the constellations by cloud cover is aggravated by the fact that there is no land in sight

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[469] On the inversion of the role of Apollonius' Tiphys in Vergil's Palinurus in this particular passage as well as on Vergil's general use of Apollonius' Tiphys see Nelis (2001b) 221ff.

[470] Cf. for the two meanings of the word Mooney (1912) 396. Green (1997) sides with "shrouding". Glei/Natzel-Glei (1996b) and Dräger (2002) translate it as "Nacht des Verderbens". Cf. Vian/Delage (2002c) 142 with n. 3.

[471] This gives Apollonius the opportunity for an elaborate αἶς λρ (*A.R.* 4.1713b-1730). Actually, in this passage there are several pieces of this kind of myth. Cf. Glei/Natzel-Glei (1996b) 203.

[472] Green (1997) 356f.

for a considerable time during their voyage. We could add that the darkness in *Argonautica* 4 only lasts one night as opposed to three days and nights in Vergil. But we also have to note that Apollonius refers with this passage to a text of Callimachus (*Aet*. I 18 Asper). Tiphys is presented to the reader in a situation that is very much like Palinurus' in book 3 of the *Aeneid*. In complete darkness he is unable to navigate. Unfortunately due to the fact that this Callimachean text today is a fragment we will perhaps never now where Callimachus located that episode. But in Apollonius' version of the Argonautic myth Tiphys is already dead when this darkness occurs. Vergil combines both accounts and portrays his steersman as unable to see the constellations or any stretch of land after his crew has departed from Crete.[473]

For the purpose of our study we have to emphasize yet once more that Apollonius delivers the background of emotions that accompany such a situation. The night instills fear in *A.R*. 4.1695 as we already saw. And the darkness leaves the Argonauts in want of means (πκ α ἐρ ς ῆ *A.R*. 4.1701) to influence the direction of their voyage in a meaningful way. Ἄπκ α ῖα is something that normally is a feature of Jason who this time knows a way out as he starts to pray. His prayer gesture makes Jason similar to the Aeneas in the sea storm of book 1 (*Aen*. 1.93).

A further storm scene from Apollonius' work also has to be brought into the discussion even if only for the sake of showing that not all epic storm scenes are related to each other.

The Argonauts just have successfully driven away the Ares birds on the island of Aretias (*A.R*. 2.1080ff.), when the sons of Phrixus are hit by a storm while they are sailing at night nearby. Their ship breaks asunder. The four sons cling to a beam from the ship and are washed ashore, where they then meet the Argonauts. The storm rages on. It even intensifies with heavy rain after the sons have indeed reached the shore (*A.R*. 2.1115ff.). Finally the bad weather ceases at dawn (*A.R*. 2.1093-1122a).[474] As such this storm in its entirety is probably best paralleled with the sea storm of book 1

[473] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 221f.
[474] Fränkel (1968) 287-290 suspected the passage 2.1106-1122 to be distorted if not corrupted.

of the *Aeneid*[475] and with the Homeric shipwrecks in *Od.* 5.2911-332 and *Od.* 12.403-425.[476] Since the Argo was unsinkable, Apollonius takes advantage of the opportunity to vary the Homeric scenes just mentioned and also to mix this with his knowledge of the storm of *Od.* 9.67-78.[477]

The structural and thematic differences between Vergil's sea storm in *Aen.* 3 and this storm in book 2 of the *Argonautica*, however, are quite considerable. There is no shipwreck in *Aen.* 3. In this storm scene from *A.R.* 2 the storm fulfills a higher purpose. With it Zeus and the gods want to help the Argonauts to find a way to approach Aietes (*A.R.* 2.1098f., 1110ff., and 1120bff.).[478] Whereas Odysseus is finally saved by the will of the gods in book 12 and 14[479] of the *Odyssey*, we do not find any trace of divine interference in the sea storm of *Aeneid* 3. There are a few parallel features, however. The storm lets the waves rise (υωη γἔ ν πα *A.R.* 2.1102). This corresponds once more with *Aen.* 3.196bf.: *magnaque surgunt aequora.* The clouds take away the possibility to navigate with the help of the stars. This is given much more prominence in Aeneas' account than in the Apollonius' narrative of the author (*A.R.* 2.1104bf., *Aen.* 3.198f. and 200-204). Apollonius lacks the Vergilian focus on the steersman. Apollonius again describes the emotions of the four sons of Phrixus. They are afraid of dying in the storm and tremble (ωχξηυὅ ςυρπέρ ςηζ οη υρ *A.R.* 2.1106b). Their fear is justified, because Apollonius tells us that there was not much that stood between them and the end of their lives (σαυἔμ ὃοἵξρ α ἁςρλρ *A.R.* 2.1113b). The shipwrecked Argonauts are grieved (ω αοὄθ ςηζ *A.R.* 2.1114b) in this gloomy night (ὕ ᾽ὗσὅ οχξαἵκ *A.R.* 2.1120a). But the geographical location of the storm and the placement of the storm within the context

[475] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 492.
[476] It is interesting to note that Odysseus' version of the sea storm in book 14 of the Odyssey does not explicitly mention the destruction of the ship. *Od.* 12.420-423 has no direct parallel in *Od.* 14 in spite of the otherwise great extent of parallels between the two storm scenes.
[477] Cf. Green (1997) 249.
[478] On the divine plan that underlies the storm in a very natural way see Fränkel (1968) 283f. and 286.
[479] In *Od.* 14 Zeus' goodwill towards Odysseus is of course part of the fiction, but also part of the parallel between *Od.* 12 and *Od.* 14.

of the respective epic poem[480] are quite different. Beyond elements that are quite typical for any sea storm, this scene from *A.R.* 2 probably cannot be compared to the sea storm of *Aen.* 3.

On the other hand, there is also the brief description of a storm in *A.R.* 4.578-595a. Although not everything is comparable to the *Aeneid*, since after all the Argo herself speaks (*A.R.* 4.580b-583 and 592a), there are a few interesting parallel details. The storm rages in darkness (*A.R.* 4.592). The Argonauts are depressed by this storm and Castor and Polydeuces pray to the gods (*A.R.* 4.592b-595a). Castor and Polydeuces, however, are actually ordered to pray (*A.R.* 4.588bff.). And the storm is caused by Hera (*A.R.* 4.578f.). Her intention connected with this storm, in contrast to the sea storm in *Aeneid* 1, is actually beneficial for the victims of the storm. Hera wants the Argonauts to complete their journey, but needs them to sail to Circe in order to attone for murdering Apsyrtus and thereby to forego the anger of Zeus.

We therefore see the use that Vergil made of both the *Odyssey* and the *Argonautica*.[481] Vergil paints a very dark and frightening picture of a sea storm. However, the Trojans and Aeneas do not show any kind of emotion or feeling during the sea storm at Cape Malea. In fact, later on in book 5 of the *Aeneid*, Mnestheus praises his fellow crewmembers for their bravery during that storm of book 3. Apollonius' Argonauts as well as to a lesser extent Homer's Odysseus supply the emotional background, so to speak, that Vergil's readers in all likelihood expected the Trojans to have experienced during the sea storm. Did Aeneas' way of telling a story that was apt to instill fear in his audience impress his Carthaginian audience when he did not mention his own and the Trojans' feelings? Mnestheus could not but praise the behavior of his comrades during the sea storms in books 1 and 3 of the *Aeneid*. Otherwise he would not have achieved his goal.

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[480] The passage comes after the episode of the Ares birds. Even if they are somewhat similar to harpies, the sons of Phrixus do not encounter them any more.
[481] Also cf. Nelis (2001b) 35f.

In sum, however, we see that, looked at from the point of the literary tradition of comparable scenes, the phrase *solvuntur frigore membra* in *Aen.* 1.92 has nothing to do with real fear. This result will be corroborated by the following examination of the philosophical attitudes to sea storms and their dangers.

3.3 Facing Death on High Seas: Philosophical Implications

I would like to defer the discussion of some of the issues involved in the previous subchapters until we can more fully see the scope of the motives[482] of which these emotions are an important part. In the meantime I will turn to the philosophical discussion about the fear of natural disasters and the importance of not letting the emotions be a distraction from the tasks at hand. There are a surprising number of relevant passages in philosophical writings on ethics that have, as far as I can see, never been brought into the exegesis of this passage.

First we have to look at the third book of Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachaea*. Aristotle presents us with a discussion of the meaning of natural disasters in regard to our emotions. In his discussion of the individual virtues, Aristotle turns to courage[483] first (*EN* 1115a4ff.).[484] He repeats his definition of γυπῖα as πηῶδ ς κζ σηί ι ὅε ρχζ ναί ἀυυκ (*EN* 1115a6f.). Aristotle subsequently asks first what fearful things there are in the face of which human beings can show their courage (*EN* 1115a24f.). He concludes by saying that death is the most fearful thing (*EN* 1115a26). Aristotle, however, denies that one can be called courageous if one dies as a consequence of disease or drowning at sea (*EN* 1115a28f.).

The relevance of this passage from Aristotle's *EN* is demonstrated through *Aen*. 1.91: *praesentem viris intentant omnia mortem*.[485] Knauer lists three parallels for

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[482] Pöschl (1977) 35ff. points out that already Aeneas' first words come in the disguise of a simple quote from Homer, but open up the entire plot of the *Aeneid*.

[483] On certain systematic problems with the position of courage (γυπῖα) within Aristotle's structure of emotions see Deslauriers (2003) 187 n. 1 with further literature. On the difficulties surrounding the translation of Greek γυπῖα into Latin *virtus* see McDonnell (2003). On the Vergilian usage of *virtus* see Eisenhut (1975) 65.

[484] For a brief general overview over the treatment of courage in Aristotle's philosophy cf. Fortenbaugh (2002) 69f.

[485] Raabe (1974) 74f. points out that actually not many Trojans really die in the end. He concludes that it must be Vergil's goal in this scene to dramatize Juno's fury and to enable Vergil to give his primary hero a more effectful background for his entry. (On this also cf. Pöschl (1977) 13.) Whereas Raabe certainly has a point, I would argue that this does not exhaust Vergil's motivation for writing the scene the way he did.

this Vergilian verse in Homer.[486] They lead us to the Odyssean sea storm of book 5. But the difference between the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* is significant. In *Od.* 5.305b Odysseus himself states clearly that he sees his end coming in the storm. The adjective ω ζ leaves no doubt. Like the courageous man, even the skilled sailor Odysseus sees no chance for ωθ ς κυΐα (*EN* 1115b2).[487] Knauer's second Homeric parallel is *Od.* 5.389. Here Homer in the voice of the author tells the reader that while Odysseus had to endure a storm that lasted two nights and two days (*Od.* 5.388f.), he continuously had his death (οη υρζ) before his eyes. Homer thus indicates that Odysseus had to suffer from fear of his death. The irony behind Odysseus' fear is that the reader already knows that Odysseus' destiny has already been decided by the gods. Poseidon only could make Odysseus' return more burdensome, but he could not prevent it from happening in the end. Even Odysseus himself had trusted Calypso's words and recalls her oracle which foretells that Odysseus will return home after much hardship during the sea storm (*Od.* 5.301). Odysseus does not need to fear death, but he does. His trust had worn thin.

Knauer's third parallel is a simile in the *Iliad* (15.628). When he is attacking the Greeks, Hector is compared to a huge wave in a fierce storm that falls into a ship. The sailors feel fear (ς υρπέρχωλγέ ς η ι υέ α α ς αλο γηγλΰς ηζ, *Il.* 15.627f.), because only narrowly they escape the storm and death (ς χς ὅ ξἄυ ὗσἔν α άς ρλρ ι έυρ ς αλ, *Il.* 15.628). Apparently the storm is so strong that even α ς αλ- whom we can suspect to be quite experienced at what they are doing, are not

[486] Cf. Knauer (1979) 372.

[487] It is interesting to note that Odysseus really should be an experienced seafarer – at least by now. Odysseus was addressed as somebody who had to have among other experiences also sailing expertise already in Homer's proem of the *Odyssey*: σ ροΰς υρσ ρζ (*Od.* 1.1; on the many meanings and interpretations of this adjective see West (1988) 69f.). As a compound adjective starting with σ ροχ-, this word indicates a notable feature of Odysseus. Cf. Stanford (1950) 108. Cf. the subsequent interpretations of Odysseus' character that hinge on the interpretation of the ambiguous word: Stanford (1964) 99. In this context one should not overstate the fact that the stars which Odysseus uses for navigation in *Od.* 5.269-281 do not allow any conclusions as to what path Odysseus exactly followed. (For a discussion of that see Hannah [1997].) To account for that would probably be a little too much to ask from a poet who not necessarily has to be an astronomer. If one takes Odysseus' experience with the sea and its weather into account, the storm appears to be even more dangerous in its rage.

quite certain whether they will survive. The strength of the storm is the decisive factor that triggers the sailors' anxiety.

These feelings tie in with what Aristotle writes. Aristotle describes the nature of the courageous man's feelings at sea (ὰοαςς α) in quite some detail (*EN* 1115a35 – 1115b4). He does so by comparing a courageous man to a man who lives on or by the sea (αοὰςς λρζ). The seaman on the sea is able to direct his behavior according to experience, whereas the inexperienced seafarer does not see how he can be saved. If that is happening already in calm weather, we can extrapolate, it will be even more so in a storm. Later on, Aristotle admits that the degree and size of things that are endurable differ from individual to individual (*EN* 1115b9f.). Therefore, if Odysseus is frightened by what he has to face, that tells us something about the magnitude of Poseidon's anger and storm. We do not have to assume automatically that Odysseus is a coward from the Aristotelian point of view.

In addition, according to Aristotle, the inexperienced but courageous man will be displeased with this kind of death by drowning (/// ναΐ ςὅ ὰ αςρ ςὅ ςρλρ ςρ γχω πναΐ ρχωλ /*EN* 1115b2f.).[488] This is indeed the case in the *Odyssey* as we hear from Odysseus himself (*Od*. 5.306-312). Odysseus longs for what in Aristotle's eyes is a death in which one can show one's courage: death in battle (*EN* 1115a30). Just as Odysseus points out that the Greeks would have given him a glorious funeral and would sing his praises had he died in battle, Aristotle emphasizes that public honors which are bestowed on the victims of battle indicate that death in battle indeed is assumed to be the most noble of deaths (*EN* 1115a31f.).

Aristotle claims that it is possible to die courageously in a situation where one can either defend oneself or die a noble death.[489] But, he says, that is impossible in the case of death in a shipwreck (*EN* 1115b4ff.). Aristotle agrees with Odysseus who

[488] On the following discussion in Aristotle also cf. Deslauriers (2003) 188-192.
[489] The issue of the difference between the ability to choose as part of one's courageous deeds on the battlefield and the inevitability of a seastorm is also raised by Deslauriers (2003) 189 and Lear (2004) 150f.

says that the death he is about to face in the sea storm is pitiful (οηχξαοέρζ ά ας ρζ- *Od*. 5.312). The same thought is on Achilles' mind when he is in danger of being overwhelmed by the waters of the angry Scamander in *Iliad* 21.281. He, too, expects to die a pitiful death (οηχξαοέρζ ά ας ρζ) now instead of a noble death in battle from the hands of Hector.[490] Nothing in Achilles' words had indicated that he was afraid of dying *per se*. He just expressed dismay at his mother's supposed lie and the kind of death he was about to die. Homer had introduced Achilles' prayer by saying that Achilles was lamenting while turning his eyes towards the sky (κοπΐγκζ γ' πθ μη γὼ ηζ ρ υα ὅ η υΰ ; *Il*. 21.272). Dismay rather than fear can perhaps be read from this introduction. Also, Achilles' words emphasize the shamefulness of his situation. Achilles sees himself trapped in the water just like a young, probably inexperienced swineherd who in the winter tries to cross a swollen river. The swineherd would have had time to think and to avoid the trouble, but apparently did not use much foresight.[491] Achilles' words thereby maybe even show some degree of indignation about himself as well. It is left to Poseidon to paint a different picture when he and Athena come to Achilles' rescue.[492] He addresses Achilles with a customary[493] prohibitive: κοπΐγκ- πΐ̈ς ' υ ς λοΐ̈κ ς υέη πΐ̈ς η ς λ ς άυε ηλ (*Il*. 21.288). Achilles' anxiety is addressed twice in one sentence. However, since Homer attributes these words to Poseidon, we cannot be sure whether Poseidon describes the reality of the situation or whether he has other motives in mind that let him use a little exaggeration to answer Achilles' swineherd comparison and to appeal to Achilles' courage.

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[490] Achilles looks for the best warrior (υλω ρζ, *Il*. 279) on the other side. Aeneas does the same in addressing Diomedes (*fortissimus*, *Aen*. 1.96). Cf. Stahl (1981) 163. After all, Diomedes survived the war, Achilles did not. Also cf. *Il*. 6.98f.: Helenus puts Diomedes before Achilles as a warrior.

[491] Cf. Jason who looses his sandal in the river Anauros. See above.

[492] This can be seen as the model for Neptune coming to Aeneas' rescue in *Aeneid* 1. It foreshadows Aeneas' being like Achilles, too. Hence *Aen*. 1.92 is recalled at the end of the epic. I owe this thought to K. Galinsky.

[493] Cf. Richardson (1993) 76.

In the *Aeneid* we are not so lucky to have the gods describing Aeneas' emotions while they intervene on Aeneas' behalf. After Aeneas' address of his former comrades-in-arms and of Diomedes the storm already breaks loose. The storm is moving quickly and intensely. To assume simply that Aeneas' typically Roman inexperience as a sailor let him be timid in the face of the storm[494] is not enough. Even if Aeneas' father Anchises was supposed to be a shepherd on Mt. Ida when he encountered Aphrodite[495], after so many years at sea, his son Aeneas could not be called an inexperienced sailor anymore.[496] Rather his experience increases the violence of the storm, just as was the case with Odysseus. In fact, we will see Aeneas again only at *Aen.* 1.170, after the storm is already over. Aeneas has assumed his leadership duties again and looks to it that the exhausted crew has a chance to recover.[497] We can surmise that he probably did not cease doing so, but only wished for a brief moment in *Aen.* 1.93-101 it had been otherwise. Later on in *Aen.* 1.450f. we hear that Aeneas' *timor* is taken away from him for the first time and he dares to hope that rescue is possible in the end. *Salus* (*Aen.* 1.451) is the Latin equivalent for the Greek σῳ ς κυΐα. This observation ties in with Arist. *EN* 1115b2 and Aristotle's remark that somebody[498] in a sea storm will not see that rescue is possible. So in order to determine Aeneas' emotions during the prayer in the face of the upcoming storm, we have to look at Aeneas' words and their introduction by Vergil.

Vergil did not simply stop at fusing his *aemulatio* of an *Odyssey* passage with Livius' translation of it. Vergil also wanted to weld *Od.* 5.297 and *Il.* 21.272 in his

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[494] Cf. Gossage (1963) 132f. This passage plays on the Roman's extraordinary fear of sea-faring. Cf. Horace's *propemptikon* to Vergil. Cf., however, Schulz (2005) 149f. for a skeptical view of the claim that the Romans were particularly afraid of the sea.
[495] Cf. the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*.
[496] According to Aristotle, already a calm sea would have been sufficient to scare a man without experience in seafaring.
[497] This is in tune with the overall picture of Aeneas that Vergil gives his readers. Cf. Galinsky (1981) 1001f.
[498] Who admittedly is contrasted with an experienced sailor. See above.

version at *Aen.* 1.92f.[499] It is curious that Vergil in transforming Livius' translation of *Od.* 5.297[500] leaves out the Livian *prae pavore* and replaces it with the ablative of *frigus*.[501] This coldness will be the coldness of death in *Aen.* 12.951. I earlier discussed whether Vergil wrote this with an eye on Aristotle's discussion about death in shipwreck and in battle. But even if in book 1 *frigus* is supposed to mean the coldness of fright, it is certainly not *pavor*, panic. In comparison, it seems, Odysseus is more frightened than Aeneas. Aeneas rather acts like Achilles, sighs, and is dismayed. Achilles' reaction to Skamander's onslaught is later interpreted by Poseidon, even if rather benevolently, as fear. But we may indeed doubt whether Achilles would describe it as such.

A courageous man is fearless (γπῆζ) on the sea as in sickness, according to Aristotle (*EN* 1115a35–b2). His point at that stage of his discussion apparently is that a courageous man does not have a chance to show his courage in that situation. Later on, after stating that there are limits to the degree of horrors that are endurable, Aristotle points out that the courageous man is as fearless as a human being can be (*EN* 1115b10f.). He defines the courageous man as one who fears and endures what is right to fear and to endure (γη, *EN* 1115b17).[502] For Aristotle also dismisses courage in situations in which courage is born out of ignorance (*EN* 1116b8)[503] or

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[499] Cf. Knauer (1979) 372. Knauer thinks *Il.* 21.272 further removed from *Aen.* 1.93 than *Od.* 5.279 from *Aen.* 1.92. But Aeneas just assumes the typical Roman gesture of prayer (Cf. Lobe (1999) 160-167, esp. 163) rather than just looking to the sky like Odysseus which, however, is also a gesture of prayer already in Homer (Cf. Lobe (1999) 165).

[500] Cf. Austin (1971) 55.

[501] Vergil is writing his poem with the help of Homeric and Livian verse *formulae*. He continues the work of epic poetry. Cf. Beye (1999) 273f. who defends Vergil from "cannibalism" of the works of his predecessors. Already Homer had proven that art has indeed much to do with craftsmanship. They are not mutually exclusive. Cf. Patzer (1972) 10.

[502] Cf. Kosman (1982) 108f.

[503] This discussion stands in the wider context of the beginning of book 3 of the *NE* where Aristotle talks about responsibility. Somebody is only responsible for what he does if he does not voluntarily what he does. The absence of force and ignorance during an action are fundamental for being able to call this action voluntary. This definition, of course, entails further problems. Basically, however, what we can say is this. Intended actions rest upon a decision. These are directed towards a certain goal. These goals may be subject to permanent attitudes or dispositions. These attitudes or dispositions in

simply out of a false disposition (*EN* 1115b33ff.).[504] Aristotle adds that the courageous man fears and endures for the right purpose (ρῦ ηνα- *EN* 1115b17), i.e. ultimately virtue (υτ ἦ- *EN* 1115b13). Also the right manner and the right time of his fear (ὥζ γη ναί ς η) are important (*EN* 1115b18).

Odysseus has no apparent reason to fear the storm, since Zeus has promised him to return home. Ironically, he would have every reason to fear the storm, because Poseidon is his adversary, but Odysseus does not know it. Achilles probably is rather dismayed at the situation in which he finds himself and blames the gods and especially his mother for it. As Poseidon[505] explains to him, he is wrong about his accusation (*Il.* 21.289-292). Aeneas, unlike Achilles and Odysseus, is not the primary victim of the deity's wrath and her storm. In fact, some of his companions are hit by it – *miserabile visu* (*Aen.* 1.111).[506] It is as if Aeneas sees what the reader is told.[507] Juno's wrath aims at Aeneas' and the Trojans' death (*Aen.* 1.37-49; 91) even if fate forbids Juno to kill them as Juno herself knows very well (*Aen.* 1.39). And Aeneas should know by now, as we will hear later when he tells his and the Trojans' wanderings, he is destined to bring Troy to Latium. Aeneas is nevertheless without a doubt entitled to fear something which, in an Aristotelian sense, is beyond human capacity to endure. He fears the storm at the right moment. Whether he fears it in the right manner seems not to be a question that can be really asked, for, as Aristotle puts it, there is no room to show noble deeds against nature. All Aeneas can do is pity his

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turn can be subject to decisions. This fact in turn shows our responsibility for these dispositions and attitudes as well. Cf. Rapp (1995) 132f. Also see introduction.

[504] Cf. Kosman (1982) 112f.: "My anger or jealousy may not be an emotion which I choose, and yet it may be true that I have become a person disposed to such anger or jealousy by a series of actions that would make it perfectly reasonable to describe my character as something I have chosen."

[505] Interestingly enough, Poseidon does not introduce himself by name. Cf. Richardson (1993) 76.

[506] The spectacle that arouses pity is, of course, theater. *Naumachiae* were a feature of public entertainment in Rome from Caesar's time (46 BC) onwards. Cf. Hönle (2000).

[507] The action during the storm is described just like some of the actions on the temple friezes later on in book 1: in the third person. During the sea storm, however, a direct connection between the action and Aeneas as somebody who would see them is not made directly. Here, however, Vergil did not write *videbat*, he renders what is happening as *miserabile visu*. In other words, we all are emphatically seeing what all the Trojans are seeing. The expression is an act of reader guidance. For a similar argument see Pöschl (1977) 41.

comrades who are hit worse than he is. Interestingly enough, Aeneas just wishes that he had had the opportunity to die during battle, a more noble death according to Aristotle.[508] Aeneas is not afraid of dying as such[509], just like Achilles. Aeneas does not explicitly utter his dismay at a possible death by drowning.[510] He only briefly and at the same time ambiguously (*ante ora patrum*, *Aen*. 1.95)[511] points to the fact that a death at Troy would have resulted in a glorious funeral and subsequent praises.[512] Thus, because Aeneas does not follow his epic predecessors in their overstatements regarding how lost they are or how badly they feel they are treated, he shows quite some restraint and moderation in comparison with Achilles and Odysseus.[513] To demand, however, that Aeneas would have to be entirely without fear in the face of a storm of that magnitude, which was quickly brooding on the horizon and had even

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[508] That it is better to die in battle than by drowning is a topos that continues in the poetry of Seneca, Valerius Flaccus, and Sillius Italicus. For pertinent passages see Henry (1873) 330.

[509] Cf. Heinze (1928) 487 who also introduces Longinus' *On the Sublime* 9.10 and Cicero's *Tusc*. 2.48 into the discussion.

[510] Cf. Gossage (1963) 133f.

[511] I do not think that Aeneas wishes for a more spectacular death. This kind of death is of course painful for the father. Cf. Austin (1971) 56. On the heroic aspect of such a death cf. Stahl (1981) 161. One should not infer from the Odyssean model that Aeneas automatically wants to eclipse the sad aspect of death in battle. He himself would have seen Priam's reaction to Hector's death and later on even tells us Priam's own opinion on the subject in *Aen*. 2.538f. Neither is Aenas to be called a lover of war at this point. Philodemus in *On the good King According to Homer* repeatedly (coll. 27, 28) demands that the good king should in principle not love to go to war. Cf. Fish (1999a) *ad loc*. and Fish (2002) 222 and 224. Aeneas' point is that as bad as such a death would have been, it would have been the preferable over the current kind of death that is before his eyes. Cf. Stahl (1981) 162. On the motif of dying in the presence of one's parents in the *Aeneid* see Pöschl (1977) 35f., Newman/Newman (2005) 218. In addition, as Galinsky (1996) 123f. points out, Aeneas is shown as preferring the safe past over the insecure present and future. Cf. Mackie (1988) 20 and Binder/Binder (1994) 144. This wish will be a recurring theme later on. Cf. Galinsky (1981) 1009 with n. 78. Aeneas will continue to remember Troy in different ways throughout the *Aeneid*. Cf. Pöschl (1977) 37. This kind of yearning for the past is also a feature of the Homeric Odysseus. Cf. van Groningen (1953) 36f. Yet, it is repeatedly impossible for Aeneas to return home. This distinguishes Aeneas from Odysseus. Cf. Galinsky (1992b) 78f. On the other hand, later on during the storm Aeneas will see the ships sink before his own eyes. We will later on discuss further details of this Vergilian phrase.

[512] Troy is, of course, destroyed. But, as we will see in book 3 of the *Aeneid*, survivors existed even outside Aeneas' group.

[513] Cf. Smith (2005) 14: "Aeneas has a less self-glorifying perspective than does Odysseus." Servius' question whether Aeneas set a good example for his companions is probably best answered by the counterquestion whether Aeneas' companions would either have had a chance to listen to him in the midst of immense thunder (*Aen*. 1.90f.) or have had time to listen, since everything seems to have happened very quickly. Cf. also Austin (1971) 55.

already disrupted Aeneas' words (*Aen.* 1.102), would be unrealistic[514], if not from the readers' immediate point of view, then at least from a consideration of epic role models. And from a philosophical point of view such a demand would have elicited Aristotle's resistance.

The same is true when we turn to Plato. In the *Protagoras* we find Socrates explaining poetry. However, he brings his own thoughts into the interpretation as well. A fierce winter-storm (πέξαζ ηλπώ ²), he says, will render a steersman helpless (πῆ α ρζ) when it hits (σλσηωώ), just as a farmer cannot do anything against weather conditions that threaten his harvest (*Prt.* 344d). It is as if Plato[516] would have anticipated Vergil's critics, for Socrates continues that in the event of unpreventable and irresistible circumstances (σηλγᾰ πῆ α ρζ ωχπι ρυᾰ να έο□)[517] even a wise, good, and resourceful man (ῃ η πῆ α ρζ ναί ωρι ὄζ ναί ξα ὄζ) cannot but be (πππη αλ) bad (νανὄζ). Plato would, I hope, agree with me that in this instance the resourceful man cannot be blamed for appearing to be without resources, even if, in contrast to Aristotle, Plato in his *Laches* (191d4) assumes that a man can be courageous in respect to all dangers surrounding seafaring.[518]

Lucretius in his first book of *De rerum natura* does not give specific advice to a sailor on how to react to a sea storm if he is caught in it. Lucretius points out that shipwrecks happen even to the highest admirals of the Roman fleet (5.1226-1232).[519] Lucretius wants to teach the causes of the phenomena of nature so that one does not need to fear them any more even if they can cause massive devastation and even

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[514] Cf. Gossage (1963) 133.
[515] The temperature that causes *frigus* comes to mind again.
[516] Without referring to Plato, Heinze (1928) 487 judges about Aeneas' situation in a very similar way: "… er [sc. Aeneas] weiß, daß keine menschliche Kraft mehr helfen kann: …"
[517] Aeneas cannot but be a "passive victim of circumstances" (Miles (1976) 133).
[518] "///ςρΰζ ςρζσυὄζςΐ ἀοαςςα νλγΰ ρλζ γυπῐρχζ ςαζ- ///" Cf. Lear (2004) 150 n. 8.
[519] In this passage Lucretius also points out that these admirals desperately seek to appease the gods, in order to avoid shipwreck. But nevertheless shipwrecks happen to them. To suppose that this Lucretius passage caused Aeneas to not really pray during the sea storm would be too far-fetched, since Odysseus also does not pray. It is curious to note in this context that Aeneas, unlike Odysseus, does not openly blame a deity for the storm.

shipwreck (1.146ff., 272; 6.429f.).[520] That, of course, does not help the seafarer who is in the middle of such a storm on the high sea, but Lucretius provides us with a warning: Never trust the false, alluring face of the calm sea, because all the remnants of shipwrecks ever found testify that storms on the sea can be devastating (2.552-558). The treachery of the sea is of course a topos that can be found in literature elsewhere.[521] However, the Trojans just did trust the calm sea (*Aen.* 1.35).[522]

Philodemus in his fourth book of *de morte*[523] discusses in cols. 27f. what constitutes a glorious death. Philodemus takes issue with the popular belief that dying in battle while accomplishing deeds that are worthy to be remembered is better than dying ignobly (ς ηρηχς ή ἀμλρζ) in bed. Philodemus explains that the goal must be to die a painless death.[524] That kind of death can be found in battle and in bed. The opposite death can be found in both places also. To be glorified after one's death simply does not matter to oneself any more. Also examples of famous people who did not die in battle are put forth by Philodemus. In this context Philodemus compares dying in bed with being beached like a ship.[525] Therefore, if we for a moment assume that Aeneas is a learned Epicurean, Aeneas really does not put as much emphasis on dying in battle as especially Achilles did. In addition, *ante ora patrum* also points to the fact that Aeneas would have liked to die at home rather than at sea.

Philodemus also discusses the question of the importance of dying away from home in foreign countries (*de morte* IV, cols. 26f.). He points out that the journey to Hades is equally long and equally direct from wherever it began. However, he admits that even learned Epicureans (ι λοὔορξ ρλ)[526] feel a bit uneasy (ὕς ς ηλ) about dying

[520] The impersonal way to talk about "battling" winds is already Homeric and can be found throughout epic literature. Cf. Gale (2000) 68f. with n. 34.
[521] Leonard/Smith (1942) 364 and Rouse/Smith (1975) 139.
[522] Cf. the end of *Aen.* 5.
[523] Quotes are given according to the edition prepared by Armstrong (forthcoming b). On this work in general cf. also Sanders (2002) 130-184.
[524] For Epicureans death *per se* did not matter at all. See, e.g., Glannon (1993) 223-226.
[525] This is, of course, important in regard to the beached Argo and the Argonauts subsequent behavior.
[526] See on the meaning of this word and the challenges the textual reconstruction entails Armstrong (forthcoming b) *ad loc.*

far from home, parents, and family. But he denies that this is a reason for grief (οὔσκ). These aspects would also be in tune with the result of our interpretation that Aeneas shows considerably less grief over the prospect of drowning than his "role models". In addition, Aeneas brings in the aspect of dying far from one's family. As we saw, this issue was incorporated into Vergil's narrative without neglecting the generic models entirely. However, this aspect was not expressly mentioned by Achilles, Odysseus, or anyone of the Argonauts (*A.R.* 4.1251-1258).[527] Now we see an even deeper reason for Vergil to transform the traditional epic wish of having a chance to die more nobly. For according to Philodemus, the separation from family is the only justified reason to feel a pang about if one has to die in foreign countries.[528]

In col. 33 of *de morte* IV, however, Philodemus engages in a direct critique of Odysseus' words during the sea storm of *Od.* 5.[529] Philodemus quotes *Od.* 5.306-308a[530] and 312 directly. While accusing Odysseus of having spoken these words ωςὅ θ ζ, "missing the mark", Philodemus, however, supposes that Odysseus wanted to put dying in a land battle before dying in a sea battle. This comes in the context of Philodemus' larger discussion whether it matters if one gets a burial after death or not.[531] This discussion is concluded by saying that the death of those who sail because of affairs that by necessity need to be taken care of, but who run into unexpected misfortune (ς γἔ γλ̓ αξναῖαζ πἔ υῆἵαζ σοῆ̓ ς θ -ς ὔ □γἔ ερχοῆ̓ ς ὼ ωχ νχυκωά̓ ς θ) does not make death itself worse if it happens while being on the high sea (μ ά̓ ξνκζ ς ρ νας αωςυέι ηλ̓ αοά̓ ς ς□σὅ ρχζ ω χυρς έυρχζ σλ̓ έυρ ς ρζ/col. 33.31-36). In regard to Aeneas we have already observed that he did not anticipate this storm that befell the Trojans so quickly. He

[527] Nevertheless, to die while being away from home gives the Homeric heroes reason for constant fear. Cf. Tsagalis (2004) 76.
[528] This might be also a reference to Philodemus' own personal situation as a Greek among "barbarians". Cf. Sanders (1995) 25 with n. 47.
[529] D. Armstrong brought this passage to my attention.
[530] Philodemus' text of *Od.* 5.308a is an interesting new version of the text as given by Allen (1917). However, the meaning remains largely the same.
[531] Aeneas' indifference to burial has been noted in a different argumentative context by Perkell (1999) 40.

also does not explicitly complain about the shamefulness of the kind of death that is before his eyes in a way that would be directly comparable to Achilles, Odysseus, or the Argonauts.

What makes col. 33 of *de morte* IV even more interesting, is Philodemus' inclusion of the Libyan Sea in the context of describing that one drowns by taking in a few gulps of water whether that happens on the sea or in a simple bathtub. Therefore, Philodemus says, it is in vain (πάς αλρζ) to exaggerate (σχυξρ) the expression σηράξηλ("on the sea") by adding ναΐ ς Νλεχν (even on the Libyan Sea). Philodemus' words inform us that apparently the Libyan Sea was particularly dreadful for seafarers of the time.[532]

Finally, how a sailor should behave in a sea storm[533] according to Stoic views can be compared with the angst management of a soldier. Seneca in *de ira* 2 (*dial*. 4) 3.3 gives the example of a soldier whose knees are shaking once the attack is ordered.[534] This soldier is not necessarily overtaken by fear if he is aware that such things are normal pre-emotions. Then the soldier can keep the necessary cognitive distance to his bodily movements. In other words he can avoid the fear.[535] Stoics understand that storms especially are a source of fear. Stoics of Vergil's time apparently advocated constant education about this kind of fear of natural disasters and of other things. The Stoics aim at explaining that nothing deserves to be feared. Yet Aeneas' behavior fits the Stoic admission that one may have initial fits, a pre-

[532] We get a similar picture from two epigrams of the Greek Anthology (*AP* 7.290 and 293). These two epigrams cite thirst during a calm and snakes on the shore as threatening the sailor. Also cf. the dangers of the Syrtes as described by Lucan and Strabo. Cf. Green (1997) 340 for details and further literature. As they tell me, D. Armstrong and B. Henry also suggest that the epigrams *AP* 7.273 (tomb epigram of somebody whose body actually was lost in a sea storm on the Libyan Sea) and 543 (a ship is sunk by an "attack" of a large group of cranes) play a role. The topicality of the dangers of the Libyan Sea is therefore obvious even if we cannot date some of the epigrams.

[533] On Seneca's views of sea-faring and shipwreck cf. Jonkers (1952/3) and Trabert (1953) 14.

[534] Cf. Malchow (1986) 42f.

[535] Cf. Halbig (2004) 59. In *de ira* 2 (*dial*. 4) 3.3 Seneca quotes other examples as well. The supreme commander of an army and even the most eloquent rhetor can experience similar pre-emotions which nevertheless do not automatically indicate their fearfulness.

emotion, of all kinds of emotions in general and fear in particular.[536] These feelings, however, may not and in Aeneas' case indeed do not develop into what according to the Stoics would qualify as "real" emotions. As we saw, Aeneas overcomes his nascent fear instantly.

In effect, Aeneas' feelings that he shows in the sea storm of book 1 of the *Aeneid* fit the demands of not just one philosophical school. This observation can be made repeatedly as this dissertation undertakes to show.

[536] Cf. Irwin (1998) 225: "According to the Stoics, an apparent danger does not make the sage afraid, but it makes him go pale: …" Cf. *ibid.* 225f. for Irwin's sources.

3.4 Conclusions: Between Heroism and Cowardice

These considerations on the literary and philosophical background of the sea storm scene in the *Aeneid* should caution us against making far-reaching inferences about Aeneas' "anxiety" during the sea storm.[537] His reaction to the beginning storm does not need to indicate that Aeneas distrusts his alleged heroic destiny. In fact, Aeneas is less fearful than Odysseus, although he is in a much worse situation than Achilles.[538] Even the Argonauts entertain doubts about their destiny during their passage of the Symplegades. The test of the dove that the Argonauts let fly through the Symplegades, as Phineus insisted they should (*A.R.* 2.328-344), has clearly shown them that they will pass through the rocks, even if maybe not entirely without bruises, because the tail feathers of the dove were damaged (*A.R.* 2.555-573). Therefore, the Argonauts should not be afraid. But when inescapable death (πῆ α ρζ οη υρζ; *A.R.* 2.578b)[539] hangs over the heads of the Argonauts, the sailors feel immense fear (λ ς α ς ρ γέρζ, *A.R.* 2.577b). It is a topical tradition in the epic genre that heroes in dangerous situations on the high sea feel extreme anxiety.

The Argonauts, however, have still some opportunity to show their courage. They are given a chance to navigate further and to escape the troubled waters by the right steering technique (*A.R.* 2.584f.) and by rowing (*A.R.* 2.588ff.). Rowing might be difficult and the struggle between the strength of the Argonauts and the rough sea lets the Argo's oars be bent (*A.R.* 2.591bf.). Athena herself has to intervene and give the Argo the last push that is necessary to escape the clashing rocks (*A.R.* 2.588f.).

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[537] Scholars have accused Vergil of being a "careless" writer and Aeneas of being a weakling. Cf. above and Fowler (1911) 412f. as well as Dale (1952) as quoted by Gossage (1963) 132 n. 1. Also cf. Stahl (1981) 160f. for further literature. Carlsson (1945) 129 n. 2 even suspected that Aeneas has forgotten his mission at this point. Aeneas never tells Vergil's readers that he wants to give up. Cf. Mackie (1988) 20. If Aeneas for a moment he would have a chance to have a different fate does not mean that he does not carry on.

[538] Cf. Highet (1972) 191: "…Vergil when introducing Aeneas wished to present him in a situation comparable to that of Homers' Odysseus, but with a character somewhat more chivalrous and Achillean."

[539] This is seen as a parallel to *Aen.* 1.91. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 455.

Nota bene, Tiphys and Euphemus are the two heroes during the storm, not Jason. But in the *Aeneid* nobody, neither Aeneas nor any of his comrades, has a chance to fight the storm[540], just as Aristotle's imagination of a shipwreck scene has it. Juno's storm even breaks the oars in *Aen.* 1.104a.

The restraint of his fear that Aeneas shows in this scene is atypical if looked at from the viewpoint of the generic hero. But, as we will see, Vergil has deferred some emotional details of the scenes of his predecessors to later scenes and transformed them into yet something else that is new. The test of Aeneas' ability to endure[541] hardship is not at a however provisional end when the storm or the personal dangers are over, in contrast to Achilles, Odysseus, and the Argo at the Symplegades. Rather this detail resembles the sea storm that starts in *A.R.* 4.1232. Aeneas' trials go beyond those of his heroic predecessors in that he will receive less immediate, recognizable, and direct divine support.

If this interpretation, which takes into account ethical discussions of this topos by Aristotle, Philodemus, Plato, and others, is correct, then there is no need to accuse Aeneas of being a weak hero in the sea storm.[542] Aeneas already displays attitudes advocated by these philosophers. He knows how to deal with emotions that are, to the extent he feels them, unavoidable and understandable. Vergil just illustrates with a grand opening example what his proem verses (*Aen.* 1.3-6) meant.[543] This time he tells us about Aeneas *iactatus et alto*.[544] Aeneas had to suffer it (*passus*), and it was Juno who forced the suffering (*labores*, *Aen.* 1.10) on him.[545] There was nothing he could do about it in the sea storm. But Aeneas does not despair in the sense that he

[540] Cf. Gossage (1963) 133.
[541] Endurance is a characteristical trait of Aeneas and the Trojans throughout the *Aeneid*. See McGushin (1964) esp. 227.
[542] This accusation of weakness refers also to many other scenes especially in the first third of the poem. Cf. Farrell (1999) 96f.
[543] Cf. Gossage (1963) 135.
[544] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 15, Pöschl (1977) 24.
[545] Cf. Galinsky (1996) 123. Mackie (1988) 20 points out that Aeneas' exhaustion will make Carthage look even more attractive to him.

would give up carrying on. Whether Aeneas surpasses Achilles and Odysseus or not, here Aeneas is the opposite of Jason.

4 Aeneas' Encounter with his Mother

4.1 Meeting Family on Foreign Shores

Vergil does not expressly indicate that Aeneas would be surprised when he meets someone on his reconnaissance mission.[546] To meet someone from whom he could gather information is what he wanted to happen. In fact, his reply (*Aen.* 1.326-334) is rendered in a very respectful tone. After all, Aeneas suspects the stranger to be a goddess. As soon as he himself has come to this realization, his speech attains the tone of a prayer.[547] Even if he is not quite sure to whom he is talking, he offers many victims in exchange for information about the Trojans' present position. When Aeneas briefly touches on the current loss, his speech becomes a reflection of a despair that lurks beneath the calm surface of his behavior. Only a hypermetric elision in the transition from *Aen.* 1.322 to *Aen.* 1.333 saves the hexametric order. In addition, in this verse there is a very unusual elision between *ignari* and *hominumque*. *Aen.* 1.333 is made up of spondees in the first four feet. Aeneas has difficulties speaking and needs to catch his breath[548], a feature that will not recur so obviously in parallel passages.

In Apollonius' *Argonautica* despair is the driving force behind a speech that closely follows the stranding in Libya.[549] Aeneas' words are in their structure[550]

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[546] Commentators have found fault with Dido's outfit. A Spartan or Thracian dress does not fit the African shore. See Smith (2005) 27.

[547] Cf. Binder/Binder (1994) 151. Aeneas' words in *Aen.* 1.328-334 include the standard three elements of a Roman prayer: 1) *invocatio*: lacking the exact name of the goddess, Aeneas tries several addresses of the deity. 2) *pars epica*: Aeneas promises many gifts in exchange for the fulfillment of his prayer. 3) *preces*: Aeneas wishes to get oriented about the place where he and the Trojans are. Cf. on the Roman prayer in general Graf (1998). As a prayer of a mortal to a deity in mortal disguise, Aeneas' prayer stands in the tradition of *Od.* 13.228-235. Cf. Hickson (1993) 28f. It is actually curious that we now get exactly the kind of prayer that was missing during Aeneas' first appearance on the stage of the *Aeneid*. Then, he raised his arms, but did not pray.

[548] Cf. Williams (1972a) 186.

[549] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456. As Nelis *loc. cit.* also notes, the speech is somewhat similar to Jason's response to having been visited by the Libyan guardian heroines in *A.R.* 4.1333. But aside from the fact that Jason received information that will ultimately set the Argonauts afloat again, there seems to be no further connection between these two scenes.

directly comparable to Orpheus' prayer in *A.R.* 4.1411-1421.[551] Orpheus' prayer is answered. Aeneas, too, indeed receives the information which he is asking for and which will show him the direction to the place where his fleet will have a chance to be repaired. But Apollonius explicitly mentions that Orpheus utters his prayer in a weeping voice (ολωιωῦπη ρζ γλ ὃσῖ *A.R.* 4.1422), while Vergil uses Aeneas' prayer itself to express his hero's emotions.

However, despair is not the only emotion that triggers Aeneas' prayer as we can see from the epic tradition and the circumstances of other scenes in which one can read about a similar encounter. In book 16 of the *Odyssey*, Athena changes Odysseus' shape back into how he looked before she made him appear as an old and ugly beggar. Then Odysseus returns to his son who is astonished to see him return in a different shape. He is frightened at the sight and suspects he has encountered a god: ἀπεκωηγέ πλ ι ἴορζ χἶὄζ- ο ς αυε ἤωαζ γ' ς έυθ ωη ε άο' ππας α πΐή ηΰζ ηἶκ- ο ///(*Od.* 16.179bf.). Since Telemachus observes the supernatural changes, he thinks Odysseus a god and starts a prayer with the same word that Jason (*A.R.* 4.1333) and Orpheus (*A.R.* 4.1411) used: … ὡκ ' ... (16.184a). The structure of Telemachus' prayer itself is expanded in the prayers of Orpheus and Aeneas. Of course, the situation in the *Aeneid* is just a reversal of the *Odyssey*.[552] Odysseus is Telemachus' mortal father who wants his son to recognize him, whereas Venus is the immortal mother of Aeneas, who apparently does not want to be recognized as who she really is. Odysseus is revealed to his son in his true shape. Venus does not let Aeneas recognize her as long as their conversation lasts. Telemachus is just frightened,

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[550] The address of the deities is followed by the request for mercy. The object of the prayer is mentioned and put into the perspective of the current situation of the one who is praying. The prayer concludes with a promise of sacrifices. Just like Aeneas, Orpheus is uncertain which deities he is dealing with. Aeneas is very specific at first and asks whether it is Diana. Orpheus is less specific and just asks whether his addressees come from the world above or below the earth. That they are nymphs is the last option mentioned by both Aeneas and Orpheus.

[551] On its being an invocatory hymn see Green (1997) 346.

[552] Also cf. Hickson (1993) 29.

whereas Odysseus finally is given the opportunity to break out in tears after he had to hold them back for a long time (*Od.* 16.190f.).

What this comparison means for Aeneas' emotions during his conversation is that the reader of the *Aeneid* will have noticed the similarity between the encounter of Venus and Aeneas on the one hand and Odysseus and Telemachus on the other. That Aeneas has difficulties speaking may also be taken to indicate that he is close to tears. But one can only assume that he also is frightened at what he sees.

The reader of the *Aeneid* who already knows Homer might ask himself whether a reunification of child and parent would be in order at this point. After all Aeneas at least would have probably felt the same way Telemachus subsequently did, when he finally, after initial doubts, accepted that he was standing next to his father. He finally embraces his father (*Od.* 16.213f.) which marks a degree of physical nearness that is denied to Aeneas, a fact that Aeneas complains about in *Aen.* 1.407ff. Telemachus then cries too. Finally, Homer informs us that father and son both give in to their feelings and decry their past misfortune of being separated until Telemachus is the reason why things start moving again (*Od.* 16.215-221).

Vergil's story, however, plays with this Homeric model and his readers' expectations. Suspense is created about whether the encounter between Venus and Aeneas may take a similar direction, because horrible things have happened to her son. But the time is not ripe for such a "happy" reunion. And besides, Vergil's repertoire of model scenes is not yet exhausted.

It is noteworthy that Aeneas does not consider the possibility that he has to deal with a deity as Telemachus did in *Od.* 16.179.[553] This brings us to *Odyssey* 6 and Odysseus' encounter with Nausicaa. Odysseus is forced by sheer necessity (*Od.* 6.136) to seek the attention of Nausicaa and her companions. When he gets close to Nausicaa he ponders his options whether he should address her embracing her knees or keep a certain distance (*Od.* 6.141b-144). In his words, however, Odysseus still

[553] On Telemachus' behavior in terms of his emotional response in this scene see also Hoekstra (1989) 273.

supplicates her (ξρχ ρ παΐ ωη *Od.* 6.149a). Odysseus, who indeed knows that whom he sees is not a goddess, nevertheless addresses her with words that Homer describes as at the same time conciliatory and guileful (α ς΄ινα πηλοΐ λρ ναΐί νημγαοέρ ι άς ρ π ρ ; *Od.* 6.148). Odysseus pretends not to know whether Nausicaa is a mortal or immortal being. His compliments are quite extensive for both options (*Od.* 6.149-169). He even managed to turn his being at a loss whether to embrace her knees (*Od.* 6.141b-147) into something that is very advantageous for him (*Od.* 6.168f.).

Williams points out as a parallel for Aeneas' encounter with his mother that Odysseus says he would be unsure whether he should recognize Artemis in Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.151).[554] The parallel goes beyond this point. Venus introduces herself as a woman from Carthage after Aeneas' prayer (*Aen.* 1.336). But also before she pretended to be a huntress without giving any indication of her immortality. In fact, she even greeted Aeneas and Achates very casually and not in a godlike way: *heus, iuvenes* (*Aen.* 1.321).[555] The velocity of this encounter is quite high (cf. also: *cui mater media sese tulit obvia silva, Aen.* 1.314).[556] After all, Venus says that she is looking for her companions as they are chasing a boar (*Aen.* 1.324). Therefore, Aeneas does not have as much time as Odysseus to prepare his speech. Venus does not allow him to have much time. In fact, Aeneas answers Venus' question first before he can formulate his own question. Nonetheless he uses the same strategy as Odysseus and plays with the possibility that the young woman whom he encountered might either be mortal (*virgo, Aen.* 1.327a) or, after he has given it some thought,

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[554] Williams (1972a) 186. On the connection between the Homeric Artemis simile in connection with Nausicaa (*Od.* 6.102-109), the Vergilian Diana simile in connection with Dido (*Aen.* 1.498-504), and the simile in Apollonius starting at *A.R.* 3.876 in connection with Medea see Glei (1990) 332-339. Apollonius will continue to play with a comparison between Medea and Nausicaa. See Garson (1972) 6f. In *Od.* 13.221a-227 Athena meets Odysseus in Ithaca. She is disguised as a young prince with a spear in her hand. This time, Odysseus seems to have no doubts about the mortal birth of his opposite. Cf. *Od.* 13.228a: ι ΄ιο'- //.

[555] *Heus* is colloquial and most of its occurrences in Latin literature can be found "*in dialogo scaenico*" (Rubenbauer (1938) 2675.18). Cf. also the passages quoted by Rubenbauer (1938) 2675.37-50 and 2675.82-2676.11.

[556] Cf. Williams (1972a) 184.

immortal (*Aen*. 1.327bff. ending with: *o dea certe*). Aeneas might not act as calculatingly as Odysseus, but he certainly might remember that it might be good to be cautious especially if someone just looks very much like Diana. The wish for divine assistance might in part be responsible for Aeneas' thought. Aeneas not only knows what Odysseus said in Phaeacia, but in the woods of Africa he actually resorts to Orpheus' words in the *Argonautica* that he spoke when the Argonauts in the desert of Libya ran out of water (*A.R*. 4.1411-1421).[557]

In sum, Vergil managed to charge the beginning of the encounter of Aeneas with his mother with a very interesting mix of emotions on the side of Venus' son. Despair in the face of an emergency makes Aeneas willing to cry, yet he still manages to keep his cool, even if only barely. A future outburst of emotions, which are until now at least constantly held back, is thus prepared and can be expected to happen. And the reader of the *Aeneid* with his knowledge of the *Odyssey* probably very well understood and could sympathize with Aeneas who was not granted an opportunity for emotional relief, in contrast to Odysseus and Telemachus. At the same time, the reader cannot but admire Aeneas for his presence of mind that enables him in spite of his many concerns and sorrows, quickly to assess the situation in which he suddenly finds himself.

Venus' speech provided the formalized orientation to Aeneas as he had wished. At the same time, she intended to instill in Aeneas sympathy with and admiration for Dido.[558] Whether she succeeded remains open for a while, because it is obvious from Aeneas' immediate response that other emotions are more prevalent in at the moment. As we have seen, the reader of the *Aeneid* has been well prepared at this point for what will follow.

After Venus has told Aeneas all she had to say about Carthage and Dido, she finally (*tandem Aen*. 1.369) asks who the strangers are, where they come from, and

[557] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456.
[558] Cf. Williams (1972a) 184 and 188. This intention of Venus links and contrasts at the same time Aeneas with Odysseus' first meeting with Nausicaa in the *Odyssey*.

where they are headed. This question gives Aeneas the chance, at last, to show some of his hard feelings about his own fate. Before he starts his reply, he takes a deep sigh and with a voice that is laden with the heavy burden of his fate addresses Venus (*Aen.* 1.370bf.). Aeneas uses a *praeteritio* as a rhetorical device to show how massive the information is that he could give her if there were just enough time (*Aen.* 1.372ff.). With heavy irony[559] he understates the fame of Troy. His concessive subordinated *si*-clause in which he weighs the possibility that Venus at least could have heard about Troy, indicates in conjunction with the attributive *antiqua* that Aeneas is aware that Troy is a thing of the past. Yet at the same time this tone shows the misgivings that Aeneas harbors in his heart.[560] In spite of the heavy blow that the destruction of Troy meant to him, others may live in peace and harmony without being affected by Troy's fall at all. Aeneas' sarcasm is obvious, if nothing else, through the repetition of the name of Troy. Aeneas' decries the arbitrariness of his fate[561] that seems to have thrown him off course after all his wanderings he already endured (*Aen.* 1.375ff.). "With tremendous" emotional "power"[562] Aeneas now introduces himself: "*sum pius Aeneas*" (*Aen.* 1.378).[563]

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[559] Cf. Williams (1972a) 188.
[560] Aeneas, however, does not rebel. Cf. Wlosok (1967) 78f. He suffers and expresses his sufferings.
[561] Cf. Gossage (1963) 134f.
[562] Williams (1972a) 189.
[563] On the parallel *Od.* 9.16ff. see Conte (1994) 140 and Seidensticker (2001) 393. Conte claims that Homer portrays Odysseus as calmly and objectively "presenting his credentials" whereas Aeneas uses a "pathetic tone" that encompasses Aeneas' "destiny of past suffering and future responsibility". In alluding to Odysseus, however, Aeneas is, in Conte's view, part of Vergil's ambition to fashion his *Aeneid* as a classic work of literature. On the other hand, Beye (1999) 279 thinks that Aeneas' speech is revealing Aeneas' "vulnerability", especially if compared to Odysseus' attempt to deceive Athena in *Odyssey* 13.254f. who had appeared to him as a young shepherd and as a son of the royal family and whom he already had supplicated. But I think we can take the argument even further. The adjective is put in front of the noun. Thereby it is stressed. Cf. Haarhoff (1930) 62. On the background of this verse as far as Aeneas' *pietas* in literature and art from Homer to Vergil is concerned see Galinsky (1969a) chapter 1, esp. 59f. and Wlosok (1982) esp. 10ff. Anchises, Aeneas' father, is a role model for *pietas* in Naevius (cf. 25 Blänsdorf) and Ennius. In Ennius 28f. (Skutsch) Anchises is explicitly called *pius*. Cf. Mutschler (2000) 92. Kronenberg (2005) 405 detected some unexpected complications in this phrase *pius Aeneas*, stemming from an interpretation of Mezentius as an, in my opinion improbable, Epicurean allegory for *pietas*. A detailed discussion would be too lengthy for inclusion here.

Aeneas seems to ask of what use his piety is.[564] He blames the gods for accepting his service not only for free, but also at a high cost for him. He emphasizes that he has saved the *penates* almost out of the midst of the enemies. He is even known in the realm of the gods whose seat is in heaven. He is looking for Italy for the greater good of Jupiter's own offspring (*Aen.* 1.378ff.). What Aeneas does not say, however, is that all this extraordinary service does not seem to get him anywhere. In fact, Aeneas recounts that his voyage started with a flett of which now seven are left which in addition suffered heavy damage from the storm. Aeneas' mentioning of the promised guidance of his mother that he claims to have been following (*matre dea monstrante viam*, *Aen.* 1.382), just leaves enough room for Aeneas' accusation against her for having left him. This is in tune with his previous implicit accusation of his mother in the speech addressed to Diomedes during the sea storm. The reader might already anticipate Venus' reply to that insult. He knows that Venus went to Jupiter in order to interfere and save Aeneas from Juno's rage. As a matter of fact, Venus complained to Jupiter about much the same things as Aeneas does now.[565]

It needs to be mentioned that Aeneas' speech in *Aen.* 1.372-385a has been recognized as a parallel to Odysseus' self-introduction to Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.259-271.[566] In their closeness to what is the opening of one of the most famous, but still cruelest scenes of the *Odyssey*, Aeneas' words therefore, from our point of view, evoke an air of boasting, even over-confidence, and hidden lurking danger at new shores. In regard to Aeneas' self-introduction as *pius Aeneas* we need to insert a little digression here and point to col. 39 of Philodemus' *de bono rege*. Philodemus quotes

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[564] Cf. Anderson (1930) 4. He points to Venus' words to Jupiter (*Aen.* 1.253a): *hic pietatis honos*? He concludes that Venus must understand Aeneas perfectly. Cf. also Austin (1971) 137 and Williams (1972a) 189. Lefèvre (1978) 105-110 thinks that Aeneas' words express "schmerzvolle Klage" (*queri Aen.* 1.385), not bitter protest and that Aeneas' words hint at Dido's *pietas*, since Aeneas' encounter with his mother prepare Aeneas for his encounter with Dido. Cf. Wlosok (1967) 79.

[565] Cf. Williams (1972a) 190.

[566] Cf. Knauer (1979) 375. Heubeck (1989) 28 points out that the proud tone is inadequate and anticipates the dissilusion that will follow for Odysseus. Similar things will indeed happen to Aeneas even if belatedly. At any rate, for the moment Vergil's audience's expectation will have rested on the Homeric Polyphemus episode.

Od. 9.19f. in this column which of course is very similar to *Aen*. 1.378f.[567] This quotation from the *Odyssey* stands among other Homeric examples which in Philodemus' view show that none of their speakers boasts without reason. Quite to the contrary, all of them had their justifiable reasons for speaking highly about themselves (col. 39.27-31).[568] Apart from other considerations (θ υίζ ς οοθ), since everybody agreed that Odysseus was a great hero, he had to introduce himself as such and had to refrain from depriving himself of his greatness, according to Philodemus (col. 38.25-34).[569] Besides, as Philodemus states, the Phaeacians had asked who he was (σχ α ὅπη ρλcol. 39.4). In Aeneas' case the situation is also very similar. Since he thinks to have met a deity, he puts his piety front and center to appease the perhaps angry or otherwise dangerous goddess. Besides, Venus had asked first (*Aen*. 1.370).[570]

Yet, it is also important to note that Aeneas' piety towards the gods had rescued him in his life before. In *Il*. 20.298f. Poseidon emphasizes that Aeneas always gave sacrifices to the gods. Also for this reason Poseidon is dismayed at what seems to be Aeneas' last minutes of his life and subsequently sets out to rescue Aeneas. Of course, as far as we know (*Il*. 20.332-339) Aeneas did not hear about this motivation behind Poseidon's action, but nevertheless Vergil's readers probably would feel reminded of this Homeric scene.

After Venus had begun the conversation, Aeneas had just asked her to orient him about the place to which he had come. Venus had complied with his request and informed him about Carthage. When Aeneas took advantage of Venus' inquiry whom she had encountered and used this opportunity for a somewhat lengthy complaint

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[567] *Pius* recalls γ ρζ *Od*. 8.495. Cf. Fish (1999a) 202 who acknowledges Armstrong as the source for this thought. *Od*. 9.19f., however, is very programmatic for his role in the subsequent story (γὅορλ). Cf. Heubeck (1989) 13. Aeneas' equally programmatic focus is, however, set on the sufferings that he had to endure, on his mission, and his piety. See Galinsky (1974) 198f.

[568] Cf. Fish (1999a) 203.

[569] Cf. Fish (1999a) 196f and 198. Also cf. Adkins (1969) 32f. He regards Odysseus before Alcinous as a ἶνές κζ. The same is true of Aeneas. His hint at his piety is giving his response an appropriate air of potential prayer and sacrifice.

[570] And Aeneas was addressed as *pius Aeneas* already in *Aen*. 1.305 by the omniscient author.

about his fate and the injustice of the gods, Venus could not stand her son's behavior (*nec plura querentem / passa, Aen.* 1.385bf.) and interrupted him "in the middle of his sorrow" (*medio sic interfata dolore est, Aen.* 1.386b).[571] Venus just had enough of her son's complaints. She swiftly punishes him by cruelly pretending in a doubtful and dismissive tone (*quisquis es, Aen.* 1.387)[572] not to know anything of what he just said.[573] On the other hand, she offers solace to him. Venus' assurance that Aeneas still enjoys divine support, of course, falls short of revealing to him the knowledge she has. She concludes with the firm order that he should go on and let the way that lies ahead lead him to his destination (*Aen.* 1.401). Thereafter, she immediately leaves Aeneas. This observation helps to explain Aeneas' emotional outburst that follows as reaction to his mother.

The Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite* could have given Aeneas a hint as to which deity it was that he was dealing with, because there are a few parallels between the encounter of Anchises and Aphrodite in the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite* and Aeneas' meeting with his mother in the woods of Africa. When Anchises first sees Aphrodite he addresses her with words whose formal aspects are very much like those of Aeneas' speech in *Aen.* 1.326-334 even if Aeneas' request is very different from Anchises'.

The beginning of Venus' answer to Aeneas resembles the first part of Aphrodite's reply to Anchises. Both times the goddess of love negates her divinity.[574] It is also striking that the Homeric Hymn, Apollonius, and Vergil describe how Aphrodite/Venus is dressed. Anchises' rising love for his visitor in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* is part of the story right from the start (90). This feature is naturally lacking in Vergil. However, Venus' appearance in the *Aeneid* is most likely chosen to make

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[571] Note the interesting position of *sic interfata* right in the middle of *medio … dolore*. Needless to say, *est* is subject to a *synaloepha*. Besides, Aeneas is interrupted here while expressing his sorrow just as in *Aen.* 1.102: *talia iactanti*.
[572] Cf. Williams (1972a) 190.
[573] It might well be that this *quisquis* is meant to mimic *quaecumque* in *Aen.* 1.330.
[574] Cf. Beye (1999) 278 and in general Janko (1982) 268 n.1 who also tracks the allusions to the *Hymn to Aphrodite* in the works of other poets.

Aeneas familiar with the kind of women he is likely to encounter in Carthage (*Aen.* 1.336ff.). Aeneas, after all, will fall in love with Dido, who dresses as a huntress also (*Aen.* 1.500bff.). Aeneas, unlike his father (85), does not include Venus in the list of deities that may be hidden under Venus' mask (*Aen.* 1.329). This parallel, just like others, is apparently alluded to by Vergil in order to trigger a cascade of associative thinking and expectations in the reader's mind. Some of those thoughts aim at the larger story. Love will be a topic later. On the other hand, one might speculate whether Venus' new plans in *Aen.* 1.657f. have come to her mind just then or earlier already. *Novus* might after all emphasize the impending disaster that will follow the execution of Venus' plans.[575]

When Aeneas' mother leaves him, her divinity is revealed by the way she walks (*Aen.* 1.405a). Venus does not introduce herself to her son directly. This is comparable to the way Athena leaves Telemachus. Her departure lets Telemachus assume that it was a god to whom he just spoke, even if Athena leaves him flying upward like a bird (*Od.* 1. 319 f.)[576] and not walking. In this very instance, marked by a hiatus in verse *Aen.* 1.405[577], the narrative stops for a little pause. But after this pause is over and Aeneas has realized with whom he was speaking, his anger and anguish bursts forth in urgent and accusing questions (*Aen.* 1.407ff.).[578] However, just as Vergil nicely juxtaposes it in *Aen.* 1.410 (*talibus incusat gressumque ad moenia tendit*)[579], he is angry with his mother, yet nevertheless follows her advice.

This is comparable to a scene at the beginning of the *Odyssey*. Aeneas does exactly what Telemachus does. The divine visit causes Telemachus to think even more about his father and to think about and marvel at what had been said to him

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[575] *At Cytherea novas artis, nova pectore versat / consilia*, … Cf. Williams (1972a) 208. The indicative present of *versat* in the same verse might just denote an ongoing thought process.
[576] West (1988) 116 assumes that Athena transformed her shape into that of a bird.
[577] Cf. Williams (1972a) 191: "The hiatus after *dea* (405) is of a kind not found elsewhere in the *Aeneid*; it serves to emphasize the word *dea* and the long pause after the brilliant description of her." But I think that the dramatic impact of that pause goes even further than that and describes Aeneas as he is stupefied and needs a little bit of time to realize the full impact of what just happened.
[578] Cf. Williams (1972a) 191.
[579] Cf. Williams (1972a) 191.

(*Od.* 1.321 ff.).[580] And as the narrative will show, he will do exactly what Athena has suggested him to do (*Od.* 1.284 f.[581]). Aeneas and with him Achates *corripuere viam interea qua semita monstrat, …* (*Aen.* 1.418. See already 1.410: *gressumque ad moenia tendit.*) just as they were told (*perge modo et, qua te ducit via, derige gressum*, *Aen.* 1.401). Those epic characters that are supposed to be good characters heed divine advice. But the parallels between the scenes extend to the emotional level as well. The wording of *Aen.* 1.418 (*corripuere*[582]) implies that the goddess has infused Aeneas and Achates with a certain degree of resolve if not courage, just as Telemachus gets strength and courage from Athena (*Od.* 1.321 f.).[583]

Aeneas' behavior towards his mother can be called somewhat pubertal, although we would expect him to act more like the adult he is at that point.[584] The question therefore is, whether we can find any epic precedent for a similar manifestation of a problematic relationship between a son and his parent. As it turns out, it will be difficult to find an exact Homeric counterpart. Nevertheless, from a comparison with the Homeric parallels it will become clear that Aeneas' behavior towards his mother is moody indeed. Yet although this Vergilian scene bears many

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[580] Cf. Athena's purpose (*Od.* 1.89) to reinforce a mood already present in Telemachus' mind and see West (1988) 86 and 116 on this.
[581] Mind the textual *crux*.
[582] Cf. Williams (1972a) 193.
[583] As a matter of fact, and looked at from the perspective of the broader context in which the respective authors put the beginning of the *Aeneid* and the *Odyssey*, the two scenes again are the link to very similar ones. Penelope's appearance and the song of Phemius of the return of the Achaean heroes are in a way parallel to Dido's appearance on the stage. Both women are, albeit for different reasons, without a husband. Differences between the situations certainly exist. Telemachus is trying to take the rule in his father's house in his hands while Dido is the ruler of a city that was founded after the killing of her husband and after she was forced to leave home. On the other hand, Aeneas will shortly see the Trojan wars being told by the pictures on the temple where he also will encounter Dido. These pictures will finally take away his fear and give him back hope for and trust in a better future (*Aen.* 1.450 f.). In *Aeneid* 2 Aeneas himself will start to tell his own attempt to leave home and find a new one after Iopas's song was about the cosmos, and thus appropriately could not offend anybody among his auditorium (*Aen.* 1.740-747). Again feasting is a topic here. In the *Aeneid* Carthaginians and Trojans eat and celebrate together. The happiness of the hour will soon be followed by sad events. In the beginning of the *Odyssey*, the destructive feasting of the suitors is at the center of the narrative focus again. Even if it seems to be almost impossible after so many years, the return of Odysseus is foretold and dangling over the suitors.
[584] We need to keep in mind that Venus had called her son a *iuvenis* in *Aen.* 1.321.

resemblances to scenes in Homer's epic poems, it will be in Apollonius' *Argonautica* that we will find a child who does not always follow the parents' will without further ado.

To demonstrate this claim, we need to turn to the *Odyssey* first. Aeneas' behavior finds an interesting counterpart in Telemachus' obedience towards Athena's fatherly advice.[585] Athena in disguise[586] advises Telemachus on what he should do next to save the house of his father from being ruined by the suitors and alludes to his age in *Od*. 1.296bf. Telemachus, in her opinion, has outgrown the days of his childhood.[587] Athena probably says that equally as self-assurance as for the sake of encouraging Telemachus. Yet, Telemachus sees their conversation pretty much as a discussion between father and son and he promises never to forget this fatherly advice (*Od*. 1.308) – just as a son should do.[588] We have already observed Athena's respect for Telemachus who is – is this a compliment as a reward or a bribe? – also called wise and even godlike (*Od*. 1.113: πρηγνῆϛ and 324: ϖῶ πρϛ are the frame

[585] We know from col. 23 of *PHerc*. 1507 that – among others – Philodemus regarded the *Telemachy* as a paradigmatic scene for matters of education. Cf. Fish (1999b) 74f.

[586] Telemachus will not know with whom he really has conversed. This is of course a reversal from the Vergilian scene in which Aeneas has difficulties to recognize his mother and does so only in the very last moment of their encounter (*Aen*. 1.405f.) whereas his being the son of his parents is never doubted. Telemachus' being the son of Odysseus is an issue between Athena and Telemachus. First Athena wants to know from Telemachus whether he indeed is the son of Odysseus. She points to the fact that he looks very much like his father (*Od*. 1.208 f.; a recurring theme: cf. West (1988) 102), but still wants to know whether that is right or not (*Od*. 1.206 f.). Telemachus responds by saying that his mother told him that Odysseus is his father and then says that he himself does not know just like – his tone turns gnomic and commonplace (cf. West (1988) 102 – nobody would really know who his father is (*Od*. 1.215 f.). Athena's response is that Telemachus' lineage promises him a famous family in the future (*Od*. 1.222 f.), even if she just calls Penelope's name as his parent. The predicative ϛ ρ ρ , however, is both alluding to Odysseus and expressing respect for Telemachus himself.

[587] For the first time Telemachus will realize this. On Penelope's surprise at this see West (1988) 113.

[588] This is reflected in a curious way in *Od*. 11.448-451. Here Agamemnon talks about Odysseus' family, about Penelope having a little baby on her breast when the Greeks left for Troy. Now in Agamemnon's opinion Telemachus is sitting among the men in prosperity. Agamemnon then goes on to contrast Odysseus' happy fate with his lamenting the fate of his own family. The reader knows better. On the other hand, one has also to look at the beginning of the second book of the *Odyssey*. There Telemachus is taking his fathers seat in the assembly. And the elders (cf. West (1988) 130) let him do so (*Od*. 2.14).

for στρ ὕπη ρζ in 213, 230, and 306) before, during, and after his conversation with the goddess.

Aeneas, however, is not the most ideal son in Venus' eyes. At the end of their conversation, she seems to be tired of her son's lamentations. She does not let him finish his speech and interrupts his narrative of his sufferings (*Aen.* 1.385 f.). Yet we need to ask the question whether Aeneas' slight misbehavior towards his physically present[589] mother is only one side of the coin, i.e. whether Venus behaves altogether blamelessly in this situation.

At the end of the scene, Venus is happy, *laeta*, (*Aen.* 1.416), when she goes to Paphus in Cyprus. Vergil leaves the reason for her happiness open. Is it because she thinks that what she wanted is accomplished? Is she happy, because of the excellent veneration she enjoys in Paphus (*Aen.* 1.415ff.)? Or can she now return to the habitual divine happiness that usually is ascribed to her?[590] We know from Sappho (1 LP-V) that Venus is especially dangerous[591] and maybe plotting secret plans when she smiles.[592] *Laeta* in *Aen.* 1.416 might not be without undertones and point us towards the end of book 1 and the beginning passion of Dido for Aeneas. At any rate, for the moment this happiness of Venus seems to be a bit misplaced in view of her son's emotions. This treatment of a mortal son by a goddess seems to be unparalleled in Homeric poetry, as is Aeneas' treatment of his mother. Instead of acknowledging her help, he reproaches her: *crudelis tu quoque* (*Aen.* 1.407). He continues to accuse her of deception while she is fleeing him (*fugientem est voce secutus, Aen.* 1.406) and wants to know why they cannot join hands[593] and have a conversation without disguise, even if, as mentioned above, Aeneas finally decides to follow his mother's

[589] Achilles complains about a supposed deception of his mother when he feels trapped in the river Scamander in *Il.* 21.273-283. Thetis is not present at that point. Therefore this Iliadic scene cannot serve as a point of comparison for us here.
[590] Cf. Wlosok (1967) 11f. with notes where further literature on this topic can be found.
[591] Cf. Hutchinson (2001) 150.
[592] Cf. Hunter (1989a) 114.
[593] Compare this with Odysseus' attempt to touch her mother in the underworld (*Od.* 11.204-222). Odysseus does not know what to make of the fact that he cannot touch her. But he is not quite sure whether his mother's intention or death is to blame for that.

advice. In contrast, Telemachus always treats Athena just as a hospitable head of the household should treat his guests (*Od.* 1.119f.).[594] He does not do anything inappropriate.

Aeneas' asking to embrace his mother brings us to our next Homeric comparandum in the context of our scene. When Odysseus encounters his mother at the edge of the underworld[595], he tries three times to embrace her (*Od.* 11.204-208).[596] When he cannot manage to do that he first reproaches his mother for not letting it happen (*Od.* 11.210). He says that he yearns for crying together with her, to be consoling and be consoled by one another (*Od.* 11.211f.). Probably because of the intensity of the experience[597], however, in the end he suspects that Persephone has sent him an image, an ἤιγθ ορ in order to aggravate his grief further (*Od.* 11.213f.). In this regard the Vergilian *imagines* in *Aen.* 1.408 become important. Odysseus' mother at least talks to him and explains that the shadows of the deceased cannot be embraced or touched.[598] The cruelty of death is inevitable. The scene will be repeated with exchanged roles when Agamemnon's shadow tries to embrace Odysseus in *Od.* 11.391f.[599] Venus could change her behavior towards her son and her shape. After all, Achilles is allowed to see and to talk to his mother Thetis in the *Iliad.* She even touches her son in *Il.* 1.361. Thus it becomes clear that Venus as a mother acts very strangely from an epic point of view and at least in part provokes Aeneas' reaction.

We have to turn to Apollonius to look for a Hellenistic description of a somewhat problematic relationship between mother and son.[600] Aphrodite's

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[594] West (1988) 92 calls it "Telemachus' hospitable instincts".
[595] This passage is the model for Aeneas' encounter with Anchises in book 6 of the *Aeneid* as well. Cf. Knauer (1979) 125. Cf. the encounter to the deceased Creusa in *Aeneid* 2.
[596] On the Homeric parallels see Heubeck (1989) 89.
[597] Cf. Heubeck (1989) 89f.
[598] Cf. Aeneas' attempt to embrace his father in *Aen.* 6.697b-702. On the parallels in *Aen.* 2.792ff and *Aen* 5.740 cf. Binder/Binder (1998) 229.
[599] Cf. Heubeck (1989) 101. The enounter between Agamemnon and Odysseus finds its general counterpart in Aeneas meeting Deiphobus in *Aeneid* 6. Cf. Knauer (1979) 114-117.
[600] As Clark (2001) in response to West (1988) 120 has demonstrated, Telemachus' behavior in *Od.* 1.356-359 cannot entirely be seen as a scene in which a son simply violates the limits of good behavior towards his mother. Telemachus tells his mother to organize the traditional work of women in the

conversation with her son Eros in *A.R.* 3.112b-157[601] and the scene that precedes it, in which Aphrodite complains about Eros and his behavior towards her[602], is relevant for us[603], especially in terms of the emotions that exist when parents want to influence their childrens' actions.

The relations between the *Aeneid* and this passage of Apollonius are complex. The motif how Aphrodite helps Hera, Athena, and ultimately Jason by sending her son to make Medea infatuated with Jason is clearly one that lies behind the sequence of divine acts to influence the feelings of Dido towards Aeneas and the Trojans.[604] First, Jupiter sends Mercury to mollify Dido's mind towards the Trojans (*Aen.* 1.297-304). After that, in a sudden change of plans motivated by Venus' fear of Juno and the untrustworthy Carthaginians (*Aen.* 1.657-662)[605], Venus sends Cupid to inflame Dido with love (*Aen.* 1.663-690).[606] In the *Aeneid* we do not see Cupid interacting with his mother beyond simply complying with her request. This is not the case in Apollonius. Some details, however, of the Apollonian encounter between Aphrodite and Eros appear in the encounter between Venus and Eros' brother, Aeneas, in Vergil and its surrounding scenes.[607]

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house, indicating that he is about to assume the position as head of the household. As such this scene is part of the aftermath of Athena's visit in disguise as Mentes to Telemachus and her recommendations in *Od.* 1. Also cf. Danek (1998) 61f. Knauer (1979) 497 sees a certain similarity between *Od.* 1.356-359 and *Aen.* 7.443f., but none between this passage from the *Odyssey* and Aeneas' meeting with his mother.

[601] Cf. Campbell (1994) 101-138 esp. for Homeric parallels. Also cf. Hunter (1989a) 108-115 and Green (1997) 256 on model scenes for this passage. Especially noteworthy is Apollo's promise to little Hermes in the *Hymn to Hermes* 462.

[602] On Aphrodite's difficulties with the education of her son see Natzel (1992) 149-152.

[603] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456.

[604] The Vergilian Venus and the Apollonian Aphrodite approach her son Eros/Cupid as a suppliant. This is just one remarkable parallel between the *Aeneid* and the *Argonautica*. Cf. Hunter (1989a) 111.

[605] Williams (1972a) 207f. calls this motivation in the face of Jupiter's dealings weak. In his opinion, Vergil shows here the cruel side of Venus.

[606] For details on the missions of Mercury and Cupid and their relation with Apollonius cf. Nelis (2001b) 77f.

[607] Hunter (1989a) 114 even notes the influence of Eros' way of getting a hold of Aphrodite in *A.R.* 1.147 on a scene in *Aen.* 8.387f. where Jupiter is touched by Hera from left and right simultaneously.

The description of Eros' travel from the garden of Zeus reappears in the descent of Mercury to the earth.[608] The Apollonian garden of Zeus (*A.R.* 3.114) is matched by the garden in which Ascanius is put to sleep by his grandmother when she replaces him with his uncle (*Aen.* 1.691-694). We may assume therefore that Eros' anger (χπόζ 3.98) towards his mother inspired Vergil to indeed portray Aeneas as brother of Cupid who does not simply agree with the ways and means of his mother (*A.R.* 3.93b-99).[609] Venus' own words to Cupid emphasize the familial bond between Cupid and Aeneas: *frater … Aeneas … tuus, Aen.* 1.667). Aeneas, too, can be angry with his mother. Of course, Eros as a god is in a position that is different from Aeneas'. Therefore, Aeneas cannot go so far as to threaten his mother or to disobey her openly, especially after she has revealed her presence not only to him, but also to Achates.[610]

In sum, we see the subtle and complex art of Vergil's use of the beginning of Apollonius' book 3. The result is, in terms of our topic, the portrayal of Aeneas as a human being who does not refrain from rebelling against his mother if he thinks his mothers' moves unjustified. This kind of behavior naturally brings Aeneas close to the portrait of his brother in Apollonius where Eros is a spoilt child.[611] Aeneas, however, unlike Eros in *A.R.* 3.131-144, does not need to be bribed by his mother to

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[608] Cf. *Aen.* 1.300 and *A.R.* 3.166. See Nelis (2001b) 73 and 156f. on *Aen.* 4.238-258 (Mercury's second visit to Carthage).
[609] On Eros' rage esp. in *A.R.* 3.98-99 see Campbell (1994) 91.
[610] Achates' remarks in *Aen.* 1.582-585, of which *Aen.* 1.585b expressly refers to Aeneas' mother, may indicate Achates' attempt to calm Aeneas emotions towards his mother down by pointing Aeneas' attention to the fact that his mother's words were correct. Secondly it is interesting to note that, as a matter of fact, Eros threatens his mother when she indicates that she wants to destroy his weapons. He says that she would regret such a move (*A.R.* 3.97bff.). Without a doubt, Eros' threat entails the possibility that Eros may turn his weapons against his mother. Cf. Hunter (1989a) 107 and Campbell (1994) 89. It is, in turn, exactly a passion against her will that will be the reason for Aeneas' existence. "Cf. her [sc. Aphrodite's] chagrin at her love-making with Anchises (*h. Aphr.* 244-55)." Hunter (1989a) 107, italics by Hunter.
[611] Cf. Hunter (1989a) 108.

do what she wants.[612] His wishes reflect the fact that he is supposedly older than his brother who remains an eternal child.

As far as Aphrodite is concerned, a certain cruelty[613] may surely be attributed to Venus who chooses to appear before her son in disguise.[614] In Apollonius we can be quite sure that Aphrodite does not have in mind to fulfill the promise she gives to Eros.[615] In fact, Eros distrusts his mother anyway (*A.R.* 3.154f.).[616] On the other hand we also have to note that Venus apparently does not continue to harbor hard feelings because of Aeneas' reply, in contrast to Aphrodite in Apollonius.[617]

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[612] For a discussion about the applicability of Homeric models (*Il.* 4.93-104 and 14.232-279) for Apollonius in this context see Campbell (1994) 118f.

[613] Aeneas includes his mother in the series of cruel deeds he claims to have experienced: *crudelis to quoque*, *Aen.* 1.407.

[614] As we will learn later on, Venus appeared before her son in person in the Helen episode: *Aen.* 2.589-593. But even then she is not clearly visible for Aeneas even if the degree of her visibility was higher than ever before (*Aen.* 2.589). Venus seems to have a history in appearing to her son not clearly visible. But also cf. *Aen.* 8.611 where Venus embraces her son in *Aen.* 8.615. In epic poetry, deities, especially if they are the mothers of the visited mortals, appear not normally in disguise. Cf. Kühn (1961) 29, Harrison (1972/3) 12. Once she has finished her speech, Venus leaves Aeneas alone at once (*Aen.* 2.621). There is indeed no opportunity for Aeneas to speak to his mother or to shake hands with her which are parts of the demands that he utters in *Aen.* 1.407ff.

[615] Cf. Hunter (1989a) 114.

[616] It is a reciprocal distrust. See Campbell (1994) 137.

[617] Hera recommends that Aphrodite should better not act out of anger against her son when she asks him to go to Medea (*A.R.* 3.108-110).

Aeneas, while summaring the result of his fate, focuses solely on the effects that his wanderings now had for himself, and exaggerates by putting it into a global, mythical perspective saying that he is driven from the European and Asian continents and left to wander through the deserts of Libya unknown and as a beggar (*Aen.* 1.384f.). For this lack of submission under his fate in the beginning of the *Aeneid* and in Carthage (cf. *Aen.* 4.267: *heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum*) scholars have called Aeneas "very far from being a Stoic".[618]

Anger is, of course, a topic that will be of great interest for our inquiry later on. At this point I would like to focus on the question how a wise man is supposed to react to an injury that is intentionally inflicted upon him.

Aeneas feels hurt by his mother in *Aen.* 1.405b-410. He leaves no doubt about that (*natus Aen.* 1.407). He thinks that his mother should provide true and reliable help and advice (*falsae imagines* vs. *verae voces*). In *Aen.* 1.410, however, we see him as he quickly overcomes his anger. In cols. 40-44 of *de ira*, Philodemus[619] describes how the good man feels fits of anger even against friends who mistakenly behave ill to him. Philodemus furthermore admits that a good man will feel hatred against somebody who intentionally injures him to a great extent. In accordance with Philodemus' doctrine, however, Aeneas demonstrates that this anger does not mentally disturb him. The good man will not fall into the trap of the potential misfortunes connected with anger. The good man only lives through brief phases of anger. Aeneas apparently also experiences no lust for vengeance, just as Philodemus requires.

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[618] Williams (1972a) 190. He quotes Bowra (1933/4) and Edwards (1960). Edwards (1960) 155f. notes that "Aeneas may be considered an / obedient Stoic, though his submission is at first enforced." Bowra emphasizes that through a sequel of trials "which are the indispensable condition of his moral development" Aeneas becomes a Stoic in the end. Bowra (1933/4) 11.

[619] In general on Philodemus' *de ira* see also Sanders (2002) 55-129.

Does Aeneas feel gratitude at some point for what his mother has done for him? If so, it is not expressed in the poem. This one-sidedness of Aeneas' reaction to finding out that his mother has just visited him seems to reveal his rather childish or inconsiderate reaction. In col. 46 of the *de ira*, Philodemus contrasts the anger at injuries suffered with gratitude for favors received. A man who can feel gratitude will also feel anger. And in col. 47 Philodemus adds that the wise man will feel it in the appropriately moderated way, namely without exaggeration of the injury received.

Apart from the question whether Aeneas is really grateful for his rescue from his certain death against Diomedes as we discussed in the previous chapter, the question that needs to be asked is whether in saying *totiens* in *Aen.* 1.407 Aeneas is exaggerating.[620] What knowledge does Vergil expect his reader to have? In the Helen episode of the second book of the *Aeneid*, Venus indeed appears to Aeneas in her true shape, speaks to him in her true voice, and touches him with her right hand (2.588-593).[621] *Totiens* does not have to mean "all the time", but a number that is significant - at least in Aeneas' eyes. Venus had promised never to leave Aeneas' side: as we will hear in *Aen.* 2.620a: *nusquam abero*.[622] Aeneas might have suspected his mother to have been present earlier as well. Aeneas' dismay in this case then fits together with his anger at his mother during the sea storm and earlier distress. Therefore, *totiens* does not need to be an exaggeration.

Furthermore, for the omniscient reader it might indeed seem to be cruel (*crudelis tu quoque*[623] *Aen.* 1.407) that Venus does not tell her son about Jupiter's

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[620] Thome (1986) 50. Being a realist, Donatus leaves open the possibility that there were perhaps more encounters between Aeneas and his mother than Vergil reports.

[621] This, then is in direct response to *Iliad* 1.361 where Thetis touches her weeping son Achilles whom she wants to console.

[622] The question of course is whether *Aen.* 2.620b limits her presence to the time period until Aeneas reaches his house after the Helen episode. Cf. Duckworth (1933) 105. But I would be more inclined to take *et tutum patrio te limine sistam* as an examplification of Venus' promise of continued support. Would Venus as a mother openly say that after Aeneas would reach his house, she would not protect her any more? How this support will look like is not foretold and creates therefore the suspense Duckworth detects in this passage.

[623] A very interesting inversion of Caesar's alleged words to Brutus. Suetonius (*Divus Iulius* 82) suspects the authenticity of this sentence which Caesar apparently was believed to have uttered in

decisions concerning the future of the Trojans that he himself has already explained to Venus in *Aen.* 1.257-296 directly. Thetis on the contrary consoled her son first and then went to Zeus in order to ask for help. Odysseus gets helpful information[624] from his mother. Achilles' mother cried with her son (*Il.* 1.413).[625] This kind of parental consolation and support is what Aeneas might be looking for and that his mother withholds from him against all epic convention. In fact, Venus will leave the site quite happy.

In the end, however, Aeneas' anger does not last long. He even does what his mother ordered him to do. So we see how Aeneas does not let his anger last longer than is appropriate given the reason for it. Also this emotion does not get in Aeneas' way when it comes to doing what is necessary at the next moment.

In Aristotle we read (*NE* 1095a2-11, 1156a31ff.) that younger people tend to follow their σάρξ rather than their οὖξ ρζ.[626] The ancients probably had some understanding for the situation of younger people therefore. Nevertheless Aristotle stresses that a good upbringing in moral terms is necessary (*NE* 1179b4-31).

Interestingly enough, Seneca in *de providentia* 2.5 tells us that mothers usually tend to be much more lenient in their methods of educating their children than fathers. Seneca says that the normal behavior of mothers would be to hold their children in their laps and to console them, but not to ask them, for example, to work hard even on holidays. Whatever the degree of humor behind this stereotype might be, Venus indeed behaves oddly in this sense.

Greek. But we cannot be sure whether Vergil knew about this rumor. In addition, it is most intriguing that Aen. 1.407 *crudelis to quoque* is a phrase to be found also in *Eclogue* 8.48 and 50. The context accuses Medea of cruelly murdering her children. *Crudelis* is Medea's attribute as becomes clear from the vocative *mater* that follows both times. Also *saevus Amor* (*ecl.* 8.46) is given partial guilt for Medea's murder. *Eclogues* 8.49f. reads: *crudelis mater magis, an puer improbus ille? / improbus ille puer; crudelis tu quoque, mater.* The same statement could be made about Venus herself and her family in regard to Dido a little later.

[624] In Odysseus' situation it does not play a big role that his mother cannot quite know the actual state of affairs at Odysseus' palace, since she has been dead for some time and is no seer. We have to recall that Odysseus was sent into the underworld to ask Teiresias questions pertaining to the future.

[625] This is taken as representing the close relationship between mother and son by Latacz (2000) 142.

[626] Cf. Gigon (1968) 190f. Also cf. *Rh.* 2.12-14.

Shame also plays a crucial role in the behavior of young people (*NE* 1128b10-21). Whether Aeneas feels ashamed in any way in this scene is also not explicitly said. But maybe we can assume that he feels embarrassed after he found out to whom he really was talking.

Of course, Aeneas is not a *puer* any more. But just as Euryalus is called *puer* in Aen. 9.181, 217 and 276 and later *iuvenis* in *Aen*. 9.399f.[627], Aeneas will stay a child in relation to his mother. After all, Achilles is a child for Peleus (ι ἴορ ς ἑνρζ *Il*. 9.444). He is also Thetis' child and Thetis does not forget that either.[628]

[627] Cf. Petrini (1997) 22.
[628] On the godess as mother in Homer see MacCary (1982) 163-177.

3 Conclusions: The Son and His Mother

Again we see how Aeneas' behavior seems to be appropriate and restrained given the circumstances and the epic model scenes for his encounter with his mother. He does not decry his fate as Achilles does in *Iliad* 1.362.[629] Yet he has so much more reason than Achilles to doubt his mother's promise to help him, since he has already endured so much, for example, during the recent sea storm.

The entire scene in which Venus and Aeneas treat each other in a somewhat rude way seems to be unparalleled in epic poetry before Vergil. The relationship between parent and child requires respect for the position of the other. It is in Apollonius that we see direct conflict and mutual discontent with their mutual behavior towards each other.[630] All the examples discussed above can only be recognized as partial model scenes for Vergil. Even Knauer's note that *Od.* 11.210-214, where Odysseus' words focus on his inability to embrace his mother, serves as the precedent for Aeneas' words at *Aen.* 1.407ff.[631] cannot fully explain the dimensions of this encounter between Aeneas and his mother. Also to claim that Aeneas' words in *Aen.* 1.372-384 resemble Achilles' complaint (*Il.* 21-275-278) that Thetis does not keep her promise would only in part be true. Whereas the *sujet* of a hero who is angry about the behavior of his parent is taken from Homer, Vergil supplemented it with the discontent of the mother with her son and found a model in Apollonius.

The arbitrariness of Venus' behavior towards her son indeed renders her cruel to a certain extent and makes Aeneas as well as the reader ask why she intentionally behaves like she does, withholding the ultimate prophecy of Jupiter himself from her

[629] Odysseus' grief in *Od.* 11.204-208 is different since he learns that his mother died.
[630] Cases in which a son joins a war effort in spite of what his parents want can be excluded here, for they have different issues at their core.
[631] Knauer (1979) 375 lists *Od.* 11.210-214 (Odysseus' words about not being able to embrace his mother) as the precedent for Aeneas' words in *Aen.* 1.407ff. In the *Odyssey*, however, the shadow of Odysseus' mother is not a disguise.

son although this prophecy certainly would be of great help for Aeneas. Thus we can understand that Venus' voluntary and supposedly intentional act must hurt Aeneas. In his response to this injury, Aeneas acts like Philodemus' wise man can be expected to react.

5 Aeneas' Arrival in Carthage

5.1 Luck and Jealousy

After their encounter with Venus, Aeneas and Achates climb up a hill from where they can see Carthage. They have resolved to follow the advice of their mother as we have discussed above and have proceeded quickly towards Carthage (*iamque ascendebant collem* 1.419a). The same determination to reach the city can be found in *Odyssey* 7.14: υς ρ σὸλ γ' ἴπη . This determination is not the only parallel aspect recalling Odysseus as he approaches Alcinous' home. Aeneas is wondering at the sight of Carthage, as expressed twice at the beginning of two verses that immediately follow each other (*miratur* … / *miratur* … 1.421f.). This marveling at a city has its precedent in book 7 of the *Odyssey*[632] (αὔπα η 43a and α πα γέω αλ 45b) even if the structure of the scene is slightly different.[633] Odysseus' marveling is framed by two parts of Athena's explanations. Venus already gave Aeneas basic information as to what city he will arrive at (*Aen.* 1.338). Vergil, therefore, can focus on the description of the growing city.[634] Thirdly, just like Venus (*virginis os habitumque gerens Aen.* 1.315), Athena appeared to Odysseus as a young maiden (σαυ η λν νχα ηΐ̈ λγλ *Od.* 7.20). However, Odysseus does not consider the

[632] Also note that Philodemus uses the beautiful topography of Phaeacia in col. 30 of his *de bono rege* in order to make his point about the link between prosperity of a kingdom and its king's justice and piety. Unfortunately this column is very fragmentary. This marveling of Aeneas will be repeated, e.g., when Aeneas will see the future site of Rome in *Aen.* 8 or specifically in *Aen.* 8.730 when Aeneas looks at his new shield: *miratur rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet*. Marvelling and the feeling of joy go hand in hand in many of these scenes (cf. Binder/Binder (1994) 153 and (2001) 214f.). It is, however, interesting to note that Aeneas seems to feel no joy at his first sighting of Carthage.

[633] On the broader context of both passages see Williams (1972a) 192. Of course, Carthage here foreshadows the transformation of Rome from the former *magalia* to the marble city of Augustus. Cf. Clay (1988) 195f.

[634] Even if the actual picture that Vergil paints is much more that of a more or less ideal Roman than that of a truly Carthaginian city, one needs to note that the topic of the rise and fall of cities is an important and recurring one in the *Aeneid*. Cf. Morwood (1991) 212f. Troy, Carthage, Rome, Epirus, Alba Longa, Pergamea, and Lavinium are paralleled with each other as cities that rise and fall.

possibility that the person he has encountered now could be a deity.[635] Odysseus has a request to make that is somewhat similar to Aeneas' questions in *Aen.* 1.331ff. But instead of giving him the information he asked for, then leaving him, and revealing herself as a goddess, Athena does not simply walk away, but leads the way so that Odysseus can follow (*Od.* 7.37f.).

Even if Odysseus knows that he has come to the kingdom of Alcinous (*Od.* 7.20), the content of Athena's speech resembles closely Venus' words, explaining in detail who the king and his wife are and how they came to power.[636] Aeneas receives the same information and help from Venus as Odysseus did.

In this context, one needs to mention briefly a passage in Apollonius. When Jason and the Argonauts approach the palace of Aietes, they also marvel at and admire the building of that palace (ς η κσ ς η ζ *A.R.* 3.215f).[637] It is quite customary for epic characters to marvel at the houses and homes of those to whom they come.[638] Compare Hermes' admiration for Calypso's grotto (κης ρ *Od.*/5.75).[639] Homer puts Hermes' behavior in perspective: even any immortal god did the same when he had to pass this place. This admiration of Calypso's home is paired with the joy that the

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[635] One should consider the contrast between Venus' exclamation in *Aen.* 1.321 "*heus, iuvenes!"* that starts the conversation and the polite exchange of addresses between Athena and Odysseus in *Od.* 7.22 ς ένρζ and 28 μη ησάς ην.

[636] It must be asked whether it is significant that the focus' of Athena's narrative is set on Arete who lost her husband, not due to human connivance, but due to Apollo's arrow. Alcinous is the brother of Arete's former husband, but he does exactly what Aeneas will not do: marry the widowed queen.

[637] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456. On the palace and its description see Gillies (1979) 135f. and Campbell (1994) 191-194. Hunter (1989a) 121 assumes that this description also responds to Homer's description of Eumaius' pigsty (*Od.* 14.5-20).

[638] A further instance where people admire buildings is *Od.* 4.43bf. Cf. West (1988) 195f. Here the admirers of Menelaus' palace also feel joy while seeing the structure. Homer indicates as well that the onlookers have to finish looking at the structure and then do something else. But homes and houses are not always looked at with admiration. Cf. the absence of any feeling of this sort at Nestor's palace (*Od.* 3.387ff.), Circes' home in *Od.* 10, although her house is approached by different people multiple times, Eumaius' place which is described in detail in the beginning of *Od.* 14, or Achilles' home in *Il.* 24.442-456 (on which see, e.g., Richardson (1993) 318f.). Cf. as a contrast the interior of Dido's palace and the short description of the *regia* of Euander in Aen. 8.359-396 as well as the the humble house in which Euander awakes in *Aen.* 8.455-462. On these last three buildings and the implications involved here for the assessment of Augustan times see Klodt (2001) 28-36.

[639] Cf. Green (1997) 260. Cf. the triple "inelegant" (cf. Hainsworth (1988) 263) sequence of κ ωαλ ρ . κης ρ . κ ωας ρ in *Od.* 5.74ff. to *Aen.* 1.421f.: *miratur … miratur.*

passers-by are said to feel (α ν᾽ σηλς α ναί ά ας ὅζ σημ σηρ ὼ ο κἤωαλς ρ γὼ ναί ς ημι ἦικ ι υημῶ ἦωλ /*Od*. 5.73f.). Judging from this Homeric parallel, *Aen*. 1.437 and Aeneas' subsequent entry into the city of Carthage (*Aen*. 1.438ff.) are a variation of *Od*. 5.76f.: after Hermes has admired the place, he enters the cave (α ς ἄυ σή γή σά ς α κἤωας ρ χπ - ο α ς ἶν᾽ υ᾽ η ζ η υΰ ωσ έρ ζ ἤοχ η ;). Just the feeling with which this happens is changed. Aeneas feels no joy, but admiration and a slight jealousy or envy.

The expression of jealousy at *Aen*. 1.437 ('*o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!*') about the fact that the Carthaginians are already building walls is of interest here.[640] We will hear later in book 3 that Aeneas at the time when he entered Carthage had already expressed similar feelings to Helenus when he was about to leave Helenus' new Troy (*Aen*. 3.492-505). Then Aeneas even cried as he himself admits.

This time, we see directly how Aeneas interprets what has happened to him. Unlike the Carthaginians, he is not favored by *fortuna*, luck. Williams has interpreted *Aen*. 1.437 as showing "Aeneas' frustrated longing during seven years of wandering to begin to build his city."[641] But this one line spoken by Aeneas also tells us something about the importance of Venus' previous words for Aeneas. In his eyes, what has happened to him and the Trojans continues to be a matter of pure luck, not of divine providence and planning. Venus' intervention has not changed anything in this regard. This emotional outburst as such is Vergil's own addition to the traditional

[640] Note the fact that this exclamation immediately follows the bee simile in *Aen*. 1.430-436. In *georg*. 4.55ff. bees always go back to their offspring, their hive, in one word: their home. Cf. Doblhofer (1982) 23. This is particularly interesting against the background of Aeneas' being an exiled Trojan. The theme of building a new city is pervasive in the *Aeneid*. See Nelis (2001c) 225-229. At the same time, observe *Aen*. 9.446: *fortunati ambo*. This affective subjectivity is a sign of the new shape that begins in Apollonius' epilogue of his *Argonautica*, but Vergil really uses it for the first time. Cf. Effe (1983) 183 and (2004) 38f. Just like Aeneas does not want to be directly in the Carthaginians' position, Vergil probably does not really wish to be in the position of dead Nisus and Euryalus.
[641] Williams (1972a) 194.

motif.[642] In the textual parallel that in terms of its plot comes closest to this scene of the *Aeneid*, Odysseus does not explicitly express his admiration for Alcinous' city or a wish that he would rather find his home in Ithaca in a similar condition.[643] Vergil also managed to weave this emotional response into the larger context of the scene, especially when compared with Hermes' joy before he enters Calypso's cave.[644]

Yet one parallel from Vergil's own text has to be noted here. In *Aen.* 1.180-184a Aeneas climbs up a hill seeking a spot from which he can overlook the sea in search of his lost ships and comrades. He does not see the missing part of his crew, but catches sight of a herd of deer and sets out to hunt instead of continuing to look for his lost friends (*Aen.* 1.184b-193). Nevertheless we can note that the outlook from a hill[645] which is followed by immediate action provides Vergil with the opportunity to contrast Aeneas' hunt then and Aeneas' admiration now. This aspect points our attention to the overall situation Aeneas finds himself in. When Aeneas undertakes to provide his crew with food, he fulfills his duty as their leader. Overlooking Carthage he looks at an activity he himself should be initiating and participate in in the interest of his people. The question now is whether Aeneas will again prove to be an effective leader of his people mindful of the Roman future? Carthage will prove to be a test for him. At the moment Aeneas has lost the prospect of arriving at his final destination soon, the goal that seemed to be in close reach in *Aen.* 1.34f. Yet Dido and Carthage

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[642] Knauer (1979) 375 does not list any parallel for this verse of the *Aeneid*. There is also nothing similar to be found in Apollonius. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456.

[643] Starting points for intertextual comparisons between Alcinous' palace and Odysseus' home, however, can be found in book 7 of the *Odyssey*. Alcinous' golden and silvery dogs are said to be immortal and unaffected by age (*Od.* 7.91-95). Odysseus' dog will die as soon as he has recognized his returned master (*Od.* 17.326f.). Alcinous way of honoring his wife is, according to Athena, unsurpassed by any husband's devotion to his spouse (*Od.* 7.66bff.). Cf. this to Odysseus' own behavior towards Penelope throughout the *Odyssey*. On the other hand, compare Eumaius' dogs that guard his home towards the beggar Odysseus in *Od.* 14.29f. and Circe's tame wolves and lions who replace dogs (*Od.* 10.212-219). The description of Circe's palace is stereotypical. Cf. Heubeck (1989) 55.

[644] Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 102 claims that more than Homer Vergil stresses the fact that Aeneas is fascinated by what he sees. I would argue, however, that Aeneas' response is something entirely different from its Homeric predecessors, geared towards a comparison between Dido's and Aeneas' reaction to the existence of a rival city of Carthage and – in turn – Rome.

[645] Note the difference between *ascendebant* (*Aen.* 1.419) and *conscendit* (*Aen.* 1.180).

represent the fulfillment of this very goal that seems unattainable for Aeneas and Rome at the moment. Even his mother left the question open what will lie ahead for the Trojans after their entry into Carthage.

In order to assess fully the degree of Aeneas' jealous feelings, we need to recall briefly his words in *Aen*. 1.94ff. Aeneas said: "*o ter quaterque beati, / quis ante ora partum Troiae sub moenibus altis / contigit oppetere!*" Now he says just one line (*Aen*. 1.437): "*o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!*" Structurally already the two sentences are very close to each other. The emphatic address is followed by a relative clause describing not only whom Aeneas is addressing, but also explaining why Aeneas thinks his addressees blessed and fortunate, respectively. Secondly, both times walls play the most important role in the relative clause. In the earlier passage, the walls simply indicate a place, namely Troy. In the second passage, Carthage is the place where – as we may safely assume – Aeneas is reminded of the fact that the walls where he could not die for his city are in ruins whereas not even the plan for the new walls he is supposed to build is laid out yet. The dead and the living are better off than he and the rest of the Trojans are.

5.2 Emulation vs. Envy: Intending also to Have, but not to Take Away What Somebody Else Owns

First of all we need to note that Vergil communicates Aeneas' feelings in these two passages only through Aeneas' words. Therefore, we cannot find a statement of the omniscient author concerning the feelings Aeneas has at the moment when he utters his words. Neither does Aeneas himself describe his feelings. He just formulates sentences that tell us that he considers somebody else lucky for the fate that has befallen them. Only in the sea storm is this followed by the highly emotional[646] admission that Aeneas is dismayed because he was denied a death at the battlefield of Troy. In this instance the fortune of the others clearly is something that Aeneas wishes for himself.

Aristotle defines envy (ι ὄ ρζ) in his *Eudemian Ethics* as follows: ς ὅ οχσηω αλ σΐ ς ρ ζ ναςʼ μΐα ἠ συάς ς ρχωλ (*EE* 1233b20f.). In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle says that to pity people in undeserved misfortunes and to be indignant at people who enjoy undeserved fortunes[647] equally shows one's good character (*Rh.* 1386b8-15, esp. 11f.: ναΐ π θ ς ἄ σά κ ἤ ρχζ υκωρ ;).[648] Does Aeneas think that the Carthaginians or the dead at Troy did not deserve the fates that he regards as better than his own? There is no indication for this attitude in the text. Therefore, ι ὄ ρζ does not seem to be the appropriate term for Aeneas' feelings. Finally, Aeneas does not in the least want that the dead at Troy or the Carthaginians should give up their happy fate and that it should be transferred upon him, because he does deserve it.

Aristotle introduces ῆορζ into the discussion shortly after the passages discussed above. This emotion that Ben-Ze'ev subsumes under the heading of

[646] Note the exclamatory infinitive *potuisse*. Cf. Austin (1971) 41 and 56.
[647] Cf. also *Rh.* 1386b8f. and 1387a9.
[648] Cf. Grimaldi (1988) 153.

"emulation"[649] is in Aristotles' opinion caused by the absence of goods that are theoretically available to us and that we regard as valuable. However, we see that these goods exist for others who are by nature equal to us. Yet we feel pain not because others have these goods, but because we do not have these goods. This "eager rivalry"[650] is in Aristotle's view a morally good[651] emotion. Applied to our passage, Aristotles' definition of ζορη fits Aeneas. Aeneas does not want to see others deprived of their luck.[652] Aeneas does not think that they did not deserve what they have got. He just wants to have something as well.[653] Furthermore, the good he wants for himself is present in the life of others who are in regard to their status equal to him.

On the other hand, one observation that we made in earlier chapters proves to be correct from this Aristotelian perspective once more. In *Rh*. 1387a38-b1 Aristotle expressly says that persons who believe themselves to be worthy of certain goods experience ζορη (ἀξνκ γή κοθ ςλρύζ πέ ηὐ αλς ρύζ μλρ ς αζ αὖς ρύζ ξα πή ρχωλ). [654] Aeneas thinks that he does not merit the fate that he sees happening to him. Does he think himself worthy of finally getting the chance to found a new city for his people? Aeneas does not make that explicit. If that is the case, however, who is to be blamed for this injustice[655]? Aeneas blames his mother for having spared his life in the fight against Diomedes only to let him drown in the seastorm in *Aen*. 1.194-101. In *Aen*. 1.437 Aeneas maybe sees fortune (*o fortunati*) behind the fact that the Carthaginians are in a position to build walls for their city

[649] Cf. Ben-Ze'ev (2003) 106.
[650] Cf. Liddell/Scott/Jones/McKenzie (1968) 755.
[651] Cf. Ben-Ze'ev (2003) 111f.
[652] The implicit question whether Aeneas' rivalry will be a productive one like Hesiod's good υλζ overarches this scene and creates suspense.
[653] Cf. Servius *ad loc*.: "*expressit Aeneae desiderium, hoc est, quia iam faciunt quod et ipse desiderat*." Cf. Austin (1971) 150f.
[654] Cf. Ben-Ze'ev (2003) 109.
[655] In *Rh*. 1386b13-14 Aristotle makes the general statement that everything that one has to suffer without having merited it constitutes injustice.

whereas he and the Trojans cannot do that yet.[656] In addition, ῆορζ clearly is paired with admiration (*miratur … / miratur … Aen.* 1.421f.) of Carthage[657], the result of the Tyrian immigrants' work.

Cicero in book 4 of his *Tusculan Disputations* reports something very similar to Aristotle's views as the Stoic definition of what he calls *invidentia*.[658] In their view, *invidentia* is a grief caused by the luck (*res secundae*) of others. However, Cicero's Stoics add that these lucky circumstances may not be harmful for the one who is jealous of others, because otherwise, he says, we could not speak of jealousy any more.[659] Just like Aristotle, after having talked about the Stoic view of *invidentia*, Cicero continues and tells us the Stoic definition of *aemulatio*. There are two kinds of *aemulatio*. One of them is laudable, the other censurable. Up to this point, Cicero's Stoic view and Aristotle's opinion seems to be largely comparable.

If we are to believe Cicero, the Stoic view, however, from this point onwards is different from Aristotle's. The imitation of virtue (*imitatio virtutis*) is considered the laudable form of *aemulatio*. The same is true in Aristotle's view (*Rh.* 1388b15-18), but Aristotle also includes other goods, namely everything which is held in high regard by society (*Rh.* 1388b10-14).[660] If somebody else acquires something that one has desired for oneself and this fact causes grief, because one still is lacking this object of one's desire, that grief (*aegritudo*) is called *aemulatio* as well. This *aemulatio* is of the censurable kind (*Tusc.* 4.16f.). Cicero's Stoics obviously do not

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[656] His suspicion regarding Fortuna and his accusations against his mother who fails to really help him seems to be somewhat corroborated by Venus' words in *Aen.* 10.48f. Venus is rhetorically quick to concede Jupiter the right to finally give up Aeneas' fate if she can only save her grandson. Cf. Williams (1972b) 324. Also cf. Aeneas' words in *Aen.* 3.493ff. to Helenus and Andromache: *vivite felices, quibus est fortuna peracta / iam sua: nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur. / Vobis parta quies.* Cf. Galinsky (1983) 49 and Doblhofer (1987) 179ff. also on *ecl.* 1.46-48: *Fortunate senex, …*

[657] It would lead to far at this point to fully evaluate the meaning of the Vergilian passage in the context of the Punic Wars and Caesar's and Augustus' attempts to found a new Carthage. But the that this context exists cannot be denied.

[658] Cf. *Tusc.* 4.16: *utendum est enim docendi causa verbo minus usitato, quoniam invidia non in eo, qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur.*

[659] Interestingly enough, Cicero uses Hector and Agamemnon as his example for this statement.

[660] For Plato these goods have to be based on virtue. Cf. *Grg.* 468e-469a, 486c8, *Lg.* 730c6.

further distinguish between the *aemulatio* which focuses on the fact that one has not yet acquired what one desires and the *aemulatio* which focuses on the fact that somebody else has already required this thing. This lack of detail could indeed be grounded in Cicero's sources or could be due to Cicero's abbreviated report. In any case, should Aeneas' words indicate Aeneas' grief (*aegritudo*) as an emotion in the Stoic sense, this grief would indeed be wrong.[661] If, however, Aeneas just expresses a brief sad feeling and does not give in to it, we cannot find moral fault with our hero at this point. In fact, we will not find a trace of Aeneas' desire to build a new city again, until Hermes will remind him of his mission in *Aen.* 4.265-276, except when he tells about Anchises' and his several attempts in book 3 of the *Aeneid.*

ὄ ρζ is to be avoided according to the Epicureans. Since they were convinced that participation in politics necessarily leads to jealousy, they advised against such participation. Lucretius, for example, understands *invidia* as the motive which is able to dethrone kings (5.1125f.,1131).[662] Thus envy is something whose object the Epicurean becomes in politics.[663] A king or politically high-ranking leader is the victim of the jealousy of others. This could be self-explanatory, because the Epicurean sage would never give in to any harmful emotion and therefore not feel jealous. Unfortunately, Philodemus' work *de invidia* is too fragmentary[664] to recognize any statement pertinent to our topic, especially on the question whether

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[661] *Itaque haec prima definitio est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. … est ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, … Tusc.* 4.14.

[662] Cf., however, Metabus' fate in *Aen.* 11.539 (*pulsus ob invidiam regno virisque superbas*) and Mezentius' lament in *Aen.* 10.852 (*pulsus ob invidiam solio sceptrisque paternis*). Cf. Servius *ad locc.* and Kaster (2005) 184 n. 30 on the exact meaning of *invidia* in these cases. It is Metabus and Mezentius, not their subjects who are envious or jealous. Mezentius realizes his mistakes in his last words (*Aen.* 10.853f.), something apparently not possible for Turnus in the end of the *Aeneid.*

[663] Just like Cicero says in *Tusc.* 4.16, *invidia* can be used in regard to the envied and the envious: "… *invidia non in eo in qui invidet solum dicitur, sed etiam in eo cui invidetur …*"

[664] The remains of this work can be found in Guerra (1985). Cf. also Erler (1994) 325. Philodemus' *de invidia* – σηί ι ὄ ρχ probably was part of a greater collection of treatises (or chapters) on various emotions: *de affectibus* – σηί σα . Cf. Erler (1994) 323.

Philodemus recognized a difference between ῆορζ and ι ὄ ρζ or *aemulatio* and *invidia*.

On the other hand, Philodemus shows that Nestor and Odysseus did not feel jealousy towards each other and therefore were able to follow what was best for the Greeks according to Nestor's own words in *Od.* 3.126-129.[665] Philodemus explicitly says that ς ὅ κοὄς χσρ (col. 29.14f.), i.e., to begrudge somebody because he shares in something oneself also has[666], must be absent and implies that this was indeed the case with Odysseus and Nestor. Aeneas' relation with Achates, who accompanies Aeneas on his way to Carthage, could be seen as in a way resembling Odysseus and Nestor in their desire to do what is best for their people, but they are not entirely equal in rank, unlike Odysseus and Nestor. This Philodemean passage, however, becomes important as well in regard to Aeneas' relation to Dido. Dido will promise help although she must know from Ilioneus' words (*Aen.* 1.533f.) that the Trojans are to found a city elsewhere as well. Aeneas, who is in the possession of divine oracles which tell him that he will get the chance to found a city ultimately, will not envy Dido her city. But Dido and Aeneas will fail in their own ways to do what is best for their people.

These political considerations set the stage for Aeneas' ascension to his new throne. Aeneas will in fact accuse Dido of trying to prevent the foundation of the new Trojan city in Latium because of her *invidia* in *Aen.* 4.347b-350.[667] Aeneas interestingly enough reverts his first encounter with Carthage and says:

> *Si te Karthaginis arces*
> *Phoenissam Libycaeqe aspectus detinet urbis,*
> *quae tandem Ausonia Teucros considere terra*
> *invidia est? et nos fas est extera quaerere regna.*

[665] Cf. Fish (1999a) 107ff.
[666] Cf. Cicero's definition of κορς χσἴα in *Tusc. disp.* 4.17. Also cf. Fish (2002) 226 for further parallels.
[667] Dido interpreted Aeneas' willingness to depart as faithlessness. Cf. Gibson (1999) 184f.

> If Carthage's castles and the sight of the Libyan city keep you, a Phoenician woman, why do you envy the Trojans for finally settling down in Ausonia? For to seek a kingdom abroad is our divine right.

Aeneas asks the formerly exiled Dido not to begrudge the exiled Trojans their wish to found a new home abroad.[668] As Vergil's reader knows, Aeneas was struck by admiration for Carthage in book 1 of the *Aeneid*. Aeneas understands also this side of what he is saying here. Dido will try to invalidate Aeneas' accusation of jealousy in her response (*Aen*. 4.381).[669] Aeneas' departure from Carthage is complex in itself. One should just think of the ant simile in *Aen*. 4.401-407[670] which is far from being a compliment for Aeneas who is called *pius* again shortly before the simile in *Aen*. 4.393. In fact, if the simile represents Dido's own view, her anger at an undeserved injustice is the more understandable. Be that as it may, for the moment it should be sufficient to point to the fact that Aeneas' feelings of rivalry at the moment he looks at Carthage as a whole and as a rising, industrious city has far-reaching consequences.

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[668] Aeneas' exile is Vergil's focal point for all of Aeneas' *labores*. Cf. Galinsky (1983) 50. The difference to "normal" exile, of course, is that there is no home country any more. "Normally" an exile would compare his situation against that of his home. Cf. Stahl (2001) 33.

[669] Ilioneus' first words to Dido pointed to the similarity and difference between Trojan and Carthaginian fates (*Aen*. 1.522-525a). Ilioneus' speech as a whole also has quite some significance for future Roman world dominance and the future Roman wars with and the subsequent destruction of Carthage. Dido also had emphasized in her words to Aeneas that she sees that the Trojans have to suffer the same fate as the Carthaginians. She also says that the shared experience influences her behavior towards the Trojans. See *Aen*. 1.628ff.: "*me quoque per multos similis fortuna labores / iactatam hac demum voluit consistere terra; / non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.*" Cf. Fleißner (1993) 30f.

[670] On the relationship between the ant simile here and the bee simile in *Aen*. 1.432-443 and their Apollonian modesl see Binder/Binder (1997) 175 with further literature.

5.3 Conclusions: Seeing Carthage – Between Jealousy and Inspiration

These consequences are not only to be found in the Dido episode, but also in regard to the rise of Aeneas in Latium and in relation to the city of Carthage during and after the Punic Wars. This observation becomes even more obvious if one looks not at the *Aeneid* as a whole, but also at the context in which ancient philosophers place their discussion of envy.

Plato, for example, puts Athens' development into a more general perspective in his *Menexenus*. Plato apparently regards ñοριζ[671] as better than ι ὅ ριζ. Socrates describes in his speech, whose author he claims was Aspasia, that Athens after the Persian Wars became the subject of the ñοριζ of the other Greeks and that ñοριζ later changed to ι ὅ ριζ/To become a victim of jealousy is according to Socrates the customary fate in the case of those who are doing well (γή ι λοη /// ς ρ ζ πὸ συάς ς ρχωλ συρωσ ἵσ ς ηλ - συ ς ρ πέ ñοριζ- σό ἤορχ γέ ι ὅ ριζ; 242a3f.).[672] This was then, according to Socrates, the reason why Athens involuntarily was drawn into wars among Greeks. Aeneas' *aemulatio* is one thing, Dido's alleged *invidia* another.

This scene in which Aeneas catches sight of Carthage for the first time is important for the *Aeneid* in and by itself just like all the other scenes that we have discussed so far even if we disregard all literary and philosophical issues for a moment. The sight of the entire city paves the way for the following description of a marvelous detail within this city, the temple that will prove to be very important for Aeneas in several ways. In retrospect this scene also complements Venus' description of Dido's and the Tyrians' fate that precedes this passage.

As far as Aeneas' emotions are concerned, this scene on the hill brings two important issues before our eyes. First, Aeneas' dismay at his fate in the seastorm and

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[671] ñοριζ is also a topic in other discussions in Plato's dialogues where the fate of states is the issue. Cf. *Rep*. 550e1, 553a9, 561d4, 561e6, *Lg*. 679c1

[672] See also Pindar, e.g., *Pyth*. 1.85. ὅ ριζ is a reaction to success, but nothing to be afraid of. I owe this observation to T. K. Hubbard.

his mother's behavior during and after this storm is closely concatenated with what is about to come, because based upon Aeneas' expression of his desire to build a city himself, the question remains for us whether Aeneas will leave it at his admiration for Carthage or feel inspired and seek new ways to let his city become reality.[673]

Since *Aen*. 1.437 has no direct parallels in Homer[674] and Apollonius[675], we cannot but conclude that this expression of Aeneas' wish to build a city brings in a new aspect. Structurally and in terms of the plot of the *Aeneid*, this verse will find a late and surprising[676] echo in *Aen*. 4.265ff. where Mercury accuses Aeneas of having forgotten that his mission is to build his own city, not to help build Carthage.[677]

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[673] Also cf. Kaster (2005) 84-103, esp. the chart on p. 87. Also cf. Kaster (2003) 258. Kaster undertakes a taxonomy of the four different forms of the Latin term *invidia*. Aeneas' emotion would come close to what Kaster calls "script 1".

[674] Cf. Knauer (1979) 375.

[675] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 456.

[676] Cf. Glei (1991) 128: "*Zugleich gibt er … dem Wunsch und der Hoffnung Ausdruck, seine eigene Gründung möge ebenso aussehen …, und das* fatum-*Widrige seines Bleibens geht ihm möglicherweise auch deshalb nicht auf*."

[677] Hermes uses the words *Karthago alta* in *Aen*. 4.265 just like Juno in 4.97 in her discussion with Venus. *Altus* is, of course, a "standing epithet" (cf. Austin (1955) 52). Nevertheless the contrast between Rome and Carthage is marked by Hermes' reminder just as by Aeneas' own observation in *Aen*. 1.437. Also see Vergil's prologue: *dum conderet urbem* (*Aen*. 1.5).

6 The Temple in Carthage

6.1 Observing and Reacting to Pictures and Stories

The *ekphrasis*[678] of the temple (*Aen*. 1.446-493) and its pictures[679] appears to be Vergilian.[680] Whereas the description of the city itself finds its pendant in *Od*. 7.43-46, the depiction of the activities that are going on within the city (*Aen*. 1.421-436) has none, neither in Homer nor Apollonius.[681] The same holds true for the account of the details of the temple in Carthage. Of course, Apollonius' description of Aietes' palace in book 3 is alluded to, which in turn has Alcinous' palace of *Od*. 7 in mind.[682] To the ecphrastic technique of cataloguing certain features of a simile[683] Vergil adds an unusually focused narrative. It is not the author who simply lists these features that for one reason or the other stick out. The lens through which the temple

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[678] On the tradition of *ekphraseis* within poetry and pertinent secondary literature see Thomas (1983) 175 with n. 1 and Fowler (1991). On *ekphrasis* in Vergil see Barchiesi (1997) and Putnam (1998b). Also cf. for reflections on the correlation between different media in modern Russian texts Hansen-Löve (1983) *passim*. The results are quite comparable even if the techniques with which texts are created are quite different. On theories about *ekphraseis* in modern times which seem generally to start with the description of Achilles' shield in *Iliad* 18 see Primavesi (2002) 191-194. We today need to distinguish the relation between the artifact, its description and speaker, spectator, and respective audience. Cf. Elsner (2004) 157.

[679] Naturally scholars have asked themselves whether these paintings and their temple really did exist in Carthage in some form. Caesar's attempt to rebuild Carthage in 44 BC left us with no evidence about what became of it. In 29 BC Augustus ordered 3000 veterans to settle on the spot where the Punic Carthage once stood. Archaeological results let it seem quite certain that Vergil apparently knew some details about the new Carthage and incorporated them into his description of Carthage in *Aeneid* 1 and 4. No traces, however, of the theater in *Aen*. 1.427f. have (yet) been found. On details cf. Niemayer (1993). On the other hand, Vergil's connection to the Roman stage has to be noted. Cf. Zorzetti (1990), Galinsky (2003b) 290-293.

[680] The observer Aeneas is also depicted in the pictures (*Aen*. 1.488). This is new in the tradition of *ekphrasis*, as far as we can see. Cf. Thomas (1983) 180.

[681] The bee simile in *Aen*. 1.430-436 lets us see that Homer's bee simile that serves to describe the Greek army in *Il*. 1.86a-94 is clearly connected with Apollonius' bee simile in the Lemnian episode in *A.R*. 1.878b-885. Especially the erotic subtext of Apollonius' version serves as preparation to what will follow in regard to Aeneas and Dido.

[682] Cf. Dräger (2002) 485. Also see Williams (1972a) 192.

[683] Williams (1960b) 148 distinguishes between the descriptions of the Carthaginian temple in book 1 of the *Aeneid* and the description of Aeneas' shield in book 8 on the one hand and description of the cloak in book 5 on the other hand. The former *ekphraseis*, he claims have more implications and more direct links with the theme of the poem as a whole. For a new evaluation of Vergil's *ekphrasis* of the cloak in book 5 cf. Putnam (1995a), esp. 438f.

is looked at and described is constituted by the emotions with which Aeneas sees what he sees.[684]

Achilles' shield in *Il.* 18.478-608[685] was described in a way that some unknown observer of the shield could see and hear the stories of the pictures on the shield unfold.[686] Yet, Achilles' own reaction to the shield is rather brief. In *Il.* 19.18 Achilles' emotion is expressed by a simple ς ἑυσ τ ρ. Achilles does not lose himself in this joy, but quickly turns his attention to his mother, praises the shield once more and then tends to the duties at hand (19.19f.). Picture stories and emotional reactions to the pictures are separated in the *Iliad*.[687]

The unity of Aeneas' recollection on the occasion of his reading the murals of the temple makes for the unity of the series of pictures described. The pictures are transformed into events as if they would just be happening at the moment Aeneas looks at them.[688] They too become stories in their own right.[689] This kind of

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[684] See Barchiesi (1994) 116, 120ff. and Edmunds (2001) 79ff. for the interpretation of this scene as depiction of Aeneas as a not so ideal reader of texts.

[685] The scholarship abounds on this shield. Cf., e.g., Edwards (1991) 200-233, Hubbard (1992) (also on the narrative structure of the shield), Becker (1995).

[686] Cf. Schlesier (2002) 19f. Cf., however, Primavesi (2002) 208 who puts more emphasis on the various aspects of the verbs used by Homer.

[687] As a direct counterpoint see Aeneas' shield in *Aen.* 8.630-728 which in turn contrasts Turnus' shield (*Aen.* 7.763-792, cf. Gale (1997) 176) In the *Aeneid* the future of Rome replaces the rather general description of the world in the *Iliad*. On the implications of Aeneas' shield, also on the problem or author intention and reader response, see, e.g., Glei (1991) 199-204, Eigler (1998), McKay (1998).

[688] Cf. Williams (1960b) esp. 150f. In this scene, too, are gaps (Iser) that need to be filled by the reader. This is the rhetorical strategy of visualization (cf. Galinsky (1993/4) 307, albeit in a different context) at its best. Painted pictures and any kind of language differ from each other in that painting imitates things parallel to each other and alongside each other whereas language has to structure its imitative action in time. The product of imitative language is, even if its object is a work of art, by necessity structured like an action would be. Naturally we have to admit that a poet furthermore can loosen the strict timeline through anachronisms etc. Already Homer knew how to deal with this fact. Cf. Primavesi (2004) 7f. In regard to more contemporary authors, e.g., on Goethe's awareness of this problems and his considerations to write an *Achilleis* with no narratological retrogradations between Hector's death and the Greek departure from Troy see Schwinge (1986a) 56.

[689] For details cf. Williams (1960b) 148-151. Cf. also Simonides' opinion that a poem represents a speaking painting, a painting a silent poem (Plutarch *Moralia* 346f). See Rudd (1989) 209 on Horace's *ars* 361 (*ut pictura poesis*), Macrobius' *hoc mire et velut coloribus Maro pinxit* (*Sat.* 5.11.11 *ad Aen.* 3.513-517). There are further passages in ancient literature that concern the same topic. Cf. Vogt-Spira (2002), esp. 26f. and 29-33. Cf. Xenophon's *Mem.* 3.10.1-5 on the question what can be illustrated in

simultaneous depiction, however, of the friezes Aeneas sees and the emotions Aeneas feels while looking at and interpreting these pictures seems to be unparalleled in epic poetry before Vergil.[690] The pictures turned stories are, it has to be noted, an epic tale themselves.

Vergil leaves his hero, who disappears in the multitude of people of the city in *Aen.* 1.440, for a moment to point the reader's attention to the center of the Carthaginian city, a grove and a temple, where we will meet Aeneas again as he is joining the reader in looking at the murals of the building. Vergil explains why this location means so much to the Carthaginians. Here it was that the Carthaginians, themselves victims of the forces of nature on the seas, for the first time were given an oracle by Juno that promised a bright future for them. In honor of Juno, Dido had ordered the erection of an opulent and huge temple, a description pointing to the central importance of the oracle of the head of the horse for Carthaginian politics and society. Now, Aeneas cannot be aware of this oracle and portent. He also cannot know that it will be Rome who will end the happy times that were predicted for Carthage by this horse prodigy.[691] However, Vergil indicates that paradoxically it was just this *laetissimus*[692] grove (*Aen.* 1.441) with a sanctuary of the Trojan enemy Juno (*Aen.* 1.446) that was built by the future enemies of Rome where Aeneas would find

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pictures. In the same chapter Xenophon indicates his awareness that emotions can be expressed by gestures. Cf. Keuls (1978) 102f. For an analysis of how ancient pictures "learn" to tell stories from the 8th to the 2nd century BC see Giuliani (2003). Without a doubt, pottery even knew how to illustrate scenes from the Homeric poems in Vergil's times. Illustrations of texts in books were not far away. Cf. Giuliani (2003) 278. We will return to this issue of a close connection between poetry and the fine arts later on in this chapter.

[690] Therefore it might not be wrong to interpret *nova res oblata* in *Aen.* 1.450 as a metaliterary hint indicating Vergil's being self-conscious about composing a new kind of literature with all the undertones of the Latin adjective *novus*. (On Vergil's self-awareness as a poet within literary history see, e.g., Schmidt (2001b) 117-124 who discusses this issue in special regard to Vergil's *Eclogues*.) The description of the temple friezes indeed is "new" in many ways.

[691] Cf. Clay (1988) 196f.

[692] *Laetissimus* goes together with *umbrae* (on the textual problem see Williams (1972a) 194). But due to the events that happened there it was probably in general a pleasant spot for the Carthaginians anyway. Cf. Austin (1971) 152. And it is destined to become one for Aeneas and the Trojans. The rivalry between Rome and Carthage is hinted at in *Aen.* 1.444bf.

reason to relent his fear and gain hope (*Aen.* 1.450ff.).[693] The *enallage* of *laetissimus* works in two ways, towards the Carthaginians and the Trojans. Thereby, as a matter of fact, happiness in the superlative forebodes ill for the future again just as the Trojan happiness in anticipation of reaching their final destination at the beginning of the *Aeneid* had to give way to unhappier feelings soon. But this time the joy points towards a more distant future.

At present, this is the place where Aeneas for the first time[694] is really consoled by what he sees and, as Vergil puts it, "dares" (*ausus*) to hope and trust that there will be a brighter future (*Aen.* 1.450ff.). The *nova res* of the temple and perhaps of Aeneas' encounter with Dido as well as his previously missing[695] companions arouse these new emotions in Aeneas. His mother apparently did not manage to infuse them into him. However, the change in his feelings comes about in a passage that is no less an *ekphrasis* of the temple friezes, but also an *ekphrasis* of Aeneas' emotions.

At the beginning and the end of Aeneas' looking at the pictures of the Trojan War[696], his marveling and detailed scrutiny of these pictures (*lustrat Aen.* 1.453, *miratur*, *videt Aen.* 1.456, *haec dum Dardanio Aeneae miranda videntur, / dum stupet obtutuque haeret defixus in uno*, / … *Aen.* 1.494f.[697]) yields to recognition of and even living through these scenes as well as to an emotional response to them. Aeneas realizes that the fame of the war at Troy has reached all regions of the world.[698] In a very distinct gesture (*constitit*) and in tears (*lacrimans Aen.* 1.459), Aeneas addresses

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[693] Cf. Horsfall (1995) 106. To add to the irony, it is Aeneas' fate to in some sense repeat all the scenes on the temple again. See Harrison (2001) 87f. with reference to Stanley (1965).
[694] *Primum* is important and therefore repeated: *Aen.* 1.450 and 451.
[695] Dido's "*solvite corde metum!*" in *Aen.* 1.562 promises security that will, however, be short-lived. Cf. Stanley (1965) 269, 273f..
[696] In retrospect, Juno's *quisquis es* (*Aen.* 1.387) does not betray any knowledge of these events which are at what appears to be the main temple in Carthage. We perhaps would expect Juno as a Carthaginian huntress to react surprised when she learned to stand before Trojans.
[697] *A.R.* 3.215b and 3.216a continues to have an impact here.
[698] This is expressed from the viewpoint of the author in *Aen.* 1.456ff. and Aeneas himself in *Aen.* 1.459-463.

Achates. He draws three conclusions from what he sees.[699] Carthage pays tribute to the honor of Troy. The Carthaginians are a people with feelings that can be touched by the misery of others[700], and this fame will carry good things for the shipwrecked Trojans as well.[701] Therefore, Achates should let his fear go (*Aen.* 1.463a).

This is an interesting remark for several reasons. Firstly, since up to this point, we heard of Aeneas' fear, but it was not at all explicit that Achates personally shared in Aeneas' feelings. Aeneas is shown continuing with the strategy that he used in his address to his men after the sea storm: he tries to hide his own feelings. But his tears betray his good intentions. After all, these pictures mean something for his own reputation as well, not just for Achates' (*tibi, Aen.* 1.463). Secondly, the question needs to be asked what Aeneas' mother during her conversation with her son could have achieved, had she just recognized that even Carthage had heard of the War at Troy.[702]

We have to ask what feature of the pictures lets Aeneas believe that the Carthaginians could pity the Trojans for what they have experienced. Cicero (*de re publica* 1.28f.), Vitruvius (*de architectura* ch. 1 of the preface to book 6), and Diogenes Laertius (2.8.4) tell us stories in which shipwrecked philosophers, probably Plato in Cicero's case and Aristippus in Vitruvius' and Diogenes' text, discover evidence (*hominum vestigia, rep.* 1.29) that the human beings living at the shore

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[699] For a similar, yet somewhat different account see Putnam (1998a) 244.

[700] *Aen.* 1.462 maybe recalls a verse from Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (432). There the chorus reflects on the grief of the families who sent members to Troy. Cf. Avery (1953) 19. If this is so and Aeneas as part of the defeated side joins the victorious in their sorrow, Vergil makes it obvious that both parties that clash in a war suffer and that Aeneas is aware of it. This awareness then would fit considerations about Aeneas' humanistic viewpoint that are discussed below. Austin (1971) 157 cites an additional reference from Euripides *Medea* (54f.). There has been much discussion about the meaning of *Aen.* 1.462. I would like to agree with Stanley (1965) 277 that Servius analyzes this passage plausibly within the scene at the temple and that the broad phrasing of this sentence brings in dramatic irony in regard to the larger context in which this verse is put by the author. Aeneas cannot know the full scope of implications that his utterance will have. Aeneas' feeling of relief carries him away.

[701] *Tibi* (*Aen.* 1.463) probably encompasses more people than just Achates.

[702] In *Aen.* 1.384 Aeneas himself suspected that he was unknown to the area where he had come. Venus had done nothing to dispel that misperception (*Aen.* 1.387) and probably had her reason for it as we saw. But now Aeneas can be the more surprised by the knowledge about the Trojan War and his own quest for new land which is pointed out by Dido herself in *Aen.* 1.565f. and 617f.

know science. That civilized people must be living here is the thought of the shipwrecked philosopher in each case.[703] In Vergil, a product of art serves as that evidence of humanity. Even if Aeneas is not a professional philospher, we probably can assume that in Vergil's eyes his feelings do not fundamentally differ from those of Plato or Aristippus.[704] This probably is what Aeneas indeed wants to see after the turmoil of the storm.

The pictures, however, are not just mathematical figures in the sand, as in our philosophers' case, which allow only to recognize how far advanced mathematics is in the area where they landed. The pictures Aeneas beholds portray details of one of the greatest victories of Juno. In other words, the Carthaginians must have created the pictures in a way that would express their awareness of the sufferings of the defeated without dishonoring Juno or the victorious. If we presuppose that, we might actually see Vergil's undertaking to prepare the reader already for an assessment of what is to come. Nisus and Euryalus, for example, will execute a deed very similar to that suffered by Rhesus and his men.[705] Thus the fate of Troilus gains a great significance for later passages of the *Aeneid*: there will be quite a few *infelices pueri* who fight against enemies who like Achilles just are superior[706] fighters in comparison and cannot be defeated.[707] But Aeneas cannot know that yet, just as he remains ignorant of the future when he will put his new shield on his shoulder in *Aen.* 8.729ff.[708] Aeneas

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[703] Cf. Büchner (1984) 111.
[704] Cf. Galinsky (1996) 252f.
[705] Cf. *Aen.* 1.469-473 and 9.314-366. Cf. Stanley (1965) 274f., Putnam (1998a) 265.
[706] Cf. the usage of the nominative *impar* in *Aen.* 1.475 (Troilus) and 12.216 (Turnus) which links the two and, coincidentally, Achilles and Aeneas closely together. Cf. Putnam (1998a) 265. But we also need to note the differences. See the chapter on the final scene.
[707] Cf., e.g., Duckworth (1967) 149f. (who relates the story of Nisus' and Euryalus' death esp. to Turnus' death) and Stanley (1965) 275. On pages 275f. he provides even more examples of correlated scenes between the temple friezes and the Vergilian "*Iliad*" (*Aen.* 7-12). However, I am not so sure whether one indeed may completely parallelize Aeneas and Achilles as Stanley suggests on pages 276f. See the discussion of the final scene of the *Aeneid* below.
[708] The phrasing of that passage is ambiguous and in its ambiguity stresses that what is the future for Aeneas is at the same time the past for Vergil and his reader. Cf. Gransden (1976) 185 and Binder/Binder (1994) 153 as well as (2001) 214f.

marvels at them and feels joy (*miratur … gaudet*). The subject of the pictures in Troy, however, Aeneas could recognize. Could he contextualize them correctly?[709]

This intratextual parallel raises another question. Were the pictures of the Trojan War that Vergil describes the only pictures on the walls of Carthage's temple?[710] If not, we would see the selectiveness of Aeneas' perception. Are we supposed to assume that the Carthaginians did not have their own stories to tell about Juno like the prodigy of the horse head? It seems to be a bit far-fetched to assume that the Carthaginians as a non-participating third party of the Trojan War decorated their temple with pictures that in addition would interpret the events of that war in such a balanced, humanistic, way as indicated above. Or did Vergil let Aeneas mistake these pictures for something that they just were not?[711] In this case, that would tell us even more about Aeneas' own character, since he thinks that something similar would be possible.[712]

Aeneas then focuses on the various scenes from the Trojan War itself. He feeds his soul with the vain pictures (*animum pictura pascit inani Aen.* 1.464). The metaphor of his soul being nourished by what he sees and the contrast between this and the emptiness of the pictures[713] bears witness to the pathos and devastation that

[709] Also see Skinner (2004) 239.
[710] Cf. Edmunds (2001) 81.
[711] Cf. the subjectivity of Aeneas' thoughts that have been stressed by many scholars, e.g. Putnam (1998a) 262. See below.
[712] This is how far it goes. Therefore, I would like to modify what Putnam (1998a) 275 said about Aeneas at the murals. I do not think that Aeneas really demonstrates that he is able to empathize towards others or to engage in self-critical examination. In the murals, he finds reinforcement of what he already previously believed and thought about the Trojan War.
[713] Cf. Austin (1971) 157. On other interpretations of the meaning of *pictura inanis*. e.g. as a picture that qua subjectivity of the beholder is incompletely communicated, see Bartsch (1998) 337f. with n. 67. Bartsch goes on to interpret this and other instances of Vergil's treatment of artistic items as hints on a metaliterary level directed towards his audience. Esp. cf. Bartsch (1998) 339. Scholars have also taken this phrase as indicative of the difference between the immediate response that Aeneas gives when he sees the friezes and the deeper meaning the events depicted on them will have for both Aeneas and Dido. Cf. Putnam (1998a) 246 n. 6.

Aeneas must have felt over these and the more recent events.[714] At any rate, Aeneas' tears and sighs only multiply over the course of the scenes that are described.[715] They culminate in an immense sigh that comes from his deepest heart (*tum vero ingentem gemitum dat pectore ab imo, … Aen.* 1.485) over the last major scene of book 24 of the *Iliad*: Priam paying Achilles ransom[716] for Hector's body. Even if this verse seems to be a little formulaic[717], the reader is reminded of *Aen.* 1.371, where Aeneas draws a deep breath to tell Venus the magnitude of his sad and sorrowful experiences that he had. Once more we see how Aeneas' feelings indeed are carried over from the encounter with his mother into this scene.[718] Furthermore, directly after that we are told that Aeneas recognized himself in the pictures as well. This juxtaposition emphasizes Aeneas' role in the war that actually was, especially in the end of the *Iliad*, not that great after all.[719] At the same time, when Aeneas is mentioned, Vergil lets this emotionally intense scene end on an emotionally less intense note with a set of post-Iliadic scenes.[720] Dramaturgically, through her subsequent appearance Dido will then advance the narrative that has come to a short standstill[721] at this moment.

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[714] Vergil's own *inanis* shows that there is a certain shallow pride in what Aeneas does and in how he interprets the pictures at Juno's temple. They were, of course, meant to glorify the achievements of the Greeks. Cf. Bartsch (1998) 337 with n. 62. He cites further literature.

[715] Cf. *Aen.* 1.465 (The diction is Greek with a trace of Ennian influence. Cf. Austin (1971) 157), 470, 485.

[716] On the role of ransom in the *Iliad* see Wilson (2002).

[717] *Pectore ab imo* seems to be a poetic expression. Cf. Austin (1971) 163.

[718] This serves to further illustrate the connections between the individual passages of book 1 of the Aeneid. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 113.

[719] Putnam (1998a) 258, 263, who supposes that this passage marks the beginning of the merger of the character of Achilles with the character of Aeneas, thinks differently. They are, however, as I said above, juxtaposed, not equated. Cf. the phrase *alius .. Achilles* in *Aen.* 6.89 which denotes Turnus in the Sibyl's, or rather Apollo's, prophetic words. The *Aeneid* will play with the similarieties and differences between these two – and other – characters of the poem. After all, Aeneas' interpretation of the encounter between Achilles and Priam in *Iliad* 24 is quite biased and rests not so much on the *Iliad*, but is more like the portrayal of Achilles by Euripides' *Andromache* 107f. Cf. Williams (1972a) 198. Therefore, the reader will have to compare what is said in the *Aeneid* about individual episodes of the Homeric poems with his own knowledge of Homer's texts. For that purpose, not for less, this passage is a marked starting point.

[720] Cf. Williams (1972a) 198.

[721] Cf. Putnam (1998a) 246.

The detail of the emotional portrayal of Aeneas that is given in this scene is remarkable as such. In terms of the works of Vergil's predecessors, one can compare the description of the Carthaginian temple to Apollonius' depiction of Aeetes' palace in *A.R.* 3.215-248 or Homer's account of Alcinous' palace in *Od.* 7.84-132.[722] In fact, as far as Aeneas' entry into the city and his looking at the temple is concerned, he looks much more like Jason than scholars have previously seen.[723]

Also, whereas Odysseus' arrival at Alcinous' palace marks the final turning point of his wanderings, Aeetes' palace is a much more menacing sign.[724] After all, it will be Hecate's temple where Jason and Medea will meet privately for the first time in Apollonius. This atmosphere is more similar to the situation at Juno's temple.[725] As much as Aeneas might be looking for final relief from his labors, he seems to overlook the fact that it is the temple of the sworn enemy of Troy where he finds reasons to stop being afraid for his future. But he should know better. For he himself has looked at the frieze depicting the Trojan women[726] who tried to pray in Athena's temple to its patron goddess who was not at all inclined to listen to them (*ad templum non aequae*[727] *Palladis ibant Aen.* 1.479ff.).[728]

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[722] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 80. On the description of the palace in general see Hainsworth (1988) 326 and on the possible Near Eastern models for the Homeric palace of Alcinous see Cook (2004).

[723] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 80f.

[724] Of course it needs to be noted that the next destroyed city will be Carthage itself. The friezes therefore have an additional layer of significance. Cf. Putnam (1998a) 262. Not only *Penthesilea furens* (*Aen.* 1.491) can be compared with the Carthaginian queen later on (Putnam 1998a, 258), but also the emphasis on Priam (*Aen.* 1.461) about whom Dido especially asks questions in *Aen.* 1.750 that lead to the description of his death in book 2 (Putnam 1998a, 259) finds its sad, but not identical counterpart in Dido in book 4 of the *Aeneid.*

[725] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 81f.

[726] This scene will find another counterpart in *Aen.* 11.477-485 when the Latin women go pray in Minerva's temple. Cf. Gransden (1991) 16 and 111. Their prayers will not be answered. Vergil, however, does not include any indication regarding Minerva's attitude towards these prayers in this passage. Homer had done the opposite in *Il.* 6.311 (see below). Also cf. Horsfall (2003) 285f. for a discussion and further literature.

[727] This is, of course, Aeneas' subjective view of Athena's attitude.

[728] *Peplum* as a gift in *Aen.* 1.480 is identical with the – and this is remarkable – Sidonian σέσορζ of *Il.* 6.289f., 293ff., and 302ff. Cf. Thomas (1983) 181. This inclusion of a work of art from the poem that immediately precedes the *Aeneid* within a work of art within a poem betrays Vergil's virtuoso use of the genre of *ekphrasis.* Cf. Thomas (1983) 188. This σέσορζ was part of the goods that Paris brought home with him when he returned to Troy with Helen (*Il.* 6.290bff.). As such this very

Just as a severe storm hit the Trojans when they set sail in too high a spirit in *Aen*. 1.35, dire events will follow the moment in which Aeneas thinks it safe to brighten his mood. We cannot compare the complex[729] portrayal of Aeneas' emotions with anything that can be found in the passages from Homer and Apollonius that we just mentioned.

Odysseus responds with sadness, however, to the first and third song of Demodocus[730] in Homer's *Odyssey*.[731] Odysseus strives to let nobody see his tears

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beautiful gift is therefore connected with the very reason of the Trojan War. Does Aeneas, however, think that if Sidon was a third party without any own interest in the Helen affair back then when Paris visited it, this will also be true now as far as Sidonian Carthage and Dido (cf. *Aen*. 1.446 *Sidonia Dido)* are concerned?
Sidonian gifts appear in the *Aeneid* several times. Cf. Williams (1972b) 385. *Aen*. 4.261-264. (Aeneas' cloak during Mercury's visit underlines Aeneas' involvement in the foundation of Carthage. Cf. Binder/Binder (1997) 171. Jason wore a cloak when he entered Hysipyle's city in *A.R*. 2. Heracles had to remind Jason at the end of the so-called Lemnian episode in Apollonius of his real duties that are different from "repolulating" Lemnos. Mercury stays far away from this kind of sexual interpretation of Aeneas' motifs. Iarbas will take care of that in *Aen*. 4.206-218 (cf. on Turnus' similar polemics against Aeneas Binder/Binder (1997) 167f.). But Vergil's audience could compare Mercury's with Heracles' words.) But even after Dido's death the Trojans continue to use Dido's gifts: 5.571f. (Iulus rides a horse which was Dido's gift); 9.266 (Iulus promises a bowl that was Dido's gift to Nisus); 11.74 (two pieces of clothing that Dido had given Aeneas serve as funeral gifts to Pallas). It would lead to far at this point to investigate what these gifts mean for the narrative context of these passages.

[729] We have to note that there is yet another woven item, a ὑφὴ ῥῆ, in the *Iliad* that is related to what Aeneas wants to see in the friezes of the temple. As Putnam (1998a) 244 has pointed out, in *Il*. 3.125ff. Helen applies the same technique as the Carthaginians apparently did. They selected individual scenes from "a grand panorama of events". The more important connection between *Il*. 3 and *Aen*. 1, however, is to be found on a different level. The pictures on this tapestry show scenes from the Trojan War as far as it had been fought up to that point. (On this symbolism of the omnipresence of war in the wake of the subsequent duel between Paris and Menelaus see Kirk (1985) 280. The question is whether and if so on what scale Vergil adapts this symbolism. Does Vergil want to point us more to the Punic Wars or to Dido's and Aeneas' "duel" of sorts that ends with Dido's death?) The pictures explicitly indicate that both parties, Greeks and Trojans, are equally suffering from the hands of Ares because of Helen. Since Juno's partiality was part of the story of the war, it seems improbable that the friezes on her temple were "bipartisan". In the Helen episode Aeneas himself blames Helen for the war (*Aen*. 2.575f.). His mother directs his judgment to the exact same result that Helen apparently held (*Aen*. 2.601ff.). The Helen episode happened earlier than the scene at Carthage's temple even if it is told later in book 2.

[730] Odysseus' reaction to Demodocus' second song is joy. Cf. *Od*. 8.367bf. On the relationship between Orpheus in *A.R*. 1.496-511 and Deomodocus see Nelis (1992). On the connection between Demodocus' songs in the *Odyssey*, Apollonius' song of Orpheus and Iopas' song in *Aeneid* 1 (742-746) see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 131-143, Nelis (2001b) 99, and Nelis (2001c) 233.

[731] Putnam (1998a) 243 calls *Od*. 8 the "primary model" of *Aen*. 1.453-493. He describes why in detail in the same article on pages 268-273.

when he hears these songs (*Od.* 8.83b-95, 521-534).[732] In a limited way this hiding of Odysseus' tears is similar to Aeneas' behavior towards Achates, as we have seen. Of course, the overall situation is different[733], but we have to note that Demodocus' song neither has the therapeutic impact on Odysseus' way of thinking about his current situation, nor does Odysseus in any way take pride in the fact that the Trojan War and his own deeds are the subject of artistic expression, nor does he mistake these songs for what they do not entail.

Alcinous compassionately asks whether the reason for Odysseus' tears can be found in a personal concern of his, i.e. in a death of a relative or friend of Odysseus at Troy (8.581-586).[734] He excludes the possibility of any general sad feelings about Troy or the dead Trojans and Greeks. For he says, it was decreed by the gods that Troy would fall and many humans would die, so that it would become the subject of songs for singers (*Od.* 8.579f.).[735] Alcinous cannot explain the difference that exists between the effect that Demodocus' pleasurable song should have, but apparently does not have on his guest.[736] Subsequently Odysseus' answer comprises praise for the art of singing of Demodocus and for the hospitality of the Phaeacians (*Od.* 9.1-11). Odysseus answers Alcinous' question by identifying himself as the subject of Demodocus' third song. Furthermore, he adds what he has lived through since. However, Odysseus does not single out any specific scene of Demodocus' song as the

[732] On weeping in Homer see Hainsworth (1988) 381. Also cf. van Wees (1998) in general on the change of mourning customs with special regard to tears.
[733] For example, Odysseus' reaction triggers Alcinous' question that makes Odysseus tell his story. That in turn becomes a tale similar to that of Demodocus for Alcinous and his guests. Consequently, Odysseus' audience reacts to his words just as it probably would have reacted had it heard the story from the mouth of a professional rhapsode.
[734] Homer tells how Odysseus tries to hide his tears from his audience. But one has to ask whether the veiling of his head really would have gone unnoticed the way it allegedly went.
[735] Interestingly enough Alcinous uses broadly the same argument about Troy's fall as Venus does in the Helen episode in book 2 of the *Aeneid*. Venus claims that it was the *inclementia divum* which brought about Troy's fall (2.602f.). The only difference is that Venus is less impartial than Alcinous who has to reckon with the possibility that his guest was either from the Trojan or the Greek side. Knauer (1979) 508 lists *Aen.* 1.22b as the corresponding Vergilian passage for *Od.* 8.579.
[736] Cf. Segal (1994) 120.

particular reason for his sadness and neither does Homer.[737] In sum, the songs of Demodocus and Odysseus' reaction to them cannot be used as specific models for Aeneas' reaction to the Carthaginian temple friezes.

Homer has Peisistratus recal Antilochus, who died at Troy in *Od*. 4.187f.[738] The sad picture conjured up by his memory makes Peisistratus cry (*Od*. 4.186). But unlike in Aeneas' case, manifest pictures are not the reason for Peisistratus' tears. Antilochus comes to his mind in the context of Menelaus' account of his plans for Odysseus that now are going to remain unfulfilled (*Od*. 4.169-182). The question, therefore, remains what reason made Vergil compose this passage that indeed represents a *nova res* as far as the tradition of epic poetry as we know it is concerned.

[737] Interestingly enough, in turn Odysseus' audience will react to his song in *Od*. 11.334f. and 13.1f. *as if* enchanted. The same word (ἐοξθ) is used of the songs of the Sirens in *Od*. 12.40.
[738] On the larger implications, which are very much debated, of that scene for the *Odyssey* see West (1988) 205.

6.2 Towards an Implicit Poetics of the Aeneid

The phrase *animum pictura pascit inanis* in *Aen*. 1. 464[739] leads first of all to Plato's critique of pictures, which describes the products of painting, an imitative art in his terminology, as far removed from truth by virtue of imitating (*R*. 598b6).[740] While Vergil certainly does not explicitly ponder the general ontological implications that lie at the bottom of the craft of painting or sculpting, we nevertheless can observe some interesting points that are raised by Plato about paintings in general and arise from Aeneas' interpretation of the specific pictures he sees.

Plato equates poets with painters in *R*. 377e1ff. and 605a8f.[741] Also *Sph*. 235d6-a7 makes it clear that Plato does not seem to differentiate between artists such as painters and sculptors as long as they practice imitative art (πλττη ω αλ).[742] We can therefore, I believe, assume that painters and poets are not far apart from each other in Plato's judgement about their work, even if Plato will talk more about poets, Homer in particular.[743] Vergil, however, combines Homeric epic and pictures with each other anyway.

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[739] Austin (1971) 157 quotes *georg*. 2.285 (also cf. Williams (1972/3a) 196) as a contrast and identifies this phrase from the *Aeneid* as being full of pathos.

[740] Cf., e.g., Schmitt (2001) 39ff., esp. n. 19. Technical knowledge of the artist should not be confused with his knowledge about truth. Cf. Halliwell (1997) 327. On the various degrees of reality in general see, e.g., Vlastos (1965).

[741] Painting is always closely connected with poetry in Plato. Cf. Keuls (1978) 5. This seems to have been a general assumption in Athens for a long time by then already. Cf. Webster (1952) 8. On the various ways in which painters appear in Plato's dialogues cf. Demand (1975).

[742] Cf. Adam (1907) 394, Cassirer (1924) 20. If Plato uses πλττη ω αλin the sense of "copying", he usually does so pejoratively. Cf. Cassirer (1924) 14. Plato, however, does not always treat the art of painting in an unkind way. Cf. Keuls (1978) 13 and 41f. In the *Sophist*, within this imitative art (ς έ κ πλπκ ς λν ή) there is nevertheless the difference between a somewhat better ς έ κ η ν α ω ξ λν ή which produces results that are like the imitated original and an even worse ς έ κ ι α ς α ω ξ λν ή whose products are made to impress from one perspective only and reveal their shortcomings if one looks at them from other angles. See also Bianchi-Bandinelli (1968). On the meaning and history of the term πλττη ω αλ also cf. Flashar (1979), Nehamas (1999a) 258ff. and 264. See also Halliwell (2002). It seems to be paradoxical that Socrates nevertheless is presented as "*performing* the term mimesis" (Farness (2003) 101, italics by Farness).

[743] On Plato's theory of literature see now the recent study by Büttner (2000) esp. 366-378.

Within the context of the demand that one should learn how to restrain oneself, observe moderation in pain, and seek the best possible self-control in adverse situations in book 10 of the *Republic*, Socrates says that whatever draws us to the remembrance (απ ῆωηζ)[744] of pain (σά ρζ) as well as to lamentations (ὄγχυπρῖ) and possesses the ability to do this in bottomless abundance (σοῆωξθ ζ ρ α ς) is a sign of foolishness (οὄξλωξρ), laziness (υξὄ), and even cowardice (γηοῖαζ ι ῖορ *R*. 604d8ff.).[745] All this makes the irrational part of the soul stronger in Plato's view.[746] Aeneas at the site of the temple is indeed caught up in what seems to be a never-ending remembrance of his people's and his own past sufferings (*noster labor, Aen*. 1.460). Only Dido's and his comrades' arrival can finally divert his sad thoughts by gathering a big crowd (*Aen*. 1.510).

For the first time, Aeneas can really grieve for his people in regard to the scenes of the Trojan War portrayed on the temple and probably about every other misfortune that happened to them since. His mother, to whom he tried to communicate all this Trojan history, did not pay attention to this emotional need of her son: *Mentem mortalia tangunt* (*Aen*. 1.462b). According to Aristotle only heroes with a good character could reckon with pity (οῆρζ), yet only if watched by equally morally good people.[747] At this point the ambiguity of Aeneas' situation starts to matter, even if Aeneas does not recognize it. At the moment, he clearly thinks to have found a civilized place where he and his people can hope to encounter understanding, help, and even sympathy.

[744] Plato is using the plural. It is hard to judge whether this is meant to be a general plural or a genuine plural. Cf. Smyth/Messing (1956) 271.
[745] Plato refers with this passage to the poet, not the painter, but see above.
[746] Cf. Murray (1996) 219. On the effects of art on human beings according to Plato in general cf. Pollitt (1974) 41-49.
[747] Cf. Zierl (1994) 27f.

The point of this comparison of the temple in Carthage with Plato's critique of poetry and incidentally with the fine arts[748] is not that Vergil would in any way adopt Socrates' suggestion to banish certain arts from his ideal city.[749] Just as Plato continued writing after he included Socrates' critique of writing in Plato's *Phaedrus*[750], he probably also continued reading Homer and the works of other authors as well as talking about painting after he wrote his *Republic*.[751] Plato's point in both cases most probably was to exhort his audience to think about the works of poetry and about their impact on everyday life. His intention probably was to alert his readers to guard themselves against the dangers innate in certain media in order to appreciate and utilize their advantages and opportunities better. As Socrates puts it in Plato's *Republic* 595b:

> Ἆθ ζ πἔ συὅζ ὖπἄζ ηυῆω αλ. ρ ξάυ πρχ ναζ ημηζ ησυὅζ ζ ρΰζ ζ ῆζ ζυαξ ὼγἴαζ σ ρλκζ ἄζ ναΐ ζ ρΰζ οορχζ ἃσἃ ζ αζ ζ ρΰζ πλπκζ λ ρΰζ . οώεκ ρλ η ὴ αλ σά ζ α ζ ἄ ζ ρλα ζ α ζ ῆζ ζ νρχὅ ζ θ γλα ρΐαζ- ωρλπΐ ρχωλι άυπανρ ζ ὅ ηγέ αλα ζ ἄ ρὰ ζ χξ ά ηλ ζ α.[752]
>
> To speak to you – for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all the other imitators – all such things seem to be a corruption of the mind of all the listeners who do not know as an antidote what the nature of these things happens to be.

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[748] It is a general question whether the ancients thought "of literature as a genre distinct from both music and 'fine art' (painting and sculpture)" in the same way as we do today. Cf. Nussbaum (2003) 213.

[749] Nehamas argues that Plato only banishes the poets, not all arts. Cf. Nehamas (1999a) 251 and 268f. While our general understanding seems to be that Plato wants "to deprive us of all the wonderful works of the imagination or submit future artists to rigid control" (Gould (1964) 71), Nehamas also argues that Plato's "attack on poetry is better understood as a specific social and historical gesture than as an attack on poetry, and especially on art, as such." (1999b, 279).

[750] In both cases it is likely that Plato responded to developments in contemporary society even if Athens probably lost its leading position in the fine arts after the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Keuls (1978) 53ff. (with further literature), 87, and 150 regarding Plato's critique of painting and Usener (1994) 237 regarding Plato's critique of writing.

[751] Plato's detailed knowledge of the arts has lead to the assumption that Plato must have dealt with them quite a bit since his own childhood. Cf. Schweitzer (1953) 16-30 and 79 and also Schmitt (2001) 41. Plato also confesses that he has become acquainted with Homer's text since the days of his youth and he expresses the deep affection that he feels towards his text. Cf. *R*. 595b9-c3. See. Halliwell (1997) 324.

[752] Cf. Keuls (1978) 41.

One needs to know the nature of poetry and the products of art.[753] Then there is no danger for one's rationality. For Aeneas' thinking, however, there is danger. As discussed above, Aeneas does not know what these pictures, which he is looking at, are. They were not painted to portray the defeat and loss of the Trojans, but in all likelihood to document the victory of Juno.[754] Looked at from this perspective, the placement of the Iliadic scenes in a Carthaginian setting while being observed by a Trojan raise the following question that was apparently much discussed already in antiquity: who is to be blamed for the Trojan War and what did this war and its result represent. Aeneas too readily takes the presence of these pictures which portray a war the Carthaginians were not involved in for a sign that every region of the world knows about the sufferings of the Trojan people (*Aen.* 1.459f.[755]). Priam's portrait solicits Aeneas' assumption that his glorious deed also here gets its earned glory[756] and that in general human suffering will be met with sympathy (*Aen.* 1.461f.). After this statement Aeneas is overtaken by his grief (*animum pascit, Aen.* 1.464), as if he really hungered for such an opportunity.

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[753] "*…, das ist der gute Maler oder Dichter, der wegen eben dieser von ihm verlangten Erkenntnisleistung ein philosophischer Künstler ist.*" Schmitt (2001) 54. It has long been observed that Plato may have thought himself to be such a philosophical artist. Cf. Schmitt (2001) 54 n. 36 with further literature.

[754] This is, of course, not to say that Aeneas' interpretation of these pictures is "wrong". It's his subjective view that translates into the hope that the Carthaginians will have pity for the Trojan fate, be merciful, and help the Trojans. In fact, a portrayal of the Trojan War might have entailed a hint that the glory of the victorious side, if there is only glory for them, is at least equated by the loss of the defeated party. We will find this view of war activity realized in Vergil's own epic poem as well. Roman viewers had much leeway in interpreting art and availed themselves of it. Cf. Elsner (1995).

[755] Cf. *Aen.* 1.457.

[756] One wonders what contribution to Juno's glory this scene is supposed to make. If it is included in the series of pictures for the sake of completeness, one can understand this. If it serves to portray the cruelty of the war for the Trojans, Juno's enemy, the "artistic concept" of the Carthaginians becomes a bit improbable. In fact, Hera (in unity with Poseidon and Athena) is opposing Hector's release from the hands of Achilles in *Il.* 24.25-30. (Aristarchus already wanted to athetize this passage. Cf. on this still ongoing debate Richardson (1993) 276ff.) This opposition does not prevent Zeus from preparing the return of Hector's corpse to Troy. Hera's (as well as Poseidon's and Athena's) anger is directed against the entirety of Priam's family. Therefore, Aeneas must be again misreading the pictures. The emphasis of the pictures probably is on the fact that Hector and with him all of Troy is humiliated and cannot buy back its freedom, peace, and security. Juno has won. It is, however, most interesting that Venus' role in bringing Helen to Troy is mentioned in this context as well. Now Venus will be preparing another ill-fated relationship, this time with Juno's consent and active help (*Aen.* 1.114).

Plato reckons with the possibility that someone can be touched emotionally by a passage from Homer and the tragedians.[757] In *R*. 605c10-d5 Socrates claims that even the best people cannot escape from even feeling the same (ωχπσάω ρ ς ηζ) as a suffering hero (ς ΄ίζ ς ή υώθ σέ ηλώ). Socrates observes that the more the artist manages to make his audience feel this sympathy, the higher the audience praises the artist, as we see in Odysseus' praise for Demodocus. Aeneas is already beyond praise.[758] He marvels at the pictures, but is taken into a totally other world of the past already and has no time to praise the artistic qualities of the Carthaginians who painted the temple's pictures. The methods with which an artist achieves this goal are also included in Socrates' remark. He lists long sad speeches or songs and gestures under this category. On the one hand, this is exactly what Vergil's audience is likely to experience when they read Aeneas' words and gestures at the temple. We can see how Vergil engages the thoughts of his readers on the level of reception aesthetics. On the other hand, we need to continue to read Plato's *Republic* a bit further in order to arrive at yet another passage that fits Aeneas' behavior.

Plato discusses what happens to somebody who in the past, while using force (ε ΄α) against his own nature (ι ΄ωζ), has desperately tried to suppress (ς ΄ νας η ΄πη ρ) his own sad feelings (γανυ ωα΄ ς η να΄ σργ΄υαω αλ) after an accident or misfortune that happened to him (ς α ζ ρ νη΄αλζ ωχι ρυα ζ) if he reads about similar things that happened to other people (R. 606a3-a7). Socrates continues that it is not considered to be shameful (α ω υ΄) to praise or pity a man who decries his own fate (οο΄ς υλα σά κ 606b1ff.). To do the same in regard to one's own fate would not be the right thing. The opposite behavior is looked for in those cases

[757] Again, I suppose that since in the *Aeneid* the pictures on the temple walls recount Homeric passages we cannot overlook this Platonic passage.

[758] In the case of Carthage's temple, there is no one artist to praise, as in Domodocus' song. Cf., however, the temple at Cumae in *Aen*. 6, where it remains unclear whether Aeneas knows the artist who made those temple doors. Both in Carthage as well as in Cumae, Aeneas' marveling at the objects is interrupted.

(ἡ ἴα ξηλ ναί ναυς ηυη 605d8-e2).[759] Socrates assumes that by having these emotions about other people's fate, one loses his ability to act correctly if one will be hit by ill-fortune again, i.e. it will not be easy to restrain one's emotions in one's own misfortune (ς ὅ οηλ ὅ ρ ὀ γλρ ς ρ ζ αὖς ρ σ ά ηωλ νας έ ηλ) if one has previously made the mistake of feeding one's pitiful emotions by reading poetry (υηφα 606b7f.).[760] Vergil's *animum pictura pascit inanis* in *Aen.* 1. 464b, therefore, could be directly modeled upon Plato's critique of poetry and painting.

Socrates indeed attributes some usefulness to pieces of art. For example, artists who can "track down the nature of the beautiful and the graceful" (ηὖηλ ς ἥ ς ρ ναορ ς η ναί η ω ἤπρ ρζ ι ὕωλ) can lead young people to perfection in their education (*R.* 401c4-d3).[761] In *R.* 397d4f. Adeimantus apparently wants to admit the "unmixed imitator of the good" (///ς ὅ ς ρ σ ληνρ ζ πλπκς ἥ νυας ρ //) into the ideal city within the context of the education of the young guardians without being contradicted by Socrates.[762] Plato, however, does not count Homeric tales in that useful category. What will happen to Aeneas? Which effect will the Carthaginian pictures have on him? That is the question that Vergil's reader, if he was acquainted with Platonic literary theory, doubtless also would have asked in this very specific way. Vergil, however, does apparently know not only Plato's view on this matter.

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[759] Socrates discusses this question while using gender terminology. According to him it is a sign of a man (ς ρ ς ρ πἔ γυὅζ) to restrain one's feelings in cases of one's personal misfortune, the opposite is the sign of a woman (νη ρ γἔ ξχ αλνὅζ *R.* 605e1). To examine the difference between Aeneas' and Dido's emotional behavior in this context would be very interesting.

[760] The terminology of eating and hunger can also be found in *R.* 606a4f.: σηρηλκνὅζ and σρσοκω ῆ αλ Socrates' remark that the desire to feel like crying in dire circumstances is innate in human nature (ι ὕωλ*R.* 606a5) further makes it clear that Socrates apparently equates desires like hunger with grief in this regard. The relation of poetry and ς υρι ἥ is very important in Plato's thought. Cf. Dalfen (1974) 150-155.

[761] Socrates rejects art as long as it is directed to pleasure (συὅζ ἡγρ ἤ *R.* 607c3-8). As long as art is detrimental for the struggle for justice and virtue, Plato's Socrates does not see a reason to practice it. Cf. Cassirer (1924) 26. On further passages in Plato's *Republic* where the importance of poetry for the ethical formation of a human being's character is expressed see Halliwell (1997) 315ff. and 319ff.

[762] Transl. Shorey (1937) 243. On the implications of this passage consult Nehamas (1999a) 252ff.

If we turn our eyes to Aristotle for a moment, we can observe that he agrees with Plato on a number of points[763], even if Aristotle is making his points in a more moderate language. Aristotle, for example, sees the necessity of censorship for obscene pictures and poetry in the state. Aristotle provides stricter censorship of the artistic material for the protection of younger children, but clearly sees the educational value of art as well as Plato (*Pol.* 1336b12-23). In fact, Aristotle emphasizes that people learn from the products of art just as he illustrates that we can learn from the examples of other people.[764] In order to make his point about the products of art, Aristotle uses πῖπκωζ quite differently than Plato did.[765] To imitate something through art is in Aristotle's eyes a natural (ι χωνŏζ) phenomenon and function of every human being. It is in a way a tool to obtain new or to test existing knowledge (πα ά ηλ ναί ωχοορξῖ ηω αχ *Po.* 1448b4-24). Aristotles' pertinent views can be seen as responses and reactions to Plato.[766] Aristotle's views differ from Plato's not only in regard to the concept of πῖπκωζ. Some of the differing aspects of his teachings are of great interest in regard to Vergil's temple in Carthage.

In Aristotle's opinion Homer was the best poet (*Po.* 1448b24-27 and 34), even if Plato explicitly challenged this view in his *Republic* on the grounds that as a poet Homer would not have real knowledge about the things he imitates in his poems (*R.* 599d2-e4).[767] For Aristotle, however, hymns and encomiastic poetry were the genres

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[763] Among them is that Aristotles compares poetry and painting with one another in away that suggests their closeness as arts to each other (*Po.* 1454b8-13, 1461b11ff.). Cf. Pollitt (1974) 49f. on the general impact art has an human beings.

[764] Cf. *Rh.* 1383a8-12 and Halliwell (1986) 176f. with n. 10.

[765] On the development of the term from pre-Platonic times via Plato to Aristotle see Halliwell (1986) ch. 4. On the meaning of the term in Greek antiquity see Kardaun (1993) esp. chh. 3 and 4. For the development up to Roman times see Petersen (2000) 19-80. On the differences and similarities in regard to the usage of this term between Aristotle and Plato see, e.g., Golden (1969) 148-152, Arrighetti (1987) 152f., and Lattmann (2005) 33f. Also cf. Woodruff (1992). From Aristotle to the Stoics there apparently is a direct link in their respective view of this term. For Stoics, too, human beings "imitate" by nature. Οῖπκωζ became a topic only during middle Stoicism and was more and more neglected by the later Stoics. Cf. Zagdoun (2000) 155.

[766] Cf., e.g., Webster (1952) 12f.

[767] One needs to note that both passages from Aristotle's *Poetics* and Plato's *Republic* explicitly refer to Homer as the author of tragedies.

in which good (ναορῖ) people were portrayed. Related is Plato's view of the admissibility of certain hymns in regard to the ideal city in his *Republic* (*R.* 372b7f., 459e5-460a2, 468d9, 607a3f.; *Lg.* 801e1-4).[768] Aristotle thinks that the genre of epic poetry itself is already a guarantee for the imitation of morally good people (*Po.* 1449b9f.). Given that minor Homeric characters like Thersites in *Iliad* 2 apparently do not qualify as "good," one should only take Aristotle's rather general remark as pertaining to the main figures of an epic poem.[769] Plato and Aristotle thus approach epic poetry from different angles. Plato demands that poetry should serve a moral purpose.[770] Aristotle describes the literature of his time, but also wants to cut out some immoral poetry for the sake of the moral edification of people, as the passage from his *Politics* quoted above clearly indicates. Looking at the temple pictures through Aristotle's eyes, Aeneas should also ask himself what he can learn from the *Iliad*.

This Aristotelian appeal even goes further. Aristotle's *Poetics* states that pictures have a very interesting effect. Dead bodies arouse the opposite of pleasures if looked at in reality. If seen in a picture, however, the cruelty of the sight is somehow replaced by the joy of recognizing a scene. The more accurate the picture is in comparison with reality the more joy will be felt by the observer (*Po.* 1448b10ff.). Troilus is portrayed as almost dead in the pictures in Carthage (*Aen.* 1.474-478). Hector appears only as a corpse (*Aen.* 1.483f.). Aeneas does not feel simply aesthetic pleasure, but even if this sight in connection with other details causes Aeneas to sigh even more (*Aen.* 1.486), he should remember Aristotle's words, so to speak, and look through the effects that these pictures have on him. His fiction and vision of the past

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[768] Cf. Murray (1995) 229, Nehamas (1999a) 252.

[769] Vergilian figures like Mezentius in the second half of the *Aeneid* make it improbable that Vergil would have thought Aristotle's dictum to be something other than just that, a general remark about the primary characters of epic. Plato, by the way, admits the imitation of bad characters in the education of the young guardians if these bad characters are either ridiculed or for once manage to achieve something good (*R.* 396c5-e8). Cf. Nehamas (1999b) 280.

[770] Because poetry is dangerous for the morally good life, poetry in itself is dangerous and better to be banned. Cf. Annas (1981) 342.

are neither necessarily nor *de facto* Carthaginian reality. In that consequence Aristotle's advice converges with Plato's as applied by Vergil.

Thus we see the far-reaching implications Vergil's variation of a Homeric αξ ώυλωζ scene. Aristotle lists the recognition of Odysseus before Alcinous in book 8 of the *Odyssey* as type 3 of such recognition scenes. We have already identified this scene as one of Vergil's models for Aeneas' reaction to the temple pictures in Carthage. What makes this observation interesting is that Aristotle subsumes also a key scene of the otherwise unknown[771] tragedy Μΰσυλρλby Dikaiogenes (*Po*. 1454b37-1455a4). In this tragedy somebody looks at a picture, starts to cry, and subsequently is recognized as who he is. Vergil does not simply follow this plot-pattern. The recognition of Aeneas is deferred, the audiences' suspense thereby heightened, and Aeneas has time to examine his past in detail. Aeneas takes advantage of this opportunity just too willingly.

Man's ability to recognize pictures and react emotionally to them is, however, not just a question of plot patterns. The fact that somebody reacts emotionally to a portrait is alson a subject of Aristotle's consideration in *Pol.* 1340a25-28.[772] This passage stands in the context of Aristotle's discussion of how art prepares one's reaction to reality (*Pol.* 1340a23ff.).

Aristotle's views about tragedy actually contradict Plato in that Aristotle thinks tragedy to be morally beneficial for the audience. He claims that νά αυωζ[773]

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[771] Cf. Fuhrmann (1982) 123.

[772] Shortly thereafter (*Pol.* 1340a35-38) Aristotle develops a curriculum of pictures prescribing which pictures young people should look at and which pictures can be left out. Aristotle is not casting his idea in such harsh words as Socrates in book 10 of the *Republic*, but it nevertheless seems to be the case here that one could learn more from one artist than from the other. Interestingly enough, Aristotle especially praises Polygnotus' works among which were scenes from Homer and the Trojan epic cycle. See below.

[773] The meaning of νά αυωζ in Aristotle is subject of much debate. On the medical background of this Aristotelian theory of pity, fear, and kathartic cleansing see Flashar (1956). Cf. Lesky (1971) 640f. and Halliwell (1986) 350-356 with further literature. Lesky sees Aristotle's term as signifying just the punctual enjoyment of a cleansing from the emotions of pity and fear. Thus it is merely an aesthetic joy (cf. Zierl (1994) 16) that is felt by the spectator. Cf. Schadewaldt (1991) 19ff. On the other hand, this aesthtic joy encompasses not merely aethetic aspects of life. See Schadewaldt (1955) 170f. and Pohlenz (1956) 70f. This cleansing has no further consequences for the life of the spectator in

purges the audience by preparing them not to feel harmfully high degrees of emotional responses in situations similar to those portrayed in the respective tragedy or epic poem.[774] The claim that the experience of νά αυωζ improves the audience's emotional life in that it gives advice for the audience's own future emotional responses to similar situations "provides a strategy against Plato's claim that the arousal of emotion by tragedy has the effect of increasing the audience's susceptibility to such experiences."[775] The golden mean is Aristotle's goal in regard to the emotions felt.[776] Nevertheless, we see how Aristotle and Plato agree that there is a direct link between human beings' reactions to real life and our responses to poetry.[777] The common goal is the habituation of one's character against false emotional responses in real life.[778]

Furthermore, we see that for both philosophers literature apparently has to fulfill a moral purpose. Posidonius apparently held quite similar views which may have found their practical application in Seneca's tragedies. Music and poetry as irrational forces manage to attain what, in Posidonius' view, reason cannot achieve: a melioration of our irrational emotional life.[779] The question we as the audience of

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Aristotle's view as Schadewaldt claims. As such, this view of the cathartic effect would prove tragedy to be not dangerous at all and generally render Plato's banishment of poetry as unfounded. Cf. Dihle (1991) 232. Whereas I would admit that there is a "*rezeptionsästhetischer Aspekt*" (Hose (1999) 134) to it, I would like to side with Fuhrmann (1973) 97f. (cf. Halliwell (1986) cf. 6, Zierl (1994) 92f.) who maintains the view that Aristotle also considered tragedy and the emotions involved in watching tragedies tools for education and moral betterment through the exemplification of the fragile condition of human life which the audience was to become aware of exactly by means of watching tragedies. This is emphasized by many recent studies in Greek tragedies these days. Particular fates are shown within the framework of more universal truths about human life and thereby loose part of their menace. Also cf. Zeller (1921) 783ff., Golden (1973) 46, Halliwell (1993) 253. Halliwell especially points to *Pol*. 1342a7-11. Also cf. Nehamas (1999b) 283. We should also pay attention to *Pol*. 1340a23ff. in this regard. See above.

[774] Aristotle's view of νά αυωζ is probably valid for both genres. See, e.g., Golden (1976) 78f.

[775] Halliwell (1986) 192.

[776] Cf. Zeller (1921) 784f. n. 1, Fuhrmann (1982) 109 n. 3. A slightly different view is held by Halliwell (1993) 253.

[777] Cf. Nehamas (1999b) 283.

[778] Cf. Sherman (1989) 176-183 on habituation in Aristotle.

[779] In Posidonius' view only the rational can be taught by means of reason. Cf. Long (1974) 220 who quotes frg. 168 Edelstein-Kidd (= part of 417 Theiler). Also cf. Kidd (1971) 205f. Habituation is the solution to this problem. Cf. Kidd (1988) 612f. Cf. Plato's *R*. 398eff. and Theiler (1982) 359.

Vergil's *Aeneid* need to ask is whether Aeneas' look at the temple pictures in Carthage will purge him from excessive emotions in the future or effect the opposite.

Aristotle's account of νάαυωζ has found a follower[780] in Philodemus. In *PHerc*. 1581 (*de poematis*), fr. I (Nardelli)[781] Philodemus makes it clear that poetry is useful for attaining virtue (υἦωπρ συὅζ] υηςἦ) due to the fact that it "cleanses" (να αἴυρχωα) the irrational part of man's soul.[782] In frg. III bis we find νά] αυωλ ς ἄπαυςλ . In lines 4f. of frg. IVb Nardelli makes out the phrase ιοέρχ νά α]υωζ ς υα ιξ λνἦ. Therefore we see that Philodemus did not restrict the meaning of this term to aesthetic aspects, but included an ethical meaning.[783] Poetry - not without restriction, but nevertheless - seems to be of advantage in regard to one's ethical behavior.[784]

These passages which are attributed to the fourth book of Philodemus' *On Poems*[785] have been put into a comparison with Aristotle's reconstructed *On Poets* and parallels have been found in the structure of the arguments made in both works, especially because both Aristotle and Philodemus began their arguments with a discussion of πἴπκωζ.[786] In his discussion of this term, Philodemus indeed is very close to Aristotle. He says: … σρκ ιςἥζ πλπκςἦζ ωϤς λσυά ιμπθ ζ ς ηρέαζ //.[787] This definition is indeed very similar to Aristotle's as we do not have any indication that Philodemus could have understood the term in a way similar to Plato's opinion.

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[780] On speculations about possible Platonic roots of the Aristotelian view of νάαυωζ see Belfiore (1986) 437.
[781] Nardelli (1978) 99f., Janko (1991) 60.
[782] On the utility of poetry in philosophical matters in Epicurus' school in general and Philodemus' thinking in particular see the series of articles by Asmis, Sider, and Wigodsky in Obbink (1995).
[783] Cf. Sutton (1982).
[784] Epicurus seems to have followed Plato's skeptical view in regard to the advantages of poetry. For Epicurus it was important to replace the old education by his philosophy. One uses prose for teaching, poetry for mere enjoyment. Cf. Asmis (1991a) 69, 72. Philodemus took a more conciliatory approach. Cf. Asmis (1991a) 86ff.
[785] Cf. Nardelli (1978) 99, Erler (1994) 308. Janko (1991) 60-63, however, suggested that *PHerc*. 1581 could belong to book 5 of the same work by Philodemus (also cf. Mangoni (1993) 34, Janko (1995) 75 and 84f. as well as Janko (2000) 13 and 473).
[786] Cf. Janko (1991) 60.
[787] *PHerc*. 1581 fr. 1.1 as quoted by Janko (1991) 60.

It is in our context important to note that Philodemus was very close to Aristotle's point of view in regard to the emotions felt by an audience of poets. We see him engaged with the literary theory as developed by earlier philosophers even if they do not belong to his "own" Epicurean school. Philodemus also paid due attention to Plato and the Academy[788] even if there are no fragments extant at the moment from which we could reconstruct any Philodemean reaction to Plato's literary theory in general or specifically to the critique of poetry and painting in *Republic* X.

Philodemus also dealt with Stoic views on poetry as we know from book 5 of *On poems*. Philodemus attacks the Stoics for overemphasizing stylistic aspects of poetry, particularly sound, and for allegorizing myths and Homeric poems.[789] Philodemus also seems to present himself as somebody who, in opposition to the Stoics, does not require any poet to incorporate good (ὧι ἐσθρζ) or wise (ωρι ὄζ) thoughts into his poetry before he would call him a good poet.[790] Poems, in other words, are not useful by being poems.[791] Moral teaching, if there is anything useful in poems in this regard, comes from the words of the poems.[792] But this claim does, however, not exclude that poetry can be interpreted morally and provide exemplary case studies for ethical education. Also Philodemus does not require a good poet to imitate works of his predecessors and Homer in particular, saying that Homer would not be a good poet if imitation of predecessors were a requirement, since Homer has not imitated Homer.[793] This statement, however, does not mean that Philodemus wanted to forbid poets to imitate their predecessors. At any rate, the extant fragments of Philodemus' *On Poems* do not provide us with Philodemus' opinion of what an

[788] Cf. Philodemus' *Index Academicorum* or *Historia Academicorum.* (On the debate on this title see Erler (1994) 298.)
[789] Cf. Asmis (1992) 399-408.
[790] Cf., e.g., col. 29.
[791] Cf. Asmis (1992) 407.
[792] Cf. Asmis (1991a) 82f.
[793] Col. 30. Cf. Asmis (1992) 409f.

ideal poem should look like[794], but we see him at work comparing the opinions of various other philosophers.

Unfortunately, we lack an extant Stoic poetics[795] even if we know the titles of several works on poetry written by Stoic philosophers.[796] Just as we saw in Plato's *Republic*, the Stoics in general apparently regarded the effects of fine arts and of poetry as very similar.[797] Painting apparently played an important role in Stoic discussions of art as well, even if we are not fortunate to be able to rely on much material. On the one hand they apparently discussed questions of aesthetic composition of pictures, but more importantly for our purposes, Stoics thought that pictures represent a commentary on what is painted in them. As such, language and art are inseparably intertwined.[798] When we meet Aeneas standing in front of the pictures at Carthage's temple of Juno, the author tells us how Aeneas perceives what is painted there, and how he interprets what he sees. Yet the question is whether Aeneas' commentary grasps what the painter wanted the observer to tell.

Let us briefly turn to Seneca, who of course lived after Vergil. As a philosopher and a poet of tragedies himself, Seneca wrote his tragedies in which "passion destroys reason"[799] as exemplary pieces[800] in order to show the aspiring sage negative examples of "heroes" who do not deserve to be followed.[801] This admittedly

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[794] Cf. Asmis (1992) 415.
[795] Philodemus in his fifth book of *On Poems* gives us a very sketchy account of the poetics of one who is generally identified as the Stoic Aristo. Cf. Asmis (1990) 196.
[796] Cf. DeLacy (1948) 241.
[797] Cf. DeLacy (1948) 248 with n. 23. Critical detachment from works of literature is the Stoic goal. Cf. Nussbaum (2003) 236.
[798] A reconstruction of the Stoic view on this can be found in Zagdoun (2000) 168ff.
[799] Pratt (1948) 3. Cf. *ibid*. 5 for quotes from Seneca's works. The claim that Seneca intented to write Stoic tragedies is subject to major debate in regard to several aspects. Cf. Mayer (1994) 151f. Eisgrub (2002) 4-10 who discusses the various views in regard to Seneca's *Hercules furens* in particular. See also Hine (2004), esp. 173-178.
[800] Meditation on exemplary behavior, precepts, and so forth was standard practice in Stoicism (cf., e.g., Dihle (1973) as well as in other Hellenistic schools of philosophy. See Philodemus.
[801] In general, it seems that reading and writing had a moral purpose for Seneca. See his *de tranquilitate animi* 9.4-7; *ep*. 2, 45, 74, 84, 92, 95, and 108. See Schöpsdau (2005), esp. 102.

rather general and simplified[802] interpretation fits Stoic views in which negative examples served exactly that purpose[803], namely to show the negative side of a life contrary to Stoic principles and induce people to turn to Stoicism using a frightful experience (ι υἵνκ) to let them know the costs of an un-Stoic behavior. Seneca's examples do not seek the spectator's Aristotelian ορζ- so to speak.[804] I do not mean to say that a Stoic will not find proper joy in good poems.[805] It seems that Stoics counted the aesthetical pleasure stemming from poetry among their admissible emotions (η σά ηλλ).[806] Poems may also contain examples of characters who are to be followed.[807] Furthermore, in many of his letters and dialogues[808] Seneca himself uses Homer as a source for his moral teachings just as Philodemus did in his *On the Good King*.[809] Just as Plato emphasized the importance of the fine arts and poetry in the education of children, the Stoics regard poetry as an important means to propitiate one's way to Stoic philosophy, especially in childhood, but also beyond.[810] Finally, we should not forget that Lucan may have composed epic poetry more or less for the same reasons as Seneca wrote his tragedies.

Seneca provides us with a little complaint in his 88th letter to Lucilius[811], where he describes how all the four major philosophical schools of the time use Homer as a predecessor of their thoughts.[812] Seneca objects to this practice not in

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[802] For a more detailed discussion see Schiesaro (2003) 228-235.
[803] Cf. DeLacy (1948) 249.
[804] Cf. on Seneca's opinion of pity Pratt (1948) 4: Nussbaum (1987a) 171.
[805] Cf. DeLacy (1948) 250f.
[806] Cf. Zagdoun (2000) 208.
[807] Cf. Zagdoun (2000) 237.
[808] Cf. the passages quoted by DeLacy (1948) 264.
[809] On the dual nature of this treatise as a speculum principis and as advice on how to criticize literature see Asmis (1991b) 1f.
[810] Cf. DeLacy (1948) 269ff., Pratt (1983) 74f. Also cf. Cleanthes in *SVF* 1, frgg. 486f.
[811] Cf. for the following 88.5-8
[812] Seneca's play with Homer, with the role of Homer in contemporary education, and thereby with his and his audience's knowledge of Homer is even more evident in Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*. Cf. Schmitzer's (2000) examination of the quoatations from Homer in *Apocolocyntosis* 5. Yet, this work may be even more difficult to reconcile with Seneca's Stoicism. Cf. Nussbaum (2003) 238. On the other hand cf. Philodemus in *PHerc* 425 fr. 21, 8-14 (Janko (2000) 126): Homer is said to be the inventor of philosophy, of the philosophers, and of all philosophical schools.

general, but to the one-sidedness of all of these views, including the Stoics. Seneca then engages in his own exemplary exegesis of various Homeric passages. All the sufferings endured by Odysseus, for example, should be the occasion for the aspiring wise to learn how to escape all these dangers and *quomodo ad haec tam honesta vel naufragus navigem*: how one can reach honest goals even after one has suffered shipwreck (88.7). This passage naturally makes us think about Aeneas and Vergil as well. Will the *naufragus* who has come to what seems a more hospitable shore be able to do honest deeds?[813] How did Vergil expect his audience to read his story of Aeneas?

[813] Seneca uses Vergil's (*maximus vates*, *de brev. vitae* 9.2) *Aeneid* as *exempla* for a philosophical education as well (*Aen*. 2.354 in *Q.N*. 6.2.2, the night of Troy's fall in *ep*. 59.17f.). Cf. Pratt (1983) 76.

6.3 Conclusions – How to Read Epic Poetry

If we are to assume that, as we have stated at the beginning of this dissertation, Vergil and Philodemus were in close contact with each other, we can see that Vergil in all probability wrote his *Aeneid* in an atmosphere that by no means stopped at only Epicurean views on literary theory, but also led to a more or less thorough knowledge of all contemporary schools of philosophy.[814] The temptation will have been great for Vergil to position his own work which followed in Homer's footsteps in the middle of the contemporary debate in literary theory about the question what qualities a good poem and a good poet should have, and whether or not one should or could learn something from poetry, and if so what that would be.

Writing epic poetry after Plato's critique, Vergil therefore cannot have overlooked Plato's thoughts. Cicero probably also had used Plato's *Republic* in his *de re publica*.[815] The question after Plato is not whether literature and the fine arts can serve a purpose in a state[816], but how it can achieve this goal and what this goal is or can be.[817] The educational aspect of poetry in the context of striving for moral perfection is, for example, stressed in Plato's *Laws* (*Lg*. 658e6-659b5) where the demand for banishment of poetry seems to be forgotten.[818]

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[814] Asmis (1992) 395 has called book 5 of Philodemus' *On Poems* "an Epicurean survey of poetic theories" of Hellenism. In addition, eclecticism was the general attitude of the time with which one approached philosophy. Cf. Griffin (1989) 32. Doxographies like Varro's *de philosophia* (On its reconstruction see Tarver (1997), esp. 161-164) may in part have paved the way for this eclecticism or in fact were part of it.

[815] For a brief comparison of the two works which is not neglecting the considerable cultural differences between the dates of both works cf. Meyerhöfer (1992).

[816] After all, Socrates uses painters in a key comparison: as painters paint their pictures statesmen create cities (501a2-c3). Cf. Schweitzer (1953) 54f. Note the sequel to this comparison in *Lg*. 769a7-e2: painters never finish their work just as statesmen. Finally, Plato's Athenian aspires to have created the best possible poetry by creating the best possible constitution in *Lg*. 817b1-c1. Cf. Zierl (1994) 72.

[817] Socrates expresses that he would be most ready to welcome poetry into his state if she can prove their usefulness for the state and the individual. (*R*. 607b1-608b2). On the value of art in Plato cf. Schuhl (1952) ch. 4.

[818] Cf. Webster (1952) 12f. One should not forget that Epicurus himself was highly critical of poetry because, among other reasons, it would present the readers with traditional, but wrong ideas about the gods and myths. Cf. Obbink (1996) 685. The result of this Epicurean criticism is very similar to Plato's

We know that from the time of the late republic in Rome, at the latest since the time of Pompey, Caesar, and Octavian, public buildings were erected not only for purely functional reasons.[819] Part of the intention underlying the erection of these buildings was to convey messages from their donors or originators.[820] Vergil apparently imagined the same to be true in the case of Juno's temple in Carthage.[821]

Know how to read pictures or sculpted scenes! This maxim seems to be Plato's recommendation not only for the readers of his *Republic*, but also for Aeneas so to speak.[822] Aeneas' interpretation of the pictures in Carthage is guided by his emotions. He suddenly thinks it safe to feel hope because he thinks that he finally has found somebody in the world who can sympathize with or even feel pity towards the Trojans' fate. After having felt the pain of neglect even by his own mother[823], Aeneas

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criticism of poetry in the *Republic* in regard to the question which kind of poetry can be approved by the sage. Cf. Obbink (1996) 698ff.

[819] Cf. Zanker (1979) 290-293. What is true for public buildings is equally valid for private houses. The *Villa dei Papiri* bears witness for that. Cf. Zanker (1979) 284-289. Art theory was also an issue for educated Romans in Vergil's time. Cf. Preisshofen (1979).

[820] Cf. Zanker (2003) 11-14. Whether we call this propaganda or not is negligible for the moment.

[821] Naevius apparently described the pictures of a temple of Jupiter at Akragas (fr. 19 Morel). Pictures with events from Troy were found on a temple of Apollo in Pompeji. The *tabula Iliaca,* which probably needs to be dated later than Vergil (cf., e.g., Jantzen (1990) and most recently Scafoglio (2005), with further literature), on the Roman Capitol portrayed the flight of Aeneas. Pictures on temple walls were nothing new for a Roman. Cf. Jucker (1950) 175-178. One should also not forget that Polygnotus is said to have painted the *Iliupersis* in the *Stoa Poikile* in Athens and in Delphi where he also painted the Homeric *Nekyia* of Odysseus. See above. Also the Greek Theon (according to Quint. *inst.* 12.10.6 Theon lived in the second half of the 4th cent. BC.) painted a *Bellum Iliacum* according to Pliny (*nat.* 35,144). As Aeneas says in *Aen.* 1.459f., indeed there is a tradition in the Mediterranean to tell stories of the the Trojan Wars in pictures. Why not in Carthage as well? On the Augustan style of telling stories in works of art see Kleiner (2005), esp. 218-225 and for Vergil's place within this context see Barchiesi (2005), esp. 295-300.

[822] How could Dido expect that the patron deity of Carthage could agree to the presence of Trojans in Carthage? Would Jupiter also have announced the rise of a new people from the foundations of two different people? It is very interesting to note that Dido probably expected the Trojans to just merge with the Carthaginians and to give up their identity as Trojans. This is never explicitly stated, perhaps because Vergil did not have to pay attention to this problem, since this option never became historic reality. If Anna and Dido just assume that the Trojans will cease to exist and that the Carthaginians will just absorb the immigrants without any impact on their society, Juno's fear, Jupiter's prophecy of the Romans as a new people and the extraordinariness of Latinus' position, Amata's attitude and Turnus' standpoint in regard to the Trojan refugee immigrants become more understandable.

[823] Without success Venus tries to remind Aeneas of the goodwill of the inhabitants of Mt. Olympus towards him in *Aen.* 1.387f.

must regard Dido as the helping hand he has missed for quite some time. His opinion needs to be called a little bit naïve at this point for the cited reasons.

Who of Vergil's readers could not sympathize with Aeneas at this point? Yet, in alluding to Plato's critique of poetry and the fine arts at this decisive point in the *Aeneid*, Vergil exhorts the reader to think about the question how he himself would have reacted to similar situations. So Vergil wants the reader to deal with his *Aeneid* in a way that is very similar to Seneca's view on how to read Homer.

Had Homer had real knowledge and the ability to communicate it, Plato claims, Homer would not have been a popular poet, because had he told the truth he would not have made many friends (*R.* 600c2-6). Popularity is something a poet can achieve only if he draws very emotional scenes and manages to seduce the audience to feel similar emotional states. In doing so the poet even wins over the "best" (ε έος λω ρχ *R.* 605c10-d5). Only very few can withstand this appeal of art (*R.* 605c6ff.). Therefore, Aeneas cannot simply be blamed for what he experiences, but the audience will follow Aeneas' next steps very closely. Will his very emotional encounter with the Iliadic past strengthen or weaken the hero?

Vergil, however, pushes the question even further. What effect will his work have on his audience?[824] The pictures on the walls of Carthage's Juno temple open up a discourse between Aeneas and his own past (*Aen.* 1. 488: *se quoque principibus permixtum agnovit Achivis*) and that of his people.[825] Moreover, the issue at stake is Aeneas' and the Trojans' future. Will Aeneas be able to recognize the nature of the emotions that have befallen him while looking at pieces of art or will he confuse his interpretation of an imitated past with the requirements of the present in the light of what is bound to happen in the future? Aristotle defined the best hero for a tragedy as

[824] As such, the temple friezes serve as an elaboration of Vergil's implicit poetics. How should a reader react to an epic composition like Aeneas' own account of his wanderings in *Aeneid* 2 and 3. On considerations in how far Aeneas' own storytelling shows Vergil's own ideas about the history of literature and his own intention to set a counterpoint to his predecessors see Deremetz (2001) 168-175 with Fantham's remarks on p. 176.

[825] As Aeneas is confronted with his past, Vergil confronts himself and the *Aeneid* with Homer's text and material from the epic cycle. Cf. Walde (2004) 48.

somebody who is neither entirely bad nor entirely good (*Poetics* 1453a7). If such a man is cast into bad luck by a mistake (ἁπαυς ῖα[826] *Poetics* 1453a10) which is the result of a mistaken judgement about one's situation[827], the audience can relate to this hero to the greatest extent possible. Aristotle justifies this view by saying that one who suffers unmerited misfortune causes the audience to feel pity (οηρζ). The one in whom the audience can recognize themselves causes the audience to fear that something similar could happen to them as well (ι ὅε ρζ *Poetics* 1453a5f.).

This appeal of the pictures naturally works the other way round also. What do the Carthaginians learn from the pictures if they learn anything from them? Aristotelian fear and pity should also tell them that their own city could fall in the future. The oracle of the horse head indicated Carthaginian independent splendor *per saecula* (*Aen.* 1.445), but not more.

When observing the temple pictures Aeneas is very much touched by the pictures. He does not, however, express any fear that something like that defeat at Troy could happen to him again. The irony is that Juno had just tried to finish off what she began at Troy. The opposite is happening: Aeneas slowly begins to feel safe. Vergil's dialogue with the philosophers as critics of literature artfully alarms the reader that Aeneas may be now making a personal mistake: by "feeding" on the pictures of the past, he is forgetting the present and the future. The omniscient author and the reader know, but Aeneas does not even recognize the brewing danger. Incidentally, this is one of the possible patterns of tragic behavior according to Aristotle: to do something terrible without knowing it at first, but recognizing it later. Grave suffering will be the consequence (*Po.* 1453b27-39).[828] In a nutshell, Aeneas is to make an Aristotelian ἁπαυς ῖα in a Platonic sense, because in Carthage and starting right at Juno's temple he lets his emotions win over his rational thinking:

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[826] On the meaning of this term cf., e.g., Dyer (1965), Lesky (1971) 641, Sherman (1992).
[827] On the definition of the term see Halliwell (1986) 212 ("… a disparity between the knowledge or intentions of the dramatic characters and the underlying nature of their actions; in short, tragic ignorance.") and 220.
[828] On the appeal to the audience sent out by this kind of σά ρζ see Zierl (1994) 39-41.

Pity, self-pity, grief, and also a great deal of anger at the misfortunes suffered at Troy are the obstacles that prevent Aeneas from thinking rationally. Aeneas' behavior corresponds to what Plato has foreseen as likely to happen in those cases of the reception of poetry (*R.* 604a10-e6).[829] It also finds its *pendant* in Stoic thinking. From Philodemus' point of view, Aeneas also should ask himself, whether he has already been "cleansed" by this poetic experience. At the same time, this "mistake" not to continue thinking rationally after so much suffering is making Aeneas the more likeable in an Aristotelian sense.

Compare the situation at the temple of Apollo at Cumae (*Aen.* 6.1-41) as a counterpoint.[830] Aeneas is again trying to "read" through the pictures he sees (*perlegere Aen.* 6.34).[831] The Sibyl, however, reminds Aeneas before he can finish looking at these pictures, that now it is time to perform a sacrifice (*nunc … septem mactare iuvencos / praestiterit, … Aen.* 6.38f.), not to marvel at the pictures (*non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit Aen.* 6.37).[832] What reason does the Sibyl have to make this statement? Does he only fear that Aeneas will spend too much time looking at the pictures and drawing parallels between his and Daedalus' fate?[833] A behavior along these lines would maybe lead to a repetition of what happened in Carthage. And just as with the pictures on his shield in the end of *Aeneid* 8, Aeneas seems to be fascinated with this appeal of art. At the temple in Carthage, Dido's arrival distracts Aeneas from looking at the pictures; in Cumae it is the Sibyl who serves as a

[829] On the dichotomy between reason and emotion in Plato's critque of poetry in his Republic see Halliwell (1997) 330. Plato admits in *R.* 605a2-c4 that it is easier to wirte poetry about very emotional subjects. In his view, the emotionally moderate, reasonable, and thereby ethically preferable life is not as easy to portray. By taking on Plato's challenge, Vergil playfully seems to ask his readers whether or not what he writes is "easy" poetry.

[830] Cf. in general for this ekphrasis, e.g., Pöschl (1975), Putnam (1987), Skinner (2004).

[831] The pictures are an autobiography of its artist. The pictures in Carthage had shown scenes from Aeneas' own biography. The pictures on the shield of Aeneas will be part of Vergil's contemporary times. One cannot fail to see that Vergil is approaching the relationship between author, text, and reader from a very practical and curious angle. Cf. already Pöschl (1983) 183: "Rerum ignarus imagine gaudet*: ist das nicht eine wundervolle Formulierung, ja geradezu eine Anweisung, die under Dichter an die Hand gibt, wie man sein symbolgetränktes Gedicht lesen soll?*"

[832] Mark the abject, despising, and you-deictic pronoun *iste*!

[833] There are such parallels. See Erdmann (1998) 488ff.

"distraction". In the end of *Aeneid* 8, Aeneas finally seems to have found the right balance between appreciating the beauty of what he sees and the necessity lost in marveling at art, but to act so that future could become history and so that Vergil could write stories about him as well. This observation then will lead us to the final scene of the *Aeneid*, where the text does not indicate whether Aeneas while having a long look at the baldric "reads" the pictures that are on it (*Aen.* 12.945f.). In this case, Aeneas does not forget that there are more urgent tasks at hand.

7 The Helen Episode

7.1 Divine Interventions in Times of Dire Emotional Distress

Many scholars have dealt with the Helen episode in Vergil's *Aeneid* (2.559-633). Their main focus and concern was the authenticity or inauthenticity of the episode.[834] Jeff Fish has recently shown that the Helen episode nicely fits into the Philodemean teachings on anger and restraint. If the Helen episode were to be spurious, we would have to assume that the plagiarist had very intimate knowledge of Philodemus' papyri, his teachings, and Vergil's way of incorporating them into his poem. Therefore I would agree with Fish that the Helen episode is authentic. I would like to support his claim even further by looking at the epic tradition of scenes that are very similar to the Helen episode. This chapter will argue that in addition to what previous scholarship has already observed, i.e. Vergil's allusions to scenes from the Homeric poems and from Euripides' *Orestes*, Vergil's Helen episode also rests upon the story of how Telamon's anger swelled and subsided in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* 1.1280-1344 after the Argonauts realize that they lost Herakles.[835] As we shall see, Vergil used a certain twist in the encounter between a god and human beings from Apollonius when he wrote the Helen episode. But we need to look at the texts first in their proper order, because these scenes deserve a close examination in themselves first, before we will be able to see how Vergil used these scenes.

In the first book of the *Iliad* Achilles is overtaken by sudden anger when Agamemnon tells him his plan to take Briseis away from him. The details of this scene are quite important for a comparison with the Helen episode.[836] After Homer

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[834] Cf., e.g., Goold (1970), esp. 101, Berres (1992) with extensive bibliography on the Helen episode from 1820-1984 on pages 241ff., Binder/Binder (1994) 174f., Egan (1996), Murgia (2003) also with an extended bibliography, Fish (2004). Gall (1993) wants to incorporate the Helen episode into the Creusa episode in *Aen.* 2.

[835] On this scene and its literary tradition also see Pietsch (1999b) 141-144.

[836] Knauer (1979) 381 only lists similarities between *Aen.* 2.589-593 and *Il.* 1.193-201 on the one hand and between *Aen.* 2.606bf. and *Il.* 1.214b on the other hand. Knauer overlooks that Athena's appearance before Achilles can be compared to Venus' advice to her son in the Helen episode. Knauer

has concluded Agamemnon's speech with a rather formulaic ὣς ἰ ἄς ρ (*Il.* 1.188a)[837], he switches the focus of his attention to Achilles' reaction to Agamemnon's words. The son of Peleus is juxtaposed to ἰ ἄς ρ and indeed starts the next sentence even if he is only the dative object (κοῆ ἴθ λ) of his feeling that comes into being (ξέ ης'). I.e., this feeling takes over Achilles who seems to be the defenseless victim of his emotion. The entire scene shows how difficult it is for both Agamemnon and Achilles to keep their emotions checked and their language free from offensive tones against each other.[838] And Homer tells us about the next step that Achilles' thoughts take. His mind deliberates two alternative possibilities for his reaction[839], namely either to kill Agamemnon at once or to calm his anger (*Il.* 1.188-192).[840]

While Achilles is pondering which way he should decide to react and while his decision seems to side with the first option that Homer discusses, because Achilles starts to draw his sword, Athena is sent down from heaven by Hera and appears to Achilles (*Il.* 1.193-196)[841] and to him alone (*Il.* 1.198).[842] Hera is said to be concerned about both Agamemnon and Achilles (*Il.* 1.196). Athena stands behind Achilles and pulls him by his hair (*Il.* 1.197). Achilles addresses the goddess first although he is trembling (ἀπε κωη [54]) because of the surprising presence of someone behind him. Nevertheless he turns and recognizes Athena at once (1.199). One should expect Achilles to react even more fearfully or at least be surprised at this

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thinks that the scene in Vergil is taken from *Il.* 1.357-428: Achilles' encounter with his mother. Conte (1986) 201f. was the first to recognize the importance of the Athena-Achilles scene of *Iliad* 1 for the Helen episode. Cf. Fish (2004) 126 and 136 n.68

[837] Cf. Latacz (2000) 87. See *Aen.* 2.50: *sic fatus*.

[838] Cf. Adkins (1982) 294.

[839] A typical kind of scene. Cf. Arend (1933) 106-113 and Latacz (2000) 87 for details.

[840] Schmitt (1990) emphasizes that Achilles has not yet decided what to do and that in that very moment even if Achilles ponders a more "rational" reaction to Agamemnon's offense it is not guaranteed yet that Achillles would really prefer to follow through with what seems to us to be the better alternative. Schmitt prefers to direct our attention to the fact that Achilles looks for a way to rid himself of the pain of Agamemnon's arrogant behavior.

[841] A modified type scene. See Latacz (2000) 89.

[842] This is again an atypical feature of this Homeric scene. See Latacz (2000) 90.

[843] Latacz (2000) 90 thinks that this form is used in an ingressive sense. The action could not have lasted for long as will become apparent from our discussion.

extraordinary[844] intervention of a deity in this situation[845]. Achilles' trembling is over very quickly. His eyes are blazing fire (*Il.* 1.200).[846] The aggressiveness of his anger is emphasized. Because blazing eyes are typical for fighting scenes or scenes in which the hero arms himself for battle[847], the reader can see that Achilles apparently stops short of fighting Agamemnon.[848] Yet the question also is whether Achilles anticipates a fight against Athena not with arms, but with arguments.

The dialogue between Achilles and the goddess is marked as being a discussion among equals.[849] Achilles asks Athena why she came. He supplies a possible answer in a sarcastic question which shows that Achilles' aggressiveness still does not subside. Did Athena come here to see the arrogance[850] of Agamemnon? Achilles argues already for a punishment of Agamemnon and seems to anticipate that Athena wants to dissuade him from executing this punishment. Achilles prophesizes that Agamemnon's behavior will kill him in the near future (ς ά ' *Il.* 1.205). Thus he leaves it open whether Agamemnon will die by Achilles' own sword right now or under different circumstances in the future, which indeed will be the case according

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[844] Cf. Latacz (2000) 90. Apollo appears to Diomedes in *Il.* 5.440ff. and to Patroclus in *Il.* 16.707ff. Both times the human hero is warned to not fight against the gods as superhuman beings and against their and fate's will. Also cf. Janko (1992) 400 on *Aspis* 336f. But Athena's extended discussion with Achilles as among equals where Achilles is even promised a reward for complying with Athena's will is different from those rather brief scenes in which the mere divine presence more or less forces the human being to withdraw. The only "reward" is not to be killed. Scamander asks Achilles courteously (Richardson (1993) 71), but unsuccessfully in *Il.* 21.214-221 to stop killing Trojans. Achilles thus proves that Athena indeed could not reckon with Achilles' compliance with divine wishes, even if she cares for and meets with Achilles quite often (cf. *Il.* 18.203-227, 21.284-298, 22.214-226). Judging from α ς ἵνα γ' ξ θ (*Il.* 1.199, cf. Latacz (2000) 90) and ς ἵσ ς ' αὐς ' (1.202, but cf. Latacz (2000) 91 *ad loc.*) we probably can assume that Achilles has met with Athena before.

[845] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 80.

[846] In parentheses it has to be said that this verse does not make it clear whether Achilles' eyes or Athena's eyes are meant by it. Cf. Latacz (2000) 90f. I would choose the first option, because of the parallel in *Iliad* 19 which we will be discussing shortly.

[847] Cf. Latacz (2000) 65 (with further literature) and 91. For this reason I would not say that Athena's proverbially owl-like or shining eyes (cf. Latacz (2000) 93 *ad Il.* 1.206) are ablaze here. On blazing eyes in the *Aeneid* see Lobe (1999) 67ff. Iarbas, Allecto, and Turnus show blazing eyes.

[848] Whether Achilles' aggressiveness is caused by or directed towards Athena's unwelcome intrusion is a question worth considering (cf. Latacz (2000) 90f. with further literature) especially if one takes into account how rudely Achilles can brush aside the wish of a god in *Il.* 21.214-221.

[849] Cf. Latacz (2000) 90 who in turn quotes Aubriot (1989) 257.

[850] Athena will explicitly agree with Achilles' judgment in *Il.* 1.214. Cf. Latacz (2000) 94.

to Greek myth. But Agamemnon will die even if Achilleus apparently is already more inclined to withdraw for the moment than he was a few moments ago.[851]

Athena instantly makes clear the purpose of her arrival. She came to end the rage of Achilles (σαὔωρχωα ς ὅ ωὅ πέ ρζ *Il.* 1.207). This takes up *Il.* 1.192, where Homer talks about Achilles' own pondering whether he should relent (ὄορ σαὔηλ).[852] Athena obviously undertakes the attempt to foster this side of Achilles' own thinking about the situation at hand.[853] She encounters an Achilles who at least has already pondered the course of action she is recommending.[854] On the other hand, as if her own divinity would not suffice to give her cause the necessary authority, Athena repeats what the author has told the reader and tells Achilles that Hera, who cares about Agamemnon as well as Achilles, sent her. Athena also leaves it up to Achilles whether he would follow her recommendation to end the struggle (*Il.* 1.207 and οῆξ' υλγρζ *Il.* 1.210).[855] She exhorts him not to draw the sword (*Il.* 1.207b). Achilles should just resort to blaming Agamemnon with words.[856] Later on the Greeks would repay him three times the value of the loss he now is suffering from the arrogance of Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.211-214). Achilles is quick to respond. Of course he will obey, he says, because it is only to heed the words of a deity. Achilles does not fail to point out that this compliance is by no means a small favor. He says he is very angry in spite of heeding her words. Furthermore, he bluntly states that he thinks that the gods will listen to those who listened to them (*Il.* 1.215-218).[857] It is clear that Achilles does not only expect the Greeks to repay him in the future for the damages he now is ready to let happen to him, but also that the gods or at least Athena will be

[851] Cf. Latacz (2000) 92.
[852] Cf. Latacz (2000) 93.
[853] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 80.
[854] This would speak against the opinion that Athena's appearance is not welcome for Achilles and for the general opinion that this scene represents the inner struggle of Achilles.
[855] Cf. Latacz (2000) 93f.
[856] Thus it becomes clear that Athena does not really want to end Achilles' anger at once. Cf. Latacz (2000) 93.
[857] Achilles seems to justify his behavior also for himself, since Athena's speech does not really require an answer. Cf. Latacz (2000) 94.

grateful for the favor Achilles is doing her. Consequently, Achilles puts the sword back.[858] And Athena can go home after she has accomplished her mission (*Il.* 1.219-222).

Achilles does not let go of his anger and immediately turns to attack Agamemnon with a very offensive speech (*Il.* 1.223f.).[859] Achilles picks up where he has left the action when Athena came to interrupt. Achilles indeed acts according to the agreement made with Athena. After Achilles' speech Agamemnon, too, is not ready to give in, but rages on, so that Nestor, who invokes his old age and experience in great battles to emphasize the authority of his remarks, gets up to calm the waves (*Il.* 1.247ff.). But also his attempt to exhort the two opponents to curb their anger by agreeing partly with Achilleus and partly with Agamemnon[860] (*Il.* 1.282ff.) is not successful. Interestingly enough Athena apparently did not reckon with the possibility that Agamemnon would give in quickly. Thus the way is paved for the fulfillment of Athena's promise that the Greeks and Agamemnon would pay larger compensation at a later point in the course of the Trojan War.[861]

This scene from Homer's *Iliad* has been called a heavily modified version of the type scene of a messenger's errand and his arrival.[862] This approach has its merits, but I would suggest that this scene is also a representative of a group of scenes in which a deity comes to a hero in order to persuade him to follow the advice the deity gives in a certain situation. In this context, it is debatable whether the hero really is free to choose whether he will follow the divine advice or not.[863] The clear advantage

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[858] Seidensticker (2001) 402 emphasizes that Athena does not force, but convinces Achilles to not kill Agamemnon. Cf. *Il.* 1.207: αἳ νηοῖ κακὰ

[859] Cf. Latacz (2000) 96.

[860] Cf. Kirk (1985) 81 and Latacz (2000) 109f.

[861] That Thetis will persuade Zeus to let the Trojans have the upper hand for a while to really show how badly the Greeks need Achilles is something outside Athena's and Hera's plan. Cf. Schmitt (1990) 79.

[862] Cf. Arend (1933) 57.

[863] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 90 for the opinion that basically the human hero is indeed free to choose his response to divine advice. (A different question would be if the Homeric hero is generally aware of his freedom to decide how he wants to act. Cf. Voigt (1972) 102-107 for a negative answer. Voigt points out (107), however, that Greek drama has heroes who are aware of their freedom to decide about their

seems to be on the side of the human beings if they follow the good advice of the gods, last not least because it obliges the deity in return. Achilles recognizes that Athena's proposal entails advantages. Killing his king would probably not sit well with his other Greek comrades[864] even if the consequences of that option are never fully discussed in the poem. Athena's suggestion sweetens the necessary decision that Achilles needs to take. It is the same in Odysseus' case, when Leucothea shows Odysseus a way to survive the storm. Odysseus puts Leucothea's device to good use only after his raft is completely destroyed. He theoretically has the opportunity to either follow or to disregard Leucothea's advice. Practically, however, Odysseus has no choice any more but to try out Leucothea's advice as he himself admits (*Od*. 5.356-375).[865]

Just as it is a deity who advises Achilles how to channel his anger, it is again a deity who advises Achilles how and when to end his anger. Achilles' anger, which started in book 1 of the *Iliad*, does not end until he himself renounces it in the beginning of book 19, after Patroclus has died. Achilles' mother Thetis recommends Achilles to renounce first his anger towards Agamemnon (πῆ λ σρηλσώ *Il*. 19.35) in an assembly of the Greek leaders before he should make haste and engage the enemy in battle.[866] Thetis does so on the occasion of her bringing new weapons to her son. There are a few parallels between Athena's appearance behind Achilles' back and Thetis' revelation before the eyes of the Myrmidons. When she initially

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actions.) Cf. *Aen*. 9.656-663 where the Trojans have to make sure that Apollo's advice is heeded by Ascanius. Apollo's departure is very similar to that of Mercury in *Aen*. 4.276ff. Cf. Dingel (1997) 243. Apollo, unlike Mercury, came as a human being and departed as a god. This resembles Venus' departure from Aeneas in *Aen*. 1.403ff. The most interesting case is perhaps that of Turnus who tries three times to act against Juno's will in *Aen*. 10.684f. Ultimately he succeeds in acting against Juno's will. Cf. Harrison (1991) 235 on the tradition of epic sequences of heroes attempting to do something three times and succeeding in the fourth attempt. *Ter … ter* corresponds to ς υἵζ … ς υἵζ. We should, however, note, that Juno could have acted like Apollo when Patroclus tried to set foot on the Trojan wall. Apollo's speech repells him during his fourth and last attempt: *Il*. 16.705f. See Janko (1992) 400.

[864] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 77.

[865] A counterexample would be Turnus who at first does not want to follow the Allecto's advice which in the end turns out to be bad advice. Allecto, however, finds a way to make Turnus obey (*Aen*. 7.406-474). This does not free Turnus from his own personal responsibility. See Erler (1992a) 109f.

[866] Cf. Edwards (1991) 238.

came to the Myrmidons and laid the weapons before them, the Myrmidons trembled because of their fear at her appearance, but Achilles' rage (ὄορζ) was said to reach new heights and, this time the syntax leaves no room for doubt, underneath Achilles' eyebrows his eyes were blazing (*Il.* 19.12-17). Achilles' rage, however, points in a new direction now. Agamemnon cannot be its object any more. Hector has replaced him.[867]

Indeed, this change will be apparent from the speech that he delivers to the Greeks shortly after Thetis has left him (*Il.* 19.54-73). This speech is very diplomatically conceived and at the same time rhetorically brilliant.[868] Achilles starts by addressing Agamemnon in a very inclusive and bridge-building way. He blames both Agamemnon and himself in the dual for putting their quarrel over a girl before the goal of their campaign. Achilles expresses his wish that Briseis had been killed right when he captured her at Lurnessos. Then there would have no reason for the death of so many Greeks. He does not explain why he regarded the loss of Briseis as a major offense against his honor as a warrior and that Agamemnon had been the one who acted unjustly in his opinion earlier. He also does not mention that he thought that the Greek army had given Briseis to him and that he had fallen in love with her. Now he claims that this affair would have been in the direct interest of the enemy. Achilles is ready to take the blame for it himself: πη σρπκ ἴωα ςρζ (*Il.* 19.62). Achilles says that however much grief they feel about what happened, they need to move on. Now he says it is necessary that they should calm themselves down. Achilles expresses it this way (*Il.* 19.65f.):

> οοἄ ς ἄ πἔ συρς ηξ ὔ αλ ἀωρπη ὔπη ρἴ σημ-
> χπὅ ἵ ωξ ἤ ηωωλι ἴορ γαπάωα ς ηζ ἀξ ν□
> But we will let the past be past although we are saddened and will tame our dear heart in our chest with force.

[867] Cf. Edwards (1991) 237.
[868] Cf. Edwards (1991) 241. Also for the following.

Achilles acknowledges that there is still grief among them. But he does not specify the grief any further. Thus this grief becomes rather unifying. The passions that now are in desperate need to be restrained are called dear. And χπδζ is not as negative as, for example, πη χζ.

Achilles downplays the intensity of the previous clash of emotions. He also goes a step further and switches the focus of the "we" in *Il.* 19.65f. to the first person singular in *Il.* 19.67f. Achilles declares that he will set an end to his rage[869], since he is not of the opinion that he may rage on forever. This intention corresponds to the thought he had already expressed to Patroclus in *Il.* 16.60f. Having this fact in mind, we see how Achilles' rage has given way to a more reflected emotion that is needed to keep his demand for compensation valid, but will end when his emotion could be called obstinancy or worse, a danger for the Greeks (*Il.* 16.60a[870] is repeated in *Il.* 19.65a; *Il.* 16.62f. corresponds to *Il.* 19.69ff.). Instead he exhorts everybody immediately to take up the battle against the Greeks again. That admonition was the underlying purpose of his speech, just as Thetis had recommended it to him earlier. Again, we see how Achilles follows divine advice. This time his freedom to choose is less explicit in comparison to *Iliad* 1 and Athena's appearance. On the other hand, Achilles again has no choice because of his own priorities. The payment of damages is now only a side effect.

The theatricality of Achilles' rage is made unmistakably clear in what follows. The Greeks are relieved because of Achilles' announcement and Agamemnon now can show how magnanimous he is. Achilles' conciliatory tone forces Agamemnon not to stay behind. He also has to show that his individual anger does not endanger the Greek mission. Agamemnon admits to having made a mistake even if he is quick to blame it on Zeus, Fate, and the Erinys[871] (*Il.* 19.87).[872] But he wants to repair the

[869] His emotion is called ὄορζ again.
[870] On the rhetorical inclusivity of the plural see Janko (1992) 323.
[871] Jupiter, Fatum, and Allecto are decisive forces behind Turnus' death as well. The use of the Erinys as the bringer of mental blindness in Homer is rare. Melampus is a victim of the Erinys in *Od.* 15.231b-234. Cf. Hoekstra (1989) 246f. and Edwards (1991) 247f. Melampus was trying to win Pero,

damage that he has inflicted upon Achilles and promises to give Achilles the gifts Odysseus had unsuccessfully tried to deliver to him in book 9 in order to persuade Achilles to end his rage. Agamemnon is even ready to send servants to Achilles' tent to bring these gifts to him (*Il.* 19.143f.). Achilles, however, does not care about these reparations any more. He wants only to fight and it takes an Odysseus to convince Achilles that the troops need some rest and food. We need to observe two things at this point. Firstly, an emotion is put aside for something more desirable and fitting even without the influence of an interfering deity. Secondly, Achilles' (and Agamemnon's) mutual anger, lasting until *Iliad* 19, centers on the question of honor among the Greeks and the appropriate expression of hierarchy. Unlike the first point, this latter point cannot be found in Vergil's Helen episode.

A comparable group of scenes can be found in book 9 of the *Iliad* (9.458-461).[873] Phoinix has come to Achilles with his companions in a *presbeia* in order to persuade Achilles to accept Agamemnon's gifts and to return to the battle. It is as if after Athena and Thetis now somebody in lieu of Achilles' father tries to influence Achilles.[874] Phoinix has just told the story how he was sent to Troy with Achilles by Peleus in order to protect Achilleus whom he calls ι ἴορ ς ἑνρζ (*Il.* 9.444), as we already observed earlier. His own mother had persuaded him to sleep with a concubine whom his father loved and with whom his father betrayed his mother (*Il.*

Neleus' daughter, for his brother and had to suffer hardship while trying to accomplish his plan against his enemies. The difference between Melampus and Turnus is thus clear. Φαωσ οῆς χζ, however, the epitheton of the Erinys in *Od.* 15.234, might have been of great influence for Vergil's portrayal of Allecto. Otherwise Erinys deals with the curses and the punishment of people who break oaths.

[872] Blaming the gods seems to be a popular epic sport: *Il.* 3.164f. (Priam talking to Helen) and *Il.* 19.409bf. and 413f. (Xanthos talking to Achilles). Also see *Il.* 9.377 and 19.273f. Cf. Edwards (1991) 247.

[873] Fish (2004) 126 and 136 n. 70 points out that Matthiessen (1997) was the first to observe this parallel. It is interesting to note that just as the Helen episode is nowhere to be found in the manuscript tradition but in Servius, Plutarch is the source for *Il.* 9.458f. (On the *Textkonstitution* see Hainsworth (1993) 123.) Were these two verses lacking, there would be no parallel. See Fish *ibid.* and cf. Erbse's (2001) admittedly very speculative thesis that Aristarch's excision of *Il.* 9.458f. served in fact as a trigger for Varius and Tucca to cut out the Helen episode. On Vergil's text of the Homeric poems see Fish (2004) 136 n. 71.

[874] Hainsworth (1993) 121 calls Phoinix' story "rather inconsequential" for the *Iliad.*

9.448-453). Subsequently his father cursed him, a curse Zeus fulfilled (*Il.* 9.453-457). Phoinix wanted to kill his father with a sword, but some deity (ς΄ίζ α άς θ) restrained him from doing so and even ended Phoinix' anger (σα ωη ὅορ *Il.* 9.458f.). This deity did so by reminding Phoinix to be aware that he would be called a parricide in Greece, if he proceeded with his intention, and that he would suffer much dishonor among human beings (*Il.* 9.459ff.). Because he could not bear to be around his angry father anymore, Phoinix then chose exile in spite of what his friends wanted him to do. Thus he came to Phthia, where Peleus treated him very well (*Il.* 9.462-484). Phoinix then continues his speech with the explicit intention to persuade Achilles to accept the gifts that Agamemnon was sending and to master his anger (οο' Ἄ λοη - γάπαωρ χπὅ πέξα ; ρ γέ ς΄ῖ ωη υή ο κοπἔζ ἦς ρυ ηλ ; *Il.* 9.496f.), for even the gods would let themselves be appeased by offerings.

It is absolutely clear that Phoinix wants his story to resemble Achilles' situation. Just like Achilles, Phoinix had initially thought of killing his offender on the spot. Just as in Achilles' case, Phoinix had been prevented from doing so by a deity. Just as Athena had reminded Achilles that not to kill Agamemnon now would pay off later, Phoinix was made aware of the fact that to be called a patricide is nothing to be desired. To kill the commander of the Greek army, he implies, would be something similar to parricide. Phoinix adds that his anger was ended by the words of that deity whom he does not name. Judging from *Iliad* 1, Phoinix could not have known that Athena had recommended to Achilles that his anger should end too. For Athena was visible only for Achilles. Phoinix, however, never explicitly says that Achilles should follow his example. And this recommendation would probably also not be a good one, since Phoinix went away.[875] Reconciliation with his father did not happen. The exhortation, however, is to give in and seek reconciliation before it is too late.

[875] Achilles of course threatens to withdraw from the war effort of the Greeks completely.

This scene is, of course, different from the other passages in that it involves a human being as the person who recommends a certain course of action. The divine advice to restrain emotions is encapsulated in yet another narrative. We can see that Homer is capable of changing even more features of this type scene.[876]

Phoinix has already told a story. So does Athena in *Iliad* 5. This time Athena tells a story how somebody had not complied with her request. Tydeus, Diomedes' father, fought the Cadmeians against the explicit will of Athena (*Il.* 5.802f. and 805).[877] Athena, nevertheless, also does mention that when Tydeus fought in spite of her request, he did so successfully with Athena's help (*Il.* 5.808). This disobedience is now used against Tydeus' son. Athena challenges Diomedes by saying that his behavior, resting from the fight, would show that he would be no son of Tydeus (*Il.* 5.800 and 813).[878] For she would be willing to provide the same help and in addition even exhort him to fight (*Il.* 5.809f.). Diomedes contradicts her and, like Achilles talking in a tone that sounds as if he has nothing to fear from Athena's divinity[879] for his rather haughty words (*Il.* 5.816), defends himself by pointing to the fact that it is not cowardice, but compliance with Athena's own advice not to fight against gods that keeps him from fighting (*Il.* 5.817ff.). Diomedes lets her know that he would not refrain from a fight even against gods if Aphrodite would be his opponent, yet he says that Ares, whom he has met on the battlefield, is out of his league (*Il.* 5.820-824).[880] Athena contradicts this thought by advising Diomedes to trust her help against Ares (*Il.* 5.827ff.) and quickly thereafter Athena and Diomedes enter the battlefield together (*Il.* 5.840f.).

Once again Athena receives what she wants. Yet, the story of Phoinix' disobedience has been interpreted to suggest that the gods indeed do leave it to the

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[876] On the question what type scene may be behind the Helen episode see Murgia (2003) 405f. n. 2.
[877] This passage gives an interesting background to Agamemnon's telling of the same story in *Il.* 4.384-390. For whatever reason, this *aristeia* of Diomedes' father was deemed to be very apt for enticing Diomedes to fight. Cf. Kirk (1990) 141f.
[878] Athena apparently has no mercy with Diomedes who is wounded.
[879] That is, of course, understandable from the viewpoint of his own psychological processes.
[880] Diomedes' answer corresponds to Athena's earlier order in *Il.* 5.124-133.

human beings to follow their advice. Human action is always in danger because of divine will, but if human beings act against divine advice, this action apparently is not necessarily considered unbecoming disobedience.[881]

Once more we see in Homer's poems how Athena attempts to dissuade somebody from fighting. In the twentieth book of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is in his palace while still disguised as a beggar.[882] When the sun sets he prepares a bed for himself in the entrance hall with the help of Eurynome (*Od.* 20.1-4). At first he cannot sleep because he is plotting evil for the suitors of his wife (*Od.* 20.5f.).[883] Then the female servants who previously have slept with the suitors come out of the palace hall laughing happily (*Od.* 20.6bff.). This behavior stirs Odysseus' anger. Again the passive form is used (ὣς ἦρ χπὸζ *Od.* 20.9). He meditates intensively about what he should do νας ἄ ι υέ α ναί νας ἄ χπὸ (20.10b). This half verse is the same as in *Il.* 1.193, where Achilles considers whether to kill Agamemnon. And indeed Odysseus also is confronted with the question whether he should kill somebody. This time the intended victims are the suitor's mistresses. Odysseus ponders whether he should rush upon the group of female servants and kill them one by one[884]; the alternative, it seems to him, would be to let them go and sleep with the suitors for one last time (*Od.* 20.11ff.). This time, the anger is not expressed by the way the angry person's eyes look. Odysseus emotions are located in his heart.[885] They are internal, whereas Achilles showed his emotion. Instead of having blazing eyes, Odysseus' heart urges him to act, as depicted in the metaphor that develops into a simile of barking dogs (*Od.* 20.14ff.). Odysseus apparently wants to show his emotions, but clearly sees the necessity to remain quiet at least for the moment. The

[881] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 90 with n. 295.
[882] Seidensticker (2001) identifies the demonstration of Odysseus' self-control as the function of the scene.
[883] Knauer (1979) 381 does not regard this scene as a model for the Helen episode. It is, however, obvious that this scene in *Od.* 20 harks back to Athena's advice to Achilles in *Iliad* 1. At least this variation of *Iliad* 1 could pose as a model for how the Athena-Achilles scene could be modified.
[884] The illoyal servant Melanthios is not quite as lucky to get away alive later on in *Odyssey* 22. Cf. G. Danek (1998) 392.
[885] Cf. *Od.* 1.4.

different setting requires the poet to choose different means to show nevertheless the hero's strong emotions. Odysseus reminds himself of what he already managed to endure in Polyphemus' cave (*Od.* 20.17-21).

Odysseus puts the scene from the beginning of book 20 in contact with *Od.* 9.299-306.[886] He wants revenge in Polyphemus' cave after the Cyclops has slaughtered two members of his crew and has fallen asleep in his cave, but puts off killing Polyphemus, because he does not know how to open the cave's entry without the superhuman strength of the Cyclops. Odysseus' far-sightedness did not need and did not receive any help from Athena. Therefore we see how complementary Athena's role in book 20 really is. Yet the comparison between Polyphemus in his cave and the suitors in Odysseus' own palace makes clear the emotional hard work that Odysseus has to perform on himself now.

Odysseus' level-headed and wise far-sightedness is the reason why Athena keeps helping Odysseus, as Athena tells him in *Od.* 13.330ff.[887] Athena points out the essential similarity between Odysseus and herself a little earlier in *Od.* 13.296-299: Odysseus is the best counselor and rhetor alive, and Athena is the patron-goddess of planning and wisdom. This scene in *Od.* 13, where Athena appears to Odysseus on the shore of Ithaca is quite significant for our purposes. Athena praises Odysseus for not having the faintest intention of rushing to his home when he hears that he is in Ithaca. In other words, Odysseus does not need her as a corrective. She applauds him for having the presence of mind to find out the state of his affairs at home first. Only when Odysseus is finally carried away by the joy over having returned does Athena advise him on what needs to be done; as if they were equal in rank, she even offers to

[886] On Homeric parallels see Heubeck (1989) 30. To see Homer explicitly draw the parallel to his book 9 of the *Odyssey* is interesting. Scholars have pointed to the fact that Odysseus restrains Eurycleia from boasting over the slain suitors, because he has learned his lesson from his own boast after his victory over Polyphemus.

[887] This scene, although there is a debate about its authenticity (cf. Hoekstra (1989) 185), is not noted as a model for the Helen episode by Knauer (1979) 381 in any way. I would say, however, that this scene is one of a sequence of scenes in the *Od.* in which Odysseus' emotional calm in situations where it is easy to have strong feelings is demonstrated. The more important is the end of the *Odyssey* where two deities are needed to make Odysseus do the right things. Also cf. Stanford (1964) 30-36.

make a plan for Odysseus' return (*Od.* 13.361ff.). This advice, however, also needs to be considered under yet another aspect. As Achilles in *Iliad* 1 took precautions against a possible betrayal from Athena's side, Odysseus, too, apparently fears that he could be deceived (*Od.* 13.324-327). He takes advantage of a prayer for help to the Naiads of his home country. When he promises to bring the Naiads gifts, as was his custom in the past, he makes it dependent on the condition that Athena will indeed keep him alive and make it happen that he will see his son in good health. That apparently is enough doubt for Athena. Now her advice gives Odysseus to understand that what is needed here is a little less useless conversation. Odysseus complies with her plan. Would he have needed Athena's recommendations to know what to do now? This remains an open question.

Let us return to *Odyssey* 20. Indeed Odysseus' heart follows Odysseus' advice to himself and keeps quiet (*Od.* 20.22ff.)[888] even if Odysseus then starts to think hard about how he could punish the suitors who outnumber him. When Athena then appears and asks why he is not yet sleeping, he recounts what he would like to do. He also admits that he cannot accomplish this task without endangering himself and asks Athena to think about it. Athena encourages him to trust her divine help and to wait; she thus puts Odysseus to sleep. (*Od.* 20.24b-57a). Homer combines many standard units of scenes in this passage. He thereby intensifies the impression that we are given regarding Odysseus' inner feelings.[889] Athena's help is actually not needed to restrain Odysseus from slaying the women. Athena is needed to put Odysseus to sleep and rid him of his general anxiety about the battle with the suitors themselves that lies ahead. Just as in Achilles' case in *Iliad* 1, Athena endorses one of two options that the heroes see themselves confronted with. Of course, there is a difference. Odysseus' own management of his emotions is remarkable compared to Phoinix and Achilles.

[888] *Od.* 20.20 connects this scene with the Polyphemus episode in *Od.* 9. See Russo (1992) 109.
[889] Cf. Russo (1992) 108.

One more passage from the *Odyssey*, however, needs to be discussed even if this scene is comparatively brief and concise.[890] When Athena orders the civil war in Ithaca to end in *Od*. 24.530f. Odysseus does not listen to her and keeps on fighting against his fleeing countrymen (*Od*. 24.535f.). This time it is Zeus himself who by sending a thunderbolt[891] to Athena[892] expresses that he dislikes what Odysseus does and what Athena does not prevent him from doing (*Od*. 24.537f.). Athena advises Odysseus to stop his pursuit of the fleeing Ithacans lest he arouses Zeus' anger against himself. Now Odysseus complies (*Od*. 24.544).[893] This scene is different from the previous scenes in that Odysseus does not really deliberate whether to cease his rage against his people. He knows no alternative but to fight in what supposedly is more or less justified anger. Zeus does not leave it up to Odysseus to decide for himself whether or not to fight on. There will clearly be consequences if he keeps on raging and fighting. Even if this lack of alternatives is not quite as total and complete as in *Od*. 24, it can also be found in the Helen episode between Aeneas and his mother.[894]

This then is the Homeric range of varieties of one type of scene: some deity intervenes at a rather critical point within a tight situation that develops quickly, when the human emotions are suddenly reaching new heights.[895] The deity then

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[890] Cf. Fish (2004) 127 and Galinsky (1988) 347.

[891] This is where "persuasion" ends just as in *Aen*. 4.265-276 (cf. Binder/Binder (1997) 171) when Mercury visits Aeneas. Jupiter's plan comes before individual human relations. See Scholz (1975).

[892] Cf. Heubeck (1992) 417 who compares this with *Il*. 8.130-136 where the thunderbolt is directed towards Diomedes and his horses.

[893] *Od*. 24.544 is very similar to *Il*. 20.301. Cf. Heubeck (1992) 417. Both Odysseus and Aeneas have to avoid the wrath of Zeus. Both verses seem to have no parallel in the *Aeneid* (cf. Knauer (1979) *ad locc*.). Turnus, however, does not escape the wrath of Jupiter as he points out in *Aen*. 12.895b. Aeneas complies more quickly than Odysseus with Jupiter's advice in *Aen*. 3.283-287.

[894] *Talia iactabam* in *Aen*. 2.588 concludes an argument that clearly is in absolute favor of killing Helen. The only concern uttered regards the fact that to punish a woman does not bring glory (2.584f.). This argument is in addition brushed aside by the consideration that this victory over Helen would nevertheless bring its praise with it (2.584-587).

[895] Arend (1933) 57 does not describe this type of scene. He categorizes, for example, Athene's visit to Achilles starting at *Il*. 1.193 under the subgroup of messenger scenes of the larger heading of arrival scenes.

recommends a course of action that will prove to be beneficial in the end, even if it may not necessarily appear to yield good results in the short run.

7.2 The Apollonian and Vergilian Transformation and Use of This Type of Scene

Just before the Helen episode, Aeneas has witnessed the death of Priam. His family comes before the eye of his mind. In this rather hopeless situation in which Aeneas finds Troy and his family, he catches sight of Helen. She, hated as Aeneas says she is (*invisa*), has sought refuge at some altars in expectation of the retribution of the Trojans, the Greeks and her husband (*Aen.* 2.567-574).[896] Aeneas wants to punish Helen, but his mother comes and advises him to let her go. This desire to kill Helen brings in yet another model scene as a potential source text that Vergil could have used for his composition of the Helen episode.

The description of the place is important. We find similar care about the specifics of the locality in *Odyssey* 13, 19 and 21 as well as in Euripides' *Orestes*[897] 1124-1127 and 1352-1357. The desire for vengeance can be found in the scenes of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* I have discussed and in the *Orestes* as well.[898] In a sudden onslaught, Aeneas becomes angry. He, too, as was the case with Achilles, Phoinix, and Odysseus, is the defenseless victim of the outburst of fury and the desire of revenge for his country that creeps into his mind (*Aen.* 2.575f.). In a speech that borrows much from a scene in Euripides' Orestes where Orestes and Pylades deliberate about the death of Helen (*Orestes* 1132-1145), Aeneas actually talks to himself unlike Achilles who had addressed Athena directly after it occurred to him that he could and maybe should kill Agamemnon. Aeneas concludes his self-quotation[899] by saying that he was carried away by his anger. Again he is the passive casualty of his emotion (*furiata mente ferebar Aen.* 2.588b), although now a sense of knowing what was on the verge of going wrong is present in Aeneas' words. Aeneas

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[896] Priam was slaughtered at an altar as well (*Aen.* 2.550-553) as the theme of sacrifice is very important in the entire book 2 of the *Aeneid*. Cf. Laocoon etc.
[897] Cf. Lange (2002) 168f., Fish (2004) 127.
[898] Vengeance is a popular topic and motif in tragedies, but also in *nostos* tales, i.e., for example, epic poems. Odysseus is taking revenge on the suitors. Cf. Lange (2002) 153 with n. 457.
[899] The Helen episode is part of a larger narrative just as that was the case in Athena's and Phoinix' case in the *Iliad.*

is like Phoinix in so far as he can speak from his own experience, even if Aeneas does not tell his story as direct advice.[900]

Then Venus, his mother, appears to him. And even if her grand entry into the narrative is not matched by Thetis' appearance to Achilles in *Iliad* 1.357-361, there still are obvious parallels: Venus touches her son with her right hand (*Il.* 1.592) just as Thetis strokes Achilles with her hand. Which hand is left open in Homer (*Il.* 1.361). Venus is called *alma parens* in *Aen.* 2.591. Thetis is named σὸς λαπῆςκυ in *Il.* 1.357. But unlike Achilles, Aeneas does not cry in this scene. And although Aeneas does not draw his sword anywhere in the Helen episode, the situation at that point is much closer to the scene in which Athena restrains Achilles. And yet it is different. Nowhere in the Helen episode does Aeneas appear to be scared. Nor are his eyes blazing like Achilles'. The fire of rage is burning only within him (*Aen.* 2.575). Venus calls attention to Aeneas' unrestrained anger (*indomitae irae Aen.* 2.594) even if she acknowledges the magnitude of grief that has befallen him (*tantus dolor Aen.* 2.594). But she still asks what grief can be so heavy for her son (*nate*), what reason he has to rage the way he does (*quis tantus dolor*? *quid furis*? (*Aen.* 2.594f.) We did not see this question in Athena's meeting with Achilles. This is taken from Achilles' conversation with his mother in *Il.* 1.362f.: ςέν ρ - ςῖ νοαΐηζς ςῖ γέ ωη ιυέ αζ ώηξ ρ σέ ρζς But Thetis' question is a real one as opposed to the rhetorical nature of Venus' concerns. This difference becomes clear when, unlike Thetis, Venus does not allow her son to answer her question, but directs Aeneas' thoughts back to his family. The rhetorical questions imply the censure: what Aeneas is angry about is nothing one should be emotional about at the moment. There is, however, an important difference between Venus in the Helen episode and Thetis in book 1 of the *Iliad*. Venus enters the stage in a pivotal moment in which her son contemplates doing something wrong. Thetis has come to console her son after Athena already has

[900] The question, however, remains what Dido could learn from Aeneas' story. A discussion of this question would be too lengthy for inclusion here.

prevented Achilles from killing Agamemnon.[901] Vergil fuses and changes his Homeric models even if he uses sentences that are almost literally translated from Homer's text. Venus asks where his care for the members of his family has strayed. In fact, she claims that she had to take care of his son's family during his absence. This is, on the one hand, a nice twist to Odysseus' words to the Naiads about Athena's care for his son in *Od*. 13.358. Venus, on the other hand, is quick to point out that this taking care of Aeneas' family was not a small task in her view. Implicit is the allegation that Aeneas has failed to do his duty in this regard, burdened others with what would have been his duty. And this is not the end of the matter.

Venus adds that neither Paris nor Helen are really to blame for Troy's fall[902], but the gods themselves decided to destroy Troy. And she points out to her son where the individual deities are currently fighting on the battlefield (*Aen*. 2.595b-618).[903] Aeneas not only has failed so far as a dutiful member of his family. He is also fighting a fight that cannot be won at all. Venus concludes with the clear order to leave Troy and with the assurance that she will be helping him all the way to his father's house.[904] It is after her departure that Aeneas fully becomes aware of the disastrous state of affairs in Troy (*Aen*. 2.619-625). In book 9 of the *Iliad*, Phoinix decides himself that he wants to leave his father's house due to the circumstances of what happened. Achilles in *Iliad* 1 knows what is at stake. It is a question of honor

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[901] Cf. Fish (2004) 136f. n. 72.

[902] Cf. Priam's words at *Il*. 3.164 who also exculpates Helen.

[903] This scene is naturally a curious inversion of yet another Homeric scene: *Il*. 15.668-673. Cf. also Harrison (1970) on the similarities between the Helen episode and Homeric scenes in which gods are participating in human fighting. After an exhorting speech by Nestor, all the Greeks behold the state of affairs on the battlefield after Athena takes away the dark clouds that prevent the Greeks from recognizing the situation they are currently in. This scene is about encouraging soldiers to fight. See the discussion of Homeric scenes in which divine mist plays a role by Janko (1992) 301. Cf. also Athena's advice to Diomedes in *Il*. 5.127-132. Athena lets Diomedes recognize the gods so that he can avoid fighting against enemies whom he cannot overcome – with the exception of Aphrodite.

[904] That a deity promises and gives help on the way to a destination is the case in Odysseus' march to the palace of Alcinous. Athena's help is gratefully acknowledged by Odysseus in *Od*. 13.322f. even if in the same breath he complains about her not being visibly around at all other times of his odyssey after the fall of Troy (*Od*. 13.316-321). It is curious to note that Athena admits that she did not want to get in Poseidon's way after the blinding of his son Polyphemus (*Od*. 13.341ff.), whereas she enticed Diomedes in *Iliad* 5 to fight with her against Ares.

that becomes pointless after the death of Patroclus. Odysseus knows the risks of what he will have to undertake and he wants Athena's assurance before she puts him to sleep in *Od.* 20. Now Aeneas knows what is going on as well. He finally is brought to his senses. This aspect is where he perhaps is most closely connected with Phoinix. Phoinix was saved from becoming a parricide. Achilles in the end did not kill his supreme commander. Also, Venus acts similarly to Euripides' Apollo in the end of the *Orestes*. She rescues Aeneas from not doing first things first just as Apollo rescues Orestes from committing yet another murder. At the same time Venus rescues Helen from being slain just as Apollo did too. The *deus ex machina* works in epic as well as in tragedy.

As if this would not be enough of intertextual allusions, in order to round out our understanding of the Helen episode we have to pay attention to yet another epic poet who in turn knows Homer. Near the end of the first book of Apollonius' *Argonautica*, Herakles is looking for Hylas in the woods[905] when the morning star rises and a favorable breeze calls the Argonauts to set sail. Tiphys, the ship's captain urges everybody to embark. Obeying his words all the Argonauts who are left on the shore eagerly enter the ship. They lift the anchors, set sail, and travel along for a while until at the break of dawn they suddenly become aware that they unwittingly have left Herakles behind (*A.R.* 1.1273-1283).[906] The Argonauts start to argue amongst themselves about whether they have left behind the best man (υλϖρ) of their own crew (*A.R.* 1.1284ff.). Jason, however, does not participate in this seemingly rather pointless quarrel. In the face of the loss of the three companions - Herakles was in his search for Hylas aided by Polyphemus - Jason is instead numbed

[905] Also cf. Propertius' 1.20.49f. On the relation of this poem with Apollonius' and Theocritus' version of the story see, e.g., Bramble (1974).

[906] Cf. Mauerhofer (2004) 81 who discusses the question how this was possible, since they must have noticed the empty spaces on the rows. Cf. also Green (1997) 230. At least Herakles' seat was a very prominent one in the middle of the ship (*A.R.* 1.396ff.). It is interesting to compare Apollonius' account to Theoc. 13. In Theocritus' version Herakles is left behind as a deserter. The various versions of the myth have different opinions over the question whether and how Herakles arrived at Colchis. Theocritus' lets Herakles reach Colchis on foot just after the Argonauts have arrived there. Cf. Clauss (1993) 176 with n. 1.

by his, in similar situations usual, πκ α ἴα/He is speechless and "eats his heart" due to this heavy blow of fate (*A.R.* 1.1286b-1289a). For Jason the question who the best of the Argonauts is seems to be of secondary importance. Herakles' loss is a heavy one anyway. Telamon[907] is like his companions outraged about the fact that the Argonauts have left Herakles, Polyphemus, and Hylas behind. Telamon is then taken by anger (ηραπ α γ᾽ οη ὄορζ *A.R.* 1.1289). Again an emotion apparently cannot be controlled by the one who is seized by it.[908] And immediately after Apollonius has given his reader this information he reports that Telamon begins to address Jason, saying Jason's calmness is indicative. Telamon apparently misinterprets[909] Jason's helpless and downcast silence.[910] For Telamon thinks that Jason intentionally left Herakles behind in order to rid himself of a rival for the fame of the Argonauts' adventures (*A.R.* 1.1290-1293).[911] Then he announces that he will go even against the will of Jason's fellow conspirators (*A.R.* 1.1294f.). Only from what follows does it become clear where he wants to go.[912] He is emotionally agitated to the extent that he leaps towards Tiphys, who is at the same time the ship's captain and the one responsible for the Argonauts making haste to board the ship in the morning in the first place.

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[907] The scholia tell us that Telamon was a close companion of Herakles. His emotional response is therefore understandable. Cf. Green (1997) 230.

[908] Jackson (1992) 156 assumes that Apollonius alludes to the fate of Sophocles' Aias.

[909] Cf. Idas' similar behavior in a similar situation in *A.R.* 1.465. See above. Idas had surmised that Jason was befallen by fear. Idmon intervened and the ensuing quarrel between Idas and Idmon was solved by Jason and Orpheus. Especially Orpheus' role as a singing reconciler in 1.492-495 between the two parties will be taken over by Glaucus in this scene. Cf. Glei, Natzel-Glei (1996a) 159. Yet, Orpheus' song is naturally something very different from Athena's, Thetis', or Glaucus' advice.

[910] Cf. Fränkel (1968) 149, Glei, Natzel-Glei (1996a) 159 *ad loc*. Mauerhofer (2004) 82 interprets Jason's helplessness as indicative of Jason's awareness of his responsibility for the mission and as a sign of Jason's pious behavior that listens for a portent from the gods. I cannot follow Mauerhofer here, since the passages he quotes as proof for his opinion (1.359-362 and 2.631-637) come from very different contexts and, in my opinion, cannot directly used for our passage at face value, but need to be interpreted out of the respective surrounding situation.

[911] Aristotle tells us of a version of the myth in which the Argonauts in general do not want Herakles to travel with them because of his superior qualitites (*Pol*. 1284a22-25). Cf. Fränkel (1968) 149.

[912] On the at first incomprehensible ηὐπλsee Fränkel (1968) 149, Dräger (2002) 456.

We do not know what Telamon would have done to Tiphys. Would Telamon have drawn his sword against Tiphys? His eyes are ablaze (*A.R.* 1.1296f.) just like Achilles' in the *Iliad*. Anyway, Kalaïs and Zetes manage to prevent Telamon from taking over the rudder from Tiphys and navigating the ship back to where they started that morning.[913] The author knows that Herakles punished Kalaïs and Zetes heavily for having prevented Telamon from bringing the Argo back to where he was searching for Hylas later on (*A.R.* 1.1298-1309).[914] But at the moment divine intervention is needed to stop the storm of emotions among the Argonauts.

Glaucus appears in the waves[915] and explains to all the heroes[916] that the loss of Herakles, Polyphemus, and Hylas happened in accordance with the will of Zeus (*A.R.* 1.1310-1325).[917] Apollonius presents his version of the loss of Herakles in a way that makes it clear that this scene is modeled on Homeric predecessors. Diodorus Siculus lets Glaucus appear after a sea storm and only after Orpheus has made a prayer.[918] Upon Glaucus' departure, the heroes rejoice (*A.R.* 1.1326-1329a) and Telamon quickly returns to Jason and apologizes. He takes Jason's hand at the fingers in his hand (*A.R.* 1.1330f.). That is a very interesting variation to Thetis' and Venus'

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[913] The question why it fell to these two Argonauts to hold back Telamon remains open. Cf. Fränkel (1968) 150. Again I cannot agree with Mauerhofer (2004) 83 when he wants Kalaïs and Zetes to be wicked people in order to contrast them with faithful Telamon. Mauerhofer builds his argument on *A.R.* 2.284, but overlooks the fact that in the end Kalaïs and Zetes are not committing anything sacrilegious or the like.

[914] Apollonius takes a stand here again in a matter that myth told in different versions again. Cf. Green (1997) 230 and Vian, Delage (2002a) 112 n.2.

[915] While it is true that Glaucus plays the role comparable with a *deus ex machina* (cf. Knight (1995) 288), his role does not exclusively rest upon this element of tragedy. His role has Homeric precedences as we saw above. Also cf. Feeney (1991) 60 and 71 who connects this scene with Athena's appearance in the assembly scene in *Iliad* 2 (pp. 52f.) On the other hand, how Glaucus appears and behaves is similar to that of Cymodocea in *Aen.* 10.225ff. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 487. The situation, however, is different, since Cymodocea wants to alert Aeneas to what is going on in the Trojan camp during his absence.

[916] Pietsch (1999b) 142f. rightly stresses that Glaucus tells something that especially Telamon and Jason did not know before, namely that what happened was the fulfillment of Zeus' plan. This is where Glaucus' words resemble those of Venus in the Helen episode even if Aeneas is her only adressee.

[917] What seems to be rather casual in Apollonius (cf. Green (1997) 230f.) will become important in Vergil's Helen episode. On the other hand, the expression Φλΰζ ε ρχοῆ reminds one of the beginning of the *Iliad* (1.5), of course. This will is nothing to mess with.

[918] Diodorus Siculus 4.48.5ff. Cf. Green (1997) 230.

gestures discussed above. Telamon asks Jason not to be angry with him. He cites grief for Herakles as the reason why he said intolerable things to Jason. He asks too that they will both forget about what happened and deal with each other just as before in reciprocal good will (*A.R.* 1.1332-1335). Jason's response makes it clear that Jason felt hurt by Telamon's words that were spoken in public. But Jason is ready to forget about Telamon's attack on his loyalty to all crewmembers.[919] He emphasizes that Telamon's interest was not a materialistic one, but focused on a fellow crewmember. Jason concludes by expressing his hope that Telamon would react like that should Jason be in a situation similar to that of Herakles (*A.R.* 1.1336-1343). The matter is settled after Jason has spoken (*A.R.* 1.1344).

Apollonius has drawn together Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon over Briseis and the end of their dispute. Apollonius compares the anger of Telamon with Achilles' anger in *Iliad* 1 and 19.[920] Achilles' dismissive remark that Agememnon and he himself have quarreled over a girl is comparable to Jason's acknowledgment that Telamon's anger had a better cause. For, as Richard Hunter has already shown[921], there are some interesting parallels between Achilles' anger in *Iliad* 1 and the following reconciliation in *Iliad* 19. Agamemnon's (*Il.* 1.103f.) and Achilles' eyes are ablaze just like Telamon's. The Boreads hold back Telamon and thus replace Athena standing behind Achilles. Like Agamemnon, Telamon in the end admits that he has acted wrongly. Telamon, however, does not call on the gods to be witnesses for his defense as Agamemnon did. He builds his argument on his grief for Herakles. The quarrel, nevertheless, is about the loss of the best hero of the Achaeans and the Argonauts even if the Apollonian scene also is motivated by the question of who really is the best of the Argonauts. On the other hand, there are dissimilarities too. Apollonius' heroes do not insist on compensation in terms of gifts or the like.

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[919] Garson (1972) 6 sees Jason's words in *A.R.* 1.1339-1342 as influenced by Achilleus' pursuit of Hector in *Il.* 22.158-161. Hunter (1988) 444 compares Telamon's concession speech with Agamemnon's at *Il.* 9.115-120, 19.88f. (on which cf. Cairns (1993) 99) and 136f.
[920] Also see Manakidou (1998) 251.
[921] R. Hunter (1988) 444. Cf. also Green (1997) 231.

Telamon, after all, has not fought for himself and Glaucus has seen to it that no real harm was done. Hunter concludes his remarks by saying: "The pattern of action in relation to Homer is what gives the scene its meaning."[922] The roles, however, are inverted. This time the commander-in-chief was wronged.

In this sense, we can recognize the Telamon scene as a precursor of Vergil's Helen episode, even if there is no formal reconciliation between Helen and Aeneas. Most importantly, Venus is using Glaucus' technique and tells her son in the *Aeneid* to accept the fall of Troy as the will of the gods.[923] In her view, there is no need to blame Helen or even Paris for it. Glaucus' explanation for the loss of Herakles serves as the model for Venus to put the loss of Troy into a wider perspective of divine planning.[924] Telamon on the other hand is able to recognize his mistake, overcome his anger, and Jason is happy to accept Telamon's apology.[925]

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[922] R. Hunter (1988) 445.

[923] Cf. Thetis' explanation of the siege of the Greek camp in *Il.* 18.73-77. Achilles does not see Zeus as the originator of the bad events going on on the battlefield. Thetis just explains what happened as his will just as Glaucus does in the *Argonautica*. Although in his mother's eyes Achilles should be happy about the situation, he is not happy. The loss of Patroclus and his weapons are too much for him (18.79-85). On the background of this cf. Adkins (1982) 293. Also note *Aen*. 5.467a: *cede deo*. Aeneas as referee tells Dares to give up the boxing match, because he should recognize that the gods have decided against him winning the fight.

[924] In parentheses we have to add that, as Nelis has pointed out, the Glaucus intermezzo also influenced some other scenes in Vergil's Aeneid where sea deities emerge from the waves.

[925] This kind of easy reconciliation seems to be taken from a very interesting parallel in book 23 of the *Iliad*. In it we see how Antilochus has outsmarted Menelaus during the chariot race. When Menelaus complains about having been treated unfairly during the race by Antilochus, Antilochus is ready to give in and pay compensation to Menelaus. In turn, Menelaus is very happy about that and accepts Antilochus' apology. The parallel in the *Aeneid* is the aftermath of the footrace in book 5 of the *Aeneid*. In this, however, Vergil lets Aeneas reward Salius whom Nisus had prevented from winning the race. A direct reconciliation between the racers, however, is not reported by Vergil. One rather important aspect emerges: reconciliation is possible among members of the same party, not between real enemies.

7.3 Therapy and the Prevention of Acratic Acts

The fundamental philosophical problem with which Vergil's reader is confronted is why Aeneas needs somebody from the outside to prevent him from killing Helen and to direct him to more pressing issues. While telling his story to the Carthaginians Aeneas acknowledges that he was simply carried away for a while by his rage over the imminent fall of Troy and more specifically by the sight of Helen whom he blames as the cause for Troy's fall. Now he is ready to accept that his mother's advice lead him to a better behavior. Was this a failure on Aeneas' part caused by his intense emotions? Would antiquity here considered the distressing situation a mitigating factor? Carneades at least shows that this question was debated by philosophers.[926]

The question of how to deal with νυαῶα or νυάς ηλα, the loss of self-control or of control over one's emotions[927], is a point that is again shared by the major philosophical schools.[928] Plato was of the opinion that one cannot act against one's knowledge.[929] As soon as an individual knows that a certain course of action would do harm to himself, he would not act in a way that would call this doom upon himself. Acratic deeds are therefore not really possible, in Plato's opinion, unless done under outside pressure. If somebody acts in a way that is in essence not to one's advantage, this person, in Plato's view, does not know better.[930] Aristotle expanded Plato's teachings on acratic behavior in his *Nicomachaean Ethics* 7.1-11.[931] Yet, we need to observe that Aeneas does not act acratically. Looked at from Plato's and

[926] Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.54. Cf. Bett (1998) 199f.
[927] Cf. *LSJ* 54.
[928] This question still is debated today, needless to say. Especially the alleged irrationality or inconsistency of supposedly acratic behavior seems to make people uncomfortable with the possible existence of "weakness" of will in the face of strong emotions which are commonly regarded as being irrational, i.e. bad. Cf., e.g., McIntyre (1990) 379f. and 383, Sabini/Silver (1998) 133f. On the development of the concept of free will in antiquity see Sorabji (2004)
[929] Cf., e. g., *Meno* 77e. Cf., e.g., Wilkerson (1997) 2f.
[930] Cf., e.g., Robinson (1995) 187, Wilkerson (1997) 11ff., and Guckes (2004) 95f.
[931] On this see Robinson (1995) and also Brown (2003) 605f.

Aristotle's perspective we can indeed observe how Aeneas initially does not know better or, to express it in an Aristotelian way, neglects other arguments and believes he is right in thinking it necessary to kill Helen. He is then made aware of the dangers of his plans by Venus. Recognizing that his mother is right, Aeneas changes his plans and avoids acratic behavior. The only objection that could be raised at this point would be that for a moment Aeneas was in danger of letting his actions take the wrong direction. This view, however, would leave out the fact that Aeneas feels hurt by Troy's fall and looks for those who are guilty of it.

A solution that takes exactly this aspect into account is presented by Seneca. Seneca in *de ira* 2.3.4 shows that he probably would never call Aeneas' emotion *ira*, rage.[932] Seneca says:

> *Putavit se aliquis laesum, voluit ulcisci, dissuadente aliqua causa statim resedit: hanc iram non voco, motum animi rationi parentem. …*
> Somebody believed himself hurt. He wanted to avenge himself, but some reason told him better not to, and he immediately calmed down: I do not call this anger, but a movement of the soul that obeys reason.

This is exactly what happened to Aeneas when he saw Helen. Compare *Aen*. 2.567-576: Aeneas describes how he sees Helen who has to fear the Greeks, the Trojans, and her husband, for she has betrayed them all. Then (*Aen*. 2.575f.)

> *exarsere ignes animo; subit ira cadentem*
> *ulcisci patriam et sceleratas sumere poenas.*
> Fires broke out in my mind; anger creeps up to take revenge for the falling homeland and to seek wicked[933] punishment.

We should not look for Seneca's terminological accuracy in Aeneas' words.[934] Seneca would probably not have called Aeneas' feelings *ira*, but the pre-emotion that could

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[932] Cf. Malchow (1986) 44f.
[933] It is, I think, indicative of Aeneas' hindsight that he calls the kind of punishment that he was looking for "wicked" unlike in *Aen*. 12.959: *poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit*. Cf. Reckford (1981) 97. That Vergil could also be suspected to let *sceleratas poenas* count as an enallage for the wicked crime that Helen committed adds to the trickiness of the judgment Aeneas is struggling with: Is Helen guilty? Does she deserve to be punished? May I execute that punishment?
[934] The same is true for Venus' words in *Aen*. 2.594.

become *ira* if Aeneas were to decide to assent to this pre-emotion.[935] While Aeneas considers the advantages of killing Helen, Venus appears to him and gives him the reason that is in Seneca's terms *dissuadens*. After Venus has spoken, Aeneas' feelings about Helen are gone to the extent that they even no longer appear in the text. This way, the Helen episode fits the picture of a perfect Aeneas who in the end keeps his cool in an extreme situation even if he is a human being subject to understandable feelings and temptations.[936]

When talking to Dido, Aeneas openly admits that now he is absolutely sure that his plans were not justifiable, because *sceleratus* in *Aen*. 2.576 implies a self-condemnation for what he had in mind to do. Nevertheless, Aeneas goes on to describe why he was of a different opinion initially.[937] While Aeneas' reason concurs with his mother's advice, he himself apparently still finds it difficult to let go of his anger over the role of Helen in Troy's fate. Given the Euripidean background, Aeneas is not alone in this regard. On the other hand, Aeneas apparently agrees with his mother and her arguments.[938] He does so not only when he gives up his intention to kill Helen and returns home, but also when he talks about his nearly acratic behavior[939] in that situation.

It is clear that Aeneas suffers from excessive, or rather, for the Epicureans unacceptable emotions, before his mother comes to the rescue. Punishment, in the eyes of an Epicurean, should never serve as a source of pleasure (Philodemus *On Anger* coll. 32.26-29; 42.20-29; 44.5-35). Punishment is only an acceptable means for securing future safety from harm.[940] Aeneas himself points to the fact that he was

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[935] Cf. Harrison (1970) 330 for the interpretation of *ira* in *Aen*. 2.575 as "angry impulse" instead of "anger".
[936] This ties in with Glei (1991) 139.
[937] Cf. Williams (1972a) 252f.
[938] Venus probably needs a little time to convince Aeneas, because in *Aen*. 2.606f. Venus tells Aeneas that he should neither fear what she wants to show him. On the other hand, she exhorts her son to look at what she wants to show him. Aeneas seems not to immediately follow Venus' order *aspice* in *Aen*. 2.604.
[939] On the problem of acratic behavior in Stoicism see Price (2004) 43ff. and Guckes (2004).
[940] Cf. Fish (2004) 114f. and 121f. who in n. 48 in turn quotes Procopé.

looking for glory and personal satisfaction in the punishment of Helen (*laudabor … iuvabit*, *Aen*. 1.586).[941] While this deed is the last of a series of rather foolish, because useless actions that Aeneas undertakes in the face of Troy's irreversible fall, these actions and in particular Helen's punishment in fact endanger him and the existence of his family instead of securing its future, as Venus points out (*Aen*. 2.596-600).[942]

Venus' behavior coincides with Philodemus' therapeutical demands for similar situations in which somebody has to be made aware of his excessive emotions.[943] She puts the future consequences of his behavior for his family before Aeneas' eyes in accordance with Philodemus' demand in *On Anger* col. 1.21-24: ς ἄ σαυανρορχ ρ ς α νανἄ ς λἑ αλσυ̋ ὅππάς θ . This detail cannot be found in any of the other parallel scenes we discussed so far. We therefore have good reason to assume that Vergil's Helen episode was written under the influence of Philodemus' ideas of how somebody has to advise somebody in case he suffers from excessive emotions.

In addition, Venus really cares about Aeneas and the future fate of her own family. This attitude is required according to Philodemus for the person who wants to correct another person's behavior (*On Frank Speaking* fr. 44).[944] Venus is the Philodemean wise teacher who takes over the Homeric role of Athena, the Apollonian role of Glaucus, and the Euripidean role of Apollo to correct the plans of somebody who is about to make a fool out of himself.[945] The fool, or rather the pupil

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[941] Noting the close resemblance between Euripides' *Or*. 1132-1139 with *Aen*. 2.583-586, Murgia (2003) 406f. with nn. 4 and 5 holds the view that the externally justified deed of killing wicked Helen would run counter to Aeneas' normal internal standard of behaving like a *pius*. I would, however, argue that Venus will indeed show that Helen indeed is not a wicked woman. Venus, in fact, gave Helen as a prize for Paris' judgement. Were it possible to blame Helen's presence in Troy for Troy's fall, then one would have to ask even further questions. For the presence of Helen in Juno's cult cf. Zeuxis' intention to paint a picture of Helen for the temple of Juno in Kroton (Cicero *De inv*. 2, proem). On why he would do that cf. chapter 5 above. Also cf. Staffhorst (1992) on Zeuxis' eclecticism and the meaning of this story and its predecessors for ancient theory of art.
[942] Cf. Fish (2004) 123.
[943] There is, of course, no fully explicit link between the Helen episode and Philodemus' *On Anger*.
[944] Cf. Fish (2004) 118.
[945] Cf. Fish (2004) 129.

who is accessible to Epicurean teachings, however, definitely recognizes his shortcomings at once even in spite of the heavily stressful situation he is in.[946]

Odysseus learns a comparable lesson the hard way. In *Od.* 22.411-415, a very dense and, in comparison with Odysseus' other addresses to Eurycleia, extensive[947], scene, he reminds her that boasting openly over slain men is not the right thing to do (ρ ηϖ́κ, *Od.* 22.412a). He portrays the death of the suitors as a punishment coming from the gods for their disgraceful treatment of guests. This rebuke in turn connects Odysseus' warning with his own behavior towards Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.475-542. Odysseus attributes Polyphemus' being blinded to the wrath of Zeus and other gods for the Cyclops' disrespect of the rules of hospitality (*Od.* 9.477ff.). Odysseus' gratuitous boasting was probably seen as indulgence in the pleasure of vengeance for his comrades slain by Polyphemus. This pleasure nearly brings death for Odysseus and his comrades, when Polyphemus almost destroys their ship after Odysseus' boast. In addition, Polyphemus curses Odysseus and his men (*Od.* 9.528-535). The second alternative of Polyphemus' curse, i.e. Odysseus' lonesome return home, will indeed come true. Judging from what we know from Philodemus' *On Anger* and Philodemus' *On the Good King* col. 26, which refers to Odysseus' change of behavior between these two incidents of vengeance in *Od.* 9 and 22, we see indeed how Odysseus undergoes moral correction in Philodemus' eyes.[948] In the end, as it turns out, he is even able to teach others what he himself has learned.

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[946] On the question what scene in the sequence of events describing Troy's fall really marks the climax of the greater context see Bowie (1990) 470. I cannot, however, see why the Helen episode - or Aeneas' vision of his mother for that matter – should be without any connection "with the action of the story" (Austin (1964) 196f). Emotionally, Priam's emblematically nasty death puts Aeneas under great distress so that his subsequent numbness can be understood. The pressure is heightened by the parallelism between Priam's death in the *Aeneid* and Hector's death in the *Iliad* (See Bowie (1990) 472f. on this.). The awareness of the unavoidable end of Troy, however, is necessary to trigger the flight of Aeneas' family. On the other hand, Aeneas needs to fight against the end of his city and have the urge to avenge it even beyond the limits of the reasonable. Otherwise his patriotism would probably be questionable to a certain extent.

[947] On Homeric parallels and the many discussions that this passage has sparked in Homeric philology see Fernández-Galiano (1992) 290f.

[948] Cf. Fish (2004) 113.

That Aeneas did not call himself to order remains as a possible objection in regard to the Helen episode. Expressed differently, why did Vergil not allow Aeneas to undergo a similar self-correction like Odysseus did between his boasting during the Cyclops episode and his admonishing Eurycleia after the slaying of the suitors?[949] As we can recognize from Philodemus' 14th column of his *de bono rege secundum Homerum*, Philodemus connects Athena's appearance behind Achilles in book 1 of the *Iliad* with a passage in the *Diomedea* of the *Iliad* (10.509ff.). Athena restrains Diomedes from killing more people in Rhesus' camp than he already had and from looking for even more booty.[950] Philodemus probably intended in this rather fragmentary passage to show that in Homer sometimes gods come to human beings and restrain them from excessive passions.[951] Why Philodemus thought the gods would do that is at least not extant in the text. Therefore, the question remains unanswered.

In sum, we can see that Aeneas is apparently a favorite of the gods, since neither Turnus nor other characters in the poem experience equally helpful treatment of any deity.[952] Quite to the contrary, Turnus's rage is even fired up[953] by Allecto in

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[949] Another, yet related question would be why there apparently is no equivalent to Odysseus' words to Eurycleia in the *Aeneid*. At least Knauer (1979) 526 lists none.

[950] I am very grateful to Jeff Fish for sharing his thoughts on this this column and his not yet published reading of this part of Philodemus' text with me.

[951] Clearly we can see how in book 9 of the *Aeneid*, Vergil has made use of the *Diomedea* and, by giving this scene a different ending than Homer, shown how inappropriate desire and emotion lead Nisus and Euryalus into disaster.

[952] Drances' censure of Turnus in *Aen*. 11.343-375 is pretense (Cf. Horsfall (2003) 220f. and also Hardie (1998b) 262.) and not spoken out of real sympathy for Turnus. Cf. Fish (2004) 118. On Drances' hatred and jealousy see also Scholz (1999). Latinus (*Aen*. 12.19-45a; his speech effects the opposite of Latinus' intention. Cf. *Aen*. 12.45bf.: … *exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo*) and Amata (*Aen*. 12.56-63; the effect of her speech equals that of Latinus' words. Cf. *Aen*. 12.71: *ardet … magis …*) do not confront Turnus with the bad consequences that his behavior will have for himself. Cf. Fish (2004) 117.

[953] The torch may have multiple meanings. Cf. Horsfall (2003) 306. Erinyes carry torches when they pursue the unjust. If the torch it to be taken this way the question, of course, would be if Turnus has already done something that deserves this kind of revenge. See Euander's accusations against Turnus and Mezentius (*Aen*. 8.474, 482, and esp. 492f.). Allecto's mission is different in that she executes Juno's request. Thus, the torch is more a torch of war or discord. See also Amata's torch in *Aen*. 7.397. It is a sign of maenadism. Cf. Horsfall (2003) 274.

Aen. 7.456-462a.[954] Venus' words in *Aen*. 1.387f., where she, disguised as a huntress, points out to Aeneas that he would not have reached Carthage if he were not loved by the gods, get a personal subtone in the light of the Helen episode. At the same time this indeed confirms our conclusion.

[954] The torch is the counterpart to Eros' arrow in *A.R*. 3.275-298. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 291ff.

7.4 Conclusions: Outside Counseling

Therefore, let us return to Apollonius' Telamon scene and conclude by saying that Apollonius has condensed the story of Achilles' anger towards Agamemnon that is told in the *Iliad* over the course of 19 books into one little scene. The difference is clear: Telamon and Jason are ready to overcome their dispute even without an explicit exhortation of the intervening deity. It takes the death of Patroclus that Achilles is finally ready to bury his rage against Agamemnon for the opportunity to be able to join the battle again and to punish Hector. Vergil picked up where Apollonius left off and signals where and how inappropriate anger should indeed end.

Yet another question is why Homer, Apollonius and Vergil introduce deities in these psychologically tense situations.[955] In other words, do the appearing deities really contribute arguments that are so qualitatively new that the human beings advised by them never could have thought about these very same arguments?

In regard to *Il.* 1 Schmitt[956] points out that Athena knows just how far she can go in regard to what she would like to receive from Achilles. Athena, or Homer for that matter, in Schmitt's opinion, does not dare to confront Achilles with a demand that would run counter to what Achilles is capable of doing. Achilles probably would not be able to give in to Agamemnon without the prospect of later compensation.[957] Indeed, Athena does not bother Achilles with any considerations about why it would be important for her that Achilles follows her proposal. Schmitt regards this scene as a parallel to *Od.* 15.1-43.[958] Athena persuades Telemachus to leave Sparta and return home. Athena does not tell Telemachus all she knows or plans. She just tells him

[955] Aeneas lists all the major events of Troy's fall at the beginning of his monologue in *Aen.* 1.581ff. and contrasts this with the prospect of Helen returning home unscathed (*Aen.* 1.577-580).
[956] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 78-81.
[957] Athena also agrees with Achilles' judgement about Agamemnon's behavior. See *Il.* 1.214 and Latacz (2000) 94. This may facilitate things. It is, of course, easier for Athena to side with Agamemnon and to just quote Hera's sympathy for both Agamemnon and Achilles in *Il.* 1.208f. than it is subsequently in *Il.* 1 for Nestor, since Athena is only visible for Achilles.
[958] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 72-76.

what he needs to know in order to decide to return. In order to do that Athena raises points which could be Telemachus' own thoughts based on his experiences.[959] Glaucus in Apollonius, however, tells the Argonauts many specifics about the future of the heroes they have left at the shore. Thus Glaucus exceeds what his divine "role models" in Homer did. Venus, however, again bases her arguments on thoughts that Aeneas himself could have had when weighing admittedly the pros (*Aen*. 2.585ff.), but also the cons (*Aen*. 2.583f.) of his desire to kill Helen. It is just that Aeneas apparently was closer to killing Helen than to the opposite behavior when his mother interfered.[960]

Vergil combines elements from various Homeric, Apollonian, and Euripidean scenes in a way that is very much in tune with the therapeutical approach to emotions taken by Philodemus. This is not to say that other approaches to the Helen episode, i.e., for example, allegorical or psychological, even narratological interpretations would be invalid or would not lead to good interpretive results. Also, in a different study we would need to look at Philodemus' approach to gods in literature and in general[961] to further test our findings. This is specifically true in the light of the forthcoming new edition of Philodemus' *de dis*.[962] Even if other philosophical models of explaning Aeneas' behavior certainly lead to a positive result, Philodemus' discussion of Homeric scenes in combination with his view of the treatment of excessive emotions is very close to Vergil's narrative.

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[959] Cf. Schmitt (1990) 75. Further examples are the following: Nausicaa is confronted with the prospect of marriage in the near future when Athena simply needs her to meet Odysseus on the shore. Penelope's intentions with setting up a contest in archery are not identical with Athena's larger set of plans: to hand his bow to Odysseus and start the punishment of the suitors.

[960] Vergil apparently introduces deities to explain internal processes in the psyche of their heroes by an external manifestation. Cf. Erler (1992a) 109f. and Galinsky (1996) 267 on Allecto and Turnus in *Aen*. 7.412-474 and further examples.

[961] Cf. Obbink (2004), Wigodsky (2004).

[962] Essler (forthcoming).

Appendix to the Helen Episode

The Helen episode and Venus' intervention become very important at the end of the *Aeneid*. Vergil, in reshaping the duel between Hector and Achilles in *Iliad* 20[963], gives his version of the build-up to the final duel between Aeneas and Turnus a twist that harks back to the Helen episode.

Saces' words (*Aen*. 12.653-664) have triggered an emotional response in Turnus of such a magnitude that he is unable to recognize anything else surrounding him. Then his mind clears in *Aen*. 12.669: *ut primum discussae umbrae et lux reddita menti*, … In deviation from the Helen episode where it is Venus who explicitly gives back to Aeneas the ability of thinking rationally (*Aen*. 2.604ff.)[964], it is not said how or by whom Turnus is helped to regain clearness of thought. Saces' words, comparable to Aeneas' catching sight of Helen, do not directly contribute to that, but achieve the opposite first. Nevertheless,Turnus becomes very vividly aware of the situation at the city walls (*Aen*. 12.672-675[965]), a situation that he noticed earlier already (*Aen*. 12.643f.).[966] Aeneas noticed the dire situation of Troy just before he saw Helen in *Aen*. 2.559-566. Venus' eye-opening action causes Aeneas to recognize this situation for a second time even if now on a larger scale and on a different – the divine – level. We see the same happening in Turnus' case. The second survey of the situation on the battlefield is much more thorough than the first which is basically centered around Turnus' own private sphere. The same applies in Aeneas' case, who first regards the situation of his own family and then is shown the larger picture.

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[963] Cf. Knauer (1979) 430.

[964] *Aen*. 2.569f. a little earlier is contrasting Venus' deed with the light that the flames of the burning city shed on Helen.

[965] These verses are introduced by the emphatic *ecce* Even if this word is spoken by the author, I would take it as indicative of Turnus' becoming aware of the situation.

[966] Polydorus' death as motivation for Hector to fight against Achilles is matched by Turnus' mentioning of Murranus and Ufens in *Aen*. 12.639 and 12.641. Turnus' motivation that he draws from his comrades' death is, however, a comparatively delayed one.

Turnus becomes aware of the fact that to fight Aeneas even if this means death (*Aen.* 12.676-679a) is his last remaining option.[967] Aeneas in the Helen episode had to recognize too that his course of action needed to be changed. Personal honor is on the line in both scenes. The result, however, is different. Turnus approaches the hour of his death, whereas Aeneas returned to his family to start Troy's rise from the ashes. Of course, the roles have changed. Aeneas is not besieger of a city, nor one of the besieged anymore. Yet Turnus is not really part of Latinus' people. He is a Rutulian who was promised the hand of Latinus' daughter. Here the parallelism between *Iliad* and *Aeneid* ends.

Hector could not bear to see the death of Polydorus[968] and yet to stay away from Achilles. Hector acts against the recommendations he has received from Apollo in *Il.* 20.376 ff. not to fight against Achilles. Initially he had fearfully obeyed the god's recommendation (ς αυε ἤωαζ *Il.* 20.380). But now he makes haste to meet Achilles in battle (*Il.* 20.421bff.). Seen from that perspective, Turnus is like Hector in *Aen.* 12.690.

Achilles is happy that Hector chooses to start fighting with him, because he expects to be able to avenge the death of Patroclus, whom he describes as ς α υρζ ς ηξ λπέ ρζ (*Il.* 20.425 ff.). Aeneas is also full of joy when he hears that Turnus is finally ready to fight with him (*Aen.* 12.700: *laetitia exsultans*). The reason for his joy, however, is not explicitly specified. As it is feasible to guess that Aeneas probably wants to avenge the death of Pallas, we have to note that other reasons are

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[967] Iuturna as Turnus' divine sister – loved by Jupiter – is paralleling Amor as Aeneas' brother. This is one more stone in the mosaic of parallels and differences between Aeneas and Turnus that becomes visible when comparing the beginning and the end of the *Aeneid*. Also cf. Juno's words to her husband in *Aen.* 12.793: *quae iam finis erit, coniunx?* and the author's description of Jupiter's reaction to the havoc caused by his wife (*Aen.* 1.223: *et iam finis erat, cum Iuppiter* ...). Of course, it needs to be noticed that Iuturna tries to play the same protective role for her brother as Venus plays for her son in the Helen episode. Venus is allowed to be successful, Iuturna is ordered by Jupiter to leave her brother as Iuturna herself recognizes in *Aen.* 12.877bf. Also note that Iuturna is trying to help Turnus in disguise, but Turnus recognizes here in spite of that (*Aen.* 12.632). This calls to mind Aeneas' encounter with his mother in *Aeneid* 1.

[968] The desire to avenge a brother's death is a standard motif in Homer. See Edwards (1991) 336 for further literature.

possible as well. Since Aeneas interrupts the entire siege of the city of Latinus at once (*Aen.* 12.697ff.), the prospect to end the war once and for all in a duel may imbue him with joy again as in *Aen.* 12.109: *oblato gaudens componi foedere bellum.*

The loss of Pallas is not the only death calling for revenge. Turnus has lost Murranus, in comparison to whom Turnus cherished nobody else more (… *quo non superat mihi carior alter,* / … *Aen.* 12.639). Aeneas killed Murranus by hitting him on his chariot with a stone.[969] Murranus falls under his chariot and its wheels and is finally trampled to death by his horses (*Aen.* 12.529-534). Turnus recalls Murranus' death vividly in *Aen.* 12.638 ff. Turnus remembers that he heard Murranus in his death call upon him. But Turnus' motive finally to face Aeneas directly comes from Saces' words, in which Turnus is presented with the accusation that he rides his chariot in an area that is without any importance for the outcome of the battle, when the Latin alliance is hard pressed everywhere else. Saces also points out that Latinus has lost his faith in Turnus and that Turnus' most loyal friend, queen Amata, is dead. Turnus' position is very weak and Turnus has to do something to restore his honor in Saces' eyes (*Aen.* 12.653-666).

The difference between the Helen episode and the Turnus-Saces scene is therefore clear. Aeneas has to be prevented from killing Helen and he needs to be encouraged to return to his family. Not to follow Venus' advice would mean dishonor for him. For Turnus to decide not to follow Saces' advice would mean disgrace for him. It is, however, too late for Turnus to return to his family, as is made clear through yet another allusion.

The fight between Hector and Achilles finally starts in *Iliad* 20.438 and is cut short at 20.443b f. by Apollo, who leaves a cloud of fog for Achilles where Hector just stood. Turnus does not experience this kind of help anymore, after, in a reversal of roles, having been rescued once already by an imitation of Aeneas that was made

[969] Turnus tries to kill Aeneas with a stone later on.

of a cloud (*Aen.* 10.636-640).[970] Then it was possible, even strongly recommended to him, so to speak, to return home (*Aen.* 10.685-688).

Turnus did not think about returning home. He instead grumbles about the disgrace that his absence from the battlefield means for his reputation (*Aen.* 10.668-679).[971] This complaint calls to mind yet another scene from the beginning of the *Aeneid*. Interestingly enough Turnus wishes that he might perish in a sea storm that bears resemblances to the sea storm in *Aeneid* 1.[972] Turnus' words *volens vos Turnus adoro* (*Aen.* 10.677)[973] make the difference clear between his wish and Aeneas' disgust at dying in the waves in the sea storm of *Aeneid* 1. Turnus explicitly wishes for a death in unknown countries for largely selfish reasons.[974]

We can observe how Vergil carefully constructs a delicate web of allusive threads from Homer's *Iliad* 20 via the fall of Troy and Aeneas' own experiences during his "*Odyssey*" to *Aeneid* 12 at this point. At this point the reader is asked the question: Who is Achilles? Is it Turnus? Is it Aeneas? Who is Hector? Is the parallel possible at all? These questions are important to ask, also because in *Aeneid* 6.89 Apollo had prophesied through the mouth of the Sibyl that Aeneas would have to meet another[975] Achilles (*alius Latio iam partus Achilles*) in Latium. Turnus, however, had boasted in his reaction to Drances' speech at *Aen.* 11.438 that he would

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[970] Also cf. the ηῖγθ ορ of Aeneas that is made by Apollo in *Il.* 5.449-453 so that the distracted Trojans and Greeks will fight over it. For details cf. Kirk (1990) 107f.
[971] Cf. Harrison (1991) 232.
[972] Compare *Aen.* 1.108 and 111 with *Aen.* 10.677f.
[973] Turnus is saying a prayer (cf. Harrison (1991) 233) here too.
[974] See the analysis of Aeneas' feelings during the sea storm above.
[975] *Alius* is not identical with *alter* in terms of meaning. The new Achilles will not just be an identical copy of the "first" Achilles. Berres (1993) 363 distinguishes four different modes of Vergil's use of Achilles: Historically speaking Achilles was superior to Aeneas in the Homeric epics. Now Aeneas is Achilles' equal in certain respects. Turnus wants to be Achilles' equal, but fails to live up to this aspiration. In certain regards, Turnus equals Achilles. Also cf. Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 161-210 and 220-225 who identifies structural parallels between the Vergilian Turnus and the Homeric Achilles, Paris, and Hector as well as between Aeneas and Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Achilles. Schmit-Neuerburg also analyzes early polemics against Aeneas (cf., e.g., Iarbas' identification of Aeneas with Paris in *Aen.* 4.215. On parallels between Achilles and Aeneas and other characters cf. also Duckworth (1961) 81-88, MacKay (1957), van Nortwick (1980). On the various functions of Achilles in the *Aeneid* see also Griffin (1985) 193ff. and Smith (1999). On the adaptation of epic heroes in Vergil in general see Galinsky (1981) 998-1009.

fight against Aeneas[976] even if Aeneas would outperform Achilles' abilities on the battlefield (*si magnum praestet Achillem*).[977] And curious enough, shortly after the Achilles-Hector scene of *Iliad* 20, Aeneas dares to fight with the original Achilles (*Il.* 20.156-352). Poseidon had rescued Aeneas back then (*Il.* 20.318-329) and advised him never to fight against Achilles again, but always to (αυωΐωαζ) stand bravely in the first rows of fighters after Achilles' death (*Il.* 20.332-338), exactly where Aeneas is to be found when Turnus decides to start looking for him. The final duel is not only the focal point of stories that originated in Homer, but the carefully constructed focal point also of Vergil's *Aeneid*. Within this framework, an analysis of the emotions of the protagonists and the comparison of them is a pivotal interpretive task.

[976] Cf. *Il.* 18.307f. Cf. Knauer (1979) 285. Also cf. *Aen.* 6.95, 9.921f.,10.448 and Horsfall (2003) 268.
[977] Cf. Horsfall (2003) 268f., Galinsky (2003b) 283. Duckworth (1933) 58 n. 130 has rightly pointed out that Turnus foreshadows his own death here without knowing it. Aeneas will outperform Achilles, especially if Turnus ever thought that he would be like Achilles. Also cf. Gransden (1991) 108 on the dual meaning of *praestare*.

8 The Final Duel

8.1 On the Right Treatment of One's Enemies and Their Corpses

Major controversy has surrounded the final scene of the *Aeneid* for quite some time now.[978] This controversy centers around the question whether Vergil wrote this final scene under the influence of ancient philosophical thoughts on anger and anger management.[979] If we look at the comparable scenes in previous epic poetry, however, we can easily see the parallels, but also the changes that Vergil has implemented into the scene. It just so happens that these changes once more are explainable by philosophical thoughts of Vergil's time in their particular Roman setting.

After Turnus is hit by Aeneas' spear[980] and is on his knees (*Aen.* 12.926 f.)[981], the Rutulians rise and utter the emotions that have been instilled in them by their leader's wound. The noise that is created by the Rutulians is very loud and echoed by the groves and the mountains that surround the scene (*Aen.* 12.928 f.).[982]

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[978] For a very useful and concise survey of the major topics involved here see Binder/Binder (2005) 179-183.

[979] Cf. Galinsky (1988), Putnam (1990), Erler (1992a), Galinsky (1994), Putnam (1995b) ch. 8, Fowler (1997) 30-34, Gill (1997) 228-241, Wright (1997). The last three articles come from a book that has triggered numerous review articles, among them Galinsky (1997), Armstrong (1998), Wray (1999), and Rabel (2000), just to name the most detailed ones. Also cf. Harris (2001) 217f. and 246f., Clausen (2002) 185-209, Gill (2003), Gigante (2004) 98f. The interpretation of the final scene was already much debated before that. Cf., e.g., Thornton (1953) 84, Putnam (1965) 151-201, v. Albrecht (1966) 567f., Armstrong (1967) 156f., 163f., Burnell (1987), Mackie (1988) 213ff. For an extensive discussion of the final scene see also Thome (1978) 274-347 and Renger (1985) 72-103. One other main aspect of recent scholarly debate has been the pro- or anti-Augustan propaganda hidden behind the final scene. Cf. Stahl (1990).

[980] On the debate how exactly Vergil dealt with the Homeric material for this spear throw cf. Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 318-325.

[981] Cf. Paris' unsuccessful attempt to wound Menelaus in their duel and then Menelaus better, but equally unsuccessful throw in *Il.* 3.346-360. Their duel corresponds to the duel between Aias and Hector in *Iliad* 7. Cf. on *Il.* 3.355-360 and 7. 249-254 Kirk (1985) 317. In response to a stone thrown by Hector, Aias lifts an even heavier stone during the duel in *Il.* 7.268-272 and hits Hector with it. This is the only time when a stone throw is countered by another throw. Cf. Kirk (1990) 270. Aias withstands Hector's throw. But Apollo then has to come to Hector's rescue.

[982] Cf. *Aen.* 12.722 and above. The shout in response to an athletic event, such as we see it in Apollonius, is well attested in epinician poetry. Cf., e.g., Bacchylides 3.9 (Loeb/Snell-Maehler) I owe this observation to T. K. Hubbard.

While there is a similarity between *Aeneid* 12.926b and *Iliad* 22.330a[983] where Hector is hit by Achilles' spear, there seems to be no Homeric parallel for the Vergilian Rutulians and their emotional reaction. However, in Apollonius there is one. Even if no one rises to the feet in these scenes, a group of people that surrounds the scene lets their voice be heard collectively. In *A.R.* 2.96b-97a the Minyan heroes ἀ κωα [984]- when they saw that Amycus was down on his knees. The difference between this scene and the final scene in book 12 of the *Aeneid* is that there is no echo. Of course there is also a difference between the "weapons" that the heroes use. Turnus and Aeneas are not in a fistfight.

Boxing matches, however, are described in terms of war and duels.[985] Since outside of games boxing matches lose their sportive aspect, they essentially are duels as well. Boxing matches in epic poetry can be found between Epeius and Euryalus in *Il.* 23.653-699[986] (which includes a little digression on Cadmean games for Oedipus in *Il.* 23.679f.), between Heracles and Titiës in *A.R.* 2.783ff., and between Dares (who killed Butes who in turn is linked with Amycus, cf. *Aen.* 5.373) and Entellus in *Aen.* 5.362-484.[987] These boxing matches are fought during funerary games and although the injuries resulting from the fights are considerable, nobody dies.[988] Euryalus' victory in wrestling at the games in Phaeacia in *Od.* 8.127 is expressed in similar terms as Heracles' victory against Titiës in the *Argonautica*. Euryalus' opponents are not even mentioned. Laodamas excels in boxing in *Od.* 8.130 and again Homer leaves out his opponents. We can, however, safely assume that no Phaeacian was killed by a fellow countryman. Outside of games, boxing matches may come to a deadly end. When Eryx' boxing "gloves" are brought in, his match with Hercules and his even

[983] Cf. Knauer (1979) 431.
[984] Cf. Theoc. 22.91f. and Cuypers (1997) 133f. for further use of this verb in Apollonius.
[985] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 20 who in turn quotes Kraggerud (1968) 215.
[986] Cf. Richardson (1993) 241.
[987] For a detailed analysis of the Apollonian and Homeric influences on the boxing match in *Aen.* 5 see Nelis (2001b) 8-21. See also Hunter (1989b) on the importance of the influence of the boxing match between Amycus and Polydeuces already in *georg.* 3.229-234.
[988] See Feldherr (2002) 66f. n. 15 on the play with reader expectation in epic boxing matches.

bigger gauntlets is recalled in *Aen.* 5.410-416. It ended fatally for Eryx[989] even if *Aen.* 5.412 suggests that Eryx, Aeneas' half-brother[990], killed men in boxing as well. During the boxing match between Irus and Odysseus in *Od.* 18.88-107 Irus is killed like an animal[991], his skull is smashed in like Amycus' (*A.R.* 2.95bf. is almost identical with *Od.* 18.96bf.[992]), and his corpse is treated quite cruelly by Odysseus in punishment for Irus' arrogant words in *Od.* 18.105ff.[993] Amycus dies of his wound instantly (*A.R.* 2.97b). Polydeuces had smashed Amycus' skull.

In the final scene of the *Aeneid* Turnus' wound still allows him to speak and to address Aeneas. Also the reaction of the Bebrycians in Apollonius is quite unlike the behavior of the Rutulians in Vergil, at least as far as we are informed about it. The Bebrycians seek revenge. Apollonius will not tell us whether the Bebrycians or the Minyans let any war cries be heard. The ensuing battle, however, will lead to the defeat of the Bebrycians. Even if Polydeuces formally is not in any position that would be comparable to that of Aeneas, Amycus was like Turnus the leader of his people and an obstacle for the mission of the Argonauts. Again there is a significant difference between the scenes: Turnus does not want to let Aeneas come to where his destiny has led him, whereas Amycus' intention was to prevent the Argonauts from leaving the shore of his kingdom (*A.R.* 2.5 ff.). Yet Turnus is thereby likened to a

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[989] Cf. Williams (1960a) 124.
[990] Cf. Williams (1960a) 43.
[991] On the wording cf. Levine (1981/2) 201 and Russo (1992) 53.
[992] Cf. Cuypers (1997) 131.
[993] The surrounding landscape does not play any role here. A little digression may be in place here: That the suitors can laugh at what they see is indeed more than a proof of their sense of humor. Levine (1981/2) and Russo (1992), in spite of their finding the phrasing of the passage identical with other scenes in which animals are killed, seem to assume that Irus does not die, since Odysseus treats Irus in a most disgracing way and addresses him after he must be dead. I, however, would like to argue that Odysseus talks to dead Irus and props his corpse up as a guardian outside the hall. Cf. the description of Eurymachus' death in *Od.* 22.79-88. Eurymachus keeps kicking with his feet for a while too. *Od.* 22.88a corresponds with 18.99a: οανςΐ θ (For further parallels see Fernández-Galiano (1992) 237.). Thus, Irus' treatment shows the suitors their own end even very cruelly. Eurymachus and Irus are connected in *Od.* 18.333f. and 393. Telemachus' words in *Od.* 18.242 imply that Irus is indeed dead. The expression ι ΐοα ξχα οέοχ ς αλ reminds us of *Aen.* 12.951. After Odysseus has dragged Irus outside, Irus does not do anything on his own any more. After *Od.* 18, Irus does not reappear on the stage of the *Odyssey* at all.

very bad character in Apollonius' poem. Amycus is arrogant, follows his own laws that contradict usual customs of hospitality, and offends the Argonauts by not asking them where they come from and what the purpose of their voyage is, even if that would have been the customary and polite thing to do.[994]

The Minyans' first response to Amycus' challenge[995] is a collective one again. They are furious: ς ρ ύ ζ γ᾽ ξ υ λ ρ ζ η ω α ρ ς α ζ ο η ὸ η ὄ ο ρ ζ (*A.R.* 2.19b-20a). Anger literally takes possession of the Argonauts.[996] Then Polydeuces steps out of the crowd and is ready to fight against Amycus, because Amycus' threat struck Polydeuces especially (*A.R.* 2.20bf.). Yet we do not receive an explanation as to why Polydeuces feels more offended than the other Argonauts.[997] It has to be admitted that Aeneas at the end of his duel with Turnus is not just one fighter among many when anger ignites him in *Aen.* 12.946. But just as Amycus' unexpected, daring, and assuming challenge triggers sudden anger within the Argonauts and just as Polydeuces functions as the individual expression of a collective feeling, Aeneas' thoughts are without a doubt in danger of being taken over by anger when he sees Pallas' baldric.[998]

There is no room in this scene of the *Argonautica* for anything like Turnus' plea for mercy. In turn, Polydeuces is not confronted with the burden of deciding whether he needs to kill his opponent, who is not any longer capable of offering physical resistance. As an alternative ending of the *Aeneid*, Vergil might have pondered a spear throw by Aeneas that instantly kills Turnus just as Polydeuces' fist ends Amycus' life. Vergil, however, chose the ethically more challenging alternative

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[994] Cf. *A.R.* 2.1-19a. Cf. Fränkel (1968) 155, Green (1997) 233.
[995] For a more polite behavior see the Lemnian epidode or the Doliones in *A.R.* 1.633ff. and *A.R.* 1.961-969. Cf. Green (1997) 233.
[996] Cf. Cuypers (1997) 51f. on parallels for η ὸ η ὄ ο ρ ζ.
[997] Fränkel (1968) 156 sees the Argonauts as one group of people acting in solidarity while Polydeuces knew that he was the one of them who could take care of a boxing match best.
[998] Carneades (Plu. *Moralia* 474e-475a. One of his examples is Odysseus as he cries when he sees his dog again in *Od.* 17.302ff. due to his being not prepared for this encounter, as Plutarch says.) and Chrysippus (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.52) held the view that unexpectedness can increase the emotional effect an event has. Cf. Bett (1998) 198f.

as we see it.[999] The question is why, because in a different version of this fighting scene between Amycus and Polydeuces that can be found in Theocritus' 22nd Idyll[1000] Amycus is knocked out (Theoc. 22.128bff.) and does not immediately die like the Amycus of Apollonius' version, but is given the chance to promise better behavior towards strangers in the future.[1001] Amycus consequently lives on in Theocritus' version of the story.[1002] Furthermore, Theocritus emphasizes that Polydeuces does not take advantage of his right as a victor and does not kill his opponent (Theoc. 22.131-134).[1003] Epic and mythological tradition clearly offered various and different model scenes. For the moment we may note that for the final duel between Turnus and Aeneas Vergil apparently chose a mixture and combination of both Apollonius' and Theocritus' fight between Amycus and Polydeuces.[1004] Turnus is spared first, but then killed in the end.

Another instance of collective emotional response to an event during a battle scene can be found in *A.R.* 3.1370. This time the Colchians πέξ᾽ ἶα ρ . This is their response to Jason's lifting a heavy stone. The weight of this stone, however, is such that *four* men would have had difficulty lifting it even a bit from the ground (3.1365 ff.).[1005] This recalls *Iliad* 12.445-449.[1006] Hector throws a stone against the gate of the Greek camp. Homer explains that Hector gets divine help (*Il.* 12.450). Hector takes special care in order not to fail (*Il.* 12.457 f.). He is successful in his attempt to hit the

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[999] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 200f. Cf. Servius' comment on *Aen.* 12.940: Aeneas' initial withdrawal of his hand augments Aeneas' glory, because in a paradoxical way he both spares his opponents life and slays him.

[1000] The question which of the two versions is the older one is much debated. Cf. Glei/Natzel-Glei (1996a) 158 n. 87 and 160 n. 1. Cf. also, e.g., Gow (1952) 382f. (Apollonius earlier than Theocritus), Köhnken (1965) 84-121 (Theocritus earlier than Apollonius), and for Apollonian priority again Sens (1997) 24-36. Köhnken (2001) refutes the notion that the question can be decided with certainty.

[1001] Cf. P. Green (1997) 232 f.

[1002] On various other followers of either version see Gow (1952) 399f., Sens (1997) 163f.

[1003] Sens (1997) 96 recounts explanations for this difference suggested in the past. Sens himself, in keeping with his view that Apollonius wrote before Theocritus dealt with this myth, just suggests that Theocritus wants to show his originality.

[1004] There is no boxing match outside of games in the *Aeneid.*

[1005] This is but one of many features of this story that render it a fairy tale. Cf. Fränkel (1968) 448f.

[1006] Also cf. Odysseus' throw of a discus during the games of Phaeacia. The discus Odysseus uses is heavier than normal (*Od.* 8.186ff.).

gate at which he aimed his throw (*Il.* 12.459-462a). Homer, however, does not indicate that the Greeks or Trojans react as a group. Only after Hector has commanded the Trojans to enter the Greek camp, the Greeks flee (*Il.* 12.467-471).[1007]

In addition we have to note the scene in which Aeneas lifts a stone against Achilles in *Iliad* 20. It was a stone that was so heavy that two of "today's mortal men" would not have been able to lift (*Il.* 20.285bff.).[1008] But Poseidon interfered before Aeneas could throw the stone and before Achilles could have killed Aeneas in return (*Il.* 20.288-291). At that point in the narrative of the *Iliad*, Aeneas already was hit by a stone (*Iliad* 5.305).[1009] Diomedes hurled it and would have killed Aeneas if Aphrodite had not taken him from the battlefield (*Il.* 5.311-317). That stone also was so heavy that two mortals of Homer's time[1010] would not have been able to lift it (*Il.* 5.303f.).

The interesting aspect of these two Homeric parallels for the *Aeneid*[1011] is that now the roles are reversed and fused: Turnus takes Hector's place and at the same time does not, Aeneas is in Achilles' or Diomedes' position. Vergil continues to play with the attribution of traditional epic roles as he did before.

Regardless, neither Poseidon, nor Aphrodite, nor any other deity is there to help Turnus this time. In fact, Jupiter is against his success and has managed to turn away Juno (*Aen.* 12.791-842) and Iuturna (*Aen.* 12.843ff.), who wanted to help Turnus.[1012] Turnus is not removed from the battlefield. Aeneas in the *Iliad* can lift and

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[1007] On the repetition of this scene in *Il.* 15.395f. see Hainsworth (1993) 366.

[1008] Cf. Edwards (1991) 324. The mass of the stone recalls to some extent Hercules' and Eryx' boxing gauntlets in *Aen.* 5. 410-413. They are producing the same atmosphere of extreme violence and incomprehensible strength. On *Aen.* 5. 410-413 cf. Nelis (2001b) 19 with n. 77 where further literature is given.

[1009] The injuries that Aeneas sustains from this throw are considerable (*Il.* 5.305-308) and need medical attention from Leto and Apollo in *Il.* 5.445-448.

[1010] Cf. already bT and Kirk (1990) 92.

[1011] Cf. Mooney (1912) 299.

[1012] For a description of Vergil's strategy in depicting the growing isolation of Turnus see Thomas (1998). After the duel with Pandarus that is won by Turnus in *Aeneid* 9 we see a similar, yet also once more different picture. Turnus is able to slay many Trojans (*Aen.* 9.756-777) with Juno's help (*Aen.* 9.764), Jupiter in the end comes to the aid of the Trojans, sends Iris, and prevents Juno from further helping Turnus (*Aen.* 9.801-805). Turnus is *consili expers*. Cf. Duckworth (1955/6) 361. That is a

swing the stone. Turnus' stone is six times heavier than Aeneas' stone, so to speak, but ultimately proves to be too heavy for Turnus in the end.

Poseidon, however, rebukes Aeneas directly for his hubris to have dared to fight with Achilles, who in Poseidon's eyes is both stronger and more loved by the gods than Aeneas (ζωη πα νυηΐωωθ ναΐί ι ΐος ημρζ α ας ρλωλ *Il.* 20.334). Achilles recognizes that Aeneas "was dear to the gods" in *Il.* 20.347f.[1013] Turnus has no one of the gods on his side any more, not even one who would stop the fight and care to alert Turnus that Aeneas' cause is favored by the gods.

Another difference between this scene in *Iliad* 20 and Vergil is, that Homer does not care to portray the emotions of the people who surround the scene. Achilles and Aeneas as well as Diomedes and Aeneas seem to be alone in the middle of the battlefield in Homer. In fact, it is left to Achilles to express his surprise at the vanished Aeneas in a monologue (*Il.* 20.341-350) whereas Diomedes recognizes his chance to fight against a deity who is less skilled in battle than others (*Il.* 5.318-351). Achilles then proceeds to spur on his fellow Greeks against all the rest of the Trojans (*Il.* 20.351f.). The masses of the Greeks and Trojans themselves only reenter the picture in *Il.* 20.373f., after Hector has in response to Achilles' words fired the spirits of his Trojans as well. Their behavior just shows that the words of Achilles and Hector have the desired impact. Vergil, however, proceeds differently.[1014]

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general flaw in Turnus' character. See Schenk (1984) 13 on this opinion of Salenbauch. But the decisive difference is that Turnus in the end of book 9 finds a way to escape by jumping into a river and be happy (*laetus Aen.* 9.815-819). On the implications of a Tiber that is helping Turnus see Dingel (1997) 278f. with further literature. In the end of book 12 Turnus looks for an emergency exit and does not find one (*Aen.* 12.917f.). He is frightened by the imminent death (*Aen.* 12.916) and finally his soul goes into the underworld offended (*indignata Aen.* 12.952; cf. Horsfall (2003) 439: he would like to see this word entail a sense of protest.). The duel with Pandarus is also important, because Turnus compares himself to Achilles in *Aen.* 9.742. Cf. Galinsky (2003b) 286. Turnus' problem is that he styles himself a second Neoptolemus who killed Priam. Cf. *Aen.* 2.547ff. and Dingel (1997) 263.

[1013] Achilles' words are an unusual "compliment". Edwards (1991) 329.

[1014] Of course, the situation is different as well. In Iliad 20 Achilles and Aeneas fight during an ongoing battle whereas the duel between Aeneas and Turnus takes place after the battle and the siege of Latinus' city has stopped. See above.

"Apollonius 'out-Homers' Homer."[1015] Jason's stone is twice as heavy as Hector's, according to the epic math. After the successful completion of the throw, Jason hides underneath his shield (*A.R.* 3.1369b-1370a). Then the Colchian response follows and Aietes interestingly does not chime in. Speechlessness has overcome him due to Jason's deed (*A.R.* 3.1370-1371a).[1016] Vergil in turn outdoes Apollonius. *Twelve* men of his time, he says, would not have been able to lift Turnus' stone (*Aen.* 12.899 f.). But unlike Jason and Hector, Turnus does not accomplish what he intends to do. The climactic increase of the stone's weight over the course of epic tradition coincides with an anticlimax in that Turnus overestimates his own strength.[1017] Vergil describes how Turnus' physical abilities gradually fade. The result is that the stone falls short (*Aen.* 12.901-907)[1018] and Turnus' fear and hesitation grow because he realizes that there is no escape (*Aen.* 12.903-918). Then Aeneas' counterattack follows (*Aen.* 12.919-926). After this attack is successful the Rutulians let their voices be heard. That a group of onlookers airs its feelings is a feature of epic narrative that Vergil picked up from Apollonius as far as we can see. This link, however, opens up a wide range of aspects for the interpretation of the final scene of the *Aeneid* that go far beyond the mere textual evidence of the description of emotions and have implications for the story.

Apart from being unable to surpass physically Diomedes, Achilles, or even Aeneas in throwing stones, Turnus is at the same time both like and unlike Hector. In contrast to Hector, Turnus does not manage to throw a stone, even if that stone is described as being circa six times heavier than Hector's stone. The gods have

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[1015] Hunter (1989a) 250. Cf. Nelis (2001b) 373.

[1016] Αἶυέθ is used again. Subject is π αῶκ. Anger was the subject to this verb in 2.19b-20a. Aietes will be furious and not be willing follow up on his promises made before the contest. The Argonauts have to flee at night and clandestinely. See, e.g., Beye (1982) 41.

[1017] Time and again Turnus very strongly wants to be an epic hero, but cannot live up to his aspiration. It becomes a feature of his general character. Cf., for example, Vergil's commentary in *Aen.* 9.756-759: the Trojans would have lost everything had it not been for Turnus' fury and his insane lust for slaughter. This is where we are missing a figure like Venus from the Helen episode. Cf. Erler (1992a) 109.

[1018] *Torquebat* in *Aen.* 12.901 is a clear instance of the *imperfectum de conatu.*

withdrawn their support completely from Turnus (*Aen*. 12.885 f. and 12.918) and for him it is clear that the gods and Jupiter are his enemies (*Aen*. 12.895)[1019], whereas in book 12 of the *Iliad* Hector enjoys the goodwill and help of the gods. Nevertheless, the scene in which Hector dies (*Il*. 22.248-363) has close ties with Turnus' death (*Aen*. 12.887-952).[1020]

Turnus is unlike Jason. The stone throw convinces the Colchians together with their king that Jason will have a chance to win the fight against the earth-born soldiers. Indeed Jason will win. The Rutulians see that their leader will not win due to his poor performance while attempting to throw a boulder. And likewise the shouting of the Colchians anticipates that Aietes will have to hand over the Golden Fleece. This way the Colchians' reaction aligns Turnus with Aietes and in turn Aeneas with Jason. Aietes' character, however, is not portrayed in a favorable light.[1021] Earlier, Peleus expressed his hope that the Colchians would not help their king if he refused to hand over the fleece peacefully in friendship (*A.R*. 2.1224 f.) due to the origin and skills of the Argonauts (*A.R*. 2.1220-1225).[1022] It is therefore interesting to ask whether the Colchians express bewilderment or even admiration for Jason's deed and thereby show a sign of deserting Aietes' side a little bit.

[1019] Turnus' speech reminds us of Patroclus' remark in *Il*. 16.844 ff. and 16.849 f. that Zeus, Apollo, and Euphorbus have killed him. In Patroclus' opinion Hector just takes his weapons away. This reduces the role of Hector. Cf. Janko (1992) 419. Turnus, however, is not yet defeated. Vergil will vary and reverse Patroclus' rhetorical strategy in the end of the *Aeneid* where Aeneas himself claims that somebody else kills Turnus. In Turnus' last speech (*Aen*. 12.931-938a) on the one hand calls Aeneas' victory *sors* (*Aen*. 12.932), on the other hand he acknowledges Aeneas' victory (*Aen*. 12.936 f.). Turnus also assumes that his corpse will be stripped of his weapons (*Aen*. 12.935). Pallas' baldric is part of Turnus' armor. Patroclus is wearing Achilles' weapons which will become Hector's possession. Patroclus, however, seems to dispute Hector's entitlement to these weapons. This is quite unlike the scene of Pallas' death in *Aen*. 10.474-509. There is no doubt that Turnus strives to get Pallas' armor as *spolia opima*. Heracles wears a baldric whose pictures are described in a "retrospective" (Harrison (2001) 77f.) *ekphrasis* in *Od*. 11.609-612 in the underworld. Turnus will probably not be allowed to keep the baldric.

[1020] Cf. Knauer (1979) 316, 431.

[1021] *A.R*. 2.1202f.

[1022] On the greater implications of this scene for Apollonius' work see Fränkel (1968) 315ff. and Green (1997) 250f.

On the other hand, we have to note that Jason hides underneath his shield immediately after his throw (*A.R.* 3.1369f.).[1023] The Colchian shouting is narrated by Apollonius only after this information is given (*A.R.* 3.1369 ff.). It is left in doubt what action made the Colchians shout. Thus it is left open whether they admire the throw or find it amusing that Jason shows signs of weakness. Interestingly enough, Aietes' emotional response explicitly refers to Jason throwing the boulder (*A.R.* 3.1372-1373a).[1024] What sparks off the Rutulian reaction to the fall of their leader? *Gemitus*[1025] seems to indicate more sympathy with Turnus than the Colchian α η [1026] does. Apollonius uses the same word about the doubtless happy reaction of the Minyans after their very own Polydeuces has hit Amycus devastatingly. So we see that there are clearly differences between the Vergilian scene and its models. Nevertheless, Turnus' position is clearly linked to two negative characters in Apollonius' poem.

The final scene of the *Aeneid* is, however, connected to even more scenes in the works of Vergil's predecessors. Where did Vergil find a model for Turnus' plea for mercy? A possible answer can be posited in the scene in which Menelaus finds Adrastus on the battlefield (*Il.* 6.37-65).[1027] Adrastus fell from his chariot due to an accident and lies helpless on the ground before Menelaus (6.42 ff.). Adrastus touches the knees of Menelaus, makes a plea for his life, and promises that his father will pay Menelaus for letting his son live (*Il.* 6.45-50). Adrastus' plea and offer quickly convince Menelaus to spare him. Menelaus is ready to hand Adrastus over to a servant who would lead Adrastus to the ships of the Greeks. In this moment Agamemnon runs to him and orders that every male Trojan, born and unborn, shall be

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[1023] Fränkel (1968) 448f. suggests that Jason wanted to trigger a jealous competition between the earth-born soldiers, but also admits that maybe not all details of Jason's procedure can be understood rationally. Thiel (1996) 46 n. 4 suspects that Apollonius wants to be ironic and sarcastic in his portrayal of his hero.

[1024] Also cf. Pindar's *P.* 4.237f. See Hunter (1989a) 251.

[1025] Cf. Kapp (1927) 1749.54ff.: "***sonus lamentabilis*** *vel vox … vel suspirium propter animi corporisve dolorem ab animantibus editum …*" (Bold print by Kapp).

[1026] Cf. *LSJ* 816. Joy or pain could be the reason for this kind of shouting.

[1027] On this scene and the theme of ransom see Wilson (2002) 165ff.

killed (*Il*. 6.54-60). Agamemnon especially reminds his brother of what the Trojans have done to him (*Il*. 6.56 f.). Agamemnon's words let Menelaus reverse his decision. Menelaus pushes Adrastus away and Agamemnon kills him with his spear (*Il*. 6.61-64a).[1028]

The facts that are interesting for a comparison with the *Aeneid* are as follows. Adrastus is killed with a spear. In Turnus' case the spear wounds him but does not kill him. It is by accident that Adrastus is put into the disadvantageous position Menelaus finds him in. Turnus is left by the gods and his strength is gone. And then he is wounded by Aeneas' spear. Menelaus is ready to spare Adrastus just as Aeneas' mind begins slowly to embrace the idea of mercy (*Aen*. 12.938b-941a). Agamemnon's role in the *Iliad* is in a sense taken over by Pallas' baldric in the *Aeneid*. It reminds Aeneas of what his family (*meorum* in *Aen*. 12.947) has endured. Turnus in fact is the one who has killed Pallas.[1029] He bears personal responsibility. But Adrastus is not Paris and bears responsibility insofar as he is a Trojan. Menelaus, who as Helen's husband has the biggest reason to feel personally violated by the Trojans, does not act as rigidly as his brother does in the end. Agamemnon apparently fears the general implications for his army if individual leaders pursue different goals on the battlefield. This way, general political considerations enter the stage and should prepare us also to think about political implications that are in the background when Aeneas finally does not spare Turnus' life. On the other hand, Adrastus asks Menelaus for his life and offers great compensation. The proposed compensation is even described in detail (*Il*. 6.47 ff.).

Nothing of that sort can be found in the *Aeneid*. Turnus does not directly ask Aeneas to spare his life. He says that he deserves to die and that he will not make a

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[1028] In general, it has to be noted that in the *Iliad*, in contrast to Attic tragedy where supplications usually are achieving their goal, no supplication by a defeated warrior is successful. Cf. Kirk (1990) 160 and Galinsky (2003b) 284 with n. 35 where further literature can be found.

[1029] Patroclus' armor has the same function of reminiscence of an earlier killing in *Il*. 22.322f. Cf. Richardson (1993) 138. The sight of the armor apparently does not, however, influence Achilles' thinking and behavior to the same extend as does Pallas' baldric in here.

plea for his life.[1030] He even exhorts Aeneas to make use of his advantage over him. Turnus only asks Aeneas not to withhold his corpse but to give it back to his father. Adrastus did not think of that possibility. He emphasized that his father would be happy to hear that his son is alive (*Il.* 6.50). Turnus slips in the possibility that Aeneas could decide to spare his life and send him back home in the tiny personal pronoun he uses in *Aen.* 12.935: *me*. He adds *seu corpus spoliatum lumine mavis* as if he would correct himself. *Mavis*, however, puts the burden of the responsibility for Turnus' death entirely on Aeneas' shoulders. The image of the corpse that needs to be returned to the parents evokes Hector's precedent in the *Iliad.*

On the other hand, Pallas was sent back home bereft of the ability to see the light of the sun as well. His *pompa funebris* was impressively described in *Aen.* 11.59-99[1031] as well as the arrival of the corpse in Euander's city in *Aen.* 11.139-181. Euander expressed that Turnus is indeed "owed" to a father, but to the father of Pallas (*Aen.* 11.178bf.: *Turnum natoque patrique / quam debere vides.*)[1032] This "debt" in turn recalls Turnus' own words in *Aen.* 10.442: *soli mihi Pallas debetur.*[1033] Then Turnus was delighted to use words regarding Pallas' father (*Aen.* 10.443b *cuperem ipse parens spectator adesset*)[1034] that were close to Achilles' remarks regarding the families of the Trojan heroes (*Il.* 18.121-125).[1035] In this speech Achilles summed up

[1030] This amounts to a very obvious *praeteritio*. Cf. for a rhetorical analysis of Turnus' last speech Renger (1985) 90-94. In addition, due to Turnus' formal pledge (*devotio*) to calm the anger of the gods with his life, he may not even ask for his life. Cf. Galinsky (1988) 324f. Pascal (1990) has called into doubt whether Turnus' *devotio* indeed fulfills all Roman formal requirements for a valid *devitio*, but concludes that only Dido and Turnus come close to be "devoted" (*ibid.* 268). But see also Renger (1985) 87-90.
[1031] On the emotions in this scene cf. esp. Rieks (1989) 114f.
[1032] On the two directions scholarship has taken in interpreting this passage see Horsfall (2003) 144.
[1033] Cf. Gransden (1991) 87. On the ardent desire behind these words see Harrison (1991) 185f.
[1034] This verse has no parallel in Sarpedon's speech in *Il.* 16.422-425 that is listed as the closes parallel for Turnus' speech by Knauer (1979) 416. This verse, however, parallels Turnus with Pyrrhus in *Aen.* 2.538f. who forces Priam to witness the death of his son. Pyrrhus is cruel and arrogant. Turnus voluntarily joins him in that. For a parent to have to live longer than one's child was considered awful in antiquity. To see them dieing even amounted to religious pollution. Cf. Harrison (1991) 186.
[1035] Cf. Connington/Nettleship (1883) 276f. and 334.

the warrior code of his time.[1036] Turnus' *imitatio* missed the mark in that it was too horrible and arrogant. Turnus' attempt to give up the formerly desirable position of Achilles for the sake of assuming the role of Hector now and to render the victorious Aeneas as the cruel Achilles is daring, to say the least.

The return of the corpse of a fallen soldier to his father for burial is at the center of important scenes of both Homer's and Vergil's epic poems.[1037] The entire 17th book of the *Iliad* deals with the fight for Patroclus' corpse. Achilles tells the dying Hector in a very passionate and brutal speech[1038] that he does not intend to bury him at all (*Il*. 22.344-354) even if Hector's family would pay ransom for his corpse as Hector promises (*Il*. 337-343) in a similar fashion as Adrastus had done in *Il*. 6 to Menelaus. Later on he does not want to give Hector's dead body back to Priam until Priam in *Iliad* 24 personally comes to Achilles and begs for Hector's corpse and brings many gifts to buy it back. Turnus, in contrast, is willing to send Pallas' dead body back to his father. His motives do not center on what is customary or appropriate to do. Turnus simply wants to show Euander how expensive his support for Aeneas is (*Aen*. 12.492b-495a).[1039]

Note also the connection between Priam's supplication in *Iliad* 24.485ff and 503f., Turnus' plea to Aeneas in *Aen*. 12.934ff. and Latinus' plea to Turnus to end the war, especially *Aen*. 12.43ff.: The suppliant always reminds his opponent of his father. Again we see Vergil playing with the identification of the Homeric heroes. This time the question is who resembles Achilles vs. Priam. The true Achilles fulfills the old king's desire. Turnus does not.[1040]

In the final scene of the *Aeneid* it is left open what will happen to Turnus' corpse. In this scene as well as in the scene in which Pallas dies (*Aen*. 10.479-500)

[1036] Cf. Edwards (1991) 162. But also cf. Andromache's words regarding the loss of a father and other relatives starting at *Il*. 6.407.
[1037] Apsyrtus' corpse is not returned to his father, but buried where he was murdered (*A.R*. 4.480f.).
[1038] Cf. Richardson (1993) 141.
[1039] Cf. Stahl (1981) 158: "Thus we cannot but call the death of Pallas a murder, committed in order to *hurt* the victim's *father*." (Italics by Stahl).
[1040] Cf. Galinsky (2003b) 285 f.

nothing is said about buying the corpses back. To add insult to serious injury, Turnus even assumes the pose of the magnanimous donor of Pallas' corpse (*Aen.* 10.492bff.).[1041] Patroclus also does not pay attention to this question in the end of *Iliad* 16. It is Hector who points Achilles' attention to the fact that his parents will give him iron and gold as gifts in exchange for his corpse as we saw. Adrastus connects the readiness of his father to pay Menelaus with his own survival. He points to the impact that the news about him being alive, even if as the Greeks' prisoner would have on his father. Nothing is said about the possibility that his father could pay anything for his corpse. Adrastus probably also could not mention this possibility from a tactical and rhetorical point of view. Hector's case is different. After being mortally wounded, Hector, of course, sees that his death cannot be avoided any more. To become a Greek prisoner is not a possibility for him anymore, even if Achilles would act a little bit more mercifully overall.

It is interesting, however, that Hector begins the plea for the return of his corpse by reminding Achilles of his, Achilles', parents instead of his own (*Il.* 22.338).[1042] The consequence of the return of his dead body would be that he is given the customary honors of burial by the Trojans. The thought that this honor, instead of being left as food for the dogs near the Greek camp[1043], would also console his parents is only implicit in Hector's words (*Il.* 22.340-343).

[1041] Again Turnus is paralleling Pyrrhus' behavior in *Aen.* 2.547-550. Turnus, however, goes not quite as far as Achilles. Achilles mutilated Patroclus' corpse. Cf. Harrison (1991) 196f.

[1042] For types of objects that are typically invoked in Homeric supplications see Richardson (1993) 141.

[1043] As a contrast cf. Odysseus' words on the fate of Socus in *Il.* 11.450-455. Odysseus pities the dead Socus for the fact that his parents will not see the corpse of their son. Instead it will be eaten by birds. Odysseus compares Socus' fate with his own as he is confident that the Greeks will give him a burial if he were to die. Cf. Aeneas' words to the corpse of Tarquitus in *Aen.* 10.557-560. On this scene cf. Farron (1977) 206 and (1986) 72-80. It corresponds with *Il.* 21.122-135. Cf. Kanuer (1979) 485. Also cf. Putnam (1990) 9 n. 7. But I would say that Aeneas' words not necessarily express gloating over the death of an enemy. Aeneas stresses the contrast between the previous threat that his enemy posed (*metuende*) and the fact that he could not live up to this aspiration, but lost the fight. Now Tarquitus' parents (his *optima mater* is emphasized) will have not opportunity to bury their son. Cf. the lament of Euryalus' mother in *Aen.* 9.481-497, esp. 485ff. Looked at it from this angle, Aeneas' words do exceed what is traditional in epic and become more like Odysseus' words deliberating the fate of Socus. Also

As Hector himself admits (*Il.* 22.356 f,), he intends to move Achilles with his word. In effect, he fails in this attempt. Hector says that he knew all along that Achilles would not want to grant him fulfillment of his wish, because Achilles has a heart of iron, in contrast to Menelaus' behavior earlier in *Iliad* 6. And just as Menelaus for a moment was likely to give in, Aeneas is inclined to be merciful. How Aeneas' mercy would look is an interesting question. Turnus asks to give him or, if Aeneas prefers, his dead body back to his family (*et me, seu corpus lumine spoliatum mauis | redde meis* 12.935-936a). The question is: under what condition? After imprisonment, for ransom, or immediately and for free?[1044] In Hector's case everything is clear. Hector is mortally wounded. Even if Hector uses the personal pronoun πη (*Il.* 22.339), it represents his dead body (ω πα *Il.* 22.342).[1045] When using the Latin equivalent to the Greek πη that alludes to Hector, Turnus implies more than just a reference to his own corpse as we saw. This identification of Aeneas with Achilles would be advantageous for Turnus, for Achilles' rage clearly was not something positive.

Turnus goes even further than to allude briefly to the Homeric scene of Hector's death. Turnus concedes that Aeneas has achieved total victory. When Hector died, Troy did not yet immediately fall. Turnus seems to say that Aeneas' victory is even greater than Achilles' triumph was. Therefore there is no reason for Aeneas to act like Achilles after he killed Hector. Turnus states that the Ausonians have seen Aeneas' victory and that the defeated pleaded for mercy. This observation brings in a new aspect; the publicity of the event. It is of course evident that the Ausonians will also recognize what Aeneas' response to Turnus' plea will be. Turnus' words imply therefore, that the Ausonians will not forget what happened. That can serve as a

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cf. Conington/Nettleship (1883) *ad* 10.557-560. Also cf. Odysseus as he declines to gloat over his enemy in Sophocles' *Ajax* 124ff. and 1365ff. On this cf. Rutherford (1982) 158.

[1044] *Spoliatum*, even if supplied by *lumine*, prepares the stage for Pallas' baldric, a spoil taken from Pallas by Turnus.

[1045] *Il.* 22.342f. = *Il.* 7.79f. in the context of Hector's duel with Aias. Cf. Richardson (1993) 141. Both duels need to be taken into account for the final scene of the *Aeneid*.

guarantee for Aeneas, but it also serves the purpose to remind Aeneas that the Ausonians will judge his behavior.

Turnus says that Lavinia belongs to Aeneas now. Whether this signals Turnus' own readiness to accept Aeneas' marriage with Lavinia is not expressed in any way although it seems that Turnus would want to have Aeneas think that way. And Turnus finally asks that Aeneas should not take his hatred further (*Aen.* 12.936b-938a). Apart from interpreting Aeneas' possible killing of Turnus as an emanation of hatred, which is a tendentious move on Turnus' part[1046], Turnus implies that the present state of the duel between him and Aeneas should be kept. Promises for a peaceful future are not made, his mistakes are not admitted beyond a miscalculation about the the most recent development of the political situation at hand[1047], and Turnus does not say anything about the role he himself will assume among the Rutulians and in the greater region of Latium. Turnus for the moment is still alive and wants to stay alive.

Thus in retrospect, the *seu* of verse *Aen.* 12.935 is not a particle that would indicate a mere self-correction of the earlier *me*. It is a choice that Turnus puts before Aeneas. Aeneas has won and needs to take advantage of his victory. *Debellavit*, so to speak, and Aeneas needs to have mercy on Turnus now in order to avoid the accusation of acting out of hatred only. It is as if Turnus would mean to say: Do not be another Achilles.[1048] This then implies for himself that he would not need to be another Hector. The choice is no choice any more. Turnus' rhetorical skills are obvious, as even Aeneas acknowledges. He describes what Turnus has told him by unmasking it as the attempt to escape Aeneas in the armor of Aeneas' family members (*Aen.* 12.947 ff.).

[1046] The distinction may play on Aristotle's distinction between hatred and anger. Hatred cannot be compassionate, anger can. *Rh.* 1382a14. Cf. Galinsky (1988) 334.
[1047] Cf. Thome (1979) 297ff., Potz (1991) 255f.
[1048] On the negative reception of Achilles in Vergil's times see Erler (1992a) 107 with n. 22: Cic. *Tusc.* 3.18, Hor. *epist.* 1.22 and *ars* 120ff., Sen. *epist.* 104.31.

From the viewpoint of epic tradition Vergil manages to write this scene not only in innovative emulation of Homer and Apollonius. He even uses the Homeric scene of the death of Hector and the limitless rage of Achilles as part of Turnus' argument. However, just as Turnus has failed to throw the boulder and to live up to the example that has been set by Hector at the gate of the Greek camp as we saw earlier, Turnus, unlike Hector, is just unable to fight at the moment like Adrastus. And just as Agamemnon makes clear to Menelaos that vengeance has to be exacted for the earlier misdeeds of the Trojans, the sudden appearance of Pallas' baldric causes Aeneas to recall Pallas' death and finally to kill Turnus. Aeneas complies with Euander's request in *Aen.* 11.177 f. for vengeance for the death of his son Pallas.[1049] In a way Turnus' death is ethically more justified than Adrastus'. Agamemnon wants general revenge. Turnus' death means individual punishment (*Aen.* 12.949). This way we see how Aeneas' angry speech in *Aen.* 12.947b ff. relates to the scene in book 6 of the *Iliad* which involves Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Adrastus. It distinguishes Aeneas' motivation to kill Turnus from the Greek leaders' reasons to kill Trojans in general. At the same time Aeneas retains a very important feature of Agamemnon's behavior towards his brother who wants to be merciful and looks for booty. Aeneas remains the leader of his army and is aware of his duty towards his fellow Trojans and his allies. He is *pius Aeneas*.[1050] To judge from Vergil's perspective we see how he lets Turnus liken the present scene to Achilles' wrath against Hector. The baldric, however, shows that Turnus himself has set a new epic precedent, so to speak, that needs to be addressed. In neglecting to acknowledge fully what he has done[1051], Turnus not only morally fails to provide Aeneas with a reason for showing

[1049] Gransden (1991) 87: "Euander's words effectively seal Turnus' fate."
[1050] Cf. Nestor's speech that immediately follows the scene between Adrastus and Menelaus (*Il.* 6.66-71). Nestor warns the Greeks in general to fight first and then look for booty. He wants to defeat the enemy first. Menelaus' desire for material gain stands in the way of the Greeks' success on the battlefield. His hesitation has diverted his own and Agamemnon's attention from their task to make progress in fighting and leading the Greek army. On the other hand, to put a stop to the collecting of armor of enemies is quite common elsewhere in the *Iliad* (11.755 and 15.347). See Kirk (1990) 162.
[1051] See Binder/Binder (2005) 262.

clementia[1052], he also proves to be some kind of hypocrite, thereby further[1053] undermining his credibility for the future.

Aeneas is tempted to agree with Turnus' argument before he suddenly recognizes the baldric Turnus is wearing in battle. For a moment it looks as if Turnus will reach his goal and will be spared (*Aen.* 12.938b-941a). Aeneas is again ready to let somebody convince him that his emotions go over the top, as in the Helen episode. The difference between Turnus and Venus, however, is that Turnus does not care about Aeneas really. We recall that Venus' frank criticism was entitled to work, because, just as Philodemus had requested, she cared about Aeneas. Now the baldric unmasks the real Turnus and presents a new offense to Aeneas.[1054] But we shall deal with the philosophical implications later and return to this issue.

Aeneas' language in answer to Turnus' attempt to corner him rhetorically is taken from the religious realm. Aeneas claims that it is not really him but Pallas who inflicts the deadly wound and sacrifices (*immolat*) Turnus (*Aen.* 12.949a).[1055] Pallas is also a name for Minerva. Here things become yet more complicated.

Double entendre[1056] at this point seems likely for reasons of meter and the symmetric parallelism with Athena's wrath against and impalement of Ajax in *Aen.* 1.39b-45, which bears a certain resemblance of *Il.* 22.270bf., where Achilles invokes Athena, who, as he says, will kill Hector in a moment.[1057] The idea of a brief allusion

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[1052] On the meaning of this term in Vergil's times see Traute (1970) esp. 82-88. Farron's (1981) 99ff. and (1986) 69ff. treatment of an alleged necessity for Aeneas to forgive Turnus needs to be expanded by saying that *clementia* is not a virtue that is to be exercised for its own sake. It stands in close context with justice and *raison d'Etat*. Also see Galinsky (1994) 198f. with n. 26 where Galinsky quotes Nörr (1989), esp. 102ff., Horsfall (1995) 207f., and Clausen (2002) 208. Also cf. Cicero's letter to his brother Marcus 6.2 (Shackleton Bailey) as quoted by Lyne (1983) 201 n. 33. Also cf. Potz (1991) 260.

[1053] This is not the first instance that shows Turnus' as not being trustworthy.

[1054] Cf. Smith (2005) 173: "Turnus' effort to manipulate vision through rhetoric …"

[1055] Feldherr (2002) 79 points to the parallel between the victim Turnus and the sacrifice after the boxing match between Dares and Entellus.

[1056] Also cf. the meaning of *condere* in *Aen.* 12.950. Cf. James (1995).

[1057] Cf. Spence (1999) 157f. with nn. 24 and 26 where further literature can be found. Also see Spence (2001) 334f.

to Aeschylus' *Oresteia* is tempting.[1058] The biggest differences, to begin with, between the two texts are, firstly, that Turnus and Aeneas are not related to one another unlike Agamemnon, Klytaimnestra, and Orestes and, secondly, that the Aeschylean Eumenides are transformed and live on whereas the Vergilian Turnus is killed. Thirdly, Orestes is first ritually purified in Delphi and ultimately judged "not reproachable" in Athens for killing his mother.[1059] We do not see something like that in the *Aeneid*.

Maybe, however, an invocation of Minerva would open up a new perspective on how one could imagine the story would unfold in book 13 and following books. Remember Apollo's role in commanding the killing of Klytaimnestra. Turnus would be sacrificed by Pallas.[1060] Klytaimnestra is killed for her killing of Agamemnon. Athena comes into play precisely in order to end the vicious circle of this kind of blood feud by democratic means. Who, if Pallas Minerva takes on the role of Aeschylus' Apollo, would play Pallas Athena? And who will have jurisdiction over Aeneas? How will the trial happen? Who will take over from the Athenian citizen judges? These questions would remain open. By comparing the end of the *Aeneid* to the end of the *Oresteia*, however, one would anticipate the outcome of Aeneas' trial: acquittal. Just as Klytaimnestra's death was required by custom, Turnus' death was too. Since the end of Turnus is happening in public[1061], Aeneas' referral to the goddess of wisdom would have significance both in regard to the natives of the land and in moving towards a reconciliation of the Trojans with Athena, whose sanctuary was at the center of Troy's citadel. After all, Ajax is killed exactly because he defiled that temple even if he fought against the Trojans. Athena is not pro-Greek at all costs, so to speak. But since Athena is on the side of Odysseus throughout the Trojan War

[1058] Cf. Spence (1999) 158ff. with n. 30 for further literature.
[1059] On the philological problems involved here see, e.g., Gagarin (1975) and Flashar (1997).
[1060] Not to Pallas as Spence (1999) 161 claims. On ritual sacrifice as a social process see Galinsky (2003b) 289 with further literature in n. 46.
[1061] Aeneas' *ultio* is both private and public. Cf. Galinsky (1994) 201. For a reading of the final scene as a public spectacle see Rossi (2003) 150-168.

and his journey home and since Aeneas does not like Odysseus, Aeneas at the same time could and could not expect Minerva to be of help to him.[1062] Perhaps that is expressed in the ambiguity of the word *Pallas*.

Let us now turn to the *Argonautica* for a moment. The murder of Apsyrtus is happening in the portico of a temple of Artemis, which makes it an even more shameful crime (*A.R.* 4.471).[1063] Jason is likened to an ox butcher in this scene. In turn, therefore, Apsyrtus looks like a victim for a ritual offering. One should not forget that Amycus had been likened to an ox butcher in *A.R.* 2.91 when he himself wants to strike shortly before he himself is killed by Polydeuces.[1064] What ties these scenes together and connects them to the *Aeneid* is Entellus. He sacrifices a bull for Eryx after the boxing match in Dares' stead (*Aen.* 5.483f.). The structural parallel between the end of the boxing match between Dares and Entellus and Aeneas' and Turnus' duel are remarkable. Aeneas' soothing and comforting words are directed at the loser of the fight and aimed at preventing Dares' death. The duel, however, is no game any more. Turnus assumes Aeneas' role from the boxing match and addresses the victor. He achieves, however, the opposite. Aeneas kills the victim that is human this time in honor of Pallas instead of in honor of Eryx. We recall that Eryx had challenged a superior fighter, i. e. Hercules, just as Pallas had challenged Turnus.

We need to step back a little at this point and return to the scenes from Apollonius mentioned above. It would be tantalizing to assume that Vergil already observed this Apollonian similarity between Jason and Amycus. Amycus was clearly

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[1062] Cf., however, Aeneas' invocation of Juno in *Aen.* 12.178 that leads to Juno's reconciliation. Cf. Buchheit (1963) 133-143. Invocations like these, also remember Aeneas' invocation of Sol in *Aen.* 12.176 (cf. Galinsky (1969b) 458), do not fail to make their conciliatory intention become reality – on both the divine and human level. Cf. Latinus' reciprocal invocation of Jupiter in *Aen.* 12.200. Also cf. Fontenrose (1968) on the function of the gods in this scene.

[1063] Cf. Fränkel (1968) 498 with n. 86 in which he points to the scholion on Euripides' *Medea* 1334 where Apsyrtus dies directly at an altar of Artemis. But also cf. Green (1997) 312f. on the parallels between the murder of Apsyrtus and Euripides' *Electra* 839-843.

[1064] Cf. Green (1997) 312 and Pietsch (1999b) 156. In addition, the bull simile in *Aen.* 12.715-719 is inspired by the description of Polydeuces and Amycus in *A.R.* 2.88f. and echoes the Hercules' fight against Cacus. See Galinsky (1968) 175. On bull fights in ancient literature see also Cuypers (1997) 124.

a negative character. Jason on the other hand is not an exemplary figure when he murders Apsyrtus. And Medea is supporting what in her case amounts to fratricide. In addition, the way they treat Apsyrtus' corpse continues their defilement (*A.R.* 4.477-481). Apsyrtus' burial in the earth even contradicts the Colchian custom of burying their deceased male countrymen in trees (*A.R.* 3.204bf-209).[1065] Medea's and Jason's deed serve a more practically relevant, apotropaic purpose than Achilles' maltreatment of Hector's dead body. But looked at from other perspectives, their action is even more horrible than what Achilles had done. Yet at the same time, Turnus' death is just as necessary and unavoidable for Aeneas one way or another as is Apsyrtus' death for the Argonauts. Aeneas does at least not resort to cowardly murder and has even more justifiable reasons to punish Turnus. Vergil admittedly leaves the question open in what fashion Turnus' corpse will be treated after is is left behind by his life in the last verse of the *Aeneid*. But at least the prospect is rather good that Aeneas will not eventually change his mind and resort to unnecessary cruelties.

In addition, we must also pay attention to an additional Homeric precedent for Turnus becoming a ritual victim. Achilles captures twelve young Trojans and throws them into the fire of Patroclus' funeral pyre (*Il.* 18.336f.; 21.27 f.; 23.175 f., 181 f.). Interestingly, their death is described as σῆ κ for Patroclus' death. While the corpses of the twelve Trojans are eaten up by the fire Achilles himself says that he does not want to make Hector's corpse a funeral offering for Patroclus (*Il.* 23.182b f.). The dogs are supposed to eat it. But Aphrodite and Apollo look to it that Hector's corpse remains untouched (*Il.* 23.184-191)[1066] so that Priam subsequently can get the corpse back. This finally ties together Aeneas' anger, the penalty Turnus has to pay, and the ritual killing[1067] of Turnus. Aeneas is fulfilling his duties towards Pallas and

[1065] Cf. Dräger (2002) 526,
[1066] On this parallel that shows the difference between Patroclus and Hector see Richardson (1993) 190.
[1067] This topic has become the subject of recent debate. Cf. Dyson (2001).

Euander in a more justifiable way than Achilles. Aeneas treats his opponent in a way that is markedly the opposite of how Achilles had treated Hector.

Achilles is a brutal warrior. Already in *Il.* 18.336 f. Achilles promises to kill twelve young Trojans in honor of Patroclus.[1068] The feeling that accompanies this intention and the deed is anger as Achilles himself tells us (ροθ ῆζ). Homer does not approve what Achilles has in mind. In *Il.* 23.176, when Achilles with his own hand kills the twelve Trojans and throws them into Patroclus' pyre, Homer says that Achilles intended to do "bad" things: νανᾰ γᾰ ι υπῶ πῆγης ρ υξ α.[1069] Aeneas follows the epic precedent and captures four young enemies for the funeral pyre of Pallas (*Aen.* 10.517b-520) in anger (*ardens, Aen.* 10.514)[1070] and sends them with the *pompa funebris* to Euander with the clear intention that they are to be sacrificed (*Aen.* 10.519f.: *inferias quos immolet*[1071] *umbris* and *Aen.* 11.81-84, esp. 81bf.: *quos mitteret umbris / inferias, caeso sparsurus sanguine flammas*). Vergil interestingly refrains from any judgment about this deed and intention. He is not prejudging what Aeneas does unlike his predecessor, even if clearly this practice was regarded a horrific custom by the time of Vergil.[1072] *Andere Zeiten, andere Sitten*, Vergil seems to say. A hero of Achilles' times has to follow a different code. Mago is killed as a suppliant in *Aen.* 10.521-536 and not spared just as this is regular behavior in the *Iliad.*[1073] The more "civilized", if the term is allowed here, Aeneas will behave, especially in comparison with other heroes, the more remarkable it will be.[1074]

[1068] For further discussion and literature on this Iliadic scene see Edwards (1991) 186.
[1069] The Homeric phrase νανᾰ υξ α does not necessarily imply a moral judgement, of course. Cf. Richardson (1993) 189 and Horsfall (2003) 97. But it can. Cf. Cairns (1993) 129 with n. 245 and 133.
[1070] The capture of the four young victims is a work done on the side. Aeneas' main interest is to find Turnus while having the picture of Pallas and his father as well as the friendly reception he received there – implicitly in contrast to what Aeneas has to experience here – constantly before his eyes (*Aen.* 10.515ff.).
[1071] *Immolare* is crucial. Cf. Harrison (1991) 203.
[1072] Cf. Livy 7.15, Conington/Nettleship (1883) 283 and Harrison (1991) 202f. Also cf. Horsfall (2003) 96ff.
[1073] Cf. Harrison (1991) 204.
[1074] See Farron (1977) 204 for an assessment that sees the level of Aeneas' anger after Pallas' death as exceeding all other characters in the *Aeneid* and even Achilles in the *Iliad* in this regard.

As a contrast, we need to look at Turnus who cuts off the heads of slain enemies and decorates his chariot with them while these heads are still dripping blood (*Aen.* 12.511f.). Turnus is like Cacus in this regard (*Aen.* 8.195bff.). Neither is there a parallel to this kind of behavior in the *Argonautica*[1075] nor in the *Iliad*, nor in the *Odyssey*.[1076] People who are *crudeles in bello* should not be spared according to Cicero (*de off.* 1.35).[1077]

The capture of the victims for Pallas, however, is followed by the scene in which Mago pleads for his life (*Aen.* 10.521-536).[1078] Especially because Mago is hinting that Aeneas could make much money out of sparing his life, this scene is relevant for the scene between Menelaus and Adrastus in *Iliad* 6 and in turn to *Aeneid* 12. There is, of course, no brother of Aeneas who could come to change Aeneas' mind. On the other hand, Aeneas has a mind of his own. He will explain why he will execute Mago. Turnus, by killing Pallas, has made it impossible to strike any deals regarding ransom for captives.[1079] In *Iliad* 6 Agamemnon pointed out that Menelaus had not been treated mercifully by the Trojans and Nestor had directed Menelaus' attention to the fact that Troy needed to be destroyed first and booty taken later (*Il.* 6.56bf. and 70bf.). For Aeneas booty does not count at all. The death of Pallas is marked as the step and violation that cannot be reversed. Mago, just like Turnus in the end of the *Aeneid*, reminded Aeneas of his own fathers and of being Iulus' father himself (*Aen.* 10.524).[1080] Aeneas, however, is convinced that the members of his

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[1075] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 475 and 481.
[1076] Cf. Knauer (1979) 403 and 429. Also cf. Willcock (1983) 94, Clausen (1987) 92, and Galinsky (1988) 323.
[1077] Cf. Galinsky (1988) 323.
[1078] As far as other parallels from Homer are concerned, Knauer (1979) 417 rightfully points to the dialogue between Achilles and Lycaon as he is pleading for his life (*Il.* 21.99-113). Lycaon is killed on Achilles' path to Hector, just as Mago is killed on Aeneas' search for Turnus. Also cf. Harrison (1991) 204. *Il.* 21.100ff. proves that Achilles considered the situation has irreversibly changed after Patroclus' death. Cf. Richardson (1993) 61f. Aeneas' thinking is very similar after Pallas' death (*Aen.* 10.533).
[1079] Maybe there is a little Ennian touch to the scene as well. Cf. Conington/Nettleship (1883) 284.
[1080] *Spes surgentis Iuli* is important. In Mago's view, Aeneas probably should think about the possibility that there is a time after the war. Apparently Mago offers to switch sides and admonishes Aeneas to take advantage of that opportunity of winning an good-willed ally for the future now.

family would decide (*sentit*) not to accept any ransom for prisoners under the present circumstances (*Aen*. 10.534). This explicit recourse to Mago's own speech (*Aen*. 10.534 answers 524f.) remains important for Turnus' death. Again, Aeneas transfers the authority to decide finally about death and life of a defeated enemy to a third party.[1081]

When Aeneas says that Pallas himself sacrifices Turnus (*Aen*. 12.548bf.), this statement counters Turnus' plea to Aeneas to think about Daunus and Anchises.[1082] Turnus should have thought of Euander.[1083] Turnus had even insulted Euander instead of paying heed to the question what his own father's reaction to his death would look like. Turnus has failed and has done nothing to deserve to be spared, quite to the contrary (*Aen*. 12.949b *poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit*).[1084]

By using the word *immolat* of Pallas, however, Aeneas aligns himself with the young prince. For after killing Mago, Aeneas goes on to wrek havoc upon the enemy. As his next victim after Mago, Aeneas "sacrifices" (*immolat*)[1085] the son of Haemonides.[1086] Looked at it from this perspective, Turnus' death marks the end of this series of ritualized killings after Pallas' death.

At this point we need to return to the fact that Turnus' first wound is not a deadly one is a fundamental difference between the last scene of Vergil's *Aeneid* and

[1081] I cannot follow Harrison (1991) 205 who calls the rejection of Mago's appeal to Aeneas' "family-mindedness" "disturbing". Aeneas is sure that his family will agree with him and with his values. After all, Mago's rhetorical trick is anticipating Turnus' behavior in the final scene when he appeals to Aeneas' sense of family, too, and is likewise rejected for very similar reasons.
[1082] Turnus' prospects would look pretty dire if Aeneas would judge him on account of his merits only. Cf. Galinsky (1988) 325.
[1083] Cf. Galinsky (1988) 341f.
[1084] This compares Turnus with Helen. Cf. *Aen*. 2.576b: *sceleratas sumere poenas*.
[1085] Cf. Servius' explanation for this term: *Immolat quasi victimam ut ille consueverat*. Cf. Conington/Nettleship (1883) 285.
[1086] Haemon is priest of Apollo and Trivia. Trivia stands either for Diana or for Hecate, probably as the gatekeeper to death and the underworld in this particular context. Turnus is the last soul that will follow this priest on this occasion.

most of the scenes which we discussed as models for it. This fact enables Aeneas to delay the long expected death of Turnus for a moment.[1087]

In Sophocles' *Ajax* (1028-1031[1088]) we find a version of Hector's death that is different from the Homeric account in that Hector is not mortally wounded by Achilles in the first place. In fact, a sword-belt, that was given to him by Ajax in exchange for Hector's sword, which later became the weapon by means of which Ajax can commit suicide (1032-1035), was the ultimate reason for Hector's death.[1089] To be dragged to death, however, supposedly by Achilles, is even more gruesome and cruel than even Homer's version of Hector's death.

Adrastus depends on Menelaus' mercy because he is the victim of an accident with his chariot. There is no fight going on between them before. Mago is not even the victim of an accident. His spear misses Aeneas and instantly, apparently without even waiting for Aeneas' counterattack, Mago clasps Aeneas' knees (*Aen*. 10.521ff.). Trading life is not something that would be feasible after the heavy losses both Menelaus and Aeneas have sustained. Thus it is clear that Vergil wants to a) elaborate on the question whether Turnus needs to be killed or not. But b) something else becomes clear. Agamemnon places the reason for the Trojan war and the point where return is not possible any more in the violation of the hospitality that Menelaus had shown to the Trojans. Vergil, in equating the stealing of Helen with the death of Pallas, makes a statement. The Trojans in Italy are not like the Greeks at Troy. Turnus, Mago, the Rutulians, and all the other enemies would have had the chance to

[1087] The view has been expressed that this delay which runs counter to normal epic expectation is by this very fact deliberately marked and indicating Vergil's willingness to have his audience discussing the moral implications. Cf. Potz (1991) 251.
[1088] Verses 1028-1039 of Teucer's words were deleted from the text by Morstadt and Nauck. Hermann tried to adapt Sophocles' text to match the Homeric account starting at *Il*. 22.395. There is, however, apparently no reason in the textual tradition of the passage that would require its deletion or significant other changes. Sophocles has been suspected to have used the Cyclic epics for his version of Hector's death. Quintus Smyrnaeus and two epigrams (*AP* 7.151f.) draw on this version as well. Cf. Campbell (1881) 92, Jebb (1907) 157 and 234f., Garvie (1998) 220f.
[1089] Cf. Galinsky (2003b) 288.

end the war until Pallas was killed.[1090] That death apparently amounts to the epic proportions of the kidnapping of Helen. In this regard to, not only in delaying the death of one of his opponents, Aeneas is in the position of Menelaus. Yet, he does not forget the injustice done to his friends as easily for the sake of money as Menelaus. Aeneas is pious in "sacrificing" his enemies to the killed Pallas in more than one way.

There is, therefore, far more involved than just the question of the mere return of the corpse of the hero to his family. Easily enough the *Aeneid* could have ended both like and unlike the *Iliad*, namely with Turnus' burial. In the *Aeneid* nothing is said about the question what will happen to Turnus' corpse. Would Aeneas have abused Turnus' body?

At this point we have to turn our eyes to yet another complex issue of intertextual allusion. Since Patroclus' death serves as the background for the death of Hector, one has to compare Turnus' and Mezentius' death.[1091] At first, Mezentius attempts to attack Aeneas and to win the fight. Unlike Turnus, Mezentius at least in part succeeds in his attempt. Aeneas has to use his shield for protection[1092] until he suddenly attacks Mezentius (*Aen.* 10.886-891). Jason's behavior in the battle against the earthborn soldiers is mirrored and contrasted here. Just like Aeneas, Jason seizes the initiative after having assumed a defensive position first (*A.R.* 3.1369bf. and 1377-1381). Jason hides beneath his shield. As we discussed above[1093], Apollonius has not made it quite clear why. Jason does not use it to fend off javelins, spears, or swords like Aeneas. He probably wants to remain unseen for a moment. Jason, of course, is in a fight alone against a multitude of adversaries.

[1090] Also cf. the way Pallas was killed – hence the author's remarks in *Aen.* 10.501-505a on which cf. Effe (1983) 184f. and (2004) 43f.

[1091] On this scene in general also cf. Thome (1978) 83-180.

[1092] Cf. *Aen.* 10.802b: *furit Aeneas tectusque tenet se* while he is fighting against Lausus.

[1093] Also cf. Dräger (2002) 514 with further literature. Dräger defends Jason from being a coward by pointing to the epic convention that a hero might use his shield as a defensive weapon in *Il.* 13.405, 408 (Idomeneus is using the shield against Deiphobus,) and 22.275 (Hector, interestingly enough, uses the shield against Achilles). Cf. also Campbell (1983) 87 who also interprets *A.R.* 3.1370a αὐτοέθ ζ as an indication that Apollonius wants to dispel any suspicion that Jason was a coward. For a different interpretation of this word see Hunter (1989a) 250. Also cf. Aeneas' use of the shield in *Il.* 20.278f. after his shield is hit. Cf. Janko (1992) 98 and Edwards (1991) 324.

We see that Vergil apparently has used Jason's fight against the earth-born soldiers twice. The stone-throw was used for the duel against Turnus.[1094] The tactics of fighting a duel against an enemy who is in a superior position at first were applied to the duel against Mezentius.

This duel, however, is fought, just like the duel against Turnus and like Jason's fight against the earth-born soldiers, but unlike, e.g., the Mago scene, in public.[1095] The reactions of that public are of great interest. The wounded Mezentius falls off his horse and is ultimately unable to continue the fighting. A collective shout is heard. The jubilant Trojans and the Latins let their voices be heard (*Aen.* 10.895). The question is why the Latins chime in. Or do they have a different reason to let their voices be heard? Mezentius himself knows the hatred of his people against him in *Aen.* 10.904b-905a. Mezentius' death therefore might be welcome to the Latins who may feel uncomfortable with this ally. The scene of this duel then aligns itself with the boxing match of Amycus against Polydeuces. Here, too, the group of the victorious man is triumphant. Also, a similar ambiguity about the emotions of a people can be found during Jason's fight with the earth-born soldiers in *A.R.* 3.1370b-1373a. There is at least a gap between the expression of emotions of Aietes, who remains silent[1096], and his people.[1097] In contrast to these scenes, however, the Rutulians in *Aen.* 12.928 react in way that expresses their sadness about the death of their leader: *gemitus*.

Aeneas then makes haste to go to Mezentius. This hurry is lacking in the final scene of the *Aeneid.* Aeneas draws his sword and derides Mezentius. This deriding of the enemy is also not part of the final scene with Turnus, although the derisive tone is

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[1094] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 500.
[1095] Cf. *Aen.* 10.895 with *Aen.* 12.928, *Aen.* 12. 937, and *A.R.* 3.1370b-1373a.
[1096] Cf. Hunter (1989a) 251 on the controversy over the exact nature of Aietes' response to Jason's accomplishment of yoking the bulls together in Pindar's *Pyth.* 4.237f.
[1097] Hunter (1989a) 251 sees the Colchians be joyful over the sporting victory of Jason. Needless to say, this has further implications regarding the Golden Fleece. Hunter sees *Il.* 2.394ff. (On this passage see Kirk (1985) 156f. and Latacz (2003) 119.) as the model for Apollonius. There the Greek reaction to Agamemnon's words is rendered as like the noise of waves clashing against a big rock.

typical for Homeric scenes like the death of Patroclus or the death of Hector. Turnus is set apart from Mezentius. To kill Turnus is more complicated than to kill Mezentius. The reason for this fact is that Turnus is in general a better human being than Mezentius and therefore merits more respect.[1098]

Mezentius asks Aeneas to be merciful (*Aen.* 10.903-906). He asks for a favor. Without any rhetorical bombast it is immediately clear what Mezentius is asking for: He wants to be buried with his son.[1099] He knows that his own people hate him. Mezentius accepts death as a normal part of his participation and defeat in battle.[1100] And Aeneas indeed kills him. In contrast to Turnus (*Aen.* 12.952), Mezentius' soul is not said to be indignant at his death. What is more, Mezentius exhorts Aeneas to cease deriding him and to kill him immediately instead (*Aen.* 10.900). This shows resignation[1101], even a kind of indifference towards his death.

Mezentius himself provides the reasoning for Aeneas' killing him: *nullum in caede nefas* (*Aen.* 10.901). This phrase actually harks back to the Helen episode in which in *Aen.* 2.585 Aeneas thinks that killing Helen would amount to the elimination of a *nefas*, although Aeneas also admits that when killing a woman one normally cannot find praise (*Aen.* 2.583f.). We see that the Vergilian heroes indeed think about what the necessary conditions are under which it is appropriate to kill one's enemy. The same thought process can be found in the final scene. When Aeneas, due to Turnus' words, becomes aware of the fact that one could interpret the killing of Turnus as a deed done under the influence of an excessive impulse of hatred, he restrains himself. Only after it becomes clear that Turnus' words do not sufficiently mirror the truth, especially in the light of the discrepancy between his

[1098] "Better", however, does not have to mean "good."
[1099] There is no direct reply, but it seems as if Mezentius would be included in the general amnesty in *Aen.* 11.100-105. Cf. Harrison (1995) 283.
[1100] Aristotle in *EN* 3.9 (1117b10-13) and 9.9 (1170b3-7) points out that the more one is a virtuous man, i.e. the happier one is, the more he (or she) will be pained at the prospect of death and vice versa. Good people have friends and friendship is a constituent of good life. Mezentius by his behavior and by having no friends makes clear that he is a wicked man. Being hated, he even acts in a self-destructive way as Aristotle predicts in *EN* 9.4 (1166b13-26). Cf. Knuuttila (2004) 40.
[1101] Cf. Harrison (1991) 282 also on *Aen.* 10.901.

own deed and words, Aeneas becomes angry again and kills Turnus. Some, however, have regarded this scene as containing enough reason for accusing Aeneas of *nefas* in this killing.

Why is it that Aeneas is not blamed commonly for killing Mezentius? Why may Aeneas deride Mezentius?[1102] Mezentius blames himself for having let it happen that his son sacrifices himself for him (*Aen.* 10.846-856a).[1103] Mezentius admits the wrongs he has committed.[1104] Equally, the question of guilt is at the core of the justification of Turnus' death. In order to preempt Aeneas' verdict, Turnus also has to make it clear that he thinks his attempts to prevent Aeneas from settling down in Latium are a failure. But does he promise to leave it at that in the future and not to challenge the outcome of this fight ever again? Mezentius, who is hated and loathed by his own people[1105], who fled from the battle and thereby incidentally sacrificed his own son so that he himself could escape, and who, in addition, hates and despises the gods, "earned" his death even in the eyes of today's readers, even if the late admission shed some favorable light on him in his last hour.

After the scene of Mezentius' death, which to judge from an ethical point of view was comparatively simple, Vergil asks his hero in the final scene of the *Aeneid* to go over the question of Turnus' guilt and the merits of his words again. Two issues emerge; firstly, the situation in which Turnus finds himself without any means to escape is brought to our attention. Secondly, the complex situation in which Aeneas

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[1102] Turnus like Mago does not give Aeneas the opportunity to deride him. They both at once start their respective plea. On the other hand, it seems as if Aeneas is not inclined to deride someone.

[1103] There are parallels in this speech to other epic and dramatic lamentation speeches. Of special interest is Creon's lament over Haemon's corpse in Sophocles' *Antigone* 1261-1276. Creon recognizes and even regrets his mistakes. See Harrison (1991) 272.

[1104] Cf. Gotoff (1984) 206: "He [sc. Mezentius] now shows the full capacity of his altered character.

[1105] Also cf. the fact that only Polyphemus (*Aen.* 3.664), Hercules (*Aen.* 8.230), and Mezentius (*Aen.* 10.718) gnash their teeth while they are being angry. (Cf. Lobe (1999) 70f.) This element is taken from Achilleus arming himself (*Il.* 19.365a). Turnus does not gnash his teeth when he gets ready for battle in *Aen.* 12.81-107. Aristarchus' criticism of *Il.* 19.365a might be behind this. On the other hand, it might just be the case that Vergil wants to mark a difference between Turnus and the even more senselessly angry Mezentius. See Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 328-224. On the relationship between the Odyssean Polyphemus and the Vergilian Mezentius in general see Glenn (1971).

is forced to act is brought to the center of the stage. And this complexity is the point where we have to pay attention to contemporary views of anger that were held in Vergil's time.

8.2 Keeping the Faith: The Right Kind of Anger

From the perspective of Roman custom and sacral law as well as from the viewpoint of epic tradition, we cannot find fault with Aeneas' behavior in the final scene.[1106] The assessment of the exact nature of the philosophical undercurrents of the final scene of the *Aeneid* has been at the forefront of pertinent scholarly discussions, as has been pointed out at the beginning of this chapter. I will undertake a brief review of the various opinions and show how they tie in with the literary epic tradition.

In a 1970 article, von Albrecht attempted to square Aristotle's definition of the tragic with Turnus' death. Aristotle distinguishes three categories, how a hero's fate can change to the worse[1107]: by outside bad luck (ς ῦ κπα), by an inadvertendly made mistake (ἁπάυς κπα)[1108], and by a consciously committed injustice (γ ῖνκπα). Only the second possibility is to be called "tragic", since to be punished for a crime is nothing tragic and bad luck is just horrible, whereas if someone makes a mistake without knowing that this deed constitutes a mistake, this discrepancy constitutes tragedy in the sense of Aristotle's *Poetics* 13.[1109] Von Albrecht further argues that Vergil has incorporated all three possible categories into the final scene. It is bad luck for Turnus that his, i.e. originally Metiscus', sword splinters in *Aen.* 12.728-733. This failure of Turnus' sword is countered by Aeneas' bad luck with his spear that cannot be removed from a tree trunk in *Aen.* 12.772-776a. So the balance between the two contestants is restored.[1110] Turnus' injustice, committed in full awareness against Pallas, calls for just punishment. This issue covers, in von Albrecht's view, verses

[1106] Cf. Galinsky (1988) 324.
[1107] *EN* 1135b12-1136a3, *Rh.* 1374b6.
[1108] Cf. Moles' (1984) attempt to interpret Dido's behavior under the auspices of Aristotle's concept of ἁπαυς ῖα on which see in general, e.g., Stinton (1975), Moles (1979), Armstrong/Peterson (1980), and Schütrumpf (1989) with further bibliography.
[1109] Cf. v. Albrecht (1970) 3.
[1110] Cf. v. Albrecht (1970) 1 and 3.

Aen. 12.941b-952.[1111] Von Albrecht then identifies Turnus' recognition of his mistake in *Aen.* 12.894f. as the real tragic moment of the final scene in Aristotelian terms. This insight moves Aeneas to the point where he apparently wants to spare him and to restrain himself.[1112] Consequently, Aeneas' killing of Turnus, if caused by a sudden and uncontrolled surge of anger, would seem to be a little awkward at first sight.

The question, however, is which of his mistakes Turnus recognizes. The only thing he admits in *Aen.* 12.894f., under the impression of the sight of the Dira[1113] and of the departure of his sister Iuturna[1114], is that all the gods seem to have turned against him and that Jupiter apparently acts against him as a *hostis*, an enemy of state[1115]: *non me tua fervida terrent / dicta, ferox, di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis.*[1116] Incidentally, Turnus, in fact, is accusing Jupiter, considering his help for Aeneas as injust or undeserved and incomprehensible. He is far from admitting or recognizing his own personal mistakes[1117] as, for example, his breaking of the treaty[1118], for which Turnus is punished, as Servius *ad Aen.* 12.949 points out.[1119] Turnus is far from recognizing a tragic and, until new information is obtained, overlooked mistake.[1120] In addition, even if his angry reaction to Aeneas' arrival would be understandable,

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[1111] Cf. v. Albrecht (1970) 2ff.
[1112] Cf. v. Albrecht (1970) 2.
[1113] This has been the starting point for reading the *Aeneid* from the viewpoint of feminist philology. See Spence (2001) 338-341 with n. 20.
[1114] On the symbolism of Iuturna's dismissal amid the harrowing of Turnus see Williams/Carter (1974) 177.
[1115] Jupiter is the god of the *hospes*.
[1116] Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 253-259 has suggested that the relative absence of divine help from the final scene is caused by Vergil's attempt to comply with ancient criticism of comparable Homeric duels that was ignited by, e.g., Athena's role in *Il.* 22 during the duel between Hector and Achilles or Apollo's role in *Il.* 16 in the passage leading up to Patroclus' death. Cf. *scholion* bT *ad* 22.231.
[1117] Cf. Aen. 12.931 *nec deprecor*. What Turnus does in the verses following this statement, however, is exactly a *deprecatio*. See above.
[1118] Turnus does not break it personally, but does participate. Cf. Renger (1985) 24.
[1119] This is an extension of the previous epic role models. Cf. Galinsky (2003b) 284f. Romans did not see any reason to spare treaty breakers. Turnus has also broken an agreement before. Cf. Galinsky (1988) 323f.
[1120] The question is whether the hero merits the audience's ὀργή for his deed in an Aristotelean sense. Also cf. Schenk (1984) 337-395, esp. 395 and 398. This is the case only if a deed is done involuntarily which is also the case if one acts without full knowledge of what one is doing. See Schütrumpf (1970) 113-117.

Turnus still is far from committing an additional involuntary injustice that would make his case comparable to, e.g., Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*.[1121]

Turnus' breaking of the treaty[1122], however, deserves a closer look for a moment. Paris did not break the treaty that was negotiated in *Iliad* 3, but it was negated by the intervention of Venus, who by using a dark cloud snatches Paris away from his duel with Menelaus (*Il.* 3.381). Turnus is left on the battlefield; no deity comes to his rescue. Turnus, who probably would like to see a new Paris in Aeneas, does nothing to stop the truce from being broken through Rutulian anxieties over the prospect of having a foreign ruler[1123] and through Iuturna's[1124] omen and Tolumnius' interpretation of it. Far from it, in a sudden surge of hope[1125] (*subita spe fervidus ardet*), Turnus does everything to participate and even increase the renewed battle (*Aen.* 12.161-330).[1126]

The last scene makes clear why Aeneas kills Turnus.[1127] Aeneas tells Turnus the reason why he is killed. Pallas' death demands Turnus' death. This brings us to the Stoic perspective of Turnus' death. Seneca in *de ira* 1.12 (*dial.* 3.12) discusses at length the reactions of a man to the sight of his father being murdered and his mother being raped (*dial.* 3.12.1):

> *"Quid ergo?" inquit, "vir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum viderit, si rapi matrem?"*
> "What then?," he said, "A good man does not begin to feel angry, were he to see his father being slaughtered and his mother snatched away?"

[1121] See Schütrumpf (1970) 118.
[1122] On the Homeric model and its reworking in Vergil see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 296-300.
[1123] Cf. Juno's concerns in *Aen.* 12.808-828.
[1124] On the Homeric parallel for this scene and the influence of the Homeric scholia on Vergil see Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 278-281.
[1125] The object of this hope is not mentioned. I think, however, that it is safe to assume that Turnus is inspired by the prospect of saving his life from having to fight against somebody who in the eyes of the Rutulians seems to be physically superior to him and whose entire appearance before the duel is telling (*Aen.* 12.216-221). Also there might be hope for his entire people to win the war.
[1126] Cf. Galinsky (2003b) 287.
[1127] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 193.

Seneca denies that a man will be confused by his emotions, but will in fact kill the murderer of his father because of his *pietas* (*dial.* 3.12.1f.).

> *Quid autem times, ne parum magnus illi stimulus etiam sine ira pietas sit? … Pater caederetur, defendam; caesus est, exsequar, quia oportet, non quia dolet.*
> But why are you afraid that piety would not be a great enough stimulus for him even without anger? … I would defend my father if he were attacked; is he slain, I will avenge him, because the obligation exists, not because it hurts.

In what follows after that passage, Seneca undertakes to show the need for an approach to avenging one's father's murder out of a sense of loyal duty with foresight, using judgement and acting voluntarily, not under the impulse of some outside force. Parents, as is significant for Aeneas' avenging Pallas, are in this regard no different case than other human beings to whom we are attached in some way or another. Friends belong in that group as well (*dial.* 3.12.5):

> *Irasci pro suis non est pii animi, sed infirmi; illud pulchrum dignumque, pro parentibus, liberis, amicis, civibus prodire defensorem ipso officio ducente, volentem, iudicantem, providentem, non impulsum et rapidum.*
> To start feeling angry for one's family is not the sign of a pious mind, but of a weak mind; it is good and becoming to go forth as the defender for one's parents, childrens, friends, and citizens as it is required by one's obligation and as somebody who wants to do it, with judgment, with foresight, not impulsively or hastily.

This passage has been used to show that Aeneas' anger is misplaced in the killing of Turnus, since Aeneas' anger in the last scene is said to be of a "reactive" type.[1128] What has not been taken into account sufficiently, I believe, is that apparently Seneca introduces a feeling of *pietas* as a stimulus that will make us avenge our loved ones. Of course, Seneca rejects indiscriminate anger[1129] as the

[1128] Cf. Gill (2003) 222ff.
[1129] See v. Albrecht's (1969 510) distinction between private anger and *pietas*. Cf. modern distinctions between anger, hate, and hostility. Cf. for literature on this topic Galinsky (1988) 321f. with n. 3. See on Seneca's differentiation of *ira* and *pietas* also Erler (1992a) 114.

appropriate reason for revenge[1130] if it is just an excuse for one's cheap submission to emotions or is valuing each loss as weighing equally heavy regardless of the lost good (*dial*. 3.12.3f.). As the general statement that Seneca puts into Theophrastus' mouth in *dial*. 3.12.3 (*Irascuntur boni viri pro suorum iniuriis*. Good men get angry over injuries done to the members of their families.) shows, Seneca argues against what normally in his time was considered to be a matter of common sense. But Seneca says that this approach often leads to the opposite result of the one desired in anger (*dial*. 3.12.5):

> *praerapida [sc. ira] et amens, ut omnis fere cupiditas, ipsa sibi in id in quod properat opponitur.*
> Overly hastily and insanely, as almost every desire behaves, it [sc. anger] poses an obstacle for itself towards the very thing it is running to.

Seneca wants the son to achieve his goal. *Pietas* with foresight, so to speak, is better than anger with unexpected, even opposite consequences.[1131] But in the end, the one who killed one's father dies without having been allowed an independent trial. Many people would today regard this kind of "justice" a criminal act. Seneca apparently did not.

The result of Aeneas' action is successful revenge. The question arising from Seneca's discussion, therefore is whether this result was achieved through a rationally pious planned action or whether Aeneas "lucked out" of his irrationally angry madness. To "save" Aeneas from the accusation that he is no Stoic[1132] there are a few possible solutions. We could say that Vergil wants Aeneas to act ethically worthy of a Stoic, not just in order to make him a more emotionally credible, likable person.[1133]

[1130] Cf. Seneca's definition of anger in *dial*. 3.3.1: "*Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest; ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi*." (Aristotle's definition is not far from ours; namely he says that anger is the desire to give back pain.).
[1131] Seneca does admit that anger sometimes achieves its goal just as poison sometimes accomplishes the cure of a disease or just as a unforeseen shipwreck turns out to be profitable in the end (*de ira* 1.12.6).
[1132] If a Stoic character was intended by Vergil.
[1133] For a similar, although ultimately rejected view see Gill (2003) 223.

Or one could say that even Cicero denied that there had been an absolutely perfect Stoic sage yet.[1134] Seneca's ideal is not necessarily a complete reality. Just as in the case of Aeneas' reaction to the temple pictures in Carthage, Vergil leaves it open to the audience to decide about the justification and basis of Aeneas' feelings.[1135]

On the other hand, I think, there is yet another way of making sense of Aeneas' behavior from a Stoic point of view. What does *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (Aen. 12.946f.)[1136] really mean, i.e. what is Aeneas angry about? The whole sentence reads:

> *Ille, occulis postquam saevi monimenta doloris*
> *Exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira*
> *Terribilis: "tune hinc spoliis indute meorum*
> *Eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas*
> *Immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit."*
> He, after he drank in the tokens and spoils of his severe pain with his eyes, he said fired up by fury and terrible in his anger: "You, who are dressed in the spoils taken from my family want to snatch yourself away from me? With this wound Pallas, Pallas sacrifices you and takes his atonement from you blood."

Aeneas takes a good look at the baldric. The metaphoric *haurire* suggests a more thorough and longer inquiry.[1137] The severity of the pain (*saevus dolor*)[1138] felt over Pallas death is stressed and this pain is immediately present again. Then anger swells up.[1139]

The Stoic Chrysippus acknowledges that the extirpation of emotions is generally impossible in situations in which emotions are raging (*SVF* 3.474 and

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[1134] Cf. *Tusc*. 2.51, *de orat*. 1.220-224 and Galinsky (1994) 193 with n. 10 and White (1995) 246.
[1135] In Roman eyes and in the eyes of an experienced reader of epic poetry, Aeneas would, however, not be condemned for Turnus' death per se, even if Turnus' age and Allecto's deception would probably cause the audience of having some pity for him.
[1136] On parallels for this phrase see Horsfall (1995) 213f. Also cf. Rieks (1989) 182ff.
[1137] Putnam (1990) 8 rightly states that the reader has to infer from the text what might be going on in terms of inner reasoning inside of Aeneas' head.
[1138] On the parallel between and inversion of Aeneas' (*Aen*. 12.945) and Juno's (*Aen*. 1.25) *saevus dolor* see de Grummond (1981).
[1139] For a different interpretation of Aeneas' hesitation and look at the baldric see Putnam (1984) esp. 240.

484).[1140] I would, however, be tempted to see Aeneas' behavior again under the aspect of a Stoic pre-passion as, for example, Aeneas felt the onslaught of anxiety for a brief moment in the seastorm of book 1 of the *Aeneid*. After he feels the pre-emotion, Aeneas analyses Turnus' words that precede the recognition of the baldric.

Aeneas states that Turnus wants to escape. And as if that intention was not enough, Turnus wants to walk away from the scene wearing the *spolia*[1141] of people whom Aeneas considers part of his family. It is not only Pallas' death that is the issue here. It is Turnus' own behavior. Aeneas rejects Turnus' claim that his thoughts are set on his father's well-being only (*Aen*. 12.932b-936a). What Turnus has done and how he continued to behave is a personal matter, of course, but also a matter of reason of state. Styled as a priest, Aeneas then makes a sacrifice which fulfills his duties of *pietas* just as Seneca demanded it.[1142] Vergil also tells us what feelings accompanied Aeneas' sacrifice (*Aen*. 12.950f.):

> *Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit*
> *fervidus*.
> While he was saying that, Aeneas places his sword under his adverse chest.

Fervidus is the description of Aeneas' feelings.[1143] This term is a little ambiguous in meaning. It can denote Amata's frenzy in *Aen*. 7.397.[1144] On the other hand it is the emotional state in which one pursues his enemies on the battlefield (Euryalus: *Aen*.

[1140] Therefore, preparation by anticipation of the situations and meditation on the possible reactions is needed in Chrysippus' opinion (*SVF* 3.482). Cf. Halbig (2004) 63. For the Stoic Chrysippus emotions perhaps can be stopped in general, but we are at least unable to control our emotions in a reliable way (*SVF* 3.462). Cf. Nussbaum (1987a) 169, Guckes (2004) 103.

[1141] A loaded term in Rome, especially in Augustan times, where three sets of *spolia* were on display that were the only sets of *spolia opima* ever won in Roman history. The three winners were Romulus, Cossus, and Marcellus. With the name Marcellus and Augustus' nephew who was given the same name, we enter another important interpretive aspect of the *Aeneid* and especially of its sixth book whose discussion would be to lengthy for inclusion here. See, e.g., Glei (1998). By keeping the spoils for himself and not offering them to the gods, Turnus violates a Roman taboo regarding spolia. See Renger (1985) 85ff.

[1142] For a different reading see Farron (1985).

[1143] For an analysis of the use of the word in the *Aeneid* see also Rieks (1989) 184ff.

[1144] On that passage see Horsfall (2003) 274.

9.350[1145], Pandarus: *Aen*. 9.736[1146], Messapus: 12.293, and Aeneas: *Aen*. 10.788 and 12.748).[1147] In addition, Turnus calls Aeneas' words in Aen. 12.894 *fervida*, although they seem to follow the standard of challenge speeches on the battlefield.

The nature of Aeneas' agitation is important, especially because Pandarus is explicitly described as *fervidus ira* because of the death of his brother.[1148] Pandarus is in a similar situation to Aeneas. However, Pandarus' ability to look out for himself is hindered by his feelings[1149] and he is subsequently defeated by Turnus in *Aen*. 9.753ff.[1150] The allusion to Pandarus' fight with Turnus shows in its alteration[1151] what Vergil wants his readers to see as altered. I would assume that Vergil by not explicitly indicating the reason of Aeneas' being *fervidus* in this particular scene, although such indications of reasons in the ablative (*spe* in *Aen*. 12.325 in Turnus' case)[1152] are common, tells us that Aeneas' emotions have been reduced to the level that would be considered "normal" on the battlefield.[1153]

[1145] Cf. Conington/Nettleship (1883) 192f. and Dingel (1997) 151 on the construction of that verse.
[1146] Cf. Dingel (1997) 263.
[1147] We need to pay attention to the circumstances of Aeneas' emotion just as in the previous chapters. Also cf. Galinsky (1994) 194.
[1148] Hercules is also *fervidus ira* in the Cacus episode (*Aen*. 8.230). Cf. on this topos Effe (2002). The difference between Aeneas in the final verses of the *Aeneid* and Hercules is thus marked.
[1149] Cf. *demens* in *Aen*. 9.728. Cf. Dingel (1997) 261. Also cf. Misenus who is called *demens* by Vergil, because Misenus challenges the gods in *Aen*. 6.172.
[1150] Of course, Juno does not fail to protect Turnus in *Aen*. 9.745. Cf. Dingel (1997) 263.
[1151] *Fervidus* without *ira*.
[1152] Cf. *gorg*. 3.107: *volat vi fervidus axis.*
[1153] This then, is in tune with Philodemus' view that anger is not necessary part of one's behavior on the battlefield. "War is war and violence is violence, …" Lyne (1983) 202. Cf. Philodemus' *de ira* col. 42 Indelli. Philodemus agrees with Stoic ideas, but contradicts Peripatetic views (Sen. *de ira* 2.32.1 and Arist. *Rh*. 1378b6f.). Cf. Erler (1992b) 188f. with n. 90. Only people who have modern means of contemporary warfare at hand, can lead a war in cold blood. A certain level of *ira* is normal for heroes in epic battle narratives. Cf. Harrison (1991) 260 *ad Aen*. 10.786ff. and in general Braund/Gilbert (2003) 268ff., 274f., 285, esp. 270: *Aen*. 10.712f.:

> *nec cuiquam irasci propiusque accedere virtus,*
> *sed iaculis tutisque procul clamoribus instant;*
> Nobody could muster the courage to wither get angry or to come closer, but they
> threaten from afar with their shouting in safe distance from his javelins.

Also cf. Galinsky (1988) 325-328 on the humanization of the hero via his emotions also in respect to ancient legal practice.

How could Aeneas think ahead and publicly announce that Pallas is sacrificing Turnus if his mind would have taken over by his anger exclusively?[1154] *Fervidus* obviously does not go so far as to let Aeneas not think about the consequences.[1155] Aeneas is not "carried away," as in the Helen episode he was on the brink of being distracted by his desire to make Helen pay and thought only a little bit about what her death would mean for his own personal glory. Aeneas apparently either has enough time or thinks quickly enough to see that Turnus deserves to be punished for several reasons. Aeneas picks the most important and most understandable one both in regard to the epic tradition and to philosophical Roman thinking. Therefore, Aeneas' thoughts are not impeded by his anger any more, just as Seneca wants it to be the case in war and battle in *dial*. 3.11.8:

> *Non est itaque utilis ne in proeliis quidem aut bellis ira; in temeritatem enim prona est et pericula, dum inferre vult, non cavet.*
> Therefore anger is not useful even in battles or wars; namely it is prone to temerity and does not fear dangers while it wants to attack.

Plato[1156] also distinguished between a type of anger that defies reason and leads to cruel and rash behavior and another type of acceptable anger. Take *Laws* 731b-d. Plato recommends looking first at whether some wrongdoing is remediable. If that is so, one should treat a wrongdoer mercifully and gently with pity. If, however, the wrongdoing is irremediable, Plato recommends either to rigorously punish this person or to fight victoriously against him.[1157] To do so, Plato claims "noble passion" (731b: ς ρ ς ρ γ ̆ ε πχ χπρ ξ η α ̈ ι ρχ φχ ή ̈ σ ά ω α γ ̈ υ α ς ρ ζ

[1154] One could object that *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (*Aen*. 12.946f.) continues to have its impact here due to the simultaneity of actions expressed in the participle present *dicens*. But why then, would Vergil add *fervidus* without *ira* while describing the killing act itself? The alteration of the normal and maybe expected phrase may not be that significant in its extent. As far as its meaning is concerned, the consequences would be.

[1155] Cf. Vielberg (1994) 422.

[1156] For details and the fact that people of the first century BC were aware of Academic views on anger (cf. Cic, *ac*. 2.135) consult Galinsky (1988) 328ff.

[1157] For details on Plato's theory of punishment see Cohen (2005) 186-190. It is unlikely, however, to assume that Vergil's Turnus recognizes that it would be best for him to cease from life as Plato assumed an incurable wrongdoer ultimately would (cf. Cohen (2005) 189 quoting *Laws* 862f.). See *Aen*. 12.952. In general on Plato's and Athenian theories of punishment see Allen (2000).

γυ /"Without noble spiritedness the entire soul cannot do this.") is necessary. Or, as he says in 731d: ι λέ αλγη ς ή ὅυξ ή .[1158]

Aristotle's discussion of anger again has Platonic roots.[1159] Directly applicable to the *Aeneid* are the following aspects. For four reasons Aristotle finds it less reproachable, if somebody shows little restraint in respect to anger than if somebody shows a similar behavior in respect to other emotions (*EN* 1149a25-1149b27). These reasons are first that rational judgement (οὄξ ρζ) is the basis of anger in Aristotle's eyes and not some irrational desire (σ λ χπή α). A mistake in rational judgement weighs less than a mistaken irrational desire. Secondly, Aristotle thinks that anger is more natural than the desire for pleasure. Thirdly, anger is an honest response. Lastly, one cannot feel angry for the pleasure of it.[1160] One has to be wronged in some way to feel angry. We cannot find any indication in Vergil's text that Aeneas is exacting vengeance for pleasure.[1161] His angry response is direct and not in any way the result of dissimulation. Aeneas feels the pain of the loss of Pallas again immediately before he decides to kill Turnus for impersonal reasons (*Aen*. 12.945: *saevi monimenta doloris* and *Aen*. 12.948f.: *Pallas te …, Pallas* / *immolat et poenam … sumit*). And lastly, after everything we discussed, I think Aristotle would agree that it is natural for Aeneas to feel an impulse for revenge in a situation that is painful for himself.

It is particularly important that slight and revenge are connected in Aristotle's view (*Rh*. 1380b20 and Cic. *Tusc*. 4.43f.). Turnus is somebody who has directed an

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[1158] This explains *Aen*. 12.499: *irarum effundit habenas*. It is not indiscriminate rage (Cf. for this view Gill (2003) 224f. who at that point admittedly does discuss that verse under the aspect of Platonic philosophy.), but the attempt to acchieve just punishment for the Rutulians who as a group shelter Turnus.

[1159] For the following discussion see esp. Galinsky (1988) 330-335, but also Erler (1992a) 114f. Also cf. Konstan (2003) on a general analysis of Aristotelian ideas about anger.

[1160] Achilles in *Il*. 18.108ff. thinks that ὄρζ unmistakeably is pleasurable and seduces even the wisest. Achilles, of course, needs to defend his angry feelings towards Agamemnon at that point. In doing so, Achilles admits that his anger was indeed not free from pleasure. Aristotle, however, quotes exactly this passage in *Rhetoric* 1378b6f. at the beginning of his discussion "on revenge-oriented anger …, but soon discarded the nexus between anger and pleasure." Galinsky (1988) 334f. The difference between Achilles and Aeneas could not be greater.

[1161] A different view is held by Farron (1981) 97f.

unjustified, apparent slight towards Aeneas' friends and ultimately to Aeneas himself. Thus Aeneas' behavior meets the requirements of Aristotle's definition of ὀυξή (*Rh.* 1378a30-1380a).[1162] Aeneas' irreversible anger against Turnus started, as we have seen, with Pallas' death. Before that we saw him good-tempered and on various occasions in tune with Aristotelian teachings on the right mean of emotional response.[1163] This finds its continuation in the final scene. For Aristotle thought that an angry response to certain circumstances should come about under appropriate conditions in an appropriate measure for an appropriate time. Ἄρυξκώα is a sign of Latinus' response to what Turnus and Amata do to prevent him from acting out his plans. Immoderate anger is a feature of Turnus' victory over Pallas (cf. *EN* 1108a4 and 8ff.; 1125b30-1126b10).

Aristotle's works enable us to understand a possible pun in Turnus' words in *Aen.* 12.938. Turnus described further action against his life as a symptom of hatred (*odia*).[1164] Hatred, in Aristotelian terms, is without a painful trigger and cannot make room for mercy (*Rh.* 1382a13f.; *Pol.* 1312b32ff.). Aeneas would be portrayed as a person who does listen to any reasonable argument due to his passion. The reader, however, has seen Aeneas in the Helen episode where he is capable of listening to his mother's admonishments. And again in the final episode Aeneas listens for a moment. The real situation is the opposite of Turnus' description. Turnus is the one constantly driven by his emotions and not able to reconsider his behavior. He

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[1162] Turnus' slaying of Pallas in battle would not be reproachable *per se*. But Turnus' gloating over the misery of Euander's childless future and Turnus' personal pleasure that he gets out of Pallas' death is beyond Aristotle's definition. Cf. Aeneas' treatment of Lausus as a contrast and Vergil's own words at Aen. 10.501f.:

> *nescia mens hominum fati sortique futurae / et servare modum rebus sublata secundis.*
> The human mind is ignorant of fate and the allotted future and does not know to observe a measure once it is carried off by the lucky circumstances.

[1163] Aristotle holds the opinion that it is generally difficult to find the right time, the right moment, the right target, the right manner, and the right extent of one's anger in *EN* 1109a26.

[1164] Horsfall (1995) 214 notes that Turnus' allegation against Aeneas does not find any support in other verses.

deserves punishment, therefore, in accordance with Aristotle's words in *EN* 1179b24-31.[1165]

The final scene of the *Aeneid* can also be connected with ideas about anger, *ira*, χπ ζ that contemporary Epicureans held at the time.[1166] From an Epicurean point of view, anger in principle stands in the way of one's achieving the desired freedom from emotion, σ ά ηλα. Philodemus, however, recognizes that there are occasions in which even the Epicurean wise man (ωρι ζ) will experience anger (also cf. *de bono rege* col. 41.26f.; 46.11ff.; 47.34f.; 49.30ff.[1167] He distinguishes between "vain" (νη ζ) and "natural" (ι χωνζ) anger. While vain anger is evil (*de ira* cols. 14f.) natural anger[1168] is explicitly characterized as not bad, but good (ρ νανό οοά ναί ξα ό *de ira* col. 38.12f.). In order to be qualified as natural, anger must meet the following criteria: it must be brief, measured, not simply retaliatory, disconnected from pleasure[1169], and come from an individual who is not prone to anger[1170] (*de ira* col. 3.23 and cols. 40-45). In other words, the right kind of γλά ηωζ is looked for.[1171] Philodemus, however, assumes that a person will compare an incident in which he is in some way harmed with previous experiences and let the level of his anger depend on what harm he can expect to incur in similar situations. Philodemus leaves no doubt that somebody will feel anger if he is harmed. This he considers as not unfitting (*de ira* cols. 46.40-47.39).

[1165] Cf. Sherman (1989) 164f.

[1166] Cf. esp. Galinsky (1988) 335ff. for the following discussion, but also Erler (1992a) 115-124 and Galinsky (1994). Their view is rejected, e.g., by Gill (2003) 217 largely on the grounds that "the Epicurean value system" would be "a project with little obvious relevance to the *Aeneid*" (n. 33). In general see Indelli (2004) on Philodemus' vocabulary on anger. On the other hand, as we discussed the role of piety for revenge in Seneca, we need to mention here that Vergil's concept of pietas is not contradicting Epicurean or rather Philodemean views as well. Cf. Johnston (2004) esp. 170.

[1167] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 195.

[1168] Also cf. Procopé (1998) 176-182 on the Philodemean "natural anger".

[1169] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 198. We find Aristotle's distinction between hatred and anger in Philodemus as well (*de ira* cols. 41.27-42.38).

[1170] On this also cf. Erler (1992b) 186f.

[1171] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 196.

This is applicable to Aeneas' behavior, even if Philodemus does not regard avenging the harm that was done to a friend a sufficient reason for an angry (πα λν ζ) reaction (*de ira* 41.5-24).[1172] It needs to be noted, however, that the typical reaction of a Homeric hero to the slaying of a comrade is pity for the fallen and an immediate attack on the enemy.[1173] Aeneas does not behave differently. In addition, as we saw, it is not only Pallas who is harmed by Turnus' behavior. Euander's grief[1174] is before Aeneas' eyes immediately after he hears about Pallas' death. Yet *Aen*. 10.515bff. shows that Turnus has done more damage than that to Aeneas himself. The lines read:

> *… Pallas, Euander, in ipsis*
> *omnia sunt oculis, mensae quas advena primas*
> *tunc adiit, dextraeque*[1175] *datae.*
> Pallas and Euander are in his eyes, the tables to which he, being a stranger, came first, and the right hands that they had given each other.

The fact that Euander was the first to invite Aeneas to his table in an act of μη ῖα or *hospitium* connects Aeneas with Hercules and Pallas' prayer in Aen. 10.460 (*mensas, quas advena adisti*).[1176] Hercules could not help, but shed tears in grief (*Aen*. 10.464f.).[1177] Even if there is no direct verbal parallel in Apollonius[1178], we know that Hercules was also unable to help Hylas in the *Argonautica*.

Heracles like Aeneas in Pallas' case only hears about Hylas' misfortune. Unlike in the *Aeneid*, Heracles' source is identified as Polyphemus (*A.R*. 1.1255bf.). The extensive description of Heracles' reaction to the loss of Hylas (*A.R*. 1.1261-

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[1172] Also cf. Cic. *Tusc*. 3.8 and 11
[1173] For examples cf. Most (2003) 55f.
[1174] Grieving parents who are bereft of their children is an epic topic. See Tasagalis (2004) 88ff.
[1175] Also cf. *Aen*. 8.122ff. (Pallas greets the Trojans) with its Homeric parallel *Od*. 3.36f. (Peisistratus greets the Ithacans) and Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 282-285.
[1176] Also cf. *Aen*. 8.362f. where the parallel between Hercules and *ingens Aeneas* (*Aen*. 8.367) is stressed by Euander himself. The sacrifice at Hercules' altar that concludes the alliance of Euander, Aeneas and their people in *Aen*. 8.542f. is also of great interest here. Also cf. Harrison (1991) 202.
[1177] Jupiter's grief over the death of his son Sarpedon (*Il*. 16.431-461) is the model for this scene. Cf. for details and further literature Harrison (1991) 191.
[1178] Cf. Nelis (2001b) 479.

1272) makes clear how angrily Aeneas could have reacted to the loss of his junior companion. Admittedly Polyphemus' report leaves it open whether Hylas can still be rescued by a quick intervention. On the other hand, Heracles just does not care about the Argonauts' mission any more, leaves them uninformed about his absence, and the Argonauts subsequently forget to take him and Polyphemus with them when they set sail in *A.R.* 1.1274-1279.

The phrase *dextraeque datae* alludes furthermore to *Aen.* 8.558-584, where Pallas and his father join their hands and Euander delivers a very emotional address to his son regarding his hopes for a safe return of his son. In *Aen.* 8.468 Euander and Aeneas join hands and Euander entrusts Aeneas with the life and military education of his son. In the following speech, Euander not only tells Aeneas of the threats that Turnus and Mezentius pose to his reign and mankind in general (*Aen.* 8.474, 482, and esp. 492f.)[1179], but also initiates a next stage in the relations between Euander's and Aeneas' families, a *contubernium* between Aeneas and Pallas (*Aen.* 8.514-517).[1180] This means that Aeneas was "responsible for his [Pallas'] welfare and conduct as well as for his education in the art of war".[1181] The *contubernium* was the military equivalent of the *tirocinium fori.*[1182] Judging from Cicero's *pro Caelio* 4.9, Aeneas therefore assumed the position of a second father of Pallas.[1183] Therefore Pallas is not just a friend. Pallas' death leaves Aeneas no chance but to avenge the death of Pallas. Thus, Vergil has Romanized the epic tradition (also cf. Achilles' response to Patroclus' death, of course) once more while at the same time reducing the traditional

[1179] On the role of Mezentius in the context of Aeneas' alliance with Euander see Thome (1978) 24-42.
[1180] Conington/Nettleship (1883) 134 compares these verses with *A.R.* 2.802f. where Lycus sends his son Daskylus to accompany the Argonauts. Nelis (2001b) 364 explains that Euander's action rests on both this passage in Apollonius as well as on Nestor's sending of his son Peisistratus with Telemachus in *Od.* 3.325f and 477-486. Nestor does this to provide Telemachus with guides to Menelaus. Daskylus who also serves as a guide is left behind by the Argonauts after a guiding comet appears in *A.R.* 4.296-300 and make Daskylus' service unnecessary. Pallas' function is therefore very different.
[1181] Fowler (1909) 194.
[1182] Cf. Eder (2002) 616.
[1183] For a similar argument see Papaioannou (1998) 223f.

epic level of anger[1184] to some tolerable degree in tune with the demand for a measured emotional response not only in Aristotelian, but also Epicurean philosophy.

The anger of Aeneas is therefore not only not unmotivated, but even plausible. His outburst of anger is, as we may assume from the text, rather short. This is especially the case if we compare Aeneas' anger against Turnus directly with Achilles' long-lasting rage against Hector. I admit that Vergil lets the *Aeneid* end immediately after Turnus' soul has departed to the shadows of the underworld.[1185] Aeneas is obviously not prone to revenge as it becomes manifest especially in the attempt to draw his hand away from Turnus just a few moments earlier in *Aen.* 12.938b-941a.[1186] Furthermore, Aeneas repeatedly shows mercy and pity for his enemies and opponents in various scenes. See, e.g., his treatment of Lausus and *Aen.* 12.314 where Aeneas tries to quell the beginning battle by saying: *o cohibete iras*![1187] Aeneas does not want war or anger. And as it can be seen from Philodemus' *de bono rege secundum Homerum* (cols. 42 and 44), the Epicurean detests somebody who does not even try to disguise his predisposition[1188] to love of war as is the case with Mezentius and with Turnus.[1189] Thus Aeneas' behavior is explainable, even justified.[1190] At the same time, Aeneas' hesitation makes the reader think about what might have happened had Aeneas decided not to kill Turnus.

[1184] On that see also Rieks (1989) 30f., Erler (1992a) 104f.
[1185] Cf. the end of *Aeneid* 4.
[1186] This sets him apart from Achilles especially who does not know any hesitation to kill Hector. Cf. Galinsky (1988) 341.
[1187] Cf. Galinsky (1988) 339.
[1188] Cf. also Schmit-Neuerburg (1999) 221: Turnus' character is defined by "Selbstüberschätzung, Hinwegsetzung über den göttlichen Willen und 'Irrationaliät im Kamp', die die antike Exegese als Zeichen von 'Barbarentum' einschätzte, während der positive Zug des 'Typus Hektor', seine *publica virtus*, von Vergil Aeneas zugewiesen wurde. Dies ist der aus der Analyse der antiken Homerexegese hervorgehende Befund, mag er auch der 'verständnisvolleren' Deutung des Turnus durch einen Teil der moderneren Interpreten zuwiderlaufen."
[1189] Cf. Erler (1992a) 109-113. Aeneas is different in that his disposition is contrary to Turnus' and Mezentius'.
[1190] Cf. Miles (1976) 134 and 157 who identifies Aeneas as a lover of peace who nevertheless goes to war if need be.

8.3 Conclusions: Roman Ethics and Turnus' False Lessons from Iliadic History

Pallas' sword-belt, with its portrayal of the myth of the Danaids[1191], obviously serves in a "generically self-reflexive"[1192] way just as other *ekphraseis* in the *Aeneid*. It underlines what sense we need to make of this final scene.[1193]

Turnus apparently is unable to understand his death. Turnus' soul is *indignata* when she goes to the shadows in *Aen*. 12.952.[1194] This verse harks back to Camilla's death in *Aen*. 11.831.[1195] Just like at *Aen*. 10.819f., Lausus' life is *maesta* when it leaves him to the underworld, since both Camilla and Turnus are young.[1196] Therefore their deaths are without a doubt premature.[1197] But Camilla and Turnus are hurt by their death. That this feeling is expressed bring in a new aspect especially in regard to the Homeric parallels, even if one could say that in general everybody could be hurt by their death.[1198]

In the verses of the scene which follows Camilla's death, Vergil paints the intensifying battle in vivid colors. An immeasurable outcry is heard (*Aen.*

[1191] On this belt cf. Spence (1991), Putnam (1994), O'Higgins (1995) who on p. 69 connects the pictures on the belt with the *pictura inanis* in *Aen.* 1.464, Harrison (1998) and Harrison (2001) 90f.
[1192] Galinsky (2003b) 289. Also cf. Conte (1986) ch. 6 which was translated in abbreviated form from Conte (1980). Also cf. Conte (1970).
[1193] It is a pity that we do not have Aeschylus' trilogy or comparable other works on this topic any more that could have influenced Vergil.
[1194] Also cf. on the following discussion Horsfall (2003) 439f.
[1195] Therefore to make *Aen*. 12.951 a reversal of *Aen*. 1.92 (Cf. Gossage (1963) 136.) means to oversimplify the issue. In fact, Vergil treats his own verses *Aen*. 1.92 and *Aen*. 11.831 just as he had dealt with *Od*. 5.297 and *Il*. 21.272 in his *Aen*. 1.92f. He fuses them together to achieve something new by evoking the reader's memory of these model verses. In *Aen*. 1.92f. the new epic hero was compared to Odysseus and Achilles. Turnus now is compared to Aeneas and Camilla. The conclusions we have to draw from this (two-tier allusions with two-tier suballusions) are quite complex.
[1196] Hunter (1988) 448-452 points out how in general young heroes in ancient mythology always have to undergo great ordeals before they can find their place in society as adults.
[1197] Cf. Servius ad *Aen*. 11.831. See Conington/Nettleship (1883) 396 who connect their deaths with Hector's and Patroclus' in *Il*. 16.856f. and 22.362f. Hector and Patroclus encounter verbal abuse through the victorious side of the duels in their death like Pallas, but unlike Camilla (who is actually not the victim of a duel), Lausus, and probably Turnus. Cf. Berres' (1993, 365ff.) discussion for further details and literature.
[1198] Cf. Thome (1978) 276.

11.832f.).[1199] All parties involved in the battle mount an even bigger attack at once, stimulated by Camilla's death (*Aen.* 11.833b-835). What happened after Turnus' death? The question is unanswerable, but pushes itself on us due to the fact that *Aen.* 12.952 literally equals *Aen.* 11.831 and this formula cannot be found elsewhere. Furthermore, will Turnus, unlike Camilla, who is avenged by Opis, suffer the shame of not being avenged (*Aen.* 11.847)?[1200] Unlike Camilla[1201], Turnus had fallen out of favor with the gods so that even his sister had to withdraw. Turnus, however, unlike Mezentius[1202], did not understand why his death was not comparable to Hector's, why his rhetorical abilities failed, and why Aeneas had to end Turnus' dream of being a powerful and leading figure in Latium, as Allecto's words in Aen. 7.421-434[1203] and Euander's words in *Aen.* 8.470-493 revealed. But will the Rutulians, who participated in the breaking of the treaty between Latinus and Aeneas because they feared the towering figure of Aeneas and the Trojans, be calmer now? Jupiter has promised to create a new people out of a fusion of the old (*Aen.* 12.830-840).[1204] On the other hand, we know from *Aen.* 1.263-266 that Aeneas will have to fight a huge war before he will be able to crush the Rutulians. But just how will that happen?

Vergil used certain elements from scenes of his predecessors' works which describe very similar situations: an important figure of one party kills an important figure of the other party. In this regard we almost have to call Vergil's procedure formulaic. There is one significant innovation, however: the scene was written with an open end, as reinforced by the parallel verse from Camilla's death, whose consequences were not left untold. The weighing of the moral merits of the deeds of the characters involved remains very much in the hands of the reader even if Vergil

[1199] "Epic hyperbole". Horsfall (2003) 440.
[1200] On vengeance as a topic in epic and tragedy see Horsfall (2003) 444 with further literature.
[1201] Cf. Opis' recounting of the good relations with the gods that Camilla had (11.840-849a).
[1202] For a general comparison of both characters see Thome (1978) 251-274.
[1203] On Allecto's rhetorical strategy and its Homeric counterpart (Achilles' words at *Il.* 9.321 on the loss of his prizes for his fighting for the allied king Agamemnon) see Horsfall (2003) 287 with further literature.
[1204] By announcing that the Romans will hold Juno in high regard, he incidentally takes care of Juno's concerns in *Aen.* 1.48bf.

clearly alludes to certain epic model scenes which in turn make it very clear on which side he himself stood regarding this question. The complex impact of the tragic aspects that accompanied the journey to the foundation of Rome is mirrored by the complexity of literary allusions. The interesting question remains how the predicted end of Aeneas' labors was brought about. Perhaps one is allowed to think along the lines of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and suppose that Orestes-Aeneas is saved after Apollo-Jupiter had basically given Aeneas the upper hand? At the same time Aeneas is connected with, but simultaneously set apart from Hercules via Euander. Aeneas is less emotional than Hercules[1205], but able at least to avenge Pallas' death.

Once more, and for the last time in the *Aeneid*, we see Vergil being more interested than his predecessors interested in portraying the protagonists of his epic poem from the angle of what their emotions are and how they are able to manage their emotions.[1206] As he uses comparable emotions within the works of his predecessors as springboards for literary allusions, he at the same time manages to point out to his audience how far the personae of his epic heroes are both like and unlike the characters in Homer and Apollonius. However, even if Vergil relies more on Apollonius to obtain ideas about how especially emotions of bystanders of the main action of a certain scene can be made useful for the narrative, it also becomes clear that in the opposition between Turnus and Aeneas the question is who would emerge as the new Homeric Achilles. Since the Homeric philology of his time obviously read Homer with its eye on what one could learn for one's own behavior, this question becomes an important one and is answered in the negative: it is not Aeneas who is acting like Achilles in excessive anger. That is Turnus' part in regard to Pallas.[1207] Yet, on the other hand, Turnus is in essence unable to become like

[1205] Cf. Galinsky (1988) 338f.
[1206] Cf. already the author's question to Dido in *Aeneid* 4.408: *quis tibi tum, Dido, cernenti talia sensus …*?
[1207] Cf. *Aeneid* 6.89 where Apollo foretells Aeneas that in Latium he would encounter another Achilles.

Achilles. He is not *alter*, but *alius*[1208] *Achilles* in that he misses even Achilles' humanly moving insights into the general tragic aspects of human life, as revealed during his conversation with Priam. Turnus' rather phony[1209] speech as his last words fail to show his humanity. His comparatively young age should move us. In his last appearance, however, he forfeits our sympathy.

The final scene of the *Aeneid* is a curious and remarkable amalgam of Homeric perspectives. There are features and motifs from the scene in book six of the *Iliad* which involves Menelaus, Adrastus, and Agamemnon. Likewise, Vergil has used the deaths of Patroclus and Hector. Apollonius' contribution is the opportunity to analyze the emotions of the relevant characters in much more minute detail than it was the case in Homer. Particular attention should be paid to Apollonius' handling of the emotions of the protagonists in the context of the people who surround the scene. Apollonius thus offers Vergil the tools to interpret the position and the character of his heroes from the perspective of their subjects. The action of the scenes in question affects the people of the acting figures in a very decisive and important way. Furthermore, in Apollonius the ethical aspect of what is happening in these scenes is brought to the forefront. The question is whether the good people win and the bad lose and what makes people bad or good. Last, but not least, this background sheds favorable light on Aeneas' motivation and unmasks Turnus' attempt to flee from his own responsibility into the mercy of his enemy.[1210]

[1208] Cf. on the difference between the meaning of the two words Kühner/Stegmann/Thierfelder (1955) 650.

[1209] Cf. Vielberg (1994) 422.

[1210] In terms of game theory – literature abounds in an era where Nobel prizes are awarded to leading game theorists –, Turnus' behavior in his last speech tentatively could be described as an attempt at bluffing. If Aeneas kills Turnus (threat t_1), Aeneas will be an Achilles acting in excessive anger (t_2). Aeneas does not want to be a second Achilles in this sense. Ergo, Aeneas overcomes his emotion and ensures that the future is not consumed by a wrong act. An equilibrium seems to be reached that could serve as platform for further negotiations. Turnus' bargaining strategy seems to be successful. The baldric in its resemblance of Patroclus', i.e., Achilles' weapons makes it manifest, however, that Achilles' act against Hector had not entirely been unfounded to say the least. No less is it the case that Turnus is playing fair. Turnus has selectively alluded to book 24 of the *Iliad* and tried to eclipse his own shortcomings. When the bluff is called by the appearance of the baldric, t_2 falters. At this point the question arises whether this is the right moment for Aeneas to "swallow an 'offence'" (Lyne (1983)

In the end, Aeneas is no superhuman. He in fact never was. Aeneas stays a human being with feelings which in themselves are nothing that would be *a priori* bad. But Aeneas has good reasons to kill Turnus, in addition to the traditional epic right of the victor to kill the defeated. Here especially the phoniness of Turnus' attempt to put himself into Hector's role and slander Aeneas as the new Achilles should be taken into account if we set out to judge Aeneas' verdict on Turnus. Turnus' death is justified. The question is whether Aeneas could have afforded to spare Turnus and *parcere subiectis*. In my opinion Vergil gave his readership every right to assume that Turnus still was far from having made the transition from the *superbus* to the *subiectus*.

Aeneas does not kill Turnus in cold blood. He seems at first sight to act very emotionally in the final scene of Vergil's epic poem. The comparison with other epic poems makes it clear that Aeneas is relatively calm and especially does not let his emotions take over completely. Aeneas finds the time to transpose Turnus' death onto a different level. Pallas is invoked. Turnus does not die for defending his home, not even for defending his aspirations to become Latinus' heir. He dies for killing Pallas in a way that is humiliating for both Pallas' father and his appointed protector. The *Aeneid* may be far removed from the times of the Geneva Convention. Nevertheless as in Aeschylus' *Oresteia* we witness the beginning a new era in the history: the enemy's general is not killed simply because he is an enemy, but because he does not adhere to minimal standards of behaving like an honorable combatant. But apparently not even the breaking of the treaty plays an explicit role.[1211] Aeneas kills Turnus while making a public statement in front of all parts of the future Roman people, explaining why Turnus must die. Turnus' treatment of Pallas is the reason that in turn

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195). In fact, Aeneas needs to do something to prevent future deceptions from happening. The escalation is unavoidable, since the other side has to fear to be exploited even further in the future after it has become obvious that the other side did not really cooperate on a basis acceptable for both sides. Cf. Klaus (1968) 252 on the strategic bluff in the Cold War era from an East-German point of view. Or apply Schelling (1963) 23: Turnus is bluffing while attempting to deceive Aeneas about the real facts. It is his bad luck that Aeneas can prove to the public that Turnus is trying to deceive him.

[1211] The broken treaty remains, of course, present in the background. See Servius *ad loc*.

may implicitly reveal what Aeneas thinks of Turnus in general and Turnus' final speech in particular.

The twist that Vergil gave his "remake" of the death of an epic leading warrior seems minimal at first, but in its details it encapsulates not only much literary erudition, but also a great deal of philosophical thought of Vergil's own time without being too apodictic about it. Always on the horizon is the question whether it would have been possible to avoid all this suffering.

9 Aeneas and His Emotions

In the course of this dissertation we have followed Aeneas on his way to Carthage, through the Helen episode and the final scene of the *Aeneid*. I selected these passages, because they can serve as exemplary texts to demonstrate to what extent Vergil could have relied on the philosophical thinking of his day when he wrote his *Aeneid* and transformed the previous epic – and non-epic – literary tradition of similar scenes and situations.

I will not claim, of course, to have proven that Vergil used any of the literature I quoted for the sake of comparison and analysis. We do not have any positive evidence that Vergil indeed had, for example, the story of Athena visiting Achilles in *Iliad* 1 sitting besides his papyrus on which he wrote or dictated the Helen episode.[1212] We do not have anything similar to the diaries of modern authors who explicity write down what they read when they wrote which part of their current works. Much less is there anything like Thomas Mann's book on the making of his *Doktor Faustus*.[1213] But even today artists do not always tell us what allusions to other works of other authors they have worked into their works. Take Charles Ives' fourth symphony, for example. Musicologists are still continuing to find musical echoes[1214] from all sorts of genres of music in it.[1215]

[1212] On the question what the text of Homer looked like that Vergil had at his disposal see Hardie (1998a) 56f.

[1213] *Doktor Faustus; Das Leben des deutschen Tondichters Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde* was published in 1947. *Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus. Roman eines Romans* appeared in 1949. In itself *Doktor Faustus* is written in a continuous dialogue with Goethe's tragedies on Faust and other material on the same story.

[1214] For a preliminary list of musical allusions in this symphony see Gail (2004) 78ff.

[1215] Cf. Lück (2004) 132f., esp. n. 9. Allusions, quotations, and innovative approaches on several levels of orchestral symphonic music join in this sympony. Gransden (1991) 10 calls verse *Aen.* 11.831 = 12.952 "a symphonic 'false ending'" in the context of book 11." Also cf. Mitchell-Boyask (1996) 302f. who points out the oddness of the end of the *Aeneid* compared to Vergil's emphasis on closure (on which see Theodorakopoulos (1997) esp. 164, Putnam (1999) esp. 229f.), *finis* or *sine fine*. The sense that the Aeneid could be unfinished is not new. In 1427 Maffeo Vegio composed a 13th book for the *Aeneid*. For a brief discussion see Thomas (2001) 278-284. Also see Farron (1982) for a "pessimistic" reading of this abruptness. I would like to point out that the ending of Ives' fourth

Since there are so many instances in which we can connect the changes that Vergil made to the literary tradition, I hope to have made it plausible that it can be reasonably expected that Vergil was indeed influenced by philosophers, be they contemporaries or more ancient thinkers, when he wrote his *Aeneid*. What we find in the final scene of the *Aeneid* is by no means a unique occurrence.

In the sea storm in book 1, Aeneas reacts as can be reasonably expected from somebody in a similar situation from the ancients' perspective. Of course, Aeneas is tormented by the question what all his previous ordeals were good for if he drowns now. He seriously questions the wisdom of his mother's rescuing efforts for him during the Trojan War. These doubts, then, becomes the main subject of the encounter between mother and son in the woods of Carthage in the end. Aeneas to a certain extent revolts against his mother, who in turn is not quite content with her son's self-pity. A serious failure in communication is avoided, however. Vergil stays probably true to life in general when, after such a grave incident as the sea storm and the subsequent uncertainty, he lets Aeneas for a while continue to harbor further doubts about the sincerity of his mother's behavior, until Achates addresses Aeneas in *Aen.* 1.585b to point out that Venus' predictions were true. Anger management is already at the core of this series of scenes. And we see that Aeneas ultimately succeeds in not letting his feelings get in the way of his care for his people.

In all this distress, Aeneas reacts a little enviously when he sees the city of Carthage as it is built. His jealousy, however, is kept acceptable, because Aeneas does not want to see his dream of his future city come true at the expense of Carthage. At the temple of Juno in Carthage, Vergil uses the occasion to reveal an intrinsic poetics that corresponds to the latest discussions, as we can reconstruct them, of his times. In fact, Vergil uses this poetics to ask the reader of his poem what he thinks Aeneas will have learned from his "Homeric" experiences and uses this tool as

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symphony indeed has such a 'false ending', not harmonically, but in the way it just fades out. But cf., e.g., the final chord of Ives' second symphony in contrast to any given symphony of Haydn or Beethoven, for example.

a means to foreshadow Aeneas' immediate future in Carthage and to keep the reader in suspense as to what will happen. This metapoetic excursus opens up a whole array of possible story developments from utter failure on Aeneas' part to its very opposite.

The Helen episode shows Aeneas as he struggles to keep a balance between piously defending his home city and community as a whole versus recognizing the fact that he cannot overcome the will of the gods and of fate. He needs to accept the fall of Troy and save his family and *penates*. This scene prepares the way especially for judging Aeneas' killing of Turnus. Aeneas is able to come to his senses if necessary and make a sound decision about what to do next after that.

A basic question is how it can be that Vergil created an Aeneas who fulfilled the demands of all the philosophical schools at the same time as far as his emotions are concerned.[1216] While I would not dispute the differences that exist between the individual schools of thought about, e.g., anger,[1217] it is essential to note that authors from Hellenistic times forward were indeed eclectic in their approach to philosophy.[1218] If Seneca himself can include the Stoics in a critique of how all philosophic schools one-sidedly abuse Homer for their purpose (*epist*. 88.7), not all adherents of the philosophic schools in question are adherents of "their" school at all costs. Ideologically stubborn approaches to thinking about the world might have been taken by some, while others were probably more interested in comparing various positions and then selecting what seemed plausible. When Philodemus argues against other thinkers we see him arguing against specific thinkers much more than against schools themselves. It may well be that we imagine philosophical "schools" and "systems" in a far stricter way than was even possible in Hellenistic times[1219], when

[1216] Cf. Gill (2003) 216f.
[1217] Cf., e.g., on the Aristotelian vs. Stoic view on anger Gill (2003) 216 with n. 29.
[1218] Cf. also Galinsky (1994) 196 on Vergil's eclecticism.
[1219] Cf. Erler (2005) 493, e.g., on the open-mindedness of the Epicurean school. We should also remember that Cicero accuses Antiochus in *ac*. 2.135 of inconsistency with his Platonic school and with himself. Cicero, in fact, considers Antiochus to be rather a Stoic than a Platonist in regard to his concept of the passions. See Dillon (1996) 77 and cf. Cic. *ac*. 2.132: *qui [sc. Antiochus] appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus.*

the adherents of the various schools were spread out all over the Mediterranean.[1220] After all, we saw in the introduction, too, how the thinking of the schools underwent several changes over time. Why should Vergil be an exclusivist Epicurean?[1221] Even Philodemus read philosophical treatises that were not authored exclusively by Epicureans. Could Vergil not be Philodemus' friend, even his admirer, during his entire career as an author[1222] and read Plato's, Aristotle's, and any other philosophers' books as well?[1223]

It needs to be pointed out that all the various philosophical schools allow for some feelings.[1224] Even the Stoics, at least those of Vergil's times, did not believe in their absolute eradication as far as emotions were absolutely unavoidable. Of course, the Stoics were hostile to emotions as they defined them. Seneca also wrote his tragedies as a mirror of the emotions felt by the unwise, not in an Aristotelian sense. But some differences may be a matter of terminology more than of principle.[1225] If, for example, Seneca allows for revenge in the name of *pietas*, but not in the name of anger, if one's father is killed, and given that Seneca always connects anger with

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[1220] Also cf. the fact that scholars are still debating whether the self-perception of later adherents of certain schools was true to the ideas of the school's founder (cf. Sihvola/Engberg-Pedersen (1998b) ixf.) or, in fact, whether later philosophers understood or misrepresented what their predecessors had said (cf. in general Gill (1998) and Irwin (1998) 219f. on the question whether Lactantius' or Augustine's opinion of Stoic treatment of emotions is truer to reality. Also we know that some philosophers in fact did change teachings of their schools. Cf. on Philodemus' role in Epicureism Erler (1992b) esp. 198ff.

[1221] Cf. Galinsky (1994) 199.

[1222] On Philodemus' influence on Vergil in his years before the *Aeneid* see Chambert (2004), Davis (2004), Johnson (2004), Gigante (2004) 95f.

[1223] Rieks (1983) 169 prefers to classify Aeneas as a hero who meets the Peripatetic criteria of πης υλρσά ηλα/But, in addition, we should be cautious. The fact that today so many new texts of Philodemus can be read again which Vergil could have known should not prevent us from at least anticipating as a possibility that the same could be the case with Stoic, Peripatetic or Platonic texts that we do not know – yet or any more. Surprises could be lurking already behind that door to the Latin library in Scipio's villa in Herculaneum, for examples.

[1224] All Hellenistic schools were interested in offering therapeutical advice. The dispute was not on whether such advice was necessary, i.e., in our case, whether emotions exist. Rather, "different theories entailed different methods of treatment." White (1995) 233.

[1225] Cf. Irwin (1998) 223ff. where he describes how the Stoic view of emotions sometimes may seem to be inhumane when one does not pay attention to the specific Stoic definition of "passion". Also cf. Sorabji (2000) 195f. on the Stoic definitions of σά ηλα.

pleasure in the execution of revenge, how is that different from the Epicurean view that anger may not be felt for the sake of pleasure? This difference in terminology is neither negligible nor insurmountable and of course it has consequences for the entire "system" of terminology that is used within the schools. Also, we can see why Seneca's approach must have been more pleasing to Roman ears, since *pietas* was a virtue for them. But the question may be allowed: was not ultimately a certain satisfaction, as sublime and removed from vile anger as possible, connected with due fulfillment of *pious* acts?[1226]

It seems that Vergil wanted to do what the various schools of philosophy did. They agreed in their willingness to help individuals answer questions about their emotional life and in their desire to transform themselves according to ideals that were recognized as reasonably following from the general approach of a given school to all aspects of life. Vergil wanted to write an epic poem that was just as offensive or unoffensive, but just as helpful to any philosophical school as was Homer's poetry. Vergil must have expected that his epic poetry would not have been treated differently from all the other works of epic poetry by Homer, Apollonius, Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Ennius, and many more as they were read and discussed in his time. The difference, however, was that Aeneas is a repeatedly Romanized Homeric hero who has learned various lessons from Homer – and others. And besides, could it not be the case that Vergil was as intellectually active as Horace[1227] with the difference that his relationship with one particular philosophical school never was as dominant and obvious as Horace's?[1228]

Hellenistic and previous philosophers recognized fundamental aspects of emotions. Emotions may in certain cases prevent one from thinking on one's own feet. The onslaught of emotions sometimes can go beyond the limits of our ability to

[1226] Happiness is after all also a goal for the Stoic. The difference is may be found in the difference of the definition of happiness. Cf. for similar considerations Irwin (1998) 229ff.
[1227] On this cf. Armstrong (2004b) esp. 269f. and 293 as well as *passim.*
[1228] Also cf. Gill (2003) 223: "… the *Aeneid* does not have to adopt a uniformly Stoic line on anger."

endure them. Emotions can lead us to unwanted actions that may or may not turn out to be harmful for ourselves. Prepare yourself as much as you can, they say. Habituation of reactive patterns and imagination of future events is recommended in practically every school. In this context they especially admonish us to look at former examples of good behavior.

It has to be refuted here that only philosophically trained persons would be able to understand the *Aeneid*. Since, as I said, fundamental issues of human life are the object of the teachings of philosophy as well as of good poetry, these very issues should be understood by all. Philosophical schools then make what they read in poetry by authors like Homer or Vergil the subject of their moral inquiries according to their line of thought. The same will be done by a reader refusing to adhere or even to listen to any of these philosophers.

Also, as Philodemus' works tell us, philosophers deal with acts of heroes that are less than exemplary. By criticizing bad examples, one can learn as well. Thereby the philosophers show how each one of us is responsible for our own life in the end. One can, however, not be self-content with the level of preparedness one has reached at a given point. The level can always be heightened and at least needs constant maintenance efforts. These philosophers are confident that the fullfilment of an ideal is always possible, but needs effort. Sometimes one even needs friends, gods, or luck to get out of emotional trouble.

Aeneas is a prime example of this human condition. He is always seen in his more or less obvious or extensive struggle to find the right answer to emotionally challenging situations. Vergil presented him to us as if Aeneas has learned his lessons from Achilles, Jason, Odysseus, and others, whereas others boasted in just being like them, but did not quite understand the point of reading epic stories. Aeneas is not always perfect, but often comes close to perfection. This fact makes for good entertainment in Aristotle's theater and, in turn, for good education for all generations

to come.[1229] Just as the ancient philosophers said in regard to one's emotions and the adjustment of one's reactions to them: "Ongoing effort … is the motto of the *Aeneid*..."[1230]

[1229] Vergil in his way stays true to Philodemus' *de bono rege* col 43.15-20 (Dorandi): … η γε̈ ς λ αζ σ αυ α οη ρ ρϊ]σ α πη ς ι]ρ υ π - η ϊ ω θ - ζ ω ξ λ σ αυ᾽ ‟ π η̆ υ ρ χ ο α ε η η ζ σ α ο̆ υ θ ω λ γ χ α ρ ώ ς η]λ ν α ί ς] σ α]υ α γ η]λ ξ π ά ς θ ///

[1230] Galinsky (2005) 344.

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